



Foreign
Broadcast
Information
Service

FBIS-USR-92-142

6 November 1992



CENTRAL EURASIA



FBIS Report: Central Eurasia

FBIS-USR-92-142

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Corruption Among Customs, Vehicle Inspectorate Officials Reported

934C0160A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Oct 92 pp 1, 4

[Article by V. Aloyan: "On the Roads of the Commonwe"]

[Text] Yesterday in Moscow the State Customs Committee opened a conference of experts from the customs services of CIS countries. They will discuss fulfillment of an agreement signed in February on policy regarding transit cargo and its customs documentation.

Experts from the customs services of Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan will take part in the conference, which will last 2 days. Invitations were sent to 10 former Soviet republics, with the exception of Ukraine and Georgia, which did not sign the tariff agreement. Nor are the Baltic states participating.

And what is happening today on the roads of the former USSR? It was with this question that our special correspondent set off on a difficult and dangerous road.

A year ago, on instructions from the editor I traveled 5,000 kilometers in a car from Yerevan to Togliatti and back. My job was to describe how things were going on the country's roads in a time when the country was no longer the USSR, but not yet the CIS. I rode there on the Military Georgian Highway and through the Northern Caucasus, and I returned along the Black Sea coast, through Abkhazia. There was essentially nothing to write about. People were traveling over the territory of the former Union like in the pre-perestroika times, stopping and resting wherever they cared to. There were of course rumors that some regions were dangerous—cases of attacks by robbers were occurring, and that racketeers had taken over Togliatti, but I personally encountered nothing of the sort.

The changes that occurred in the past year are astounding. All that has occurred can be described by a single word—lawlessness.

But, let's take things in order. A racket is in fact now operating in Togliatti. Practically every lucky fellow, regardless of national or state origin, who puts down half a million or even more for his own vehicle and drives it off the territory of the Zhiguli plant or its factory outlet finds himself in a tight ring of surly characters who extort a "gift" out of him. That's 10,000-20,000 rubles, depending on the vehicle model and the owner's behavior.

That's today's prices. As soon as the plant raises them again, in the words of the local leader of the extortion ring, their charges will also climb. And no one in Togliatti doubts that the next rise in prices on the Zhiguli is a matter of just days. Ballpark figures are even suggested: two million for the most prestigious model, 21099.

During my return trip I was accompanied by an entire caravan of vehicles—20 trailers loaded with spare parts

from the Charentsaval-Lada-Servis Joint-Stock Company, and 80 new light trucks from the same company. There were times when all of this wealth was carried by rail, but the trains aren't running these days. And even if they were running, given today's lawlessness on the railroads virtually nothing of value would ever reach its destination. Moreover the rail journey that used to take a couple of days has now transformed into a week-long nightmare.

Before setting off on their journey, the owners of the light trucks, who had come themselves to ferry back their own vehicles, were briefed long and hard: Travel together, don't stray far from your vehicles at stopping places, and bring a week's water and food and two cans of extra gasoline with you. The column finally set off, stretching 4 kilometers from head to tail. Associates of the Armenian National Security (former KGB) ferrying official vehicles equipped with regulation weapons and rations rode at the head and tail. By the way, their pistols could only produce a psychological impact, since robbers are armed with assault rifles as a rule. Moreover an incident could cause a political scandal: Consider how it would look if associates of the security service of one state fire their weapons on the territory of another! Add to all of this the fact that associates of the GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspection] are no longer impressed by anyone's particular credentials.

A couple of months ago associates of the Armenian GAI agreed to escort a similar caravan from the company in Charentsavan in their patrol vehicles. They made it one way without incident, but on the return trip the associates were warned: The next time you stick your noses in our territory, don't count on our help—we don't go into yours, and we don't dig into your wages.

The first 2 days (Samara, Saratov, Penza oblasts) went by uneventfully. Gasoline was always available at the pumps, for 30 rubles in some places, 25 rubles in others, and even 17 rubles in Volgograd Oblast.

But things began to unravel in Volgograd Oblast. An officious lieutenant overtook and stopped the first column of Zhigulis, and told the driver of the lead vehicle: You've got 51 vehicles here, and each one is fined 90 rubles because no one is wearing safety belts. Then they were stopped at a GAI post. The police questioned the drivers slowly, as if reluctant to do so.

"So. What are you carrying? Spare parts? How do we know that they're spare parts? Even if the vehicles are sealed, that doesn't mean anything. Do you have export licenses? These licenses aren't good here—others are needed for our oblast."

All of the problems were simply solved: Pay a little money and travel on. The farther we went, the more such posts we encountered, and the more we had to pay. Just going over Kazbekh Pass I counted 10 booths—wherever there was a village, there was a GAI post as well. By the

time you reach your destination the amount of money paid en route grows to fantastic proportions, just about doubling the cost of the transported goods.

I must admit that I very much wanted to meet Russian customs officials who, judging from information in the press, had already begun working at the borders. But we never did encounter any real customs officials. The people that stand watch at the border between Russia and Georgia, and especially between Georgia and Armenia at Patara-Dmanisi, left the impression of highwaymen interested in only one thing—how much they could take you for.

Nor was I able to determine precisely where the Russian border was. *De jure*, from what geography I know, it should run along the Kazbekh foothills, where Northern Osetia borders on Georgia. *De facto*, the border extends beyond Mineralnyye Vody, to the border with Kabardino-Balkaria. That is precisely where concrete barricades are erected, antitank hedgehogs are installed, and barbed wire is stretched.

A similar picture is also observed on the boundary between Kabardia and Northern Osetia. There, however, there's also a machinegunner, who watches each passing vehicle through his sights.

The column had a day's layover at the approach to the pass. We were warned that we should not go up there without an escort. Volunteers from among the local populace were already offering their services. A young lad in a sheepskin hat, an "Afghan," carrying a grenade and an assault rifle, was especially pushy.

"Brothers, I escort caravans like this every day. You'll be home before you can even blink. For just 5 million."

"Could you please tell us where you're from?" one of the drivers asked him.

"I'm from the Georgian Ministry of Self-Defense, I'm a counterintelligence chief."

This "counterintelligence chief" was crowded out by his competitors, who asked less but who took such a long, close look at the three lead vehicles, the color of "wet asphalt," that it became clear that these beauties wouldn't make it to their destination.

While the negotiations were going on, I decided to find out exactly where we were from a comrade who had introduced himself as the local gasoline magnate and who expressed the desire to purchase one or a few vehicles on the spot.

"Friend, whose territory are we now on?"

"This is ancient Ingush land, occupied by enemies of our people. But we will soon take it back."

There was one logical conclusion to this answer—this beautiful ravine could also transform into a zone of

combat activities tomorrow, after which the Military Georgian Highway will be cut completely as well.

The column finally set off under the escort of workers of the Georgian GAI.

The first time racketeers graced us with their attention was in Kabard, where we waited in the hot sun for a failed pump to be replaced on one of the KamAZ's. Two vehicles bearing no license plates drove up and announced: "Leave three vehicles behind here, and you'll make it through our territory, but if you don't, watch out." Our security workers immediately raced over to Nalchik, and soon returned with associates of the local UGRO [State Administration for Investigative Operations] whose advent on the scene immediately caused the racketeers to vanish into thin air. Then associates of the Kabardino-Balkarian Ministry of Internal Affairs offered us an escort vehicle and took us as far as the Osetian border, where they transferred us to the Osetian police, who led us to the approach to Kazbekh without incident.

Subsequent events proved that while in other places the appearance of a person in a policeman's uniform continues to have a sobering effect on malefactors, in today's Georgia the police were only an object of scorn.

Despite the escort, the first attempted attack on the column was made near Rustavi (foolishly we were traveling in the dead of night). A UAZ vehicle carrying men armed with assault rifles was keeping watch, hidden beyond a turn in the road. Having allowed the entire column to pass by, it cut in front of the path of the last vehicle which, to their misfortune, was occupied by armed police. On seeing that they weren't going to be taken so easily, the UAZ retreated and, switching off its headlights, went back to waiting for more-vulnerable prey.

But a real incident occurred practically at the Armenian border, when we thought that all danger was now behind us. Twelve men armed with assault rifles suddenly appeared beside a parked Zhuguli of one of the company workers who decided to wait for two KamAZ's that had fallen behind. The leader fired a long burst at the feet of the surprised victim. Then they beat him and, stealing his money and leather jacket, got into his vehicle and disappeared. On hearing the automatic fire, GAI representatives, who were sitting not far away, counting the money they had earned for escorting the column, also disappeared out of harm's way.

Rafik Shakhmuradyan, the president of the company, drove up upon hearing the shots. Taking the beaten man into his vehicle, he chased after the robbers. The risk was great, for he could also lose a second vehicle. But after a couple of hours they returned with the stolen car. When I asked him how he had managed to pull it off, he answered evasively:

"I simply talked to them, man to man."

When the heads of our independent states convene for a summit at a given CIS capital and sign those countless agreements, few are interested in how they will be enforced. And from the bird's-eye view afforded from presidential airplanes, it is impossible to see how their citizens way down below, on the roads of the CIS, are suffering.

Of course, a couple of plundered KamAZ's or stolen light trucks cannot spoil good-neighbor relations between Armenia and Georgia. But if the dangerous trend isn't stopped, you can't expect relations not to suffer.

I felt this especially strongly when a couple of months ago I tried to conduct my own investigation, once again associated with the theft of a vehicle. A middle-aged man went to a police station for help: A vehicle was stolen from him in the light of day from a quiet elm-lined sidestreet in a small Georgian town. We went there, and found the elm-lined street, and the new owner of the vehicle. But he flatly refused to return the vehicle:

"Let the army first get my white Niva back."

So we set off to find the Niva. We picked up its trail in one of the mountainous areas of Armenia. But once again they refused to return it: Let the Georgians first find our Volga, which was stolen in Zugdidi at gunpoint. I wasn't about to go to Zugdidi—everyone knows what the situation is like there.

This was only one example. How many cases of this sort occur daily on the roads of the Commonwealth? What we find ourselves with here is not at all a Commonwealth but a kind of Commonwoe. And life in it is exactly like the nightmare on Vyazov Street. For one and all in every state, oblast and city.

Bishkek Banking Agreements Described

934A0113A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by Leonid Mikhaylov: "The CIS Bankers Did Not Wait for the Politicians, and Created a Supranational Structure"]

[Text] The consensus of a majority of journalists who covered a meeting of the heads of CIS states in Bishkek was that the signing of an agreement on a unified monetary system by seven states (Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Armenia) and a resolution on the establishment of an interstate bank to service mutual payments were the only accomplishments of the summit.

At the same time, there were many skeptics among politicians with regard to the concept of a uniform ruble space. As Viktor Gerashchenko, acting chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, told a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent, "this is quite a delicate issue; there is a lot of inner fear that the surrender of some sovereign powers of national banks will unfavorably

influence the economic situation in individual republics." We should recall that the reasons for the "inner fear" are not only mystical but also quite material. The Central Bank of Russia unilaterally increased the interest rate on loans to 80 percent the day after the Tashkent summit, at which the heads of national banks agreed on a uniform interest rate.

A two-day conference of bankers, which preceded the meeting, greatly facilitated the signing of final documents. Chairmen, or deputy chairmen, of the national banks of 14 former republics of the USSR, including the Baltic republics, took part in the conference (no Georgian representative attended). Unlike political leaders who are concerned about the purity of sovereignty, the bankers were primarily troubled by the issue of overcoming the crisis in the system of settlements between republics, which has been mounting since the disintegration of the USSR. In the words of Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia Vyacheslav Solovov, the creation of an interbank union was not discussed at the conference; "such a union has always existed, and has not fallen apart." Moreover, in Solovov's opinion, states which have resolved to introduce their own currencies will actually remain within the borders of the ruble zone. Thus, the representative of the Central Bank of Ukraine assured his colleagues at the conference that, despite the introduction of the karbovanets, Ukraine would follow the common rules of the states of the ruble zone with regard to the provision of credit and emission of currency.

In addition to Nursultan Nazarbayev's initiatives to set up executive structures of the Commonwealth, which subsequently failed, Kazakhstan prepared for the Bishkek summit a draft agreement "on a uniform monetary system and coordinated monetary, credit, and foreign exchange policies of states which have preserved the ruble as legal tender." The draft called for establishing an interstate bank, essentially with the functions of the former USSR State Bank (control over the provision of credit and emission of currency, foreign exchange regulation, and so on). Naturally in the process all the state-founders of the bank were declared legal successors to Soviet currency. In discussing the draft, the CIS bankers could not agree on the rights of the founding members. Russia insisted that the weight of votes on the Bank Council be determined based on the volume of funds used in the national economy of the founding country. Others leaned toward the formula "one state—one vote." As a result of the debate a compromise version was adopted on the suggestion of Russia. The powers of the established bank were restricted to the sphere of organizing interstate settlements.

Following the disintegration of the USSR, mutual settlements were effected through bilateral agreements. This arrangement did not make it possible for national banks to draw up consolidated sheets of positive and negative balances in correspondent accounts. This has to do with the fact that, because of the uncoordinated credit, monetary, and price policies of the states of the former USSR, the same rubles have differing real value. Nobody

quotes "national currencies" officially, with the exception of the Bank of Latvia: With a view to evening out the provision of credit, the banks of the ruble zone will now have to coordinate among themselves maximum credit quotas, taking into account the indexation of working capital in 1992.

However, the consent of bankers does not yet mean that all problems have been solved. The agreements

arrived at in Bishkek are yet to be subjected to ratification procedures in parliaments. One does not have to prove to bankers that a uniform interest rate on credit should exist in the uniform ruble zone, whereas, for example, members of the Kyrgyzstan parliament believe that 50 percent is "highway robbery." At the same time, even now, the realistic prime rate should be between 150 and 200 percent, given the current rate of inflation.

Russian-Ukrainian Trade Issues From Kuchma Visit Reported

934A0163A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 24 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by V. Borodulin: "Results From Visit by Ukrainian Premier. Russian-Ukrainian Trade: All Is Well But There Is No Freedom"]

[Text] In the course of a one-day working visit by Leonid Kuchma, the premier of Ukraine, leading a state delegation, it was planned to discuss a large number of questions which determined the busy work schedule of the guests from Kiev. During the day Leonid Kuchma was received by Boris Yeltsin, conducted negotiations with Yegor Gaydar, and met with Viktor Chernomyrdin, minister of fuel and power engineering. KOMMERSANT is herewith publishing a detailed report on the results of that visit which was announced in yesterday's issue.

Credit and accounting relations, which have recently become most acute in connection with the forthcoming introduction of Ukrainian national currency, constituted the main topic of negotiations between leaders of the two countries. Problems of mutual payments and adjustment of quotas for deliveries in 1993 were also examined. Three agreements were signed as a result of the visit: on mutual establishment of most favored nation treatment in trade, on technical cooperation in the construction of facilities in third countries, and on mutual opening of trade representations. It is true, Yegor Gaydar did remark that he was more satisfied with the course of negotiations themselves rather than with the documents that were signed.

It is believed by independent experts that this evaluation was caused, first of all, by the fact that an agreement on free trade between Russia and Ukraine, which Moscow was expecting, was not concluded. Instead of that agreement was reached on most favored nation treatment which was mentioned above. According to Vladimir Maksimov, chief of the department of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties which monitors contacts of Russia with former union republics, at the present time such relations have been established with 120 countries of the world. On their basis, for instance, goods exported from Ukraine and imported there are subject to export levies and customs duties. With the establishment of free trade between two countries, however, such levies and duties could be eliminated entirely or applied only to a limited number of goods. In the opinion of Yegor Gaydar—"A free trade agreement would be best suited for the level and intensity of Russian-Ukrainian relations." He stated that he and Leonid Kuchma agreed "to move toward free trade together."

On the basis of the results produced by discussion of questions concerning credit and financial relations it was decided to create a joint commission of experts to resolve these problems. Touching on issues pertaining to the servicing of the foreign debt of the former USSR Yegor Gaydar declared to the journalists that Russia

proposed several ways of resolving them but—"The Ukrainian side has not yet reached any specific decision and time is needed for the new government of Ukraine to work out its position on that question."

Attempting to somehow placate western partners of both countries Viktor Chernomyrdin, the Russian vice premier, informed the journalists that at the negotiations the sides "reached an understanding that obligations in the delivery of energy sources, including to West European countries, must be fulfilled regardless of the domestic situation."

Problems of Ethnic Russians Seeking Estonian Citizenship Viewed

934C0147A St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 10 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by V. Rabotnova: "Sanctions Against Their Own?"]

[Text] According to data derived from sociological studies around 25,000 Russian-speaking residents of Estonia have firm intentions of moving to Russia. Most of them would like to settle in St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast. It is evident that problems connected with their settlement will "fall" on that region. After all, it is impossible to count on any significant assistance from Estonia and Russia.

After a victory by the "right" in the elections the number of returnees will probably increase. The victors, calling for "freeing of the area," will be promoting that in every possible way. According to various estimates from 70,000 to 90,000 Russian-speaking people (out of 600,000) have the right to immediate citizenship. The others face a naturalization procedure. Thus far it is not clear whether it may be completed by the unemployed since one of the mandatory documents is a reference concerning source of income. The main impediment, however, is the examination in Estonian.

The language requirement is still not formulated. The former Supreme Council repeatedly rejected draft laws due to excessive rigidity. The "rightists" insisted that an applicant have a vocabulary of at least 2,500 words. In their opinion the examination should consist of dictation and a conversation on historical and cultural topics. At the same time no formalization of criteria is offered and everything depends on the subjective impressions of the examiner. It would be interesting to know, if the acquisition of Russian citizenship hinged on similar examinations, would many of us be able to get it?

Former deputy of the Supreme Council Pavel Grigoryev states: "My daughter failed her entrance exams at the Pedagogical University because during the interview she was asked to talk about rehabilitation dances. Subsequently I asked Estonians I knew to talk on this topic. Everyone made big eyes. In this way it is possible to undercut a person at the state examination, even one who is well prepared."

"That is still not all. The ultra 'rightists' are calling for the introduction of a quota for citizenship—not more than 1,000 persons a year. It is quite possible that the current legislators will establish just such a procedure and in about 500 years all the Russian-speaking people will become citizens."

Vladimir Churov, a deputy of the St. Petersburg City Council, says "Russian democrats regarded Estonia exclusively as an ally for too long. Many high political figures were convinced that Estonians would have no territorial claims against us. At the negotiations the Russian delegation immediately started with minimum demands, depriving itself of room to maneuver. There were many errors but they cannot be rectified with rigid economic sanctions. The opposite is more likely. That is another, no less dangerous extreme."

"It is paradoxical but a fact that in protecting Russian-speaking people in the Baltic region no one was interested in finding out just what protection they require. They would have explained that economic sanctions, will, first of all, impact on them and not the Estonians. It is specifically the Russian-speaking population which will be without work after disintegration of industrial enterprises. Where can it turn?"

Aleksey Semenov, cochairman of the Russian Democratic Movement of Estonia, says: "All of this appears to me as a well planned provocation. Too many slogans of Estonian nationalists and Russian 'patriots' coincide. Here they are shouting: 'Let there be more Russian citizens in the neighboring countries!' The Estonian 'rightists' say the same: 'Take Russian citizenship and get out!'"

Semenov states that Savisaar was compelled to resign at the moment when the real possibility appeared for creation of an Estonian-Russian coalition government.

Semenov believes: "That is not accidental. Estonians have apparently not finished playing with national revival. The republic is not ready to build a normal democratic society."

In the opinion of Pavel Grigoryev, in two or three years the pendulum will swing in the other direction and the "rightists" will have to leave. Today, however, creation of a civil movement of accord with the Estonians is necessary. Otherwise there will be intensified confrontation, with consequences that are difficult to gauge.

Russian Consulate in Riga Starts Citizenship Proceedings

934C0147B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Oct 92 p 2

[Unattributed item: "Number of Russian Citizens Grows"]

[Text] The Russian consulate in Riga started issuing documents to those residents of Latvia who wish to

obtain Russian citizenship. That is a right of all former nationals of the USSR residing on the territory of the republic who recognize the present Russian authority as being lawful. In order to complete documentation, applicants must declare in writing that they will have no citizenship other than Russian. Some 162 applications have already been received. The applicants explain their desire to become citizens of Russia as being mainly due to violations of human rights in Latvia, a lack of knowledge of the Latvian language, and the rise in unemployment.

Preparations Made for Expected Tajikistan Refugees

934C0147C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Oct 92 p 6

[Item by Ye. P.: "Russia Expecting Refugees from Tajikistan"]

[Text] Some 320,000 refugees are officially registered in Russia but actually there are 900,000 of them. At present 30,000 refugees from South Ossetia have returned to their former place of residence. According to estimates of the Federal Immigration Service of the Russian Federation (FMS), 50,000 people are expected from the Baltic region. The flow of migrants forced out of Moldova is already smaller. A disturbing situation has now developed in Tajikistan where 300,000 Russian-speaking people live. The FMS is faced by the question concerning emergency evacuation of 50,000 of them to Russia. For that purpose it is proposed to build temporary refugee housing centers in Altay Kray, Astrakhan, Orenburg, Kursk, and Omsk oblasts. The oblasts agreed to receive the refugees and the government is appropriating 4.5 billion rubles for their welfare.

A draft government decree is being prepared which prescribes the construction of houses in 15 oblasts of Russia for refugees living in Moscow and Moskva Oblast. The government will appropriate an additional one-and-a-half billion rubles for that purpose.

Communist Party Conference Resolution Text

PM0211152192 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Oct 92 p 4

[Text of "20th All-Union Party Conference Resolution on Organizational Issues"]

[Text] The CPSU's temporary defeat—caused, in particular, by retreats from the Leninist principle of democratic centralism and betrayal by party leaders and some functionaries—has not broken the communists. They themselves have set about reviving the CPSU. Many of them take an active part in the work of communist-oriented parties and movements and have resumed payment of their membership dues. Communist associations are being set up and primary party organizations restored. Despite bans and anti-communist hysteria,

most kray and oblast organizations held meetings and conferences to elect delegates to the 20th All-Union Party Conference.

Doing communists' will, the conference sees its task as being to galvanize efforts to restore the CPSU as a political party defending working people's interests, opposing national extremism and the country's conversion to capitalism, favoring the revival of the USSR on a new basis, and promoting friendship and fraternity between its peoples.

1. The conference believes that the CPSU can only be revived at the present stage by restoring and uniting the communist parties of the former Soviet republics on the basis of international fraternity between communists and organizing their collaboration. The renewed CPSU will be an alliance of independent communist parties acting in accordance with the constitutional norms of their states and following a coordinated political course. The conference is in favor of this alliance's retaining the name of the CPSU until the USSR is restored in a new form.

The conference calls for unity between the communist-oriented parties active in a number of the former Soviet republics; their disunity only plays into the hands of the anti-communist regimes in power. The conference is in favor of restoring a single communist party in Russia as part of the CPSU and renewing the activity of the RSFSR Communist Party.

2. The conference considers it advisable to revive the CPSU as follows:

To restore, where possible, previously active statutory [ustavnyy] party structures, create new ones, and establish ties between them. To form primary party organizations, on the basis of [local] initiative, in accordance with the rules of the CPSU and union republic communist parties. This process must be of a consolidating nature. To approve the formation of communist associations and the holding of joint party meetings.

To reregister communists on the basis of personal oral or written questioning of all who used to belong to the CPSU and union republic communist parties. The reregistration procedure will be decided by party organizations on the basis of the special features of their activity. Those who have renewed their work in party organizations and the payment of their membership dues will be considered as having passed the reregistration procedure.

To hold communist meetings on the reregistration results and form local leading bodies on a statutory basis.

To hold rayon, city, and subsequent party conferences, and congresses or conferences of communist parties in states belonging to the USSR. To restore the principle of democratic centralism.

To hold the 29th CPSU Congress in the first quarter of 1993.

To work on the basis that, while acting independently, communist parties incorporated in the CPSU will adhere to identical party membership requirements and the same organizational principles, coordinate strategic and tactical matters, create a coordinating body and common institutions and mass media, and establish a procedure to finance them.

3. The following urgent tasks face the CPSU in the process of revival:

To work actively to unite all the peoples of the USSR on the basis of internationalist principles, restore the alliance between workers and peasants, and strengthen ties with trade unions. The ban on political work in labor collectives should be vigorously opposed.

To resume enrolment of members to the CPSU and union republic communist parties in accordance with provisions of the rules [ustavnyye polozheniya]. Pending the restoration of the party establishment, the form of party documents will be decided by active party bodies or, as a last resort, by primary organizations. The enrolment of young people and of those who have proved their loyalty to the party by their actions should be intensified. During reregistration, comrades who joined newly-formed communist-oriented parties during the ban on the CPSU should, if they so desire, be considered as members of the CPSU, counting the length of their party membership from the point at which they joined these parties.

To break through the information blockade, give active material support to mass media of communist and socialist orientation and the worker press, increase subscription to these publications, and propagandize them as much as possible; use local potential to publish new newspapers; and work with communist journalists.

To master all forms of work with communists and non-party people possible in the present conditions (open meetings, discussion groups, political clubs, councils of public organizations and movements, associations based on profession or place of residence, voters' clubs, and so forth); take active part in protest actions to protect the social gains of the working people (rallies, demonstrations, pickets, strikes, and so forth); and organize information backup for communists to enable them to conduct active agitation and propaganda work among working people and the general population.

To ensure that communists observe party discipline.

To restore party comradeship and mutual trust as an indispensable condition of collective action. The party still has members who really believe in its ideals and are not afraid to uphold them. Indiscriminate mistrust and suspicion of all former party workers should not be supported, because the active involvement of the best, honest professionals in party affairs will help to speed up the process of restoring lost ties and the CPSU itself.

4. The nomination of new leaders who have won their comrades' trust by their selflessness and their active organizational and political work is of crucial significance to the CPSU in the present situation. The utmost support should be given to people who show initiative and act in the party's interests, rather than in the name of personal ambition. In the present conditions, the appearance of chance people in key positions could do irreparable damage to the CPSU.

5. To consider it advisable to continue the work of the organizational committee formed by the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and concentrate its attention on

implementing this resolution, coordinating action connected with convening the 29th CPSU Congress, and drafting the appropriate documents. To instruct the organizational committee to prepare draft CPSU Rules and submit them for discussion by communists. To this end, to form a commission involving representatives of the republic communist parties. To reinforce the composition of the committee with communists who actively proved their worth during preparations for the 20th party conference.

6. To confirm the decision of the June (1992) CPSU Central Committee Plenum on expelling M.S. Gorbachev from the CPSU for betraying the interests of the party and the people.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Gorbachev Refusal to Testify Attacked and Defended

Refusal to Testify Scored

934C0125A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Oct 92 p 5

[Article by Aleksey Vorobyev, under rubric "Our Ways":
"Who Did Mikhail Sergeyevich Quarrel With? And Why
He Is Convinced of His Own Impunity"]

[Text] Well, the moment has come when the citizens of the long-suffering Russian state can express with a clean conscience to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev their profound gratitude. Inasmuch as the desperate squabble into which, in proud solitude, the former general secretary entered with the Constitutional Court has apparently reminded the powers that be about what they already should have remembered every day in the interests of all the citizens of the entire country.

Gorbachev's refusal to participate in the court session evoked a storm of emotions in society. And they are the most varied ones. The scenario of his appearance is easy to imagine. First he will be crushed and pressed down by the democrats' questions, the providing of an honest and complete answer to which would be equivalent to political (as well as moral) suicide. After that, severely wounded, he will be ferociously attacked by a pack of his former comrades in the struggle, a pack having the purpose not simply of getting revenge for his betrayal, but also of preventing Gorbachev from sharing the responsibility with the former Politburo and Central Committee. The Communists will attempt to shove onto the general secretary all their own sins and, having finally "buried" him, will rescue their renewed party from the onslaught.

Even the optimists evaluate Gorbachev's chances in this squabble as being zero. What sense is there for him to play these games?

Obviously, having ascertained that it was down a blind alley in this situation, the Constitutional Court in its statement proposed a compromise. Let Gorbachev simply appear in court, and there, inasmuch as, according to the Constitution, no one is obliged to testify against himself personally (implying at such time that everything occurring in the party pertained personally to the general secretary), Mikhail Sergeyevich will simply stand for a while on the rostrum, will remain silent, and then will leave.

These arguments, alas, are not convincing ones. What occurred in the party pertained personally not only to its 18 million members, but also to the entire country—in this alternative the court risks finding itself with absolutely no witnesses at all. Secondly, the resolution to refrain from giving testimony is a privilege not of a witness, but of the accused, which Gorbachev so far is not. In addition, it is not his own safety that the former

general secretary is afraid of, nor criminal prosecution. Instead, he is worried about his humiliation, the loss of face that is inevitable in the very fact of his giving a public explanation.

Consequently the compromise proposed by the court will definitely not be acceptable to a person who is attempting to avoid a nationwide flogging. And that person is attempting to defend his personal dignity in those forms that are accessible and customary for him. One of these forms is the democratic ignoring of the law.

Opponents attempt to appeal to the conscience of the obstinate one, reminding him of his civic duty, his respect for the court, and his concern for the confirmation of a law-governed state. Yes, the words are correct, but they have been extracted from "dead storage" to fit the situation, and therefore they fall on meager soil that dried out long ago.

We might recall how, when he retired in December last year, Gorbachev "talked Yeltsin into" a good-sized guard, a government limousine, a luxurious building to house a future foundation, and other benefits pertaining directly to state property. I assume that, after this "deal," the Russian president would really like to wash his hands very thoroughly with soap, but nevertheless the deal was done. But, forgive me for asking, according to what right? On the basis of what laws or constitutional norms?

Recently, by his edict, Boris Nikolayevich took the buildings and dachas away from the Gorbachev Foundation. The error was corrected. The law triumphs? But the question is: why did this "error" become possible at all? And even if it was corrected at some other time, wouldn't Mikhail Sergeyevich get into a squabble with the Constitutional Court?

The proffered buildings, limousines, and guard are, of course, petty details, for such a high-flying individual, but petty details that form in that individual a disrespect for the law. The disrespect is all the stronger, inasmuch as the other side, by condescendingly making such gifts (at the taxpayers' expense), also demonstrates its complete disdain for legislation.

Who knows better than they do, those current and former powers that be, that, once you have stepped over the strict legal line and established yourself comfortably "behind the curtain," it is very difficult to turn back. So what were we expecting from the former president, who knows everything and sees everything in our life today?

Let's look at this same problem with the eyes of Gorbachev as a private individual, which he actually is today. Can representatives of the power at any level be an example currently for the private individual that he actually is today? Can representatives of the power at any level be an example currently for private individuals in respecting the laws and constitutional norms, in the building of a law-governed state?

Mikhail Gorbachev, who was the first to mention the law-governed state, was also the first to give its builders a public and extremely resounding slap in the face. It is difficult to find any justification for this. But who is guilty of the fact that the former general secretary (as well as other highly placed comrades in arms of his) is so convinced of his own impunity?

Gorbachev Actions, Record Defended

934C0125B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Oct 92 p 5

[Article by Eduard Samoylov, under rubric "Polemics": "Inertia of Evil: Gorbachev Is Being Beaten Up in Truly Russian Style, By a Crowd of People—Wildly, Without Restraint, With Wild Shouting"]

[Text] What is happening today around Gorbachev is completely comparable to medieval obscurantism. Its causes are more than understandable: Gorbachev has inflicted on the prince of darkness a very skillful and tremendously powerful blow that he will have to pay for.

The inertia of evil in Russia is still tremendous. In general, people here love to humiliate their truly great people, and sometimes even to kill them. Then they love them—with sighs of repentance and tears of emotion.

All this, unfortunately, is perfectly understandable. Gorbachev, the liberator of a country such as ours, is doomed to pass through the delirium of mass awareness that is awakening and forcing its way from the darkness to the light. He is doomed to being assaulted.

Once again, that's our way of doing things, the Russian way.

We beat up people in a crowd—wildly, without restraint, with wild shouting. We like to feel things in the pit of our stomach, and the more painful, the better. We like to act eccentrically, to show that we're more sensitive. Concerning a wife, we like to wag our tongues—we do this avidly. So they have deprived the ex-president of certain of his privileges—they have pulled back his guard, they have taken away his car, and given him somewhat less... and to many people this is some kind of tasty, irresistible cause for feeling profound satisfaction.

Our much-vaunted, unique intelligentsia, for the most part, has been conducting itself through all this like an ineffectual and cowardly "four-eyes" within whose sight a vicious assault is being committed, but who, frightened out of his wits, can only look from around the corner and shudder at every blow.

He is being beaten from the top down. He is practically under an artillery onslaught. And we must dwell especially on this, because the word of the powers that be is of special weight. But even they are being illuminated unmercifully.

Boris Yeltsin has been stressing for several years that the reforms should have been started earlier and more decisively. Not too long ago, I read once again:

"There has opened up for us an opportunity that we could not use for seven years—the opportunity to begin the economic and political reform, to begin the change-over to a democratic, law-governed society with a market economy" (IZVESTIYA, 12 June 1992).

This is how this must be understood: in 1985 Gorbachev was supposed to propose the introduction of private property, a multiparty system, freedom of speech, etc., but, because of his indecisiveness, everything dragged out, slowed down, until, seven years later, Yeltsin finally said his weighty word.

If, seven years ago, the general secretary had begun everything in the way that Yeltsin describes, the country would have immediately got another general secretary. This should be clear to any child, but would seem to be incomprehensible to the Russian president.

Finally, what prevented the first secretary of the CPSU Sverdlovsk Oblast Committee in 1985 from bringing up before the Politburo members the question of reforms in exactly the sharp manner that today's Yeltsin is demanding of the Gorbachev of that time? Probably the fact that the members' reaction was completely predictable? Yeltsin was completely aware of that at that time. I think that he realizes it no less today.

The speaker of the RF [Russian Federation] parliament has claims against Gorbachev, but they are different ones:

"We are tasting the very difficult fruits of Gorbachev's activities. Certainly we would have carried out the changeover to a normal human society by an evolutionary path, without such tragic consequences, without any excessive upheavals" (PRAVDA, 15 August 1992).

Apparently, Ruslan Imranovich made a great political discovery: he found a means of evolutionary changeover from the most "steep" form of fascism to democracy. True, for the time being, one has never observed in political history anything similar to which Khasbulatov has in mind. It is all the more a pity that seven years ago he did not propose his own recipe to Gorbachev.

All right, then, let him share with us his remarkable theoretical achievement. But only without that "certainly"...

In Yeltsin's opinion, it turns out, Gorbachev could barely drag himself along. But in Khasbulatov's opinion, it was just the other way around—he rushed ahead headlong. As we can see, our presidential authority and our representative authority in the person of their highly placed leaders, even with their hatred of Gorbachev, managed to occupy directly opposite positions.

Arkadiy Volskoy makes this jab:

"Gorbachev used to change his loyalties much too frequently. As a result, he lost wealth that is invaluable for a political leader—the trust and intellectual resources of his comrades in arms. Gorbachev did not have a sense of comradeship. He always strove to focus everything on himself" (PRAVDA, 9 September 1992).

In the political hierarchy of the fascist state, things are actually rather difficult concerning the "sense of comradeship." It is replaced by the "sense of the clan" that is holding onto its own piece of the power. And even if the improbable occurs—if the leader of the fascist regime begins a struggle against him, that politician should in absolutely no instance be guided by the "sense of comradeship," because, in this instance, he is for the fascists not a rival in the struggle for power, but, rather, a frail lady of the gentry, surrounded by her stern men.

Gorbachev did not have the right to display or preserve his sympathies and antipathies, relying on something other than a sense of political calculation, and in this regard he was three times right, because this kind of influence exerted upon his position was a necessary part of the price for victory over fascism.

So it is really ridiculous and sad to observe today certain respectable men with "more experience in party work" who nowadays have been offended by Gorbachev exactly as though they were completely ignored by the lady of the gentry.

Nor is there anything mysterious in Gorbachev's cadre policy that is so incomprehensible for our "democratic public." Reacting to the intensified pressure from the "conservatives," the president allowed them to achieve the withdrawal of the reform-minded politicians from their high positions, because another reaction would have provoked an adequate sharp response: then the putsch would have occurred somewhere at the end of 1990 or the beginning of 1991 and would have been much better prepared.

Leaving all the key positions for the "rightists" and having achieved Yanayev's confirmation as vice-president, Gorbachev created among the "conservatives" the illusion of the consolidation of their positions. Actually, at that moment, the mastery of the key positions no longer meant in any way the mastery of power. The continuity of the process of democratization was guaranteed by the president. He had more than enough powers and political art to assure this, and that guaranteed the main thing—the winning of time. When the "rightists" realized this, it was too late: the correlation of the forces by that time had developed in such a way that any putsch could only be an operetta-style one.

I must say that I was considerably surprised by the claims against Gorbachev because of his cadre policy, and especially the mocking of him regarding the *nomenklatura* member of mediocre capabilities whom Gorbachev had stubbornly promoted and kept promoting to the position of vice-president. Would our democrats really have preferred seeing in that position in August

1991 a rigid, decisive politician who, by his unwavering hand, would have sent the tanks to storm the White House?

Roy Medvedev, evaluating Gorbachev's role, suggests a truly amazing "scale of values":

"I like his glasnost policy, his carrying out of definite democratic reforms, the arising of new parties, the rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinism, the truthful illumination of the past. So I began to print my books after he came to power. And my brother Zhores had his Soviet citizenship returned to him..." (OBNINSK, 4 August 1992).

That is on the one hand. But on the other side of the scales R. Medvedev places this:

"With this, the positive part of his activities ends. He does not like to listen to others, but prefers to dominate in the discussion. Essentially speaking, it is impossible to utter a single word, and even if you do manage to utter it, you can be convinced that he is not listening to you." (*Ibid.*)

That is, it is not enough for us that Gorbachev guaranteed the breaking of the back of the most powerful fascist empire. We definitely need to have the Soviet president also demonstrate at such time manners that are no worse than those of the French president. Otherwise Gorbachev, with his gift of a freedom that was won in a difficult struggle with the *nomenklatura*, would seem not to be suitable for us. His manners are all wrong.

Well, people might say this...

But the person who looks most menacing, as well he should, is Russian General Prosecutor Stepankov:

"In an interview given to STERN magazine... Valentin Stepankov did not preclude the possibility of bringing to court former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev. Stepankov does not preclude that the ex-president will have to appear before the court and answer for his actions while he was the general secretary of the currently banned Communist Party" (PRAVDA, 13 August 1992).

Definitely, in certain actions taken by Gorbachev as the leader of a totalitarian state, there was a criminal component, and there could not have failed to be one. Just as this occurs in the actions of any party or state worker under any previous regime, for example, any prosecutor. Other than those who refused to observe the criminal rules of the game and who, in such an instance, were supposed to resign.

Gorbachev, thank God, did not do this. Nor did prosecutor Stepankov.

But if prosecutor Stepankov at a former time, while he was a worker in the "law-enforcement agencies" of the fascist state, and while he was dutifully executing its "laws," had nevertheless managed to avoid actions

which, from today's height, are definitely subject to censure or that entail criminal responsibility, that prosecutor is absolutely unique, because there wasn't a second person like that in the entire country.

But, by the way, I think that there was not even a single person like that.

All this immoral, intricately vulgar nonsense that is being launched continuously at Gorbachev from all sides is a threatening sign of the acute spiritual powerlessness of society. If even the leaders of the country, if the responsible political leaders discuss Gorbachev in a way that only the rabble can discuss him, then Russia's affairs are in a bad way and there is nothing we can put our hopes on. Miracles do not happen: people who are incapable of evaluating a great man cannot successfully manage a state.

We all stand equally to the extent that we are able to relate to one another in a human and just manner. A great person in this sense is always a very difficult test for society. He is always impossible to understand, is even alien, and demands from society those spiritual efforts and insights that people very frequently prove to be capable of only after a long delay. The greater the distance here, the more special, the more unique the genius is.

But, by having failed to understand his ideas and his actions, society is doomed to fail to understand something that is important within itself—and the price for this kind of inability to understand is a high one.

Yeltsin, Gorbachev Exhibit Lack of Dignity

Gorbachev Supported

934C0161A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 43, 21 Oct 92 p 11

[First of three articles under the general heading "Two in One Boat, Not Counting the Country." Article by Olga Chaykovskaya: "Dignity Is Higher Than Politics"]

[Text] When Gorbachev came to power, subsequently to excessive power, I thought: I just want this man to release Sakharov and end the war in Afghanistan, that is all. It never occurred to me, or to others, to what Gorbachev would ascend.

Do we now remember what he started from, how he hacked out the road of glasnost (yes, it first, because it alone could have broken the empire of lies)—hacked it out in the thickness of the suspicious, cowed consciousness (which, if it spoke at all, did so in a barely audible whisper). The fear was so great that even the general secretary was not believed. Yet Gorbachev continued to shake up the social consciousness, to de-Stalinize it and by cautious injections to introduce to it forgotten moral truths—he went to Murmansk, for example, and there in a speech let fall by chance, as it were: Values common to all mankind are higher than class values. And all hell

broke loose! "Undermining the foundations! Blasphemy!" But about two months later, the general secretary was repeating this blasphemy at the other end of the country, and the sharp intelligentsia latched onto it, introducing the forbidden idea into the people's consciousness. A turbulent era of enlightenment.

In this way, step by step, Gorbachev moved toward his goal—lifting the fear from people and restoring to them a sense of their own dignity.

A mass meeting; on the podium, a woman with a strange, as if roasted, face; she is shouting hysterically, and her voice, amplified by the microphone, flies over the thousands-strong crowd: Gorbachev has taken bribes; "He is under criminal investigation!"—in response below, an orgy of raving, fist-raising, and shouting: "Bring him to book!" The woman on the podium knows, of course, that she is lying, and when, subsequently, she is asked by doctors of sciences what proof she can offer for her monstrous claims, she will be unable to answer. The two men next to her on the podium, also doctors of sciences, also are in no doubt that she is lying, but they stand by, not uttering a word of objection: The charges against Gorbachev are to their advantage, and the dirtier, the better. Three doctors of sciences!

What was going on?! It was the "progressive intelligentsia," which, as has now been revealed, was neither progressive nor intellectual, moving to seize power. Its direct duty, it might have seemed, was to have explained to the people what a crisis of the system, such a savage one, furthermore, actually meant. But instead it embarked on persuading the country, upon which grim adversities had come crashing down, that Gorbachev was to blame for them, that he had "brought them to this."

Gorbachev, of course, was counting on the support of the left (how could he have done otherwise?) and did not, in any event, expect that it would go on the attack against him. I believe that this aggression of the left was held back by A.D. Sakharov to a considerable extent; in any event, I myself heard (when I was a guest of the Inter-Regional Group) Yu. Afanasyev read a program document (clearly written by L. Batkin: It was so long), which said that Gorbachev had to be supported, that there was no other leader; this was on Saturday, 9 December; A.D. had just five days left to live. When he was dead, that same Yu. Afanasyev opposed Gorbachev at the congress on behalf of the Inter-Regional Group.

Were many mutual mistakes made in this struggle? Of course. But there are mistakes and mistakes. Tell me, was the vaunted statement that the democrats would undertake economic reform without raising prices (which sounds particularly splendid today)—was this a mistake or a deliberate deception of the people? And the utmost support for the sovereignties which tore apart an already ailing country—was this a mistake? And Belovezhskaya Pushcha? If the disintegration of the USSR were really historically necessary and inevitable

(it might very well have been!), the division of such a cumbersome object, which had grown together over the ages, should undoubtedly have been a slow process, requiring the work of a multitude of highly skilled specialists—long, attentive, responsible work. But here they cut to the quick. Did anyone, even one person in our country, need this avid haste? No one other than politicians thirsting for power.

So Gorbachev the reformer came up against the furious resistance of the left, which proved more dangerous than the right, because it was able to raise the "fury of the masses"—and it did so! Meanwhile, it is now becoming clearer by the day that it would be far easier to undertake economic reform in a united country which is still more or less healthy, not comminuted, not torn apart. In other words, it is becoming increasingly clear that Gorbachev was right when he called for the Novo-Ogarevo process, for the preservation of unity, even if considerably transformed, unity nonetheless. Remember how he tossed and turned as he appealed: first reform, then separation! The response he got was Belovezhskaya Pushcha.

Of course, Gorbachev is a tragic figure. So, what, then, did he suffer defeat? It is precisely the case that he did not. How is reform defined? By the level of freedom which it contains. From this viewpoint, Peter's reforms, say, were more than dubious—pretty good reforms which abruptly and for a long time intensified serfdom in Russia. Catherine was on the point of great deeds, but realized that she would perish and retreated. Aleksandr II took a step—a huge real step—along the path of freedom, but did not touch the foundations, of course.

Gorbachev is the sole great Russian reformer for whom the reform succeeded: He made a lifeless, servile country vital and free. As has been said and written repeatedly, no one can take this away either from him or from the country.

But what is happening today? Gorbachev did not go to the Constitutional Court, to which he had been subpoenaed as a witness; he did not go, explaining that he considered the proceedings pertaining to the "CPSU affair" to be politically and socially harmful and that he had no wish to be a part of it. In response the Constitutional Court adopted measures to see to it that he was prohibited from leaving for overseas (and B. Yeltsin decreed the removal from his adversary of the Gorbachev Foundation building). A clamor was raised, and many of the mass media stigmatized Gorbachev, who, in their opinion, had failed to perform his civic duty; having proclaimed the principles of the state based on the rule of law, he was being the first to violate these principles and had "finally cast off his mask." There were lawyers who raised the question of his being compelled to appear before the court, and some newspaper hastened to depict this in a caricature: Two militia officers are dragging Gorbachev along, his legs jerking (very funny); the mob rejoiced; the ex-president had his "privileges," building, and limousine taken away from him. And only the most moderate said: Both sides are

good, they have locked horns (and this also was graphically portrayed), and neither wants to give way. Sober, explanatory voices, of V. Gushchin in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, for example, could not be heard over this uproar. I turn, however, to a remarkable article in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA by A. Move, a top lawyer and man of immense experience; this was not, in fact, an article, but a letter full of profound distress and addressed to V.D. Zorkin (and, through him, to the whole Constitutional Court). How did it happen, the author asks the chairman of the Constitutional Court, that you, a brilliant lawyer, have allowed yourself "to be dragged into a political game, as a result of which exclusively legal proceedings have been turned into political proceedings." You have in your zeal somehow overlooked even, A. Move continues, the fact that "the Constitutional Court, which is called upon to put an end to any illegality and to ensure strict compliance with the law, has itself embarked on a path of the most flagrant violation of the law and the most undisguised flouting of a most important human right, which amounts to "each individual having the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country" (clause 2 of Article 13 of the Declaration). Could you really have made so flagrant a mistake, the author exclaims, and he continues: "There involuntarily creeps in the suspicion: Is the ill-starred 'telephone law' not being revived anew? Is it not this which explains everything? God grant that I may be mistaken!"

God grant. But on what, for all that, did the Constitutional Court base its decision? It was with good reason that Gorbachev demanded that he be shown this document, and it would have been important for all of us to have read it. But this did not happen. Instead of the decision, we received a statement of the Constitutional Court press service, from which it followed that the court was guided by—what might you think?—the "Regulations Governing Exit From the USSR and Entry Into the USSR" of 23 September 1970, clause 25, providing for a ban on citizens traveling overseas in certain instances (into which Gorbachev does not fit, incidentally). The Constitutional Court thus counterposed to the Declaration of Human Rights the Brezhnev "exit law," a wretched anticonstitutional scrap of paper, which the garbage chute has mourned long since! There you have it, the legal basis of the decision adopted by the country's highest court. Is not this, in fact, distressing, is this not tragic? Did we need this turpitude of the Constitutional Court, in which we had all placed and continue to place our hopes, our last hopes, perhaps? Where are we to turn now? B. Yeltsin has "confiscated" the building of the Gorbachev Foundation—is this edict, behind which, incidentally, vengeance clearly shines, lawful? And the militia officers who barged their way into offices and ransacked files—what was this, a search? Who authorized it? To whom are we now to put these questions?

IZVESTIYA for 5 October presented the position of Justice Minister N. Fedorov, for whom the issue was beyond dispute: There is an article of the Criminal Code

providing for punishment of a witness for a refusal to testify and for his being compelled to appear in court. But the article is criminal, and the court, constitutional, and it does not have the right of sanctions with respect to a witness or the right to have him brought before the court. It does not! Then N. Fedorov begins to talk about *lacunae* in the law.

But of what kind of *lacuna* could it be? It was no accident, of course, that the legislator did not give the civil court, for example, the right to compel attendance in court—the constitutional right of the citizen defending his freedom is so precious that it may only be violated for a very serious reason (when a crime has been committed); proceeding from those same considerations, neither, one would have to think, does the Constitutional Court, whose job it is to establish whether a given phenomenon (law, edict and so forth) is constitutional or not, have such a right. Yet the “*lacuna theory*” was also supported in *IZVESTIYA* by Yu. Feofanov, who also believes that the “*lacuna*” should be filled in, that is, the right to compel attendance taken from criminal proceedings needs for a very short while (since this is how things are) to be “squeezed” into the rights of the Constitutional Court (“in the process of work”). And this does not correspond to the “letter of the law”; it corresponds, on the other hand, to its “spirit” (although there is no “spirit” without “letter”). But, then, V. Zorkin himself (in a speech on the radio on 15 October) also speaks about a “*lacuna*” in the law. But, you see, the minister of justice, a legal correspondent, and the chairman of the Constitutional Court—might it be supposed that they are by chance intuition making one and the same flagrant legal mistake?

And here we have an impropriety “in full view of the peoples.” Gorbachev was allowed to go to Germany; he was not allowed to go to Italy. We have begun to play on tragedies (the South Korean Boeing, Katyn), when the authorities have recalled—all of a sudden!—that Gorbachev was allegedly aware of secret documents and concealed them. And V. Zorkin’s statement on the radio: If Gorbachev wants so much to go abroad, let him go—what should we call this?

What is most appalling in all this, perhaps, is the loss of the sense of our own dignity (which Gorbachev had instilled so insistently). How quickly—how dexterously—we are losing it.

Gorbachev Refusal To Testify Scored

934C0161B Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 43, 21 Oct 92 p 11

[Second of three articles under the heading “Two in One Boat, Not Counting the Country.” Article by Arkadiy Vaksberg: “Nonstop Striptease”]

[Text] Now, when passions have subsided, the conflict is deemed to be played out, and the newspapers are awaiting new sensations, we can tally certain results, abstracting ourselves from the all-too-naked latest news.

Gorbachev’s refusal to appear before the Constitutional Court is one further manifestation of unsinkable Bolshevism, which has always scorned legality and which proceeded exclusively from so-called expediency, that is, simply, advantage—the question of whose, “public” or personal, being immaterial. The similarity of the characters (granted all the difference in situation) which accompanied the birth of these authorities and their inglorious end would seem a caricature, almost. In the summer of 1917, as we recall, Vladimir Ilich and his “operations staff” also scorned legality, arrogating to themselves the right to decide whether the leader of the future revolution should put in an appearance in court or sit things out in his hideaway.

Contrary to what was dinned into us for almost three-fourths of a century, no “physical reprisals” threatened Ilich, but repudiating (not denying, repudiating!) the charge that he had obtained from the enemy money for the overthrow of the authorities in his own country (a typical “betrayal of the motherland,” in Soviet terminology)—even such a lawyer as attorney-at-law Ulyanov was not up to this, alas.

When, as they say, one does not have a leg to stand on, it is best to remain silent and to avoid a dialogue in which the master of the situation is someone else, and avoiding a moral defeat is obviously impossible. Although Mikhail Sergeyevich is by no means Vladimir Ilich: He was subpoenaed merely as a witness, and not to a criminal court, but to the Constitutional Court, and who had been subpoenaed, furthermore? Yesterday’s emigre, a total unknown, who had holed up in a hideaway? No, the favorite of all mankind and a Nobel Prize winner protected against any misfortune by the powerful force of world public opinion. He knows full well that nothing threatens him.

This striking instance has laid bare particularly clearly what was never a secret to anyone: Party thinking, at the highest echelons of power all the more, does not carry over to the mind legality in its truly democratic sense. The equality of all before the law was asserted even in the Stalin constitution, and we know what kind of equality this was. When Khrushchev was reminded that the law is not retroactive, he reasonably remarked: “We enact the laws, and we will amend them also.” He did so, remember, dispatching with a bullet those who would today be, possibly, respected and popular “business people.” The recognition of one’s subordination to a law common to all is the primary indication of democracy, no, more broadly, of civilization. Demanding this of the former Soviet rulers is, most likely, to demand the impossible: Their innate certainty as to their elite position, to their special status, is not subject to any perestroikas.

It is very possible that a court—any court, constitutional included—will with respect to some case or other render a judgment which does not coincide with that which each of us would have rendered. Hypothetically, is mistaken even. But the sense of justice, not of “Sovman,” of

nomenklatura Sovman even more, but of the normal individual living in a normal (not ideal but normal!) society commands subordination to even this decision. Demands its execution, without making life difficult for either oneself or others with a search for arguments "justifying" disobedience. I readily admit that these arguments could in some instances be more persuasive than those of the court. But the right to render judgments within its jurisdiction belongs to the court, and only the court, and rebelling against this means excluding oneself from the democratic process, which has, indeed, "taken," but without, alas, the participation of the one who engendered it. And even, as we can see, in spite of him.

The sensation, which has played itself out and which was of a scandal-making/political nature, shed light on one of our biggest ailments, whose treatment will take many years and much effort. Only now are we, it would seem, beginning to understand (are we even beginning?) that the deformed sense of justice is preventing and will prevent for a long time yet the realization of even the best and most sensible laws. There is no mechanism, other than, perhaps, the Lubyanka torture chambers and the boundless gulag archipelagoes, which could compel compliance therewith, no, more, an understanding that universal subordination to sensible laws is more profitable than, if you will, contempt for them. If they are sensible, yes. But the true equality of obligations is the most sensible thing imaginable. Rebellion against it, by whatever considerations it is caused, encroaches on the very foundation of society, which is endeavoring to extricate itself from the vise of totalitarian thinking. The bitter irony is that it is he who steered society onto the civilized path and who was the sponsor of the creation of genuinely legal institutions who has demonstrated his disrespect for them—one of those who have arrogated to themselves, and only themselves, the right to decide when they should "cooperate" with them, and when, refuse. It is sad....

And what has happened in the wake of this is even sadder. The retaliatory move of the court which followed this could not have failed to have caused bewilderment. In having fined the offender, the judges had applied with respect to him the penalty specified by law, seemingly. The right of the court to appeal to the authorities for a recalcitrant citizen to somehow be compelled to do his duty is not in question, for that matter. But this reaction appeared in an entirely Soviet light. In a rayon CPSU committee light, to be more precise. After all, it is clear that, following all his declarations, Gorbachev could not, having come to terms, show up in court. No penalties could motivate him to this. He had by his refusal punished himself—in a way which was beyond the capabilities of the Constitutional Court even. Having become a "non-departee," he, on the contrary, restored to himself a large number of "points," appearing to the world in the image of a victim.

In addition, it constituted no great difficulty to assess what the world's response to this penalty would be and

with what inevitability it would have, for all that, to be abandoned. But the business involving the eviction of the foundation conclusively discredited this whole venture. Who so wanted to score a knockout blow against the Constitutional Court? Who had arranged, for example, so inappropriate—at the height of a trial—an increase in the pay of the Constitutional Court judges? Who had palmed off (I can find no other word) on the president for signature the "antifoundation" document and, even more, summoned the militia the very next morning? Primitive vengeance at the level of Soviet municipal intrigues has reduced a conflict of tremendous fundamental significance to the level of political farce. Will there be a sequel to the story of the little white bull? Is there any need for this, if the clothes have been discarded, the striptease has taken place, and everything to follow is of no value?

What, though, should we do? Simply look on as the top nomenklatura, having changed the name of its positions and political status even, remains permanently in place, not changing its habits in the least and demonstratively advertising them even. Politburo member Karimov is eliminating the opposition (in the name of the unity of the people, of course) and preparing to celebrate as a national holiday the birthday of the leader of the mafia, which staggeringly coincides—to the day!—with the anniversary of the October Revolution. Politburo member Niyazov is awarding himself (that is, excuse me, the Supreme Soviet is unanimously awarding him) the gold star with diamonds and declaring himself Hero of Labor No. 1, bestowing in passing his name on the main street of the capital. Central Committee Secretary Kravchuk recognizes only the press which is "useful" to his regime and threatens all the rest with sanctions. Central Committee Secretary Falin is demanding of the court, telegraphically, in the exalted language of commercial prose, guarantees of compensation either for "contract violations" or "loss of earnings," believing, as we can see, that he is addressing not lawyers of the highest qualifications but ignoramuses from the party apparatus. Who else? A former nomenklatura Central Committee member, who is avid for "objective coverage" of his actions and who vulgarly (and publicly, what is more!) swears in by no means the metaphorical meaning of this word if he is "covered" wrongly? Who else?

Aggressive self-assurance and a subcutaneous sense of permissiveness have always been a hallmark of the top nomenklatura, which has been taken as an example by the middle and the lower and any other nomenklatura. And, further, lack of breeding clumsily concealed behind university diplomas and degrees and, at times, academic titles, which arrogant apparatchiks generously distributed among themselves. The form of satisfaction of one's vanity changes, the type of thinking remains. The Neanderthal "sense of justice," whereby for some people some particular laws are written, for others, entirely different ones, today appears an absurdity, which only a blind man could fail to notice. Do the ci-devants really not notice this, or do they simply have no solution other than to play their game, which has already been lost?

"Since the law specifies a fine for a failure to appear in court," M. Gorbachev maintains, "a failure to attend is, consequently, permitted by law." Please! Since the law specifies imprisonment for larceny, larceny is permitted by law, consequently? My lawyer colleague will have to be reminded that a penalty for an action specified by the description of a rule of law means merely that it is not permitted but prohibited.

But, despite all that, there is, nonetheless, some benefit to be derived from all such embarrassments. As there is in the testimony of the "weeping Bolshevik," fanatically true to the principles of the fighter against alcoholism, the exasperated and arrogant Hamburg professor. As there is in the political monologues of the "old guard," which are pouring forth onto us in a powerful stream. They are with startling ecstasy stripping from themselves the wretched ammunition which for so long covered the party's shame. We knew much about their brutal, inhumane power. We have now learned in addition how self-enamored and stupid it was.

Yeltsin, Gorbachev Agreement Conjectured

934C0161C Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 43, 21 Oct 92 p 11

[Last of three articles under the heading "Two in One Boat, Not Counting the Country." Article by Yuriy Sirotkin: "But What If They Have Reached an Accommodation?"]

[Text] Moscow—Press exegesis in connection with the conflict between Gorbachev and the Constitutional Court are astonishing in that it almost all reflects only the parties' positions.

It is perfectly obvious that the conflict is beneficial to both Yeltsin and Gorbachev equally.

The state of affairs in the country and the spread of political forces are such that those in power today greatly need a "lightning rod" and figures on which the energy of public malaise may be "grounded."

Gorbachev is in this sense Lightning Rod No. 1. The war that has been declared on him will today find support on all sides. For the disciples of the pre-perestroika way of life, Mikhail Sergeyevich is the one who started the whole business and brought down a great power.

For the supporters of radical change, the former general secretary is a man who could not wholly break with the party-bureaucratic past and a "supporter of the socialist choice."

And for those who have come to replace the Gorbachev team, its leader is simply a thorn in the flesh. First, he has done so much, but is not only continuing to live, but at his pleasure, what is more. Second, we are having to sort out his mess for him. Third, he is continuing to have his say about those who are doing the sorting out, although he had promised, seemingly, to stay out of politics.

In short, Gorbachev is the "enemy image" which did not have to be invented. He is not your enigmatic Yids and Masons or world imperialism. He can perfectly easily be subpoenaed to appear wherever.

And if he is unwilling to appear, this is all to the good! This is, in fact, the dream of his opponents. And Mikhail Sergeyevich is helping to realize it by his own obstinacy. He is behaving as his antagonists had hoped he would.

But the paradox is that his opponents also are behaving as Gorbachev would wish. Their "gaffes" are just as programmed.

Everyone in this performance is spectator and actor and producer.

The farce is unfolding.

And the people, who deserve toward themselves a more serious attitude, are being forced to watch the action. Is it becoming in the eyes of a great country which is experiencing a most tragic period in its history putting on such a political show?

There are, for that matter, things which are more simply explained. When a politician (and I refer to Yeltsin and Gorbachev equally here) begins to sense his helplessness, impotence, and decline in popularity—call it what you will—he then joyfully latches onto such situations.

Today analysts are counseling with hindsight: Gorbachev would have been the big winner had he gone to the court and decided there whether to answer the questions or not; Yeltsin would not have experienced a decline in his authority had he forestalled the ban on Gorbachev leaving the country.

Counseling is easy. But, then, neither participant in the performance is in a position to follow such wise counsel. Each is accustomed to acting within the bounds of his previous experience.

And it is sorry experience.

Were both leaders capable of learning lessons from their past relations, Yeltsin, whose star was in the ascendant thanks to a stupid program for his political extermination, would surely have learned it and resolved: Nothing is to be gained by making of Gorbachev a person who is humiliated and insulted. And Gorbachev should have recognized that he is not Solzhenitsyn, not Grigorenko, not Sakharov....

All this is merely a manifestation of the totalitarian consciousness under the new conditions. And the novelty is that the relations of Yeltsin and Gorbachev have been unconsciously declassified. It is the lifting from these relations of the "classified" stamp which may be considered the sole achievement of democracy.

I would not vouch for the other achievements.

I altogether have the foolish fantasy: Have not Gorbachev and Yeltsin reached some accommodation?

How could Yeltsin rid himself of Gorbachev? Put him on a steamboat, as formerly Vladimir Illich sent off into the "capitalist distance" Nikolay Berdyayev and Pitirim Sorokin? Hardly. After all, by today's standards, Lenin was a dictator, Yeltsin, a democrat.

The world does not hold exile in high regard. And Gorbachev would take umbrage. He would declare: I will not leave for anything.

What is the solution? Simple. Everything needs to be stood on its head. The authorities should so restrict Gorbachev's freedom of movement that the world will sigh with relief when he is finally permitted to leave for good. And there would be not the least decline in Yeltsin's authority. After all, Gorbachev put himself above other citizens and refused to abide by the laws of the state based on the rule of law, for which he had formerly so strongly campaigned. And so he departs. There has been no infringement of human rights. Especially since no one dragged the great man to court by force.

The free man is at liberty to do as he pleases—the slightly wounded Russian authorities tell Gorbachev.

The curtain descends....

Yeltsin, Parliament Relationship Studied

934C0203A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 44, 28 Oct 92 pp 1-2

[Article by political scientist Andranik Migranyan: "Pointless Battle at an Impasse"]

[Text] Few of the serious analysts doubted that parliament would refuse the request of the president to postpone the congress until the spring of next year. It has become apparent that the reforms of the government are at an impasse. Both the adjustment in personnel and the principal policy of reform, which was started by the president last spring, actually led to the fact that all of the objectives that were set by the government turned out to be unrealized.

It is not a matter of the parliament being conservative, but that the reform policy of the government was associated with colossal social costs. Before the election, the president was confronted with a choice: Either to continue this policy, which could lead the country to a social explosion and to a halt in industrial enterprises by autumn—that is, to unpredictable consequences for his administration—or to implement this correction under the onslaught of parliament and all of the opponents of shock therapy.

No one had any doubts that the fate of the government was predetermined at the very beginning of the session. Although Gaydar remained after the last session, Gaydarism, as an aggregate of ideas on the stabilization of the financial situation, disappeared. The personnel changes that occurred already point to the fact that Yeltsin was making a policy adjustment. This became

the beginning of the end of Gaydar as an integral team and as an overall strategy of reform. This meant that the president decided, although he will not change this government, to prepare for its change and to implement it to the extent that the general situation comes to a head. This is the only way that I explain the appearance of the Civic Union, which was viewed as a reserve variant in the event of the emergence of a grave social and political crisis, and which took a sharply critical position with respect to the government's policy.

That which we see today, possibly, is not part of the plans of the president who proposed a smoother transition from Gaydar to the Civic Union. The president's strategy could have been as follows: To retain Gaydar until such time as there were no serious social cataclysms and conflicts, and to succeed in implementing privatization at least in the amount that Chubays proposed. After which it would be possible to consider the mission of this government fulfilled. But, given the emergence of serious social cataclysms, the president would be able painlessly to carry out a replacement of part of the government with representatives of the Civic Union, and thereby maintain a certain continuity with respect to reform policy.

However, by prohibiting the president from postponing the congress, parliament disrupted the plans both of the president and the reform-oriented forces. The consolidation of forces against governmental reform occurred faster in parliament than in society. At least, we are not seeing social outbreaks outside the walls of parliament. But congress can make the future development of the situation unpredictable. Because this institution possesses all of the powers for adopting any decision, including those of a constitutional nature. The qualified majority of the deputies that can speak against not only the government, but the president also, is capable of rendering the situation even more dangerous. Possibly, this is why the president had such a nervous reaction to the absolutely constitutional and normal decision of parliament not to put off the congress.

Different variants are possible in the situation that has set in. But, of course, if this government is permitted to work until spring, then, it is possible that the most important thing in reform will occur—privatization. In this event, during the differentiation and stratification of society, which accompanies the process of privatization, an opportunity will occur for the emergence of a large strata of property owners. The policy on the creation of a market economy, or, to put it bluntly, capitalism, will receive certain social support. Opponents of the policy understand very well that to execute a turnaround in this case will be very difficult.

Even sharper appeals than just the resignation of the government might be heard at the congress. Constitutional changes could also be introduced, right up to the abolition of the institution of president. And as society is still not sufficiently structured, the entire struggle is playing havoc among the political elite. The fate of one

or another political leader depends on the results of this struggle. This is why, it seems to me, that the outcome of the congress itself could prove to be very dangerous and unpredictable.

What can the tactic of the president be under the conditions that have developed?

Today, many are talking about the possibility of the dissolution of congress or parliament—an extreme measure that can be resorted to by the president. It is possible, of course, using force (Minister of Defense Grachev has already affirmed his readiness to support the president), to dissolve parliament, to disband congress, declare a state of emergency, and introduce presidential rule. But, it must be said that in such a case the president would violate the constitution. Neither in the law on a state of emergency, nor in the powers of the president, are there such provisions that the president can stop the functioning of the Supreme Soviet or the congress against their will. Supporters of the disbandment of parliament and congress argue their position with the fact that neither inside nor outside the country will parliament receive any support.

Such a variant of the development of events could be very tragic for Russia. Not because congress and the Supreme Soviet will be disbanded (and, possibly, those are right who claim that there will be no serious opposition inside or outside the country to these actions), but because, it seems to me, this could lead to the breakup of Russia itself. This breakup in any case is going on almost everywhere, but, given the absence of an organ that today symbolizes the unity of the Russian state, it is difficult to imagine in what way Moscow will be able to maintain control over the regions and the republics. The process of disintegration will accelerate, and the president will not have enough institutional or forceful means to restrain it.

First, the employment of force requires the presence of this force and, second, large-scale violence requires definite ideological justification. I cannot imagine under what kind of slogans such violence could be justified.

One would like to hope that the president will not decide to do this. It is most likely that the president will have the opportunity to go to the congress and to try through compromise to obtain the support of the deputies, making certain concessions in a personnel renewal of the government as well. The support of factions can be acquired in this kind of political maneuvering and search for compromise. The assignment of a number of representatives of the Civic Union to ministerial posts could give the government and the presidential team a certain respectability and a de-facto coalition character that personifies national harmony and representation of the entire basic spectrum of political forces in the country. In general, this could lead to a certain move to the right in the program of the government and in its domestic and foreign policy, but, at least it will prevent Russia from sudden changes, including a breakup and civil war.

There is still a chance to establish national harmony. The demand of the radically inclined democrats to go on the counteroffensive and to resolve the problem radically harbors more dangers than attempts to find compromise solutions in the situation that has developed, even if it will come to sacrificing a number of political figures who have not yet fully exhausted their potential.

Yeltsin, Government Future Viewed

PM3010141592 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 29 Oct 92 pp 1-2

[I. Sichka article: "Threat to Authorities Comes From Authorities"]

[Text]

What the President Fears...

Indeed, the president essentially does not fear a great deal. All the calls for resignation and the talk of impeachment and winding up the institution of the presidency as such are more of a psychological attack than a real threat. That is easy to see if you study attentively the alignment of forces during any attempts to overthrow the president.

The bloc of opposition parties and movements represented within the body of deputies by the "Russian Unity" coalition is fighting for Yeltsin's resignation. Even if they mobilize all conceivable and inconceivable reservists to their banners, they will then be able to control roughly a fourth, a third at most, of the Congress votes. (As you know, two-thirds of the votes are needed in order to adopt constitutional amendments at the Congress).

The moderate opposition, which actually prefers to call itself the "center," forms up under the banners of A. Rutskoy's and A. Volskiy's "Civil Union." Despite the fact that at present these two columns have diverged, the possibility of their forming an interim bloc has not been ruled out. In that case some experts estimate their potential at 80 percent of the Congress votes, while others do not even give them half. I think that the truth as always lies somewhere in the middle, and this bloc also lacks a secure two-thirds. Theoretically, admittedly, they can count on some of the waverers.

What is more, Vice President A. Rutskoy's presence among the leaders of the moderate opposition deprives this potential bloc of freedom of maneuver. Since an attack on the president automatically also strikes at the vice president. And the "Civil Union" will not do that.

What is worrying the president then? The fact that anyone who feels like it is starting to discuss his name on every street corner. Moreover the fierce attacks on Gaydar's government are indirectly also directed at Yeltsin himself. Of late he has constantly found it necessary to justify himself, defend some people, and respond to attacks... Now there is the December congress. Incapable of effectively deciding anything, it will

inevitably turn into another session where the president and his team are picked to pieces. I think that Yeltsin is simply tired of all this. Ultimately the prestige of the authorities cannot sink beyond a certain point. Otherwise people will simply stop taking them into consideration. It seems that Yeltsin has decided that this point has been reached and that it is time to reverse the process.

...What About His Team?

Unlike Yeltsin himself, the threat to his team is far greater. It will after all only keep itself afloat as long as the president supports it. If he decides one fine day that the team is not helping him that much, he will immediately get rid of it. Big-league politics has its own laws: They are brutal and cynical. Everyone who moves in this sphere is perfectly well aware of it.

Judging by information leaked from the Kremlin corridors, preparations are already under way there to "surrender" the team, or at least part of it. At any rate a candidate for the post of premier is being discussed fairly actively. The chances of Yu. Skokov, Security Council secretary, are rated extremely highly. The names of incumbent Vice Premiers G. Khizha and V. Shumeyko are also being mentioned.

It is easy to list other resignation candidates. Vice Premiers Poltoranin and Chubays; Foreign Minister Kozyrev; Aven, minister of foreign economic relations; Industry Minister Nechayev, and State Secretary Burbulis. These names are being discussed more and more often in opposition circles.

It is among these seven that the greatest signs of concern can now be observed. Burbulis, Poltoranin, Chubays, and Kozyrev recently made a provocative move in the face of parliament, dubbed the "Statement of the Three" [as published]. Information has come in from behind the scenes at "Civil Union" to the effect that "Civil Union" leaders intend to meet with the president in the near future and propose their terms (the resignation of the above among them) for undertaking to ensure a favorable outcome to the congress for him.

In these conditions the president's team seems to have decided that it is up to the drowning people to save themselves. Gaydar, Chubays, Aven, and a number of other government leaders flew out to Tolyatti last Sunday to meet with representatives of the body of directors. This meeting clearly had one purpose: to show the president that the directors are with them rather than with Volskiy and the opposition. There is nothing for you to fear from this quarter, Boris Nikolayevich, they said.

The day before "radical" Cabinet leaders met at Poltoranin's dacha. The upshot was that a "working group" of six or seven people was set up (compare that with the number of proposed "retirees") and has taken the initiative of studying the arguments in favor of holding a

referendum on the new constitution and temporarily suspending the parliament's activity.

The parliament's activity can only be suspended by the introduction of a state of emergency. As for a referendum on a new constitution, one must not forget that in addition to the official draft produced by Rummyantsev's Constitutional Commission, there is another draft lying on the president's desk, a draft formulated by Shakhrai for the last Congress. The latter aims to radically reinforce presidential power and to reform representative power.

The idea here seems to be a simple one: The tougher the stance taken by the president, the less he will have to "surrender." Thus, in the near future the atmosphere must be hotted up as much as possible and the president forced to take tough steps. Hence, in my view, the strenuous amplification of all manner of threats (some not unfounded, moreover).

I do not rule out the idea that the president may have had a discussion on the eve of the above move in parliament during which he was warned: If you "surrender" us today, tomorrow they will do the same to you as they did to Gorbachev. Kozyrev's subsequent delivery of the "Statement of the Three" to deputies may quite possibly have aimed to upset their balance and impel them to step up confrontation with the president. And to impel the president to take the appropriate countermeasures.

War to a Victorious Conclusion?

What action can the president take in this situation?

It is quite obvious that he has already made one choice: It is time to "turn the screws." A number of his recent statements are evidence of that. He warned diplomats of the inadmissibility of groundless criticism of the existing regime. Deputies heard the menacing promise from the television screen: "I will not forget this!" He has given orders for the National Salvation Front to be disbanded... The Defense Ministry collegium spoke last week of its concern at the confrontation between the legislature and the executive and confirmed its devotion to the president. Tell me, when have the military been allowed to discuss at the Defense Ministry collegium relations between politicians and even make public statements on this?..

On the other hand, the president's readiness to embark on a number of cadre reshuffles in the government arouses no doubts in most observers. The whole problem is how to arrange it so that it does not look like a concession to the opposition and, consequently, evidence of the president's weakness?

Scenario No. 1. After accumulating a critical mass of appropriate examples, the president says: Do you see what is happening? Fascists are destroying the editorial offices of democratic newspapers, the opposition is calling openly for the overthrow of the president, the

parliament has become a nest of plotters, criminals have cast aside all restraint... And he introduces a state of emergency and direct presidential rule. Within the framework of the Constitution, of course. The activity of the parliament and the Congress are temporarily suspended. So as to never resume their activity with the same membership. A Council of Heads of the Republics has already been set up in order to ensure that he does not appear to be a personal dictator in this situation. Incidentally, it would not go amiss to remind readers of the circumstances in which the prototype of this was created—Gorbachev's State Council.

Scenario No. 2. The president goes to the Congress, but carries out a preemptive strike first. He puts to a referendum the question of dissolving parliament and the Congress or, which amounts to roughly the same thing, the draft constitution lying on his desk. In this situation the Congress will simply "wilt" and frighten the president no more than a sick man with a priest already at his bedside.

Undoubtedly, some other, softer options are possible; politics is always full of many options. You can only say two things with a fair degree of certainty at the moment. First, there will be no battle at the Congress in December, everything will be decided beforehand. Second, the threat to the authorities today comes from the authorities themselves: The threat to the government comes from the president, the threat to the legislature from the executive, and vice versa. Everything else is just a matter of attendant circumstances that may direct events into a particular channel.

Sobchak Interviewed on Reforms, Civic Union

934C0107A St. Petersburg SANKT PETERBURGSKIYE
VEDOMOSTI in Russian 24 Sep 92 p 2

[Interview with Mayor of St. Petersburg Anatoliy Sobchak, by SANKT PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI Editor in Chief Oleg Kuzin, place and date not given: "A.A. Sobchak: 'I Act on Behalf of Our City's Residents'"]

[Text]

[Kuzin] What are your hopes for the next session of the Supreme Soviet of Russia? Are the politicians and specialists who say that another attack on the government will be undertaken at this session correct in their forecasts?

[Sobchak] I do not have high hopes that this session will achieve significant results. Rather, I am concerned that, much as during the previous sessions, political emotions and aimless discussion may cause a further decline in the authority of the national parliament, which cannot help but weaken the positions of democracy in this difficult time we are living through.

One could, of course, follow tradition, appeal to the deputies' common sense and conscience, and wish them to achieve more results in their work, but experience shows that these appeals are fruitless; one would wish,

however, that the session resolved at least one—but the most important—issue of our future: to adopt a law on the private ownership of land, which would allow us to start implementing real agrarian reform.

Even if the session adopts nothing but this one decision, it will still immortalize itself.

As for the predictions about the government's resignation, one does not have to be exceptionally perceptive in this respect, since the discontent over the government policy has increased dramatically, and it is clear that this will affect the deputies' attitude. The only question that remains is from which position to criticize the government, and what is being offered as a replacement or in a form of corrections to the government policy. If the criticism is going to be from the positions of orthodox Marxism, as is done by deputies from Baburin's group or some other factions, such criticism cannot have a positive effect, since it is aimed at undermining the reforms.

If the Supreme Soviet, having heard the government out, makes the necessary corrections to the implementation of the program of reforms, that is, if it does what is currently quite obviously necessary considering the real economic situation (institutes a price freeze, accelerates land reform, removes restrictions in the implementation of privatization—in particular, permits using the vouchers to privatize land, apartments, etc.), this would be a positive contribution to building a new democratic society.

Unfortunately, I doubt that the Supreme Soviet is capable of doing this.

[Kuzin] What do you think of the proposal to convene an extraordinary session of the Congress of Soviets? To whose advantage is it to demand this, and why?

[Sobchak] My attitude toward the idea of convening the congress, as well as the congress itself, is negative. This idea of Lukyanov's to create a hierarchical, easily manipulated parliament, which would allow all previously adopted decisions to be easily changed, is in general contrary to a democratic system and to the notion of a law-based state. Besides, I think that millions of voters realized a long time ago the ineffectiveness and futility of the congresses of people's deputies. This is why the earlier we shed this parliamentary form, the faster true democratic institutes of power will take root.

Looking at who benefits from this demand, we should have a look at those who demand the convocation of the extraordinary congress. It is mostly the conservative nomenklatura segment of the people's deputies, who link their hopes for a potential resignation of the government and the president with the extraordinary congress.

[Kuzin] Lately you increasingly frequently criticize both the government and the president in the mass media for their actions with respect to the economy, nationalities policy, and so on. Does this mean that you have shifted into the ranks of the constructive opposition?

[Sobchak] No, it does not. One cannot simultaneously be in opposition and be the current power. As to my criticism of the actions of the government and the president, it is of a dual nature. On the one hand, it is a normal, I would say, criticism coming from a head of a local administration and addressed at the actions of the central government. Practically all heads of local authorities all over the world are in the same situation. This is understandable, because in the process of resolving financial, economic, ecological, and other problems, it is necessary to bring together the federal and the local interests, and this coordination always involves struggle.

There is, however, another aspect to my criticism. I cannot help but contemplate what is happening in Russia as a whole, and I cannot limit myself to local interests only. I cannot remain silent when I see obvious mistakes being made with respect to legislation and in the government's action during the implementation of the reforms. For instance, from the very beginning I supported the idea of making land and apartments a privatization priority. The government decided otherwise, but by excluding the housing stock and land from the list of items being privatized through the system of vouchers, it jeopardized the very idea of privatization, since at this point we do not have, we are not ready to make good on vouchers by issuing shares of industrial enterprises. To complete the conversion of enterprises to joint-stock ownership will take a lot of time, and considerable technical work will have to be done with respect to creating a securities market. Thus, we will make it difficult for the people to make use of their privatization vouchers, and instead of achieving a positive effect we will only cause discontent and bitterness, which is very dangerous in the current conditions.

My proposal, on the other hand, removed this problem, since we have enough vacant land and enough people who want to privatize their apartments to ensure the realization of the vouchers in the shortest possible time, since the larger part of the vouchers could be used in this sphere.

We have over 250,000 city residents on the waiting list who want to receive plots of land and who will be happy to give up their privatization vouchers in exchange for becoming the owner of a piece of land. In addition, about 500,000 residents of St. Petersburg are users of garden and personal plots, of which they would like to acquire full ownership. Not to mention hundreds of thousands of residents who want to privatize their apartments. I can give you many other examples of my criticism of the government on general political matters—for instance, the government's relationship with the International Monetary Fund, etc.

In all such instances, I am acting on behalf of those millions of residents of our city who had placed their trust in me and elected me mayor. That is why I consider myself obligated to protect not only their day-to-day practical interests in the city, but also their principal political and economic interests insofar as meeting them depends on the policy conducted by the central government.

[Kuzin] What is your attitude toward the Civic Union? Does this organization have a political future?

[Sobchak] We are now at the stage of new political parties and movements coming into their own; therefore, I look positively on all organizations that speak from positive positions. Whether the Civic Union will have a political future, and what kind, depends on the union itself, to what degree it is organized, and on the clarity of its political positions.

I think that in the future we can expect a period of forming coalition governments with representatives of various movements and parties, and the Civic Union may become one of the organizations that will play a serious role in our political life.

[Kuzin] Prices on energy were recently "freed." How will this affect your city? Many people are convinced now that further increases in prices of food, basic necessities, apartment rents, and transportation are inevitable. How will the population be compensated for these new expenses?

[Sobchak] Prices on energy are controlled; had the prices been completely freed, it undoubtedly would dramatically have worsened the economic situation and lowered the population's standard of living.

As a result, we can get such a price explosion, including of food prices, that it will put a considerable segment of the population below the poverty line, below the line of normal sustenance.

The city had been compensating and tries to compensate for the population's increased expenses caused by rising prices. In this sense, it would be fair to say that local budgets have absorbed the main shock stemming from rising prices. This year alone, billions have been spent from the city budget to create a system of social shock-absorbers, a system of social protection. If prices continue to grow, however, I doubt that we will be able substantially to help the residents, because we do not have the money needed for it. Therefore, I oppose further price decontrol. I believe that during the transition period, prices should remain regulated; wages need to be pulled up to the price level, and this needs to be done in stages.

[Kuzin] It is fall, and winter is not far away. Is the mayoralty confident that all municipal services are ready to face the winter? In past years, the bureau of the party

oblast committee would already be admonishing economic managers that they would be held personally responsible; what about now?

[Sobchak] If we are speaking about preparations for the winter, the preparation level does not depend on how many pep talks we give the managers—it depends on the normal, day-to-day functioning of all of the municipal services. This work started long ago, in June. Basically, the city currently has the needed supply of fuels. Potatoes and other vegetables have been laid into storage. So I am counting on being able to meet the demand of supply, of normal life support for the citizens during the winter period—unless, of course, something unforeseen happens that does not depend on us.

[Kuzin] Will St. Petersburg become a "capital of the new Commonwealth of states," and will the Taurida Palace witness another meeting of the Constituent Assembly?

[Sobchak] I am not a great supporter of returning the status of capital city to St. Petersburg, but I was glad to hear the unexpected decision that the leadership of the parliament has selected St. Petersburg as the seat of the parliamentary representation of the Commonwealth countries. We are ready to create all the necessary conditions for the functioning of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly.

I think that the Taurida Palace is indeed the most convenient place to house the new parliament.

I see the creation of this parliament as a sign of an increasing trend toward the integration and restoration of many relations among the former republics of the Soviet Union—relations that have been so carelessly disrupted during the past two years.

'Democratic Russia's' Kalugin On His Candidacy For National Deputy

934C0181A St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 10 Oct 92 p 1

[Interview with Oleg Kalugin, member of the Democratic Russia Movement Coordinating Council, by Anna Broydo: "First-hand: The More Contenders, the Better"]

[Text]

[Broydo] Oleg Danilovich, have you decided to return to national politics?

[Kalugin] Yes, I have been nominated for the office of Russian People's Deputy in the district that is vacant following Vladimir Shumeyko's transfer to executive government structures. The district is in Krasnodar Kray. In terms of territory, then, the district virtually coincides with the district from which I was elected a USSR People's Deputy.

[Broydo] It seems that you are in good company. They say that your rivals will be Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Konstantin Borovoy, Lev Ubozhko, and Kondratenko, former chairman of the kray soviet.

[Kalugin] As I see it, the more candidates, the better. I think my chances are rather good. I think my most serious rival is Kondratenko. Not long before he was dismissed from the post of chairman of the kray Soviet, he won residents' sympathy by stubbornly refusing to raise milk prices.

[Broydo] What sort of program are you taking to the voters?

[Kalugin] I am a member of the Democratic Russia Coordinating Council, and my program largely coincides with the program of that movement.

[Broydo] But hasn't democracy been rather compromised in the eyes of public opinion?

[Kalugin] You're absolutely right—by talkers and demagogues. But the fact is that Democratic Russia's objectives are essentially not being implemented, and I intend to do this.

[Broydo] Have you already chosen your advisers?

[Kalugin] Yes, they are mostly people who helped me in my "Union" election campaign. I want to ask Gennadiy Khazanov to become my adviser. I hope very much that in view of our longtime friendship, he will agree. Incidentally, the last time the late Igor Talkov was one of my advisers.

Travkin's Statement on Reform, Government, Constitution

934C0164A St. Petersburg VECHERNIY PETERBURG
in Russian 29 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by PETERBURGSKIY LITERATOR Correspondent Sofya Vasilyeva: "The Adventures of Travkin and the Three Whales"]

[Text] There is a little book called "Travka's Adventures." The cover shows a little boy wearing a cap with earflaps and felt boots, against a background of a Moscow high-rise. Travka is the little boy on the cover. He wants to know about everything.

Nikolay Ilich Travkin is a big politician. He knows about everything. And he flew in with all this knowledge to spend a half day in St. Petersburg, take part in the broadcast of "The 13th Question," meet with his party comrades, hold a press conference at the Moskovskiy Vokzal and depart on the Krasnaya Strela [Red Arrow].

Journalists led off by asking Nikolay Ilich to explain what brought the leaders of Grazhdanskiy Soyuz [Civic Union] to descend on our city en masse, and what they plan to do with the present government. Travkin was, as always, aphoristic, but did not choose to make any

pronouncements. He said that Gaydar must be abandoned as a generator of reforms, and that the "ideolog Burbulis, the exhausted Chubays and Foreign Minister Kozyrev must be removed." The course to reforms will remain as before, but with changes. No one killed the three whales on which Gaydar's reform is based; they died a natural death, because they were released in the wrong waters. "The government did not have a reform program at all. First the government uttered certain words, then they published a program for deepening the reforms when they had already crawled into that pipe and it was easier to crawl on than to back out to the exit." It is not necessary to pose the question of private ownership of land, since "this is a card played by politicians who have nothing better to do." One can expect a turnabout in policy only from the Skokov structure, and "GKChP-2 [State Committee for the State of Emergency-2] can take place only under the leadership of the President." Rumors of a director's lobby or about nomenklatura opposition are vastly overstated.

In response to journalists' suspicions that the real reason for the visit revolves around the desire to try to undertake something before the announcement of the beginning of voucherization—1 October, Travkin replied with a question:

"Do you believe that on October 1 all the citizens of Leningrad will be covered with vouchers? Well, they will pass them out on the first, but when will they begin to use them? On the second? Vouchers... This is some kind of fairy tale they have thought up. If we do not start up all the enterprises for vouchers, and municipal property and all that pertains to the state, the land, garden plots, apartments; that is, if we do not expand the market under vouchers, they will be like soap bubbles. Supposing I buy some 'Togliatti' shares. Will that inspire them to say, 'We must work harder now so Travkin can make a profit?'"

On Russian statehood he expressed himself with total conviction:

"In order for the citizens to look at this problem with open eyes, we must remove all of the excess verbiage. Under the cover of democratic slogans, we are trying to divide Russia into several dozen pieces. We must return to the values common to all humanity, and calmly looking one another in the eye say, that democracy is the acknowledgment of the primacy of the person, the citizen, and not the nation. And if we want to do something on the territory of Russia, we must acknowledge that it is an entity not because someone chased somebody somewhere, sometime; but because it is an historic entity and it has a common economy."

The journalists responded in a single burst: "Historically unified within which borders?" Ilich responded in fine Gorbachovian fashion:

"Let us acknowledge the reality of the last decades, and the international agreements. Today's borders have been affirmed by the Constitution."

Incidentally, on the new Constitution, Nikolay Ilich is "by nature an authoritarian;" therefore he is most comfortable with the version of presidential rule. A new Constitution must be adopted at a congress. "And then what happens? If Popov is not a deputy, it will be necessary to convene a Constituent Assembly, in order that it be adopted. I do not want the Popovs to adopt a Constitution for me. Everything that they can do for the country they have already done."

He was not particularly disposed to go into party matters. He said only that the DPR does not pretend to any ministerial portfolios if the "Civic Union" comes to power.

In almost every answer, Nikolay Ilich cited his personal experience in leadership of Shakhovskiy Rayon, and described how one can carry out privatization, get rid of the state sector, and solve the food problem in one small rural region, all by itself.

At the end of the press conference Nikolay Ilich had a major squabble with the RADIO LIBERTY correspondent. They had a difference of opinion. Nikolay Ilich believes that the "voice of 'Liberty' has always been a scoffer from the moment it appeared on the air." And things are getting bad—they are dividing Russia into 83 (!) states and are making it a third world country. But Aleksey Volovikov (RADIO LIBERTY) reproached Travkin for the fact that the director's lobby helped him put things into order in Shakhovskiy Rayon.

There used to be a method called team contract [brigadny podryad]. It was called Travkin's. Now Travkin has become a politician, but the method is the same.

Faults, Dangers Seen in Recent KGB Actions

934C0200B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 44, 28 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Shchekochikhin: "Everyone Up Against the Wall! Put the Military Secret on the Table! The Ministry of Security and 'Pamyat'—the Same Hand?"]

[Text] When I was told about Oleg Kalugin for the first time, there was also a search in the editorial office, but they did not venture to arrest Kalugin for revealing a state secret; that is what they did today.

This is how Natalya Gevorkyan, a MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent, comments on the recent events in her own editorial office: "It did not get better, but worse."

The events that occurred last week in the editorial office of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI also seem to me to be a very disturbing symptom of the fact that the KGB (I cannot get used to the new abbreviation MBRF [Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation]), after

declaring a complete change of policy following the August putsch, has not changed its predilection for "witch hunts."

The publication itself of an article by two scientists—Vil Mirzoyanov and Lev Fedorov—about the fact that despite an official statement (including one by the president) that Russia has completely stopped testing and developing chemical weapons, it is in fact testing and developing them—I consider to be an act of civic courage. If the government (including the president) is playing dirty games, this does not mean that everyone should play in these games. But the reaction of the security service to this publication—search, detention, and arrest—indicates that nothing has changed in the country. Until now, instead of accepting the law on state secrets, they were guided by old instructions that were consecrated recently by presidential edict. To this day, the security of the individual is not a priority in their work.

What is more! I am getting more and more information indicating that the KGB, after changing the signs on its many buildings at Lubyanka (oh, excuse me, there never were any signs there and there are none now), has not changed and does not want to change its style of work. I will cite only one example. It was quite recently that it was specifically the security service that refused a visa to Russia for the well-known civil rights defender Louise Shelly, a professor at American University (and, incidentally, the editor of the journal DEMOCRATIZATION), and only the intervention of Vladimir Lukin, Russian ambassador to the United States, made it possible to avert a scandal that inevitably would have flared up around the old theme: the KGB and human rights.

I do not even want to enumerate those real events that the security service could prevent (at least that pogrom at the St. Petersburg markets committed by a fascist organization that has already been formed). I am now thinking about something else—and I am beginning to suspect more and more often: But are the authorities themselves not concerned that, as before, the security service will specialize more in political detection than the fight against corruption, organized crime, ecological catastrophes, and protection of the citizen; that is, everything we hoped for and that the Ministry of Security of Russia would begin to work on?

One of the MBRF officials who works on corruption in the organs of authority and the state administration recounted how he once tried to penetrate the White House, but, after showing his identification, was stopped by the security service at the door of the White House, through which 5,000 people enter. "No," he was told, "we will take care of corruption here by ourselves."

Well, all that is left is to penetrate defenseless editorial offices.

National Salvation Front Meeting Reviewed

934C0200A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 42, Oct 92 p 5

[Article by A. Uglanov: "Salvation of Russia or of Themselves?"]

[Text] It was necessary to go through no less than five cordons of controllers dressed in militarized uniforms in order to get to the auditorium where the constituent session of the National Salvation Front (FNS) was taking place. In other respects, there was nothing unusual in the organization of this type of measure. It was exactly in this way that the "democrats" assembled two to three years ago in order to shame Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, and Ligachev. This time as well they stigmatized almost in the very same words, and again for the glory of our poor people and state—only the personalities have changed: Yeltsin, Gaydar, and "those affiliated with them" were reviled.

The first part of the adopted joint "Manifesto" states some very serious things—concerning the threat to the integrity of Russia and the problems of the army and industry.

But what are the ways to overcome them?

The way to salvation is indicated on four little pages of general, unfortunately, sentences. For example, state subsidy of the production of food commodities. But at the same time nothing is said about where the money for this is to come from.

Further. The program for conversion of the defense industry will be suspended. Consequently, the output of thousands of new guns, tanks, etc. that clank and fire on Russia's borders, almost ready to penetrate inside as well, continues.

One of the central points is the phased restoration of the USSR. Even if it is assumed that the other republics want this, we are being called on, consequently, to begin, let us say, a postwar restoration of the Transcaucasus and parts of Central Asia, and to resolve their complex ethnic, food, and other problems, the likes of which we ourselves are burdened with and are resolving with difficulty.

Evidently, not without the help of communist-saviors, there is a section "How to Operate?" in the "Manifesto":

- unite,
- establish cells,
- conduct rallies, demonstrations, and pickets,
- collect money,
- reproduce and disseminate the "Manifesto" with all available means.

And these are the theses from speakers' speeches:

A. Prokhanov. The enemy is in the house. Foreign intelligence is running the ball. It is good in Russia for rats and ravens. Bitches are poisoning patriots. There will be an elite in Russia that will sacrifice itself for the people. Gorbachev is a criminal of all times and people. The boor reigns everywhere—well-fed, vile, laughing loudly. Let them lead us into a dungeon, they scoff. Hear us, Yakut, and Chuvash, and Tatar.

Deputy **S. Baburin** proved to be cleverer than many in the auditorium and the presidium. He recognized both the weakness of the deputy corps and the fact that the slump in production will last one and a half years under any arrangement. If it was not Baburin who said this but someone from the other camp, evidently he would have been pelted with rotten eggs in this auditorium. But in this case—it got by. There was even weak applause, but not standing.

Deputy **M. Astafyev** solemnly declared the end of civil war in Russia, bearing in mind that a very diverse public was assembled in the auditorium. A number of delegates, it is true, did not agree with this.

The auditorium broke out in applause five times, and the attendees stood up in one outburst when **A. Makashov** spoke. He gave an analysis of the state of affairs in the army, and noted in particular that "it is difficult to watch the actions of little marshal Shlyapnikov."

N. Lysenko, leader of the National Republican Party, was very emotional and direct. He was sincerely indignant over the fact that "semiliterate Kravchuks and Khmaras are forcing the founders of Kiev Rus to speak the Ukrainian language." And, in general, he will "never recognize the sovereignty of Kiev and Minsk. Not international law but the criminal code is applicable to them."

In the words of **S. Baburin**, the charming **S. Umaltova** pulled a trump card out of her sleeve. In her speech, surrendering to the general excitement, she declared that a new government of the Soviet Union will be elected at the December Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

Communist deputy **S. Goryacheva** also became a believer. She believes that the truth and God are an antidote to the Satanic destruction of the state. After cursing the puppeteers from beyond the ocean and the apostates without kith and kin and other demons, she swore love for Tatar and Chechen and Bashkir and Buryat women. "One land has nurtured us..."

But this land has also nurtured one more member of the presidium—writer **E. Limonov**. His work "It Is I—Edichka" is superpornographic, although it is not without talent. In the meantime, almost everyone spoke out against pornography from the stage. But Limonov sat next to Prokhanov, Goryacheva, V. Belov, and V. Rasputin.

Well, accordingly, herein lies the specific character of today's political situation. * * *

Meanwhile, intentions to ban the activities of the FNS have become known from the latest reports. **B. Nemtsov**, people's deputy of the Russian Federation and governor of Nizhny Novgorod, expressed great concern in this regard. He believes, in particular, that the FNS provoked exactly these actions on the part of the leadership in order to acquire the halo of martyr.

Arms Export Officials Arrested

934P0007B Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 23 Oct 92 p 15

[Unattributed article: "Weapons Trade: Spetsvneshtekhnika Specialists Arrested"]

[Text] KOMMERSANT has learned from reliable sources that yesterday ministry workers arrested several workers of the Spetsvneshtekhnika joint-stock company who were suspected of illegal operations involving the sale of arms abroad. During the search they confiscated money and valuables worth a total of 200 million rubles.

The Spetsvneshtekhnika joint-stock company is the legal heir to the previously existing Main Technical Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and, like its predecessor, on behalf of the state and at the request of the government, it engages in the sale of large batches of weapons outside Russia.

Our correspondent managed to contact the deputy president of the joint-stock company, Yuriy Andrianov, who was literally flabbergasted by our correspondent's report and assured him that he knew nothing about what had happened. KOMMERSANT will report the details of the event on Saturday, 24 October.

Uranium-235 Smuggling Thwarted

934P0007A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 21 Oct 92 p 14

[Unattributed article: "Attempt to Steal Uranium: The Chekists Received a Tip-Off and the Uranium Did Not Make It to Moscow"]

[Text] We have already reported, in our 17 October issue, that a Luch Scientific Production Association worker who tried to steal 1.5 kg of uranium-235 was arrested in Podolsk. Charges were brought under Article 223 Point 2—"Illegal acquisition and storage of radioactive materials" (up to five years). Point 3 will probably be added—"Theft of radioactive materials" (up to 10 years). KOMMERSANT correspondent Boris Klin went to the scene to get the details.

It turned out to be very easy to find the secret enterprise in the small provincial village. The first passerby pointed it out. The policemen on duty greeted the unexpected guest impolitely, they would not speak about the incident, and they advised that he not waste his time. The secretary announced that the director was not handling the incident and anyway he did not feel very good so he

went home. His deputy for security, Sergey Rystsov, was also absent—he was accompanying a foreign delegation to Moscow. And the workers said that they had learned all the details of the matter from the central newspapers.

Convinced that the collective of the Luch Scientific Production Association was able to keep a secret, I went to see the chief of the Fourth Division of the Main Internal Affairs Administration of Moscow Oblast for Podolsk, Yevgeniy Nikiforov. He expressed his regret that the investigator was not there—he had left for Moscow to go to the Procuracy of Russia. "We are expecting him any minute. I myself do not have all the information. Moreover, the Criminal Procedure Code gives only the investigator the right to divulge such information," Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich was sympathetic. But I did manage to have a conversation with the head of the press service of the Ministry of Security of Russia for Moscow Oblast, Aleksandr Mikhaylov. Because of the kindness of Mr. Nikiforov, who phoned the city division of the Ministry of Security of Russia and made a request for me to the workers of the local special services.

The chief of the city division, Sergey Kudryavtsev, and the chief of the press service of the administration of the Ministry of Security of Russia for Moscow Oblast, Aleksandr Mikhaylov, gave us some interesting details: There was a theft and the suspect had managed to take the uranium through the guard gate. He was not arrested until a tip-off was received (I did not get the name of the vigilant patrolman) after he was already on his way to Moscow and was about to board an electric commuter train. A worker of the Radon Scientific Production Association who participated in the arrest confirmed with the help of his instrument that the arrested person's luggage was "radioactive." In Sergey Kudryavtsev's words, the workers of the organs were somewhat flabbergasted. "We could not believe that it was possible to carry 1,200 grams of uranium-235 out of the restricted enterprise, but the information was confirmed—we confiscated three containers of uranium," said Sergey Alekseyev. The Chekists refused to make further comments, saying that would be unfair to the investigator in charge of the case.

Uranium-235 is an enriched prepared raw material for atomic reactors. It is used in atomic energy engineering and also to obtain plutonium (which is necessary, mixed with uranium-238, for manufacturing nuclear weapons). But in the opinion of the experts who confiscated it, 1,200 grams is not enough either to start up a reactor or to manufacture an atomic bomb. Although the experts assert that this raw material is quite costly, it is difficult to say what its exact value is—according to information obtained by the editorial office, the price ranges from \$50-55 to \$1,500 per gram.

When investigator Aleksandr Nikolenko arrived, he was cordial and even offered us tea and bagels. Mr. Nikolenko, however, refused to give the name of the person arrested, saying he was afraid of causing emotional harm

to his family. Moreover, he explained, he did not want to contribute to the formation of a particular public opinion about the arrested person until the court had made a decision. Aleksandr Grigoryevich described his subject as a very cultured, educated, and well-read person. Mr. Nikolenko stated that the suspect has a higher technical education but was working as an ordinary worker (apparatchik). He had access to uranium because of his length of service. And although there was fairly good accounting for radioactive materials in the scientific production association, the uranium was not missed. Incidentally, after the theft the subject kept this property in his own apartment (true, the investigation revealed that it caused no harm either to people or to the environment). In the opinion of the investigator, the engineer-worker intended to sell the stolen uranium, but there are still no grounds for saying that he is in any way involved with the international nuclear mafia.

West Seen As Slow to Cooperate in Halting Flow of Contraband

934C0139A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Oct 92 p 8

[Article by Sergey Gorlenko, Center for Public Relations of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation: "Contraband"]

[Text] How to convert "wooden rubles" more advantageously into hard currency? There is no need to rack our brains over a long time over this: For rubles items of contraband are obtained, but abroad they are sold for foreign paper money. The underground trade in works of art brings legendary profits, not without reason this kind of business in terms of profitability occupies third place in the world, being inferior only to "operations" with weapons and narcotics.

In April of this year, the security organs of Russia instituted criminal proceedings in Moscow in relation to M. Breslav, a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany. It had come within the field of vision of the service for the struggle against contraband already long ago, but the detention of the next batch of contraband goods being transported across the frontier served as the basis for the institution of the case: Antique shop goods, works of art, goods made of precious metals. In the course of the investigation, 10 episodes of contraband shipments carried out by M. Breslav and his accomplices during the last 3 years. Some of the valuables exported earlier, including paintings of Malevich, Kyun, and Morozov, were returned to Russia.

Returned to Russia. . . . How many of them, works of art and antiques, have been returned, and how many have vanished irrevocably behind the cordon?! In Moscow, in the exhibition halls of the Tretyakov Gallery on the Krymskiy val work has begun on the exhibit "Returned Property." There works of art, Russians icons, antiquarian jewelry designated for contraband export are presented as exhibits.

But the exhibition "Returned Property" arouses sooner sad than enthusiastic emotions, since there are more than sufficient problems standing before the Russian organs of state power and administration for the prevention of the further loss of our wealth abroad. The most serious of them for the federal security organs is the imperfection of our criminal legislation, visible even to the naked eye.

Here is the opinion of Col of Justice I. Andreyev, an executive of the Investigation Administration of the Ministry of Security of Russia:

"As before, we are forced to be guided by the old wording of Article 78 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, in accordance with which contraband is defined as the legal transfer of goods or other valuables across the state border of the USSR. In other words, across an external border of a state which does not exist now. But, you know, the main flow of contraband goes to the independent states of the Baltic, the borders with which are transparent for the time being. There are, in addition, a number of alternative versions between the Criminal Code and the Customs Code of the USSR adopted in June 1991 and for the time being still in force, which creates quite a number of problems in our work. Consequently, already now there exists a need for a change of the article on contraband in the Criminal Code in accordance with the realities of today. Also necessary is new legislation on the state border."

Contraband in property of our country is carried out most often by organized criminal groups with well-arranged international connections. One encounters, of course, solitary operators, but they do not constitute the chief danger for the country. In the criminal contraband groups, there is a clearcut division of responsibilities: Ringleaders, owners of contraband channels, suppliers of goods, dealers, and couriers. The latter, who are also called "shuttles," directly transport the goods across the state border, and for this reason it is they who most often are detained in customs. As far as the ringleaders and organizers are concerned, they remain mainly in the "shadow," since it is very difficult to prove the criminal activity of the members of the entire contraband chain, and in some cases—simply impossible.

A great deal, undoubtedly, depends on the skill and professionalism of the very workers of the service for the struggle against contraband. But by far not everything depends on the practical art of the executor, and here once again we have to talk about the imperfection of the Russian laws, especially in the part pertaining to the struggle against organized crime. But the crimes connected with contraband are none other than their particular occurrence. However, up to now the adoption of laws on state service, on corruption, is being impeded.

Still one more problem. The security organs of Russia are interested in cooperation with foreign special services. There has been talk about this for a long time, but how are things in practice? Let us turn to the criminal

case that recently caused a sensation—the case of the theft at Sheremetyevo-2 International Airport of a large sum of foreign exchange received in December 1989 from the Republic National Bank of New York addressed to the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Relations.

Not long ago, the Investigation Administration of the Ministry of Security of Russia in the main completed the case and sent it to the procuracy for approval of the indictment and transmission to the court. Meanwhile one of the episodes was singled out into a separate procedure, and the investigation of it continues. We are talking here about the contraband import into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) of a sizable part of the foreign exchange stolen at the airport, estimated in the tens of thousands of American dollars.

The dollars were illegally exported abroad at the beginning of 1990 by a certain Belyayev and a certain Yaroshenko (the names have been changed). The contrabandists carried out their operation in movements, utilizing in so doing forged customs certificates, and then during the entire period of the investigation hid from the investigation organs on the territory of Germany. Repeated official appeals to the Ministry of Justice and the organs of the public prosecutor of the FRG concerning the acceptance of a Russian operational investigation group, the extension of assistance in the execution of necessary investigation actions abroad, and the deportation of the contrabandists and their transmission to the investigation organs remained without answer.

It is difficult to determine precisely by what the Germans were guided in this case, but the fact that our request was ignored remains a fact. Nevertheless it proved possible to bring Belyayev from abroad to Russia, where he was arrested by officials of the Ministry of Security. Work in regard to Yaroshenko in the meanwhile continues.

The contraband export of raw material represents the greatest threat to the interests of Russia, since this form of illegal trade still further undermines the as it is imbalanced economy of the country. Noteworthy is the fact that precisely in the struggle against this kind of contraband the special services of the Western countries do not want to enter into even minimum cooperation with us. When we are talking about the struggle against illegal trade with weapons or against narcotics business, no special differences between us and the Westerners are noted. But as soon as the question of the export of raw material from Russia comes up, a quite different approach of the Western countries, and first of all of United States is revealed. However, it is understandable: To the West, to all appearances, it is advantageous for Russia to be a country with a weakened economy.

Raw material is exported, as a rule, on the basis of forged documents or by means of the receipt of "reliable" documents through corrupted officials. On the whole, the problems of the struggle against contraband are directly connected with the problems of corruption,

which manifested itself recently in all acuteness when the complete disintegration of the system of legislation in the former USSR took place. The principle "everything is allowed which is not prohibited," which was proclaimed during the perestroika period, as it turned out, has a right to exist only in the presence of adequate and working laws. Otherwise a splash of all sorts of crimes, including economic crimes, takes place. This is what happened in the USSR and is happening in the Russian Federation.

"Against contraband, we, undoubtedly, struggle according to our forces and possibilities, proceeding from the pertinent existing legislation," says Col A. Grinenko, responsible official of the Administration for the Struggle Against Contraband and Corruption of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. "But we succeed in preventing only a small share of the entire volume of contraband being exported from the country."

"The law is severe, but it is the law"—this formula was adopted already in Ancient Rome. Since that time it has been the symbol of the prerogative of the law over the emotions and feelings and people. To dispute it is short-sighted and hopeless. But the main thing is for there to be a law. And not simply to be, but to correspond to the realities of our difficult and contradictory life.

State Committee Chairman Explains His Resignation

934C0141B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
20 Oct 92 p 1

[Interview-based article by Pavel Shinkarenko: "Retirement: There Was No Policy, There Was Fire Extinguishing. This Is How Valeriy Tishkov, Chairman of the State Committee for Nationalities Policy, Having Submitted His Resignation, Assessed the Results of His Seven-Month Work"]

[Text] "No, this is not a challenge to the government," Valeriy Aleksandrovich anticipated my question about the reason for his withdrawal from a ministerial post. Circumstances of a personal character played their role.

From further conversation it turned out that the decision was influenced by a number of factors. Moreover, the main ones among them have a far from personal nuance.

I remember, during our first meeting, Professor Tishkov, who had just been appointed to the post of the chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for Nationalities Policy, talked enthusiastically about the prospects of his department. "We will take an active part in the development of a government policy." "We will have a new building in the center of Moscow, which we will make into the House of the Peoples of Russia." "The best cadres will come to us." And why not? The promises only remained unfulfilled, and the great scholar and ethnographer, capable of playing a peacemaking role in the settlement of conflicts between the nationalities not only in Russia, but also throughout the Commonwealth,

parted with his hopes. During the 7 months, he failed not only to secure the new building, but also to assemble the staff of the state committee. And nevertheless it was not these difficulties that were decisive.

"I have always been struck by the senselessness of many of our laws," says Valeriy Tishkov. "Now I have personally become convinced: In their development, the interests of the cause by no means always dictate their style. For the majority of legislators, it would appear, it is more important to defend their party position, to comply with the request of one political force or another. How else can one explain the adoption, for example, of the laws on the rehabilitation of repressed peoples and on the Cosacks? To a person who knows the situation from the inside, it was clear from the outset that they are not only impossible to implement, but they even provoke conflicts."

In the opinion of Tishkov, the State Committee for Nationalities Policy of the Russian Federation did not succeed in becoming the coordinating center of Russian nationalities policy. And, indeed, all are engaged in it: The President and the vice-president, the Supreme Soviet, the Government, the political parties, and the parliamentary factions. The most responsible decisions are made by the Security Council. But the heads of the departments for nationalities policy have never been invited to its sessions.

"I am convinced," says Valeriy Aleksandrovich, "that our committee is necessary to the Government. Especially as we succeeded in establishing a quite good organizational structure, capable of effectively influencing the situation in multinational Russia. But the new head has to have effective support."

Does the departure of Tishkov have an impact on the policy of the Government in the national question? "But there was no policy," my interlocutor states with regret, "there was fire extinguishing. To implement a clear policy line, good laws are necessary. They must be developed first of all."

Who will be the successor? Valeriy Aleksandrovich is convinced that this post must be filled with a person well-versed in the games of the bureaucracy. "There is talk about the candidacy of Sergey Mikhaylovich Shakhrai," I suggest my variant. "This would be an excellent candidacy. His own man both in the Government and among the deputies. But after the post of vice-premier he will hardly agree to a ministerial portfolio."

"And what are your personal plans?"

"There are no problems—you see, I am the director of the Institute of Ethnography imeni Miklukho-Maklay. Now it has become the analytical center of the State Committee for Nationalities Policy. So that I will not lose the connection with previous affairs."

Rule of Law Seen as 'Myth' in Today's Russia

934C0138A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Sergey Kara-Murza: "The Wandering Flame of Perestroika"]

[Text] The myth of building a state based on the rule of law as opposed to our lawless past became one of the cudgels with which the state itself was destroyed. The "pendulum of perestroika" of which Gorbachev spoke cast us far back from a society based on the rule of law. Petty politicians wasted a great idea from which it will not be easy to cleanse the filth and blood. But we must start doing so right away.

Perestroika faced a difficult task—enlisting 300 million people who for the most part wanted to live, rather than fight, in the destruction of their own home. This task was accomplished: in 1989 passionate people with fiery eyes defeated the balanced and reasonable people in elections. But how were we to be persuaded that "we cannot go on living this way?" Not by appealing to reality, but by aggravating the injuries and splits in people's minds. And not in order to set those injuries out on the table and find a means of healing them. No, the injuries were exaggerated to fantastic dimensions and poison was poured into people's hearts—in order that the wounds might be opened and contradictions might explode into conflicts. Then people blinded by that poison were set against the structures were slated for destruction. And if you were dealing with a credulous people, "the process had begun." Properly whip up the case of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, and you could violate all norms: seize union property, throw out Chernyakhovskiy's remains, and turn a third of the population into cattle—the "democrats" would support you. And would they: the injury caused by Molotov demanded revenge.

All perestroika was projected as the creation of a situation in which the specific law of revenge would hold sway. This has nothing in common with a rule-of-law state and has been used only for the purposes of dividing society. Let me recall how on the first day of the freeing of prices one enthusiastic lady tried to prove to the gloomy waiting line that we had deserved this measure, since "half the country went to the camps under Stalin." What provides a sign of the fact that the ideologue who drags old injuries out into the light of day is striving to kindle new enmity today? The manipulation of the concepts of law and lawlessness, tyranny and victim.

The myth of the transition to a rule-of-law state could be accepted only in the case of general derangement—after all, at the same time a revolution was being proclaimed! All the structures of statehood that alone are capable of preserving any sort of law whatever were being destroyed. And people became hostages of their own destructive actions. This is evident in the November 1991 conflict with Chechnya alone. The "democrats" could not appeal to law immediately after they had exerted such effort to destroy the Union. If the Estonians had been helped to withdraw from our "common

home," and what's more, by such an unlawful means, trampling 40 percent of the population and not paying their debts, what sort of complaints could there be against the Chechens? That would be an acknowledgement of the racist nature of the new ideology, and they did not want to make such an acknowledgement.

Finally, for six years the principle that expresses the very essence of the state—the right and duty of the regime (and only the regime!) to employ coercion (nasiliye)—was destroyed. Here is the definition of Max Weber, a theoretician of the state: "The modern state is a union for rule (soyuz gospodstva), organized like an institution, that has been successful in monopolizing legitimate physical coercion as a means of rule and, to this end, has combined material instruments and institutions in the hands of its leaders." In other words, state coercion exercised through institutions (and not arbitrarily) is legal. The state, in order to be a state, must preserve its monopoly on coercion and on the control of weapons ("material instruments"). Where it abandons this grave duty, the right to coercion is seized by other forces. And that is incomparably more frightening. If the authorities give up, even for a brief period, the monopoly on this terrible instrument, it becomes very difficult to regain it—the state becomes unstable, and its principal root is removed from it.

Yet the leitmotif of all perestroika was the removal of the legitimacy of coercion as an instrument of state power. That was the aim of the campaign against all the law-enforcement agencies, and then against the army. And that was the smokescreen used to deprive the state of its monopoly on coercion. Under various justifications, nonstate unions for rule that employed coercion arose. And it is important that all these armed formations have strived to appear "like state formations" in the eyes of the public—they have immediately shown up in uniform. The appearance of a uniform has a tremendous impact, giving even a gang the status of an almost legitimate force. Perestroika is a special phenomenon; in this case even extreme anti-Soviet forces established their power on the street not just in uniform but in Soviet uniform, using uniforms taken from state warehouses. Their appearance not only acted on the subconsciousness but produced a shock—a split in people's minds. This itself is criminal, and under international conventions the use of another country's uniform in war is punishable by death.

The result was the destruction of statehood. And that is a crime before the nation, for an industrial society cannot survive without an effective state, and in such a society the breakdown of civilization occurs very fast (in this sense an agrarian society is more stable). The state—an immense and complex machine that was built by numerous generations, the supreme achievement of civilization, which was restored after the Civil War with such blood and convulsions—has been virtually destroyed. Restoring it again will cost immense deprivations and sacrifice. If the "democrats" undertook this, they would atone for part of their guilt, but one sees no

understanding among them of what they have done. The extradition of Parfenov to the Latvian special services alone was an event of immense importance, the full destructive force of which has not yet been duly appreciated. And such cases are innumerable.

From every indication, the state will not be able to regain its monopoly on coercion quickly. Moreover, for the sake of immediate, short-term interests, arsenals are being opened up to arm allies in first one and then another political clique. And it is frightening that the criminal element is more and more loudly staking a claim to its share of what is, for all intents and purposes, legitimized coercion. We are on the eve of a qualitative leap: hitherto criminal coercion was committed against individuals—tomorrow it will become a means of rule over social groups. The regime has definitely set a course aimed at the legalization of criminal capital. Given the preservation in the army of remnants of solidarity with the people, capital will be forced to create its own forces for the repression and intimidation of the working people.

The struggle against them will be undertaken by criminal paramilitary organizations. Both a social base and "officer" cadres are being actively created for such organizations. In contrast, the workers' movement is only slowly being organized, and it is conceding the arena. Later it will have to be won back with great casualties (as in southern Italy, where the trade unions were the object of mafia terror). In many Latin American countries, where "death squads" are highly developed, the creation of a partisan movement was a condition for the most ordinary trade-union work. In the case of danger, trade-union activists and members of their families could be evacuated there. Clearly, if an organized workers' movement is not established until after gangs seize the street and start dictating their conditions, society will slide into a new and bloody revolution—it will once again represent the nation's only salvation.

For the sake of politics, the "democrats" laid extremely powerful mines under the legal system—whole regions and spheres of our society were cast back into lawlessness and violence. What did the abolition of the USSR mean for Tajikistan, for example? Its people lived under the protection of a powerful state, and in literally a matter of months they were given over to be torn apart by warring detachments of fighters. After all, they were not even given minimal time to build their own state system—an army, police and security agencies. Soviet Army units stationed there all of a sudden ceased performing the protective functions of armed forces. And the democratic press in Moscow sided one part of the people against the other and called for struggle against the president, a "former partocrat." And a Bacchanalia of killings began.

Let us look at another side. The kolkhozes have become victims. They were used to operating in a situation in which there was a low level of crime, without guard

services and without any traditions of guarding themselves. Individual farms located far from villages also became the targets of bandits. An avalanche of robberies and thefts of livestock got started in 1991, along with an ideological campaign that put kolkhozes outside the law. The militia did almost nothing to pursue the robbers, fighters against the "totalitarian kolkhoz system." The scheme was clever but not very farsighted, for crime is apolitical. Individual farmers have found themselves even more defenseless than the kolkhozes, and a capitalist cannot exist in the countryside, simply because he immediately becomes the victim of a criminal. And the regime has taken a step of immense significance (significance that it evidently does not recognize)—it has promised to give combat weapons to individual farmers. This totally changes the Russia's traditional image of the state in the eyes of citizens. What it involves is the legitimization of nonstate coercion and punishment ("lynch law"). But Russia is not America, and this will cause severe shocks.

And what have the results of privatization been? What legal grounds existed for denationalization of the property of the whole people? None. Everything was done with the help of a parliamentary forgery. The provision concerning the property of the whole people, a key aspect of all USSR Constitutions, was secretly removed, without any discussion, in the fall of 1990 in the course of "clarifying the wording" of a number of articles. This was done so subtly and unnoticeably that, when discussion of the law on privatization began in May 1991, a majority of the deputies were certain that the ownership of industrial enterprises by the people as a whole was a constitutional norm. One had to see how Boyko, one of the drafters of the law on privatization, mocked the deputies: "Look in the Constitution; there is no mention there of any ownership by the people as a whole; you yourselves revoked it long ago." I took part as an expert in the work of the Committee on Economic Reform, and the cynicism of that forgery was simply shocking.

After August 1991 it proved even easier to carry out the robbery of personal property through the uncontrolled increase in prices and destruction of all labor savings. As Yeltsin said, "Russia will be able to assume the responsibility of legal successor of the USSR." In reality, however, the Russian Federation government fundamentally abandoned the responsibility that the USSR had borne before its citizens. In the USSR a modest but decent provision for old age was guaranteed. One could buy a tonne of potatoes on a pension, but now one can buy 60 kg. What sort of legal succession is there here?! The August "revolution" brazenly refused to pay society's debt to several generations of citizens. And on what sort of attitude toward the property of the new owners can the liberal reformers count?

Only the member of the intelligentsia who has gone crazy with ideology fails to see that in 1990 alone the increase in the number of killings equaled the number of all the Soviet soldiers and officers killed in the 10 years of the Afghan war. Not the number of killings, but just the

increase in them! On that subject the democratic press remained silent—blood that does not deliver political dividends has no value.

And what about the consumer rights about which so much was said? At every step, on the street and in state stores, imported alcoholic beverages are sold. And the television warns that they are sometimes toxic, that you can go blind from them. If that is the case, why aren't the sellers of them in prison? Why isn't that alcohol confiscated by the militia, the KGB and the army and destroyed (as, for example, tens of tonnes of black caviar were destroyed in 1972 on suspicion of contamination—it was taken to be burned under the guard of soldiers)? Isn't that a direct, elementary duty of the authorities? Can you imagine such a thing happening under our non-rule-of-law regime six years ago?

Yet the point is not just specific cases but the fact that the law is flouted ostentatiously, in order to get people used to the idea that the law of the jungle has started to operate. And people already understand that. A person who has a ticket for a plane to Tbilisi has been unable to fly for several days—at the Domodedovo Airport the check-in counter has been blocked by a gang. And he does not even complain and appeal to the militia, which is standing 10 paces away. There are huge lines at the gas pumps, and a gang of speculators is always operating there. It brazenly gives orders and fills its canisters and tanks, even when the gasoline is running out, and people who have been waiting in line for three hours remain silent. For they see how a knife is brandished at someone who tries to protest. And on the roads the representatives of the "new class" run red lights and drive on the wrong side of the road with equal ostentation. State automotive inspectors turn their heads—they know who holds power now.

A sincere democrat and member of the intelligentsia will say that all these are the costs of revolution, and that we will survive this period of lawlessness and banditry, and then society will be stabilized and order instituted, as it was after the Civil War of 1917-1920. Not a bad prospect! But even these hopes are illusory, which A. Murashev, chief of the Moscow Main Internal Affairs Administration, has admitted by taking Harlem and Chicago as models. The genotype of criminal capitalism has already been incorporated in the reform, and quite deliberately so. As it grows, it will not lose but intensify its criminal nature—that is indicated by the criminology and theory of capitalism and by all historical experience. The present regime will not want to or be able to restore the health of society. It is no longer a master but a servant. The return to any sort of law will be possible only after a change of course and will now come at the price of great blood.

But the problem is not only this reality of our troubled time. The problem is that our "democrats'" ideal notions of a rule-of-law state presuppose the complete destruction of the foundations of legal life in Russia. A. D. Sakharov was the most sincere and honest ideologist of

perestroika. And here is what he said about the meaning of the rule-of-law state: "The principle that 'everything is permitted that is not forbidden by the law' should be taken literally." This laconic idea signifies a complete and irreversible break with the system of law that exists in the traditional society, a break in the continuity of the whole trajectory of Russia's legal consciousness. The essence of the matter is that in a traditional society a huge part of law is incorporated in cultural norms, taboos and traditions. These norms merge with legal norms to such an extent that most people make no distinction between them in their ordinary life. As the "democrats" understand it, the USSR was not a state based on the rule of law, but unwritten norms existed that were considered law (that is, people sincerely believed that somewhere these norms were written down as the Law). When the authorities violated these norms, they tried to carefully conceal it. The new idea of law means that all taboos and all cultural norms not written down in law are removed. What is happening is what Dostoyevskiy warned about and Berdyayev expressed as a member of our intelligentsia's notion of democracy: "I want what I want!"

It seems a curiosity, but in reality the recent case of a marriage in Italy between a brother and sister is of immense significance—no law could be found that forbade it. Western free society swallowed that, as it has marriages between two men. But are Russia and all the peoples inhabiting it ready for such a thing? And here is a curious case from our own life. On 9 May 1992 some sort of irrational motive prompted A. Murashev to visit a rally in Sokolniki. He was surrounded there by a crowd crying: "Hangman! Hangman!" And people started to spit on him. An old woman standing near me said to her friend: "Let's go join them. You can't hit someone, but the law doesn't forbid spitting!"

Yet we are speaking of ideals, and in politics there is deception in the very formula. After all, "that which is not forbidden by law is permitted" is only for the citizen. And for the regime—"that which is permitted by law is permitted"! Have our "democrats" "forgotten" that? After the 9 February rally, as KOMMERSANT writes, the information surfaced that "it was planned to use specially recruited people to create disturbances, after which special chemical agents and equipment were supposed to be put to use against the demonstrators." And further: "In the Moscow City Procuracy, where our correspondent went for an explanation, this was regarded with exceptional calm. In the opinion of legal specialists, such orders are not contrary to the Law on the Militia, which in no way regulates the methods of agents' operational work." And where are our advocates of the rule of law? After all, this is what tyranny is. Just as the USSR was immersed in a condition "without plan and without market," which resulted in the collapse of the economy, we are being immersed in a condition "without law and without morality," which is even more tragic.

The casting of society into mass violence occurs when the individual loses his system of coordinates and criteria for distinguishing between good and evil. The scientist and philosopher W. Heisenberg, who observed this in fascist Germany, writes: "In the life of an individual this manifests itself in the person's loss of the instinctive sense of the true and the false, the illusory and the real. In the life of peoples, it results in strange phenomena whereby immense forces that have been gathered to attain a certain goal suddenly change their direction and lead, in their destructive action, to results that are diametrically opposed to the goal that was set. When this happens people are so blinded by hatred that they observe all this with cynicism, indifferently shrugging their shoulders."

If A. D. Sakharov's thesis were full implemented in practice, it would mean society's slipping into an absurd civil war. And Andrey Dmitriyevich himself would be horrified at that. He was already horrified at a great deal. Thank God that our peoples' attitudes are characterized by enough inertia that they were not totally shaken up even in six years of perestroika. Nonetheless, the seeds of the "new legal thinking" have been sown. We are at a point of unstable equilibrium. One wrong step and these seeds will come up as poisonous flowers. The attractive idea of a state based on the rule of law should be purged of ideological mystifications, and the wandering flame of this myth of perestroika should be extinguished. We will not turn into a herd but will live in the law, respecting one another, only if we build it in harmony with truth—by those cultural norms that are incorporated in the memory of our peoples.

20th CPSU Conference Calls For Unity

934C0181D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Yevgeniy Krasnikov: "Communists: CPSU Pretends It's Still Alive—20th Party Conference Held"]

[Text] Representatives of various communist parties, movements, and regional organizations, calling themselves the "20th All-Union Party Conference," met in Moscow on October 10.

The organizers of the conference were inclined toward secrecy and did not invite to the function journalists from noncommunist publications. But the communists failed to conceal their activity from the authorities all the same. As one conference organizer, Aleksey Prigarin, told this NG correspondent, a prefect came to the hall in which the conference was being held on two occasions and threatened to use the special police to disperse the communists.

Nevertheless, the 20th party conference was indistinguishable from other communist functions in terms of both those in attendance and the content of the speeches delivered. The speakers talked of the importance of

uniting all forces, berated Yeltsin and Gaydar for antipopular policies, and maintained that the CPSU lives on.

But whereas the first two claims are quite debatable, rumors of the CPSU still being alive seem greatly exaggerated.

A representative of the Russian Communists deputy faction pointed out quite logically that the conference was not of an intimate character. Indeed, the decision to hold it was adopted at a meeting that called itself a CPSU Central Committee plenum—despite the fact that only one-tenth of the former Central Committee members take part in these measures.

It also seems highly doubtful that the reconstituted CPSU (in effect a totally new party) has managed to organizationally bring together all the existing communist parties and movements. In any case, it is known that leaders of the Russian Communist Workers Party take an unenthusiastic view, to put it mildly, of this idea, and that representatives of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks walked out of the conference hall to protest the course of its proceedings.

It would be clearly correct to take the view that October 10 marked the start of a process of founding a new party that retains only a certain ideological continuity with the late CPSU.

'Working Russia' Welcomes Next Congress Of National Salvation Front

934C0181C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 22 Oct 92 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Congress Supported"]

[Text] On October 20, by majority vote, the Working Russia Movement Coordinating Council adopted a statement in which it welcomes the founding congress of the National Salvation Front and says that it will send an official delegation to participate in the congress.

Report On Meeting Of Opposition Leaders With 'Den' Youth Activists

934C0181B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Vera Kholodnaya: "Opposition Forges Cadres"]

[Text] "The process is complete"—these words were the theme of a meeting between opposition leaders and youth activists of the Den movement (needless to say, the words refer to the situation in the country). Of the four promised opposition leaders, one didn't make it to the meeting—Yuriy Vlasov didn't attend, apologizing and promising to meet with the same group at any time. Nikolay Pavlov, Sergey Baburin, and Mikhail Astafyev did attend.

Ironically, the meeting between the statesmen-patriots and the youth activists took place in the building of the former Dzerzhinskiy Rayon CPSU Committee. To complete the scene, hanging over the stage was a catholic cross and a poster reading, "World Missionary Church."

The meeting was opened by Mikhail Astafyev. After briefly justifying his democratic past, he told of his disillusionment with Western democracy, "even though the Constitutional Democrats were always oriented toward it. For the West, the criterion for our country's being democratic is that we refrain from its restoration. And no one over there is concerned by the fact that former Communists are in power," said the Constitutional Democrats' leader.

In the opinion of Sergey Baburin, we are on the threshold of a third world war, a war for the redistribution of resources in which Russia will be the battle ground.

The opposition was unanimous in characterizing the recent incident involving MK [not further identified] a provocation. According to Pavlov, "as soon as the patriotic movement gathers momentum, these sorts of incidents involving Pamyat occur."

The audience was very active, noisy, and agitated. It argued with the speakers and passed up questions for them. Baburin, responding to one of the questions, characterized the meeting's aims and results in passing: "We came here not so much to speak as to look at you and to understand what can be expected of you."

Working Russia Movement Holds Constituent Congress

PM2810131392 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Oct 92 p 1

[Report by Igor Malyarov, member of the Working Russia Coordinating Council Executive Committee: "Working Russia Constituent Congress]

[Text] The "Working Russia" constituent congress was held on Sunday 25 October in Moscow. Viktor Anpilov's report pointed out that the "'Working Russia' sociopolitical movement is active in 80 cities in the republic and has in actual fact become the most consistent opposition to the antipeople regime." Thus, it is not a question of creating a new structure, but of registering in law an existing organization that combines within its ranks members of the Russian Communist Workers Party, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Union of Communists, the United Front of Working People, the Movement of Working People's Soviets, and the Lenin Communist Youth League.

Roughly 200 delegates represented 65 regions of the country—from Maritime Kray to Leningrad. "Working Leningrad," "Working Omsk," "Working Kuban," "Working Kazan" and many other regional organizations of our movement have been in operation for a long time now.

The speakers backed V.I. Anpilov in saying that, at a time of national catastrophe brought about by the introduction of capital [kapitalizatsiya] to the country following IMF practices, it is quite inadmissible to fragment communist forces and provoke splits within our ranks.

The "Working Russia" Constituent Congress statement expressed willingness to cooperate in specific matters with all political forces that oppose the antipeople regime. The movement's tasks for the coming months were articulated. The most important of these being: to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution; prepare a Russia-wide strike—to this end it was decided to set up a "Working Russia" strike fund; and prepare for the Seventh Congress of Russian People's Deputies. "Working Russia" urges deputies to accept for discussion the draft RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Constitution prepared by a large group of academics under the leadership of Russian People's Deputy Yu.M. Slobodkin and approved by the Russian Congress of Soviets of workers, peasants, specialists, and employees held in Nizhny Novgorod 17-18 October 1992.

The movement's coordinating council was elected, with representatives of Russia's regions delegated to it, along with its executive committee. Among the executive committee's 15 members are Prof A.A. Sergeyev; V.I. Ilyukhin, chairman of the public committee for the investigation of M.S. Gorbachev's activity; USSR People's Deputy V.P. Nosov; and the poet B.M. Gunko, leader of the "Unity" ["Yedinstvo"] Society. V.I. Anpilov was unanimously elected chairman of the "Working Russia" Coordinating Council Executive Committee.

"Working Russia's" telephone number in Moscow is: 198-32-75.

'Sociopolitical' Center's Parallels With CPSU Organs Viewed

934C0140A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Vadim Gorshenin and Viktor Trushkov: "Old Winds off Staraya Square"]

[Text] How many times now it has been asserted to the world—in the "democratic" mass media, from parliamentary and other rostrums, and in the Constitutional Court—that the party's merger with the state was not simply a great vice but an unprecedented political Fall. Along with his fellow defendants (lawyers for the presidential side in this case), Sergey Shakhrai, the Russian president's representative in the Constitutional Court, considered this card absolutely unbeatable and put it out for general view in the press even before the actual hearings of the "CPSU case" in the Constitutional Court. When their principal trump card got beslobbered and worn utterly bare from unreasonable overuse, they put out a duplicate of it. In his expert statement, Prof Stanislav Chernichenko, defender of the presidential

ukases, cited the 1990 Copenhagen documents, which declare the impermissibility of parties' merger with the state. And at that time—At the end of last year, Sergey Shakh-ray was draped in offices like a cocklebur plant with burrs. In the government he was vice-premier, in the presidential structures—director of the State Law Administration, in the legislative branch—an RSFSR people's deputy. Despite this immense work load, an 18 November presidential order laid yet another office on him: that of a member of the Council of the Russian Sociopolitical Center [RSPC]. Judging from the functions of that institution, the new assignment was hardly a purely ceremonial one.

B. Yeltsin's order establishing the Russian Sociopolitical Center was preceded by his ukase terminating the activities of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party as "state structures."

That part of the public that came to worship the Russian president more than the previous president for the promulgated decree simply could not imagine party and political life without the patronage of the state (or vice-versa). As it used to be said, "Accommodating the desires of the working people," on 18 November 1991 Boris Nikolayevich promulgated Order No. 90 rp [possible expansion: of the Russian President]: "To support the initiative of the RSFSR's political parties and sociopolitical movements to create a Russian Sociopolitical Center." Point 3 of the order stipulates that "direction of the activities of the Russian Sociopolitical Center is exercised by a Council. ..." A list of eight names follows. Since the alphabet does not favor Sergey Mikhaylovich, his name is given next-to-last. Another presidential state adviser, Sergey Stankevich, was confirmed as the Council's chairman.

It is logical to assume that the closest presidential adviser and consultant on legal questions had a hand in both of the aforementioned documents: his name figures on the second, and he has been diligently defending the first for several months now in the Constitutional Court. Yet the emotional thrust of the two documents is diametrically opposed. Here are the words of Stanislav Eduardovich Skopovskiy, general director of the RSPC (the Council confirmed by the president is for ideological and political guidance, while the general directorate is for practical duties):

"The new institution, in the opinion of many specialists, is fairly original. That is what we are told in both public and governmental circles. It is a sociopolitical center, but in terms of its status and its position, which is approved by the Russian Federation President, this organization is, all the same, a state institution, with all of the attendant consequences. There are none like it with an analogous status in other countries."

True, indeed. There is no such institution in other countries, and there was previously none in our country, either. The Lord himself has decreed that sociopolitical

centers belong to public organizations or political parties, and by no means to the state. But even that is not where its uniqueness lies. The new state institution was established for—the guidance of political parties and public organizations.

S. Skopovskiy tries, if not to circumvent, at least to mitigate this ticklish problem. He denies a direct merger of the state with political parties, citing the list of parties to contracts concluded by the institution he heads. But, since, like anyone else, he does not want to make his own activity and its purpose meaningless, he agrees:

"The center should have some sort of guidance function. It is the coordination of political organizations, so that they think not only about the local interests of individual parties and movements but about common interests. It makes direct sense for the RSPC to cooperate with the parties that defend the president."

Either the Stankevich-Shakh-ray-Skopovskiy firm is not yet performing its duties, or the general director is being modest. The president's order "On the Russian Sociopolitical Center" sets much clearer objectives:

"The basic objectives of the RSPC are:

"—organizational, informational and consultative support for the activities of political parties. ...

"—professional training and instruction of the cadres of political parties and sociopolitical movements, to be carried out with the consent of the leadership bodies of those organizations. ..."

And so, a state institution's duties include providing organizational support for the activities of political parties. How can such parties be called anything but state parties?! Moreover, that same state institution undertakes to train and instruct party cadres, and what is left for the parties' political leadership is to nod in agreement, which is what is called "consent" in bureaucratic language. Incidentally, one can probably guess what instruction is. But what, in the given context, is "training"? Filling with ideological content? The distribution of functional duties on party staffs? The amassment and inculcation of partocratic skills?

Granted, in a conversation with one of us the general director of the RSPC especially emphasized that his biography is free of partocratic incrustations:

"I was never a party functionary. I am an economist by training and a candidate of economic sciences. ... I worked as an expert on Gorbachev's staff. I went through all the events of 19-21 August on Gorbachev's side; I have nothing to be ashamed of here. After the president resigned and his structures were destroyed, I worked until recently as an expert on the staff of Sergey Stankevich, state political adviser, and was then appointed director of the initiative group that established the RSPC. Now I am its general director."

Stanislav Eduardovich has a quite respectable biography, although without the pertinent experience it will probably be difficult to train a new, high-quality state nomenklatura. However, such people are not bothered by trivia. Especially when the president has most strictly ordered the government to provide everything necessary to the newly established incubator for hatching a "democratic" nomenklatura. His Order No. 213 rp states: "The Russian Federation government is to provide the Russian Sociopolitical Center, in accordance with its statements of requirements, with the material and technical resources, equipment, supplies, transportation, communications equipment, and data-processing and computing equipment necessary for its activities."

Granted, the general director is counting on commercial activity. However, it seems that commerce will be an auxiliary source of financing for the RSPC. The present and former state advisers heading its Council will look after their charge. Otherwise it will not manage to hatch fresh and outwardly attractive state parties.

Without generous state financing it would also be inconceivable nowadays to establish the necessary international image for the nomenklatura incubator. That is why the Russian president ordered: "The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be to provide assistance to the Russian Sociopolitical Center in making international contacts." Granted, one thing is not clear here: Will the Russian Foreign Ministry be required to assist the RSPC alone in making contacts abroad or, together with it, those parties whose organizational activity this state institution is instructed to support? After all, unwanted temptations could arise of the sort that sometimes become the subject of consideration in the Constitutional Court or other courts.

In the conversation S. Skopovskiy insistently stressed that the center he heads is dual-purpose:

"The RSPC occupies a dual position. It itself generates ideas of what Russian statehood should be like. On the other hand, if ideals have been developed by the state, and if the state has deemed them to be correct and necessary, our task is to persuade all the sociopolitical forces and groups that exist here that it is precisely those ideals that must be realized, and that they probably should not seek other courses of solution."

And Stanislav Eduardovich further persistently stressed that the RSPC is supposed to feed the state leadership both information about the country's political life and substantiated recommendations.

"Aren't you competing with such an analytical center as RF [Russian Federation]-Policy?"

"We may find ourselves to be its competitor," S. Skopovskiy agreed.

Our readers are familiar with the style of RF-Policy's recommendations (see "Burbulis vs. Yeltsin," 29 August 1992, and "A Crib Sheet for Shakh-ray," 17 September

1992). In the propaganda of the "witch hunt," its standard is extremely high. However, it is entirely possible that the young RSPC also has inclinations. Let us cite S. Skopovskiy once again: "We are a presidential structure. Of course, we, like the president, combine legislative and executive functions. But we serve the presidential echelon. We are also a spokesman for the government." We shall not risk disputing the latter contention. But as for the combination of legislative and executive functions—not by the RSPC but by the president—that is curious. Given such an approach, it is no surprise that the president instructs a state institution to provide organizational support for the activities of political parties. In that area the RSPC may very well overtake RF-Policy, to which State Secretary G. Burbulis has seemingly not yet assigned such functions.

Moreover, the Russian Sociopolitical Center has an effective material incentive to knock together state parties to meet the president's and government's needs. The president has given staff members of the RSPC the honor of being on a par with staff members of his own administration—in terms of their level of material benefits. In order to avoid making an unsupported statement, let us once again cite the 5 May 1992 Presidential Order No. 213 rp: "In terms of the conditions of material, everyday, transportation and medical services, employees of the Russian Sociopolitical Center are to be put on the same footing as corresponding categories of employees of the Russian Federation president's administration."

However, the point is not privileges. The government is free to pamper and look after its ideological servant. The point is that a state structure has been established that is instructed by the highest command to purposefully form state parties, instruct their cadres, and see to the organizational support of their activities. This is truly an inestimable achievement in the theory and practice of "democratic" state administration. And after that, the Russian Federation president's representative Sergey Shakh-ray delivers angry tirades in the Constitutional Court concerning the CPSU as a "state structure." Even while serving at the same time as a member of the Council of the RSPC, an incubator of new state parties! We know, of course, that the tongue is a flexible organ. But among normal people it is customarily believed that, though flexible, it should be strictly guided by conscience and decency. Or have the supporters of total buying and selling, rushing to enter the market, already managed to sell their tongues? Then they will have an easy time competing even with RF-Policy.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

DELOVOY MIR Economic Statistics, 26 September
934A0125A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
26 Sep 92 pp 2, 3

[Report by Valeriy Galitskiy, Aris Zakharov, and Aleksandr Frenkel: "Growth and Decline"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the year the republic parliament and the government have basically created the legal and economic conditions for the development of market relations. A large number of laws, statutes, and normative acts to enable the market to become established have been adopted. On the other hand, the adoption of some documents is taking longer than expected.

The center has implemented measures aimed at averting hyperinflation in the first half of the year, giving a boost to money circulation, and saving the ruble. The monetary, credit, and budget restrictions that were in effect during the first months of the year have restored the ruble as a means of payment and reduced direct barter, while managing to keep the growth of the money supply within 9-14 percent a month. These measures made it possible to rein in the runaway pace of overt inflation from 345 percent in January—as compared with the preceding month—to 112 percent in May, 119 percent in June, 111 percent in July, and 110 percent in August (consumer price indexes are shown to characterize inflation).

The pace of wholesale price increases is declining rather steadily from month to month. However, at the end of August wholesale and consumer prices started to rise somewhat faster. It is expected that as a result of the recent decision to raise oil prices, prices for other types of products and goods will start creeping up again. Consumer demand is increasingly noticeably playing a role of regulator putting a lid on price increases. Enterprises are gradually realizing (albeit slowly) that they are now in a situation that is principally different from before, so they have started limiting price increases and monitoring customers' solvency.

The implementation of economic reform is now shifting to the regions, cities, and rayons. This is where market relations and economic links are now being formed, an entrepreneurial class is emerging, small and medium-size businesses and private farms are being established, and the process of converting large enterprises into joint-stock ownership and small enterprise privatization is getting underway.

Free trade is developing; its share is estimated to account for about 10 percent of goods turnover, with a volume of over 200 billion rubles [R].

In the opinion of the republic's leaders, reform is being implemented more actively in Samara, Penza, Sakhalin, and some other oblasts, as well as in Maritime Kray. There are examples of well thought-through, purposeful work conducted along the lines of transition to a market economy and reforming the form of ownership of large industrial enterprises: at the Saratov aviation production association, individual large defense enterprises in Tula, and other enterprises.

All this is taking place, however, against the background of continuing production decline. As is known, the beginning of this process goes beyond the boundaries of this year—the decline started earlier; still, the unjustified explosion of wholesale prices at the beginning of the year

which exceeded all expectations did play a negative role, noticeably weakening the producers' incentive to increase production. Basically, this was the main factor in the eventual total insolvency of enterprises.

Conversion had a perceptible effect in the sense of contributing to a production decline, as well as the fact that enterprises are suspending the production of ineffective types of goods.

In July and August the decline in industrial production amounted to: in July—22 percent; in August—27 percent, as compared with 15 percent for the first half of the year (the Russian State Committee for Statistics in addition to reported data also makes alternative calculations of the physical volume of production indices, based on products expressed in physical units, and the results are close to the reported data).

Of the 254 types of products counted in periodic reports, the output of 133 (61 percent) declined by 25 percent or more.

Since this year's grain procurement began, state stocks have received 14.8 million tonnes of grain. Despite increased procurement prices, agricultural enterprises are in no hurry to sell grain to the state; mandatory procurement targets have been met only by 51 percent. The level of procurement of vegetables and potatoes is considerably lower than last year. As compared with January-August of 1991, procurement of cattle and fowl has declined by 29 percent, milk—by 24 percent, and eggs—by 25 percent. There was less rough and juicy fodder laid in this year than last.

State investment in the economy is declining sharply. Compared with last year the volume of capital investment fell almost by one half. At this point enterprises are not yet committing themselves to major investment in production development. Construction organizations and enterprises are hard hit by the difficulties of the transition period. There was 37 percent less contract work fulfilled this year than last year. Many construction programs are being folded. The volume of completed residential housing construction declined by 27 percent.

Russia's foreign trade in January-August amounted to \$42.7 billion, which represents a 28-percent decline as compared with the corresponding period of last year.

The parliament and government are taking steps aimed at softening the impact of price decontrol on the population's standard of living—especially that of the least-protected social groups. The minimum wage is being increased. Salaries of employees of budget-financed organizations in health care, education, culture, arts, etc. have been increased.

In some months wage increases ran ahead of price increases; in May and June the ratio was as follows: wages grew by 38 percent and 20 percent, respectively, while prices went up by 12 percent and 19 percent

(consumer price index). In July the situation changed: wages grew by 8 percent, while prices went up by 11 percent.

Steps are being taken in the direction of overcoming the imbalance of both state and enterprise finances; certain signs of improvement are showing. The continuing solvency crisis feeds instability in this sphere. So far it has

not been possible to stop the swelling volume of arrears in the national economy, but the pace of their growth has subsided. The situation with issuing payroll money at enterprises has normalized.

The socioeconomic situation in the Russian Federation is characterized by the following data (in current prices, billions of rubles):

	January-August 1992	1992 as a percentage of 1991 (in comparable prices)	
		January-August	August
Gross domestic product, in trillions of rubles	6.0-6.2		
Volume of industrial production (goods and services)	7,369	83.4	72.8
Production of consumer goods	2,156	83	73
including:			
food products	849	78	78
alcoholic beverages	162	91	84
nonfood items	1,146	86	70
Putting in operation facilities built with state capital investment			
residential housing—millions square meters of total area	11.2	73	
general education schools—thousands of student placement slots	112.7	70	
Procurement of agricultural products (millions tonnes of grain (as of 09/14/92)	16.3	91	
potatoes (as of 09/14/92)—thousands of tonnes	350	28	
vegetables (as of 09/14/92)—thousands of tonnes	921	56	
cattle and fowl	4.2	71	74
milk	19.3	76	79
eggs—billions of units	15.3	75	73
Freight (shipments) of cargo by general use transport—billions of tonnes	4.3	81	73
Retail trade turnover	1.4	58	66
Paid services	144	60	61
Monetary income of the population	2,480	5.3-fold*	8.2-fold*

* in current prices

National income produced on the territory of the Russian Federation in January-August of this year amounted, in preliminary estimates, to R5 trillion, which is 20 percent less than during the corresponding period of last year. National income declined to the same extent in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Azerbaijan the decline was greater and amounted to approximately 25 percent. In the Republics of Belarus and Turkmenistan the pace of national income growth amounted to 85 percent and 89.5 percent of the corresponding period of last year, respectively.

Formation of a Market Economy

In January-August of 1992 the process of creating new economic forms continued. As of 1 July 1992 there were 249,200 joint-ownership companies; 58,100 joint-stock societies; 9,900 associations, concerns, and consortiums;

5,300 commercial banks; 217 commodity, stock, commodity and stock, and commodity and raw materials exchanges; 158,100 cooperatives; 7,600 joint enterprises; and 138,500 privately-owned, individual, and other enterprises registered on the territory of the Russian Federation.

The process of formation of the market economy is being held back, however, by the slow pace of destatization and privatization. As of 1 August 1992, 6,459 enterprises (entities) have been fully privatized in Russia, including 136 enterprises converted to joint-stock ownership. The means (revenue) received from the privatization of enterprises (entities) amounted to R9,189.3 million; of this, R363.6 million came from sales to labor collectives; R4,919.6 million—from the privatization of industrial enterprises; R2,331.5 million—from the privatization of

trade and public catering enterprises; and R696.2 million—from consumer services enterprises.

Employment of the Populace

There have been changes in the structure of employment of the republic's populace: The number of employees of leased enterprises, joint-stock societies, associations, concerns, consortiums, and privately-owned enterprises increased by 2.5 million persons as compared with the beginning of the year.

During January-August of this year, 10 million workers left their place of employment for all reasons combined.

The number of unemployed persons applying to the employment service is growing. In January-August 1992, 1.5 million persons applied with a request to find employment. During the same period, employment was provided for 420,000 persons.

In the structure of the unemployed population registered with the employment service, the percentage laid off by enterprises, offices, and organizations in connection with structural changes, changing form of ownership, or in some instances liquidation is growing. Since the beginning of the year about 1 million persons have been laid off for these reasons. It is expected that during the next three months another 300,000 persons will be laid off.

As of 1 September of this year 904,300 persons looking for a job were registered in branches of the employment service. Of them, 294,200 had the status of unemployed. Unemployment benefits were received by 174,100 persons (59 percent).

As compared with the beginning of the year, a considerable increase in the number of unemployed was registered in Pskov and Kirov Oblasts—more than 20-fold; in Kostroma and Tambov Oblasts—15-fold; in Penza, Astrakhan, and Ivanovo Oblasts—more than 8-fold; and in Vladimir and Amur Oblasts—6-fold. The Russian State Committee for Statistics estimates that by the end of the year the number of unemployed may reach 2 million persons.

The number of employment vacancies listed with the employment service—even without taking into account their structure—is half the number of applicants for these vacancies.

Issuance of Currency for Payroll and Other Monetary Disbursements

The situation at enterprises in the national economy with respect to availability of currency for payroll, monetary disbursements, and remuneration is moving towards normalization. During August the backlog in issuing currency for these purposes was reduced by 41 percent (27 percent in July) at surveyed industrial, construction, and agricultural enterprises. The situation has improved due to monetary emission, the issuance of higher denomination banknotes and coins, and use by enterprises of noncash methods to pay employees.

As of 1 September the total volume of this type of arrears at enterprises in the aforementioned sectors (excluding the amounts deposited directly into employees' bank accounts) amounted to R28.2 billion as compared with 47.6 billion as of 1 August.

As of 1 September the situation with issuing currency for payroll, monetary disbursements, and other remunerations to enterprise employees by individual surveyed sectors of the national economy was characterized by the following data:

	Number of enterprises in arrears		Arrears in issuing currency for labor remuneration and other monetary disbursements, billions of rubles	Of that, arrears due to fault of bank	Arrears more than 20 days past due, billions of rubles
	thousands	as a percentage of total number of enterprises			
Total in industry, construction, and agriculture	16.8	34.3	28.2	7.9	17.7
of that, at enterprises and organizations:					
—in industry	5.4	24.4	17.3	5.1	11.3
—in construction	4.1	30.0	6.4	1.2	3.9
—agriculture	7.3	28.6	4.5	1.6	2.5
of that:					
—kolkhozes	3.4	26.0	1.9	0.7	1.0

While arrears have been reduced overall by 41 percent, in industry and agriculture the reduction amounted to 43 percent and 49 percent, respectively, and in construction—23 percent.

Arrears declined most perceptively at enterprises and organizations in the aforementioned sectors in the Central-Chernozem region—by 59 percent; the Central region—by 56 percent; and the Urals and East Siberian

regions—by 55 percent each; within these regions the greatest reduction took place in Orel, Tver, Lipetsk, and Kaluga Oblasts, and in Buryat and Udmurt Republics—by 70 percent or more.

Nevertheless, incidents of past due arrears still occur at a large number of enterprises: in industry—at about one-quarter of enterprises; in construction—one-third; and in agriculture—one half.

The greatest amounts not paid out within the prescribed time are owed by enterprises in these sectors in Tyumen (R5.3 billion), Sverdlovsk (1.3 billion), Chechen-Ingush Republic (1.1 billion), Krasnoyarsk Kray (0.9 billion), Perm (0.8 billion) and Novosibirsk (0.8 billion) Oblasts, and the Komi Republic (0.8 billion).

Arrears more than 20 days past due amount overall to 63 percent of the total sum of arrears (67 percent as of 1 August 1992); at enterprises in the city of Moscow, Irkutsk, Kamchatka, Magadan, and Smolensk Oblasts, Khalmg Tangch, Kabardin-Balkar, Chechen-Ingush, Gornyy Altay, and Tuva Republics—between 80 and 100 percent.

Due to the shortage of currency in banks, enterprises and organizations in industry, construction, and agriculture did not receive consumption funds in the amount of R7.9 billion (29 percent of the total amount of arrears). Arrears accounted for by this factor decreased in August by 72 percent. Enterprises in Voronezh, Tambov, and Tomsk Oblasts, Krasnoyarsk and Stavropol Kray, and the Republics of Kalmykia, Tatarstan, Adygey, Dagestan, Checheno-Ingushetia, Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, and Gornyy Altay were in a more difficult situation than others with respect to issuance of these funds because of currency shortages in the banks.

Industry

In the second half of the year the scale of decline in industrial production increased sharply. To a certain extent the decline in industrial production is the result of positive structural changes caused by defense industry conversion. According to estimates of the enterprises that supply the needs of the military-industrial complex, the output of military-related items in 1992 fell by almost half. At the same time, their current capacity for increasing output for civilian needs does not allow them to compensate for such a drop in production. Also increasingly felt is the impact of insufficient financial and material resources, which is forcing enterprises to switch to a shortened work schedule and send employees on unscheduled leave, as well as causing an increased incidence of idling industrial shops and production lines.

According to the results of a sample survey, every month 800-900 enterprises in the industrial sector of the Russian Federation are at least partially idled because of the insufficient supply of electricity, raw materials, supplies, and components. As compared with June, the loss of productive time for this reason in August of this year

increased 1.5-fold and reached 4.5 million man-days, which comprises about one-third of such losses since the beginning of this year.

In the fuel industry the production of coal in January-August declined by 4 percent as compared with the corresponding period of last year, including an 11-percent decline in August. Average daily production in August was 3 percent below that in July.

Production of oil over eight months declined by 14 percent; 13 percent of producing oil wells in the oil fields are idle.

In the past, a decline in the production of coal and oil was usually compensated for by an increased production of gas. In January-August the production of gas declined by 0.9 percent as compared with the corresponding period of last year. In August, the production of gas declined by 1.4 billion cubic meters (3 percent).

Electric power production in January-August declined by 4 percent; at thermal power stations, which generate three-quarters of total electric power, it fell by 8 percent.

The production decline continued in August in the ferrous metals industry: while in July the output of the main types of metal production decreased by 21 percent, in August the extent of decline in the production of finished rolled metal was 26 percent, and steel pipes—32 percent. During the current year the traditional problems of this industry (wear and tear of technical equipment, running behind schedule in putting production capacities into operation, the deformed structure of metallurgical production, shortage of material and technical resources—first and foremost scrap metal) were compounded by the problem of the difficult financial situation of metallurgical enterprises. High prices on metallurgical output depressed the demand for metal, resulting in a reduction of its output. In addition, the decline in the output of metallurgical products has been caused to a certain degree by reduced investment activity as well as the cutbacks in the production of military items.

In machine-building the daily output of a number of the most important production items this August was the lowest this year; this included metal-cutting machine tools, drop forges, flax puller, tower cranes with a capacity of eight tonnes or higher, and tractor trailers. The production of these items in January-August of this year was 20-57 percent below that of the same period last year. The output of alternate current electric motors, grain-harvesting combines, tractors, excavators, and freight railroad cars fell by 26-33 percent; and that of self-propelled cranes and antifriction bearings—by 14-16 percent.

This August also produced a trend towards an increasing decline in the chemical industry. The output of chemical fibers and filaments this August was the lowest since the beginning of the year and amounted to 86 percent of the preceding month's level. As compared with last year's

level the total shortfall in the production of these items over eight months amounted to 45,000 tonnes, or 12 percent.

A similar situation developed with respect to the production of mineral fertilizers. Their average daily output this August was below that of this July by 2 percent, and one-third less than that in August of last year. Compared to last year's level, over eight months the shortfall amounted to 1.7 million tonnes (17 percent), including the output of nitrogenous—485,000 tonnes (11 percent, phosphate—990,000 tonnes (33 percent), and potash fertilizer—201 tonnes (9 percent).

In the timber, woodworking, and cellulose and paper industries the level of output of most types of timber products in August was below that of July. The timber-logging industry continues to destabilize the work of the industry's enterprises. As compared with the corresponding period of last year, over eight months the production of commercial wood fell by 16.6 million cubic meters (12 percent), including that of round timber—by 13 million cubic meters (11 percent). The increasing imbalance between the raw material base and the timber-processing industry has led to a 21-38 percent reduction in the production of pit props, shaft timber, switch ties, and prefabricated wooden houses; and a 12-20 percent reduction in the production of bolt timber, plywood, wide-track railroad ties, and window and door frames.

The situation in the cellulose and paper industry continues to worsen because of the unsatisfactory supply of raw wood, chemicals, recyclable paper, and imported spare parts for equipment (imported equipment accounts for 80 percent of all installed equipment). The daily production of paper and cardboard in August was the lowest during the elapsed period; as compared with July, the production declined by 15 percent and 14 percent, respectively.

In the construction materials industry in August the average daily output of certain items—pliable roofing and insulation, window glass, linoleum—exceeded last month's level. However, the daily output of most of very important types of construction materials—cement, slate, construction brick, prefabricated ferroconcrete—declined by 2-3 percent as compared with July. As compared with the last year's level, the shortfall since the beginning of the year amounted to 6-20 percent.

Against the backdrop of reduced investment activities, the shrinking demand has led to further cutbacks in the production of materials for the construction of production and technical facilities—prefabricated ferroconcrete components and items; steel, wall, and roofing panels; and components made of aluminum alloys. Their output in January-August declined by 20-29 percent.

Agriculture

By 14 September grain crops have been harvested on 42.7 million hectares (75 percent of the area sown) and

threshed on 40 million hectares (70 percent). This has yielded 82.2 million tonnes of grain (last year by the same date—81.6 million tonnes). Threshed yield per hectare was to 20.6 quintals as compared with 16.5 quintals last year.

Harvesting is in progress mostly in the Urals and Eastern and Western Siberia. A little more than 14 million hectares remains to be harvested.

Grain procurement amounted to 16.3 million tonnes (20 percent of the threshed total), which is 9 percent less than last year. Mandatory procurement targets have been met by 56 percent. During the past week 1.5 million tonnes of grain was delivered to grain procurement centers, as compared with 1.3 million tonnes during the preceding week.

Generally, grain is being held back by the farms in the expectation of lucrative offers. So far kolkhozes and sovkhoses in Russia have sold through all channels less than one-quarter of the harvested grain. Of the total volume of grain sold, 83 percent went into state stocks, 7 percent sold was through markets, and 8 percent distributed as in-kind payment and used in public catering in kolkhozes and sovkhoses.

Vegetables at state and collective farms have been harvested on 69,000 hectares (23 percent of total area); potatoes—on 303,000 hectares (35 percent). Average yield per hectare amounted to 91 quintals of tuber-crops as compared with 97 quintals a year ago.

Flax-pulling progresses at the last year's level (73 percent of the total area). Harvesting of sugar beets has begun. Root-crops have been harvested on 123,000 hectares (9 percent of the area), which amounts to approximately 200 quintals per hectare (20 percent more than in 1991).

By 14 September of this year 10.8 quintals of feed units of rough and juicy fodder per standard head of cattle has been laid in for the upcoming stall period, as compared with 12.0 quintals of feed units last year. This shortfall has not been made up for by grain forage stocks—15.1 million tonnes (18.4 percent of the harvest). Last year by the same date forage stocks had 15.8 million tonnes of grain (19.4 percent).

The work on laying the foundation for next year's harvest is behind schedule. As of 14 September winter grain has been sown on an area of 12.4 million hectares, as compared with 15.8 million hectares last year. With respect to land plowed for spring sowing, 16.0 million hectares has been plowed (in 1991, 30.6 million hectares).

The State of the Consumer Market

Retail trade turnover amounted to R1.4 trillion in January-August of this year, which is a 5.7-fold increase as compared with the corresponding period of last year. In terms of goods content, however, it was 42 percent below that of last year.

In itself, the process of trade is acquiring an increasingly free character; a huge number of physical and legal entities have entered the market. During the elapsed eight months industrial enterprises realized through free trade channels R36.8 billion worth of goods, which amounted to 2.6 percent of retail turnover (in January-August of 1991—1.7 percent). The population purchased from private sources one-tenth of all goods purchased this year.

Last week (7-11 September) trade and industry stocks of meat increased by 7 percent, sugar—by 16 percent, and

flour—by 18 percent. At the same time, their production declined by 11 percent, 16 percent, and 7 percent, respectively.

Since the beginning of September there have been interruptions in the supply of bread in Krasnodar, Stavropol, Perm, and Yekaterinburg.

Below is the grouping of cities that characterizes the state of the market of basic food products during last week (from the data produced by surveys of the stores in 76 capitals of Russia's constituent republics, and oblast and kray centers):

	Number of Cities Where the Commodity			Market Saturation Index*	
	Could Be Purchased		Was Not Available	08/31-09/04	09/07-09/11
	Easily, Without Waiting in Line	After Waiting in Line, or By Coupons			
Meat	47	4	25	2.8	2.9
Butter	69	3	4	3.7	3.8
Whole-milk products	64	9	3	3.7	3.8
Eggs	70	2	4	3.8	3.8
Sugar	37	15	24	2.6	2.7
Vegetable oil	39	3	34	2.7	2.6
Potatoes	58	-	18	3.1	3.2

*The value of this index is between 1 and 4 and is calculated as a weighted average taking into account groupings of cities depending on the following situation in the market: the commodity is not available (1); sold by coupons (2); may be purchased after waiting in line (3); is easily available (4).

Wholesale enterprises' monopoly on supplying retail trade with goods is weakening. According to a sample survey the percentage of shipments through the trade sector's wholesale network in the total volume of goods arriving at state retail stores was reduced on average in Russia from 68 percent last year to 54 percent this year; in Novgorod, it dropped from 87 percent to 57 percent, Volgograd—from 68 percent to 47 percent, and in Smolensk—from 56 percent to 28 percent. At the same time, there is an increase in goods procurement resulting from direct links with producer enterprises (from 18 percent to 21 percent), on the basis of independent procurement or barter operations (from 9 percent to 17 percent), through exchanges and other sources (from 4 percent to 7 percent).

Over eight months of this year the volume of paid consumer services amounted to R144 billion (a fourfold increase as compared with the corresponding period of last year). The physical volume of paid services during the same period shrunk by 40 percent.

According to a sample survey conducted by statistical organs, custom tailor and shoe-making shops as well as public baths and hair salons have lost almost one-third of their clientele because of increased charges for their services; enterprises engaged in repairs of residential housing, television and radio equipment, and appliances

lost more than one half of their customers as compared with the corresponding period of last year.

The emergence of a competitive environment in the consumer market for goods and services is being constrained by the slow pace of privatization of state trade and consumer services enterprises. By the beginning of September of this year 50,600 state enterprises, kiosks, cafes, cafeterias, etc., and more than 21,000 consumer services enterprises in the Russian Federation (respectively, 25 percent and 23 percent of the total number of enterprises subject to commercialization) had the status of legal entity. Completely privatized by that time were 9,500 retail trade enterprises, which comprises 5.5 percent of the total number of state enterprises, 2,800 public catering enterprises (2.0 percent), and 5,700 consumer services enterprises (4.5 percent).

Prices on the Consumer Market

After the relative deceleration of price increases that continued in the past two months (weekly increases were in the 1-2 percent range), since the last week of August an upward trend has again emerged. During the first week of September prices for food products in retail trade increased by 4.1 percent, while during the preceding week in August they increased by 3.9 percent. At city markets the pace of price increases is somewhat slower—a result of dropping prices for potatoes and vegetables.

Price changes by product group from 1 to 8 September are presented below (in percentages):

	Taking city market into account	Including:	
		retail trade	city markets
All food products	103.0	104.1	100.1
Meat and meat products	102.4	102.1	102.8
Fish and fish products	99.7	99.1	
Edible fats	101.4	100.8	105.7
Dairy products and cheeses	103.7	103.2	107.8
Eggs	101.0	101.1	100.0
Sugar	109.5	109.5	
Confectionery items	104.5	103.0	
Salt	106.8	106.8	
Flour	103.2	102.5	
Bakery products	104.7	104.7	
Cereals and pasta	104.7	104.7	
Potatoes and vegetables	100.1	103.6	96.9

During the indicated period average prices in Russia registered an increase in retail trade for practically all food products. The most perceptible increase was in the price of sugar (from R58.3 to R64.8 per kg); semolina (from R16.2 to R18.1), oatmeal (from R23.6 to R26.3) and buckwheat (from R50.1 to R55.4) cereals; and cabbage (from R13.4 to R14.9 per kg).

The average price of wheat bread made of highest grade flour went up by 7.6 percent and amounted to R23 per kg. In certain regions the price of eggs went up perceptibly. In Belgorod 10 eggs cost R37; in Novyy Oskol—R35; in Kaluga and Smolensk—R33; and in Tula—R31, with the average for Russia being R25.

City market prices for beef, pork, milk, and cottage cheese are 50-70 percent higher than those in the stores; for sour cream—almost three times higher; and for vegetables—30-40 percent higher. City market prices for potatoes and vegetables have changed the following way over the week:

	Average price in rubles per kg	
	as of 1 September	as of 8 September
Potatoes	19.8	18.2
Yellow onions	28.1	27.7
Beets	24.9	24.5
Carrots	25.9	24.1
Cabbage	17.7	18.6

The nonfood goods market continues to be saturated with expensive varieties of goods. Over the week prices for electric appliances increased by another 5.7 percent. The average price for floor-standing refrigerators and color televisions sets as of 8 September was R22,000 and R21,200 respectively. At the same time, color television sets were put on sale in Yakutsk at R36,000, and refrigerators in Surgut—at R48,000. Prices for footwear went up dramatically over the week (30 percent on average for Russia). There was a noticeable increase in prices for women's fall boots—from R2,102 to R3,023, and men's low shoes—from R1,524 to R1,970.

Cost of Selection of Basic Food Products as of 09/08/92 (Taking City Market Prices Into Account)

City	Cost of selection (rubles)
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy	839.55
Vladivostok	751.18
Vorkuta	721.92
Magadan	696.43
Yakutsk	573.35
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	571.82
Stavropol	553.46
Khabarovsk	548.96
Chelyabinsk	533.95
Smolensk	532.96

Cost of Selection of Basic Food Products as of 09/08/92 (Taking City Market Prices Into Account) (Continued)

City	Cost of selection (rubles)
Severodvinsk	532.46
Yaroslavl	526.32
Kaliningrad	526.09
Apatity	505.20
Nakhodka	503.56
Krasnoyarsk	503.42
Shebekino	501.65
Prokopyevsk	499.19
St. Petersburg	498.49
Yekaterinburg	498.31
Perm	496.56
Kemerovo	495.77
Cherepovets	493.76
Saratov	479.32
Murmanak	476.65
Vladimir	472.50
Sykt'yvkar	469.80
Norilsk	468.92
Irkutsk	466.24
Novokuznetsk	462.16
Sovetsk	462.06
Novgorod	460.28
Ukhta	458.51
Tomsk	458.04
Angarsk	457.21
Miasa	450.32
Tyumen	449.13
Vologda	446.05
Ivanovo	445.37
Nizhniy Novgorod	443.14
Blagoveshchensk	441.94
Rybinsk	441.42
Moscow	439.67
Tayshet	438.91
Petrozavodsk	438.78
Chita	437.04
Kostroma	436.86
Lipetsk	435.74
Tula	435.55
Obninsk	435.20
Novomoskovsk	433.44
Arkhangelsk	433.31
Novorossiysk	430.88
Yurga	426.96

Cost of Selection of Basic Food Products as of 09/08/92 (Taking City Market Prices into Account) (Continued)

City	Cost of selection (rubles)
Tolyatti	423.73
Kopeysk	423.69
Shuya	418.66
Belgorod	415.40
Ulan-Ude	415.15
Makhachkala	413.75
Pskov	413.24
Kaluga	412.62
Ufa	411.23
Kurgan	410.92
Nizhniy Tagil	410.73
Tver	410.55
Divnogorsk	408.08
Novosibirsk	407.11
Taganrog	405.30
Tuapse	405.04
Shakhty	404.36
Serov	404.13
Ishimbay	402.48
Barnaul	402.11
Elektrostal	396.51
Sterlitamak	396.49
Cherkessk	395.38
Novyy Oskol	392.01
Abakan	390.76
Krasnodar	389.42
Ryazan	388.76
Volgograd	388.72
Nevinnomyssk	387.54
Astrakhan	387.12
Penza	382.65
Gorno-Altaysk	382.27
Vladikavkaz	381.00
Tambov	380.35
Maykop	377.15
Berdak	375.25
Armavir	372.62
Kirov	372.52
Kyzyl	369.69
Voronezh	369.68
Cheboksary	368.72
Syzran	366.37
Kamyshin	364.31
Rostov-na-Donu	360.93

Cost of Selection of Basic Food Products as of 09/08/92 (Taking City Market Prices Into Account) (Continued)

City	Cost of selection (rubles)
Yoshkar-Ola	358.42
Izhevsk	357.55
Omsk	356.25
Elista	354.99
Orenburg	354.99
Bryansk	353.95
Volgograd	352.61
Groznyy	352.08
Salekhard	351.90
Orsk	349.65
Kirovo-Chepetsk	346.28
Kursk	342.91
Orel	338.38
Novocheboksarsk	338.02
Balakovo	336.17
Saransk	335.68
Rubtsovsk	334.92
Gornyyak	334.54
Samara	324.52
Arzamas	319.74
Yelets	310.08
Ulyanovsk	306.50
Biyak	292.47
Kazan	288.18
Naberezhnyye Chelny	273.66
Chistopol	269.35
Russian Federation	413.32

Presence (Absence) of Goods in Cities as Registered on 8 September

Product	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Available As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Available As Per- cent of All Cities	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Available As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Available As Per- cent of All Cities
	in retail trade			total		
A	1	2	3	4	5	6
Beef, Category I	106	24	18.46	123	7	5.38
Pork	71	59	45.38	119	11	8.46
Meat patties (per 10)	30	100	76.92	30	100	76.92
Pelmeni (meat- filled dumplings), frozen	37	93	71.54	37	93	71.54
Boiled sausage, Grade I	110	20	15.38	110	20	15.38
Salami, Grade I	105	25	19.23	105	25	19.23
Live fish	22	108	83.08	34	96	73.85

Presence (Absence) of Goods in Cities as Registered on 8 September (Continued)

Product	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Available As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Available As Per- cent of All Cities	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Available As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Available As Per- cent of All Cities
	in retail trade			total		
A	1	2	3	4	5	6
Mackerel, quick-frozen, refrigerated, unsegmented	13	117	90.00	13	117	90.00
Fish filet (mackerel)	9	121	93.08	9	121	93.08
Smoked fish (mackerel)	24	106	81.54	24	106	81.54
Herring, salted and brined, ivasi	46	84	64.62	46	84	64.62
Butter	125	5	3.85	126	4	3.08
Vegetable oil	100	30	23.08	112	18	13.85
Melted pork fat	44	86	66.13	46	84	64.62
Table margarine	102	28	21.54	102	28	21.54
Pasteurized milk, 3.2-3.5 percent fat	127	3	2.31	128	2	1.54
Fatty kefir	106	24	18.46	106	24	18.46
Sour cream	122	8	6.15	127	3	2.31
Cottage cheese	73	57	42.85	101	29	22.31
Low-fat cottage cheese	62	68	52.31	63	67	51.54
Powdered cow's milk	56	74	56.92	56	74	56.92
Hard rennet cheese (of the varieties "Poshekhonakiy," "Rosiyskiy," "Kostromakoy," "Yaroslavskiy," "Gollandskiy," etc.)	111	19	14.62	111	19	14.62
Pasteurized processed cheese (of the varieties "Druzhba," "Volna," "Yantar," "Leto")	45	85	65.38	45	85	65.38
Feta cheese	11	119	91.54	16	114	87.69
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, natural, with oil added (mackerel, scad)	76	54	41.54	76	54	41.54
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, salmon in tomato sauce	20	110	84.62	20	110	84.62
Canned tomato puree and paste	64	66	50.77	66	64	49.23

Presence (Absence) of Goods in Cities as Registered on 8 September (Continued)

Product	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Available As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Available As Per- cent of All Cities	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Available As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Available As Per- cent of All Cities
	in retail trade			total		
A	1	2	3	4	5	6
Canned fruit for children	55	75	57.69	55	75	57.69
Chicken eggs (price per 10)	125	5	3.85	127	3	2.31
Granulated sugar	103	27	20.77	104	26	20.00
Ordinary cookies (of the variety "Apelsinovoye," "Privet," etc.)	98	32	24.62	98	32	24.62
Spice cake, bulk	89	41	31.54	89	41	31.54
Caramel candy, wrapped	52	78	60.00	53	77	59.23
Bohea black tea, highest quality	93	37	28.46	93	37	28.46
Salt	121	9	6.92	121	9	6.92
Rye flour	7	123	94.62	7	123	94.62
Highest grade wheat flour	81	49	37.69	82	48	36.92
Rye bread	33	97	74.62	33	97	74.62
Rye-wheat bread	70	60	46.15	70	60	46.15
Wheat bread from entire-wheat flour	2	128	98.46	2	128	98.46
Wheat bread from highest grade flour	66	64	49.23	67	63	48.46
Wheat bread from Grade I and Grade II flour	91	39	30.00	91	39	30.00
Rolls and buns from highest grade wheat flour, price per 500 grams	103	27	20.77	103	27	20.77
Rolls and buns from Grade I wheat flour, price per 500 grams	40	90	69.23	40	90	69.23
Rolls and buns from Grade II wheat flour, price per 500 grams	1	129	99.23	1	129	99.23
Pretzels, Grade I wheat flour	77	53	40.77	77	53	40.77
Rusks, Grade I wheat flour	65	65	50.00	65	65	50.00
Milled and polished rice	102	28	21.54	102	28	21.54
Semolina	76	54	41.54	76	54	41.54
Milled millet	43	87	66.92	43	87	66.92

Presence (Absence) of Goods in Cities as Registered on 8 September (Continued)

Product	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Available As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Available As Per- cent of All Cities	Number of Cities Where Item Was Available As of Survey Date	Number of Cities Where Item Was Not Available As of Survey Date	Cities Where Item Was Not Available As Per- cent of All Cities
	in retail trade			total		
A	1	2	3	4	5	6
Unground buck- wheat	57	73	56.15	58	72	55.38
"Gerkules" oat- meal	39	91	70.00	39	91	70.00
Ground split peas	16	114	87.69	16	114	87.69
Macaroni, ordi- nary and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from highest grade wheat flour	44	86	66.15	46	84	64.62
Macaroni, ordi- nary and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from Grade I wheat flour	11	119	91.54	11	119	91.54
Noodles, made from highest grade wheat flour	50	80	61.54	50	80	61.54
Vermicelli, made from highest grade wheat flour	98	32	24.62	98	32	24.62
Elbow macaroni, all varieties, from highest grade wheat flour	71	59	45.38	71	59	45.38
80-proof vodka, price per liter	111	19	14.62	112	18	13.85
Mayonnaise	58	72	55.38	59	71	54.62
Potatoes	108	22	16.92	126	4	3.08
Fresh green-head cabbage	115	15	11.54	122	8	6.15
Yellow onions	113	17	13.08	125	5	3.85
Garlic	41	89	68.46	107	23	17.69
Red beets	97	33	25.38	112	18	13.85
Carrots	86	44	33.85	113	17	13.08
Apples	103	27	20.77	124	6	4.62
Tobacco prod- ucts, price per pack of cigarettes	55	75	57.69	59	71	54.62
Tobacco prod- ucts, price per pack of filter cig- arettes	92	37	28.46	95	35	26.92
Matches	117	13	10.00	118	12	9.23

Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (Retail Trade and City Market)				
Representative products	08/18/92	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92
Beef, Category I	108.03	112.01	116.31	120.20
Pork	121.65	125.05	138.25	142.18
Meat patties (per 10)	63.43	62.70	64.74	60.07
Pelmeni [meat-filled dumplings], frozen	59.03	62.19	63.16	67.26
Boiled sausage, Grade I	131.61	130.09	137.31	136.61
Salami, Grade I	188.13	193.43	203.66	207.55
Live fish	40.46	43.69	48.07	50.29
Mackerel, quick-frozen, refrigerated, unsegmented	38.81	39.16	42.64	44.17
Fish filet (mackerel)	51.85	54.18	54.40	48.00
Smoked fish (mackerel)	76.30	82.44	90.77	94.58
Herring, salted and brined, ivasi	73.24	72.20	68.93	72.62
Butter	182.30	184.31	188.70	187.69
Vegetable oil	53.81	54.39	57.79	63.90
Melted pork fat	64.43	66.66	65.51	66.22
Table margarine	72.51	71.71	76.36	75.16
Pasteurized milk, 3.2-3.5 percent fat	9.27	9.58	9.85	10.19
Fatty kefir	9.89	10.08	10.60	11.35
Sour cream	61.99	63.93	64.51	66.83
Cottage cheese	48.72	47.73	47.80	53.16
Low-fat cottage cheese	20.25	19.32	20.23	22.02
Powdered cow's milk	88.05	89.13	90.82	90.58
Hard rennet cheese (of the varieties "Poshekhonskiy," "Rossiyskiy," "Kostromskoy," "Yaroslavskiy," "Golandskiy," etc.)	144.97	148.34	152.53	151.27
Pasteurized processed cheese (of the varieties "Druzhba," "Volna," "Yantar," "Leto")	114.71	112.47	115.72	118.60
Feta cheese	83.31	84.60	82.33	88.48
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, natural, with oil added (mackerel, scad)	36.07	40.40	39.47	39.87
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, salmon in tomato sauce	47.87	52.08	51.46	54.64
Canned tomato puree and paste	54.65	54.01	57.95	57.84
Canned fruit for children	53.61	56.14	57.43	57.93
Chicken eggs (price per 10)	22.96	24.26	25.02	25.34
Granulated sugar	55.46	56.09	58.56	64.91
Ordinary cookies (of the variety "Apelsinovoye," "Privet," etc.)	65.32	64.86	69.06	73.13
Spice cake, bulk	56.81	56.42	58.83	60.72
Caramel candy, wrapped	114.79	115.18	117.80	123.74
Bohea black tea, highest quality	297.20	296.93	294.49	298.14
Salt	5.40	5.35	5.93	6.08
Rye flour	10.61	10.43	9.67	10.12
Highest grade wheat flour	18.93	18.74	20.82	21.37
Rye bread	9.82	10.19	10.78	11.16
Rye-wheat bread	9.31	9.94	12.06	12.14
Wheat bread from all-wheat flour	7.31	7.25	5.42	5.38

Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (Retail Trade and City Market) (Continued)

Representative products	08/18/92	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92
Wheat bread from highest grade flour	18.80	20.05	21.35	22.98
Wheat bread from Grade I and Grade II flour	11.91	12.19	13.82	14.01
Rolls and buns from highest grade wheat flour, price per 500 grams	11.64	11.55	13.53	14.89
Rolls and buns from Grade I wheat flour, price per 500 grams	9.26	9.23	10.71	11.30
Rolls and buns from Grade II wheat flour, price per 500 grams	10.00	11.84	13.50	13.50
Pretzels, Grade I wheat flour	39.57	39.22	39.59	41.77
Rusk, Grade I wheat flour	46.70	48.01	50.36	54.70
Milled and polished rice	29.66	30.98	30.25	31.11
Semolina	15.00	15.33	16.21	18.07
Milled millet	9.23	10.21	10.39	12.92
Unmilled buckwheat	44.05	49.23	50.38	55.62
"Gerkules" oatmeal	22.82	24.49	23.59	26.27
Ground split peas	10.43	11.37	11.38	11.30
Macaroni, regular and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from highest grade wheat flour	35.96	36.39	37.35	38.71
Macaroni, regular and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from Grade I wheat flour	24.93	25.48	26.47	32.96
Noodles, made from highest grade wheat flour	26.81	27.82	29.81	29.23
Vermicelli, made from highest grade wheat flour	27.78	29.85	29.25	30.89
Elbow macaroni, all varieties, from highest grade wheat flour	24.25	26.25	28.05	28.21
80-proof vodka, price per liter	256.73	253.88	255.44	274.11
Mayonnaise	88.88	94.32	89.69	89.01
Potatoes	20.80	19.64	19.90	18.69
Fresh green-head cabbage	13.84	14.10	14.72	16.05
Yellow onions	22.75	23.27	25.50	25.25
Garlic	86.24	95.89	103.06	112.23
Red beets	19.82	20.40	20.03	20.32
Carrots	24.07	23.17	23.25	21.75
Apples	40.98	37.97	36.60	33.66
Tobacco products, price per pack of cigarettes	10.50	11.68	12.57	15.48
Tobacco products, price per pack of filter cigarettes	22.85	26.16	28.94	35.86
Matches	1.17	1.16	1.23	1.23

Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (Retail Trade)

Representative products	08/18/92	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92
Beef, Category I	81.76	84.27	86.25	89.63
Pork	80.41	83.26	88.99	90.45
Meat patties (per 10)	63.43	62.70	64.74	60.07
Pemeni (meat-filled dumplings), frozen	59.03	62.19	63.16	67.26
Boiled sausage, Grade I	131.61	130.05	137.31	136.63
Salami, Grade I	184.92	191.73	202.27	205.96
Live fish	39.47	44.23	47.49	50.13

Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (Retail Trade) (Continued)

Representative products	08/18/92	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92
Mackerel, quick-frozen, refrigerated, unsegmented	38.81	39.16	42.64	44.17
Fish filet (mackerel)	51.85	54.18	54.40	48.00
Smoked fish (mackerel)	76.30	82.44	90.77	94.58
Herring, salted and brined, ivasi	73.24	72.15	68.93	72.62
Butter	182.29	184.16	188.39	186.98
Vegetable oil	51.54	51.94	55.24	60.57
Melted pork fat	65.00	67.77	65.68	66.45
Table margarine	72.51	71.61	76.29	75.09
Pasteurized milk, 3.2-3.5 percent fat	9.14	9.43	9.72	10.05
Fatty kefir	9.89	10.08	10.69	11.33
Sour cream	54.21	54.73	54.88	56.98
Cottage cheese	42.50	40.45	40.71	43.71
Low-fat cottage cheese	20.13	19.10	20.02	21.90
Powdered cow's milk	88.05	89.13	90.82	90.58
Hard rennet cheese (of the varieties "Poshekhonskiy," "Roslinskiy," "Kostromskoy," "Yaroslavskiy," "Gol-landskiy," etc.)	143.65	147.19	151.35	150.60
Pasteurized processed cheese (of the varieties "Druzhba," "Volna," "Yantar," "Leto")	114.71	112.47	115.72	118.60
Feta cheese	77.99	78.87	76.65	79.28
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, natural, with oil added (mackerel, scad)	36.07	40.40	39.47	39.87
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, salmon in tomato sauce	47.87	52.08	51.46	54.14
Canned tomato puree and paste	54.65	54.01	57.95	57.43
Canned fruit for children	53.61	56.14	57.43	57.93
Chicken eggs (price per 10)	22.76	24.08	24.78	25.11
Granulated sugar	55.18	55.65	58.26	64.70
Ordinary cookies (of the variety "Apelsinovoye," "Privet," etc.)	65.32	65.00	69.20	73.17
Spice cake, bulk	56.81	56.42	58.88	60.81
Caramel candy, wrapped	113.65	114.98	117.15	120.28
Bohea black tea, highest quality	293.68	288.08	290.74	284.98
Salt	5.40	5.35	5.93	6.08
Rye flour	10.61	10.43	9.67	10.12
Highest grade wheat flour	18.85	18.70	20.82	21.20
Rye bread	9.82	10.19	10.78	11.16
Rye-wheat bread	9.31	9.94	12.06	12.14
Wheat bread from all-wheat flour	7.31	7.25	5.42	5.38
Wheat bread from highest grade flour	18.80	20.05	21.34	22.97
Wheat bread from Grade I and Grade II flour	11.91	12.19	13.82	14.01
Rolls and buns from highest grade wheat flour, price per 500 grams	11.64	11.55	13.53	14.89
Rolls and buns from Grade I wheat flour, price per 500 grams	9.26	9.23	10.71	11.30
Rolls and buns from Grade II wheat flour, price per 500 grams	10.00	11.84	13.50	13.50
Pretzels, Grade I wheat flour	39.57	38.92	39.59	41.77

Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (Retail Trade) (Continued)

Representative products	08/18/92	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92
Rusk, Grade I wheat flour	46.70	48.01	50.36	54.70
Milled and polished rice	29.67	31.04	30.24	31.14
Semolina	15.00	15.31	16.20	18.06
Milled millet	9.23	10.12	10.39	12.92
Unmilled buckwheat	43.92	48.69	50.13	55.35
"Gerkules" oatmeal	22.82	24.49	23.59	26.27
Ground split peas	10.43	11.37	11.38	11.30
Macaroni, regular and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from highest grade wheat flour	35.60	36.25	37.21	38.40
Macaroni, regular and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from Grade I wheat flour	24.93	25.48	26.47	32.96
Noodles, made from highest grade wheat flour	26.81	27.82	29.81	29.23
Vermicelli, made from highest grade wheat flour	27.67	29.64	29.22	30.83
Elbow macaroni, all varieties, from highest grade wheat flour	26.25	26.25	27.97	28.21
80-proof vodka, price per liter	251.96	251.55	253.82	272.58
Mayonnaise	88.39	92.71	89.56	88.76
Potatoes	20.66	19.28	20.16	20.06
Fresh green-head cabbage	13.46	12.96	13.44	14.88
Yellow onions	22.36	22.13	23.15	23.14
Garlic	84.71	93.31	104.91	119.23
Red beets	14.23	15.59	16.40	17.25
Carrots	17.60	19.71	18.82	18.63
Apples	35.94	36.46	35.67	34.75
Tobacco products, price per pack of cigarettes	9.70	10.48	11.49	14.70
Tobacco products, price per pack of filter cigarettes	19.94	21.64	25.47	33.25
Matches	1.15	1.15	1.21	1.21

Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (City Market)

Representative products	08/18/92	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92
Beef, Category I	126.66	129.80	138.05	142.59
Pork	133.53	136.47	150.43	154.56
Boiled sausage, Grade I		150.00		130.00
Salami, Grade I	274.46	276.54	257.27	260.65
Live fish	43.11	42.96	49.24	50.94
Herring, salted and brined, ivasi		100.00		
Butter	182.44	186.64	196.68	202.21
Vegetable oil	68.65	67.52	72.18	77.24
Melted pork fat	56.05	55.70	60.87	60.77
Table margarine		112.00	112.00	170.00
Pasteurized milk, 3.2-3.5 percent fat	15.02	16.95	16.00	15.66
Fatty kefir				
Sour cream	124.95	136.82	146.71	157.08
Cottage cheese	61.08	64.09	66.46	72.04
Low-fat cottage cheese	28.89	28.50	32.31	29.35

Average Prices for Food Products in the Russian Federation (City Market) (Continued)

Representative products	08/18/92	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92
Powdered cow milk				90.00
Hard rennet cheese (of the varieties "Poshekhonskiy," "Rossiyskiy," "Kostromskoy," "Yaroslavskiy," "Gol-landskiy," etc.)	231.07	221.85	235.45	179.94
Feta cheese	88.86	93.24	92.08	97.83
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, natural, with oil added (mackerel, scad)				
Canned fish, price per standard 350-gram can, salmon in tomato sauce				98.00
Canned tomato puree and paste				69.89
Chicken eggs (price per 10)	26.81	27.75	29.81	29.62
Granulated sugar	64.65	71.99	72.88	73.29
Ordinary cookies (of the variety "Apelsinovoye," "Privet," etc.)		57.14	60.98	70.00
Spice cake, bulk			38.00	40.00
Caramel candy, wrapped	156.67	150.00	144.42	171.15
Bohea black tea, highest quality	421.11	479.26	508.11	482.61
Salt				
Highest grade wheat flour	22.26	21.57	20.75	26.25
Wheat bread made of highest grade flour			25.00	25.00
Pretzels from highest grade flour		60.00		
Milled and polished rice	28.75	28.57	30.88	30.00
Semolina		25.00	25.00	25.00
Milled millet		19.00		
Unmilled buckwheat	55.00	56.84	58.87	60.08
Ground split peas				
Macaroni, regular and fancy, various styles of cut (long and short), made from highest grade wheat flour	52.86	53.33	62.42	62.50
Vermicelli, made from highest grade wheat flour	60.00	47.60	70.00	49.00
Elbow macaroni, all varieties, from highest grade wheat flour			66.67	
80-proof vodka, price per liter	362.22	341.47	336.89	354.26
Mayonnaise	130.00	149.25	160.00	167.50
Potatoes	20.85	19.78	19.80	18.15
Fresh green-head cabbage	14.61	16.72	17.73	18.60
Yellow onions	23.19	24.48	28.09	27.70
Garlic	86.65	96.60	102.75	110.80
Red beets	26.01	25.92	24.91	24.50
Carrots	27.02	25.19	25.86	24.13
Apples	42.28	38.29	36.80	33.44
Tobacco products, price per pack of cigarettes	15.08	17.38	17.13	18.85
Tobacco products, price per pack of filter cigarettes	36.67	44.82	45.87	53.75
Matches	1.90	1.53	1.68	2.06

Average Prices on Nonfood Products in the Russian Federation

Representative product	08/18/92	08/25/92	09/01/92	09/08/92
Men's light overcoat, wool blend	3,423.61	3,291.20	3,383.38	3,648.52
Two-piece suit, wool blend	2,675.12	2,692.39	2,766.76	2,924.72
Men's trousers, wool blend suit fabric	740.18	739.12	763.63	809.81
Men's shirt, cotton fabric	263.74	265.42	268.88	302.06
Women's light overcoat, wool blend	3,798.87	3,867.67	3,920.73	4,104.29
Women's dress, wool blend	759.38	740.47	799.89	846.21
Boy's jacket, lined, synthetic fabric	917.16	913.18	999.87	1,138.24
Girl's dress, wool blend	305.15	308.62	309.28	305.42
Boy's shirt, flannel or fustian	94.40	94.94	98.54	100.33
Men's jumper (sweater), pure wool yarn	1,238.33	1,253.62	1,266.64	1,495.15
Children's T-shirt, cotton fabric	43.97	44.10	44.98	45.82
Women's pantyhose, elastic	80.02	81.58	83.93	94.05
Men's socks, cotton	38.01	39.00	38.64	41.36
Children's socks, cotton	16.85	17.91	17.80	18.87
Children's tights, cotton	61.32	63.18	64.21	64.40
Men's low shoes, fashion, with natural leather sole	1,521.14	1,474	1,523.99	1,973.87
Women's boots, low-heel or platform sole, lined with textile material, with polyurethane sole	2,062.87	2,171.51	2,101.70	3,022.54
Women's summer shoes, fashion, with high (or medium) heel, with natural leather sole or imitation leather	1,463.24	1,482.88	1,548.33	1,820.72
Summer shoes for school-age girls, medium heel, porous rubber sole	320.80	333.18	343.68	408.96
Refrigerator, floor-standing, semi-automatic defrost (KSh-260)	19,719.40	19,171.94	20,541.86	21,947.54
Electric iron, automatic	640.73	648.97	692.10	743.07
Color television, non-portable (screen diagonal 61-cm.)	19,294.90	19,982.26	20,317.05	21,209.50
Gasoline	7.66	7.61	7.65	7.60
Coal	135.71	138.03	143.01	145.13
Firewood	64.78	64.84	65.22	65.47
Peat briquettes	114.15	112.96	113.08	117.08
Electric power (urban localities)	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23

Latest Price Hikes in Foodstuffs Reported

934A0117A Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Golubachev, TRUD political observer: "Everyday Arithmetic: How Many Times Have Prices Risen?"]

[Text] It has always amazed me how much a price increase calculated by scientific methods differs from that which we see when coming into a store and buying specific goods. I understand: in the scientific calculation a wide range of goods and services is taken; moreover, not in a single city but over the entire country. Then they add, multiply, divide, in short, they obtain an average indicator which by itself is interesting and important for

identifying general trends, but may have a very remote connection to a specific good in the store on my street. I understand precisely, but, looking at the price list on the counter and no longer asking whether an extra zero had been accidentally put up, I derive for myself entirely different price increase proportions.

And why indeed undertake theoretical discussions and argue about price calculations methods—isn't it simpler to stroll through different Moscow stores, examine produce and other goods (where there are any) and compare their cost with what it was two or two and a half years ago. That's what we have done along with specialists from the General Confederation of Trade Unions who study living standard problems.

How Many Times Have Prices Risen?

Description of goods	Price (in rubles)		Price increase (in times)
	April 1990	October 1992	
1. Rye bread	0.18	19-22	114 times
2. Wheat bread, long loaf	0.18-0.25	18-24	100
3. Flour, kg	0.46	47	102
4. Potatoes, kg	0.20	20-25	112
5. Beets, kg	0.15	20-29	163
6. Cabbage, kg	0.30	25-35	100
7. Carrots, kg	0.18	25-30	152
8. Cottage cheese, kg	0.75-1.1	80-120	107
9. Salt, kg	0.06-0.1	7-9	100
10. Sugar, kg	0.9-1.04	104-107	108
11. "Hercules" oatmeal, 0.5 kg	0.21	25	119
12. Sweet pepper, kg	0.40	40	100
13. Buckwheat groats, kg	0.56	60-103	145
14. Sausages, kg	2.40	230-250	100
15. Matches	0.01	1.23	123

MEDICINES

	Price (in rubles)		Price increase (in times)
	October 1990	October 1992	
16. Blakstonia	0.03	3	100
17. Potassium permanganate	0.02	7	350
18. Hydrogen peroxide	0.03	5.5	183
19. Finalgon	0.4	50	125
20. Rumalon	5.25	600	114
21. Bifikol	0.23	96	426

In my opinion, the table being published gives a very specific answer to the question of the increase in the high cost of living. The prices in Moscow for many basic food products and medicines have risen a hundred and more times in two and a half years. Nearly 15 products have been given here but this list could have been extended. The spurt in prices is from 10,000 to 16,000 percent. See, what a rate—not tens and not hundreds of percent but many thousands.

Because of a lack of space we are not publishing a second table where the growth in the prices for butter, cheese, beef, sour cream, eggs, kolbasa, margarine, and cheese curds are shown. Here the rise of the high cost of living is also considerable: 55—84 times. Moreover, all this is not delicacies but products which are needed in everyday life. Very likely one of the few exceptions is milk, which has risen in price in Moscow not 50 times but "only" 38.8 times during this period.

It's better altogether not to speak about medicines. Even the purchase of the most necessary preparations often becomes ruinous for the needy. An increase in prices of 100, 350, 426 times...

So that it is not necessary to deceive ourselves. We will look the truth in the face and admit: the increase in the prices for many basic goods has already scaled the "100" mark. Last year the Polish newspaper EKONOMIKA I RESURSY published a forecast in which it was said that in seven to nine years an ordinary loaf of bread in Russia will cost 30 rubles, a kilogram of beef R150—200. Alas, the forecast will be realized much more quickly.

By the way, if one compares our reform with the "shock therapy" in Poland in 1991, it is easy to see that in Russia the "shock" has proven to be far more severe. For example, for the average monthly wage in Poland one could buy 500 kilograms of bread, in our country only 300, milk—617 but in Moscow—427, butter—60, but in our country—only 20, sugar—in Poland 500, in Moscow—60... I will not talk about vegetables and a number of other products. I will cite potatoes only more as an example. A Pole could acquire 1,200 kilograms for the average wage, but a Moscovite—less than 300. In short, we have surpassed the Poles.

And this is understandable. If prices for many basic products have increased in our country a hundred and

more times, you can't say this about wages. Since April 1990 they have increased 24 times on average. Having compared these two figures, 100 and 24, everyone will easily grasp how much the standard of living is falling.

Of course, I'm not discovering any America in citing these calculations. Millions of people know everything well; they experience it daily in their family budget. It is also no secret that prices will increase even further. In that case, the question is why am I even writing all this? First of all, in order to know the truth. As has already been said, the statistical services are not publishing such local calculations. But these data, in my opinion, are necessary not only for the population but also for the members of the government on whose desks the other figures lie.

Secondly, the hundredfold and more growth of prices in addition confirms the need for substantial adjustments to the program of reforms. And primarily this concerns the growing slump in production, including for consumer goods. For nearly all goods—cloth, footwear, knitwear, radio receivers, washing machines, etc.—the decrease in output in September has amounted to from 13 to 51 percent in comparison with September of last year. Task number one is to reduce the slump to a minimum.

The "shock" is already becoming so painful that it is becoming ever more difficult to endure it. That is why one would like to finally see the light at the end of the tunnel. That is, a workable program which would not only on a theoretical basis but also taking our everyday realities into account establish the way to the so longed-for stabilization.

Agro-Industrial Complex Workers Gaining Assistance
934A0117B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian
21 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Yelena Tokareva: "In No Way Will They Come to an Agreement"]

[Text] Two small scraps of paper came to our newspaper by mail as, most likely, by the way, they did to others. One bore the title "Open Letter," and the other was called "Resolution of the Coordination Council of the Collective Actions of the Workers of the Agro-Industrial Complex." The "Open Letter" recommended that the peasants not leave the agrarian trade unions for the time being because it is they that are organizing and directing the agricultural army scattered throughout the Russian villages. The "Resolution" contains the threats of strikes directed at the government which have already become traditional. And the coordination council of the collective actions of the workers of the agro-industrial complex takes upon itself the coordination and organization of the strikes.

By the way, this committee has had great successes during the past six months. There are now strike committees of agriculturists not in 26 oblasts of Russia but in

50. Obviously, their growth is proportional to the number of refusals of the government to go out and talk face to face with the agriculturists.

Despite the definite successes of the pressure on the government, the agriculturists have decided to hold an all-Russian protest street demonstration on 24 October. And, apparently, not for nothing. After each protest action the agriculturists snatch something from the hands of an invisible government. Here the organizers of all the peasant protest actions are demonstrating their successes before their peasant colleagues who are running from the trade unions: "The coordinated actions of the peasants have yielded the first results." The chief result is the decision taken about allocating 257.7 billion rubles of centralized capital investments: "for maintenance of the social infrastructure of the village"—R34.8 billion and for the construction of intra-farm roads—R9.6 billion. The agro-industrial complex has been allotted R178 billion in preferential loans for current needs and it has been allotted R539 billion to restore the shortage of working capital. Wait lads, they say, perhaps you'll succeed in picking up something more. To tell the truth, I can't imagine where this money is coming from if not from the printing press.

But in the end the leadership of the agro-industrial trade unions is not aiming for these small sops. The list of the demands of the agriculturists is so extensive, and they themselves are so persistent that, it seems, the government will not be able to ignore them for long. This list includes, in point of fact, demands to restore centralized guidance of the agro-industrial complex. However, a paternalistic and not an administrative-command guidance. The agriculturists demand a new form of relationships that is convenient for themselves: monetary and "human factor" assistance. Our marketeers are attempting to set the land bank against these demands.

Despite Yeltsin's protestations that "We need not new ideologies but new technologies," the government is proposing exactly ideology again. The direct dialogue (budget—peasantry, government—peasantry) is to be abolished. From the moment the land banks are established the dialogue will be only with the bank.

How Yeltsin and Gaydar intend to "save" the agrarian sector is not clear. And do they intend to "save?" In all the latest speeches of our leaders agrarian problems follow after the insulting for the ear of a villager remark "now a little about agrarian reform." And indeed a little and indeed only about the new panacea for old troubles—the creation of land banks which also "will safeguard the interests of the landowners."

The enthusiasm of our leaders for ever new ideas moves one to tears. But what is to be done with old problems? With the failing pedigree stock farms, the degenerated hothouses, etc? Do they really think that, having created

a class of landowners, as in the USA, they will be able to dissipate the desire of the peasants to speak on behalf of their own class? Obviously this will not happen. Alas, the problems of the peasantry still are not to be solved without state assistance, without the special purpose programs which everyone has become tired of and other forms of the collaboration of the state and the agrarian sector which soviet man has become accustomed to. The fact is that even solitary individual farmers are holding out their hands to one another and are uniting into associations.

And if the old agrarian trade unions very much remind the government of party organizations then, having destroyed them, it needs to help the peasantry to reconstitute other collective forms of cooperation. However, there is no guarantee that the same energetic party-economic bosses who sprout up even in the most unsuitable soil will not occupy the key positions in the new formations.

Regional Opinion Polling on Support for Reforms

934C0107B St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 22 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Mariya Matskevich and Leonid Kesselman, Center for the Study and Forecast of Social Processes, under the "Sociological Survey" rubric: "The Majority Disproves Commentators' Opinion"]

[Text] As our newspaper has already reported, in the first half of September, the Center for the Study and Forecast of Social Processes completed another probe of the attitudes of the populations of Russia's key regions toward the changing conditions of life.

More than 10,000 people were polled in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Samara, and Kemerovo—approximately 2,500 people in each of these cities. Although this does not provide a complete picture of the whole of Russia, it still makes it possible to obtain reliable information on attitudes toward the issues under consideration on the part of various social groups and of the entire adult population of each of these cities.

The data that emerged after all the collected information had been processed provides evidence that by the beginning of the fall, approximately every fifth resident of St. Petersburg (21 percent) was firmly convinced that "the economic reforms started by the Gaydar government should be continued," and another 26 percent were leaning toward this opinion, but not with as much certainty. The total number of reform opponents comprised 27 percent (including the 14 percent who were quite adamant in their disagreement with the ongoing transformations). The remaining 26 percent did not have a firm position on this issue. The continuation of the reforms was also supported by 52 percent of Muscovites, 49 percent of Kemerovo residents, and by as many, percentage-wise, in Samara. Those opposed comprised: in the capital city—24 percent; in the city on the Volga—29 percent, and in the Kuzbass [Kuznetsk Basin]—26 percent. As we can see, despite the unceasing difficulties

of the transition period, the number of supporters of the reforms in the key regions of Russia is one and a half to two times as great as the number of those who demand to halt the initiated transformations.

As compared with mid-summer, the number of those supporting the continuation of the reforms in Moscow decreased by three percent (while the number of opponents remained unchanged). In St. Petersburg, the number of supporters increased by about as much. The support for the reform increased even more significantly in Kemerovo—by seven percent, and Samara—by 10 percent. In other words, we have not detected any evidence of the dramatic shrinkage in the social base of the economic reforms of which some commentators speak in any of the surveyed regions. Moreover, in some locales the figures show an exactly opposite trend.

The data also show that throughout this time, women have been somewhat more critical with respect to the reforms. This is perhaps because they are more on the receiving end of the impact of price increases, the threat of unemployment, and the increase of the general instability, while men are also sometimes influenced by increasing income and an expanding range of opportunities; plus, they feel somewhat more secure in a situation of general uncertainty.

As was the case in the previous two surveys, the people who have the least confidence in the reforms are those over 60. In all other age groups, the number of supporters of change continues to outnumber the opponents by approximately two to one.

The group that is least happy with the ongoing transformations are the unskilled workers. Close to them in their reticence are office workers of medium skill level. At the same time, the number of reform supporters among the nontechnical intelligentsia is almost four times as high as that of the opponents. The greatest support for the continuation of the reforms comes from managers who have subordinates who themselves supervise their own subordinates. Quite understandably, those engaged in the "new economy" are noticeably more active in their support of the reforms than those working at state enterprises. However, while among the "private sector" the support of the reform has slackened somewhat lately, with respect to employees of state enterprises the opposite happened—support for the reform has increased noticeably.

As in previous surveys, those with higher education support the ongoing transformations noticeably more actively. At the same time, among those who have not completed high school the number of reform opponents currently (as well as before, actually) noticeably exceeds the number of its supporters. This is practically the only social group where the opposition to the reforms is higher than the support.

The fact that those whose financial situation has improved recently support the economic reforms is easy to explain. However, even among those whose situation

has become worse this year (of which in the cities there is a majority—51 percent), the number of supporters of the changes that caused this worsened situation is noticeably higher than of those who advocate a halt to the reform.

A continuation of the ongoing reforms is supported by the overwhelming majority of those who believe that "the activities of Ye. Gaydar's government are helping to solve the problems that the country is facing." However, even among those who adamantly disagree with such an appraisal of the government's current actions, only one-half advocate

the suspension of the reforms, while one-third believe that the reforms should be continued.

Among those who want actively to influence the course of the development of social relations ("the politically active"), those supporting the continuation of reforms outnumber by a factor of five those who believe that the reforms should be suspended (70 percent vs. 14 percent). On the whole, the ongoing reforms are designed first and foremost for active people—there are three times as many supporters as there are opponents of the reform among those who assume full responsibility for their financial situation.

Changes in the Attitude of Different Social Groups of St. Petersburg's Population Toward the Economic Reforms (April-September 1992)

Economic reforms started by Ye. Gaydar's government must continue	Agree			Disagree		
	April	June	September	April	June	September
City population as a whole	63	45	47	22	28	27
women	64	42	46	21	30	27
men	65	49	49	23	26	26
aged under 30	71	47	45	16	26	27
aged 30 to 45	64	46	46	21	27	24
aged 45 to 60	62	44	53	23	30	23
aged over 60	56	43	42	28	29	39
unskilled workers	43	28	32	36	46	32
skilled workers	62	41	44	23	28	32
unskilled office workers	43	33	43	34	36	26
office workers of medium-level skills	62	43	30	20	27	28
college and other students	73	58	55	14	20	28
technical intelligentsia	69	55	49	20	26	18
nontechnical intelligentsia	73	61	62	16	20	18
managerial personnel	67	59	79	18	15	13
servicemen and militia	72	50	60	19	23	28
engaged at state enterprises	63	42	49	22	30	25
engaged in the "new economy"	67	59	55	20	22	19
nonemployed pensioners	57	45	40	26	26	39
Education: less than high school	39	27	34	41	37	43
high school	56	42	44	23	29	28
college	71	57	57	18	24	19
those who have improved their financial situation		64	61		14	19
those who retained it		49	47		23	21
those who situation has worsened		44	42		33	33
those who absolutely approve price increases	90	73	77	5	10	11
those who do not	42	29	35	41	44	46
those who trust the government absolutely		92	82	89	4	4
those who do not trust the government	34	25	31	51	49	52
those who assume responsibility for their financial well-being	73	56	63	14	22	29
those who rely on outside forces	58	40	44	27	32	30
City populace as a whole	63	45	47	22	28	27

Official on Provisions of New Law Raising State Pensions

934A0118A Moscow TRUD in Russian 22 Oct 92 p 1

[Interview with Yuriy Shikharev, chairman of the sub-commission on pensions of the Commission on Social Policy of the Supreme Soviet Council of the Republic, by Vladimir Naumov, special TRUD correspondent: "After Heated Debates; the New State Pension Rates Have Been Set"]

[Text] Yesterday the parliament of Russia adopted a new Law on increasing state pensions in the Russian Federation. The chairman of the subcommission on pensions of the Commission on Social Policy of the Supreme Soviet Council of the Republic, Yuriy Shikharev, tells a TRUD special correspondent about the sudden turns of events in the discussion and what the new document promises for the elderly, the disabled, and other persons who receive state benefits.

[Naumov] Naturally, the question of the size of the minimum pension interests all pensioners first of all.

[Shikharev] Today the guaranteed minimum, as is well known, is 900 rubles. It's clear that you can't live on that money. As a result of the discussion we have worked out a new minimum level—R2,250.

[Naumov] I've heard that the arguments were heated and that one had to fight for this amount. What variants were proposed?

[Shikharev] Indeed, very different points of view clashed in the discussion in the commission. Representatives of five ministries, including even the Ministry of Social Protection, defended the government's point of view. In their opinion, the minimum pension ought to be R1,350. Our commission proposed an altogether different amount: R4,407. We proceeded from the realities of our life. And it really became bitter. It seemed that everything was at a dead end. After one futile day of work I turned on the television in the morning and there a deputy minister of social protection said that they were insisting on a pension of no less than R2,000. Well, well I thought. However, all the same the ice had begun to break. Ye. Gaydar's letter addressed to the session was received by the day of the discussion of the final version of the draft law. In it he proposed, in the name of the defense of the financial system, to limit himself to such a step: to pay pensioners an additional R1,000 each every month. The Russian Minister of Labor came out with yet another approach: double the minimum, i.e., to R1,800 and return to this problem sometime later. In the end one managed to literally pull the increase out and the legislators voted for R2,250. Although our commission insisted on R2,500.

[Naumov] Yuriy Illarionovich, the minimum—this is still the bottom level, something like a life jacket. But the top level is even more important. Today people who have worked well and have earned quite well are dissatisfied.

[Shikharev] And we have placed them on the same footing with vagrants? Agreed. But until now the pensions ceiling was limited to two minimums; leveling reigned in pensions. This injustice is being overcome to some extent in the new law. We are reverting to an earlier procedure under which the basic mass of pensioners had a right to state benefits at the rate of three minimums. For those, whose pension is set taking factors detrimental to health into account and for whom the length of service is recorded,—their "ceiling," as formerly, will be 3.5 times the minimum. Workers, let's say, in hot shops and underground and certain other workers will be able to realistically get a pension at the rate of up to R8,000. Limiting devices are being removed. For the overwhelming majority of pensioners the rate of the state benefit is to be regulated by the principle: it's been earned—you get it.

[Naumov] And how will the previous amounts be revised?

[Shikharev] For pensioners already receiving a pension its amount is to be multiplied by 2.5.

[Naumov] And if they are computing it for a person from the start?

[Shikharev] The last year's earnings will be taken as the basis.

[Naumov] Won't all this lead to the fact that the pension of the majority will turn out to be on the minimum level and a yet worse levelling will set in?

[Shikharev] According to our calculations the pension of approximately 20 percent of the citizens receiving it will be at the minimum level. About 30 percent of the pensioners will receive it at the maximum. For the remaining 50 percent the pension will be close to the mean value (and according to our estimates this is more than R3,000). Levelling is not foreseen.

[Naumov] When will the new procedure enter into operation and when will the recomputation of the pensions begin?

[Shikharev] The law will take effect as of 1 November. The recomputation will begin right away.

[Naumov] Won't it turn out as it already was: instead of an increased pension people didn't receive any pension whatever for six months?

[Shikharev] That experience has been considered. Pensioners will not have to wait this time. The pension will be paid to everyone and will be paid regularly in future. But at first only the minimum. That is, even those who can claim an amount greater than R2,250 will receive this minimum all the same at first (you will agree that this is not so meager). The recomputation procedure may even be dragged out to spring here and there but in the end no one will be stinted. All the money due to a pensioner will be paid to him in full.

[Naumov] And can't it be managed in a shorter time frame?

[Shikharev] This problem is complex and painful. One must carry out rather complex computations, cancel certain documents and set up others for 35 million pensioners. Where the recomputations will be done with the help of machines everything will take place comparatively quickly and simply. However, computerization has touched the social security organs only in certain regions. In the overwhelming majority of social security offices they continue to count in the old way. There are a host of problems here and one of the ways of solving them, it appears, is to transfer to the Pension Fund those subdivisions which are strictly in charge of calculating pensions. Such an experiment is now going on in the Moscow area. The Fund has available both the money and the material base and it knows the ropes. Of course, at the same time, it should now, under market conditions, learn to acquire and earn funds, including for technical equipment.

[Naumov] Let's return to the new pensions. For a long time it has been the custom that persons disabled from childhood receive a substantially smaller pension than people who have lost their health at an able-bodied age. What does the new legislation propose for them?

[Shikharev] They also will receive more. The rate of the pension will also be stipulated by the new law, but it is already by another. This is the Law of the Russian Federation concerning social services for elderly citizens and disabled persons, the draft of which is now being prepared. This law, evidently, will be submitted for the consideration of the parliamentarians and adopted in November or December. Some new approaches to computing pensions, supplementary payments, payments, and compensations will be established in it. The Law will affect the interests of all categories of pensioners—war veterans and the war disabled, rear area personnel, persons discharged from the Armed Forces, etc. For first and second group disabled persons there must be a supplementary payment to the pensions which compensates the services for their care. Persons disabled since childhood must receive an "adult" pension and a supplementary payment for care besides. The presently existing procedure stints not just them. Let's say that a person who has been maimed in production is in great distress. Compensation is set on the basis of a decision of an industrial injury experts commission and recomputation to conform to contemporary earnings is not provided for by the law hitherto in effect. Here people who came to grief in production receive a so-called "regress," calculated from a long forgotten wage, let's say, of R150. Our commission has proposed the elimination of this absurdity.

[Naumov] And the last question: in your opinion, when will a new, next revision of pensions be needed?

[Shikharev] An inflationary jump will probably occur before the end of the year; however, the increase in

pensions will largely compensate for it. I hope that the stabilization of prices will soon begin and the emergence of the economy at a peak will begin to show. Taking all this into account, I think that the next change in the pension rates will occur no earlier than March of next year.

Partners Sought for Aerospace Conversion

PM2710162592 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 24 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Russian Vice Premier Georgiy Khizha:
"Conversion Should Be Civilized"]

[Text] In starting to convert our national defense complex—like other countries, incidentally—we have been encountering many problems. As is well known, we need to invest 1.3 rubles [R] to maintain and convert defense enterprises for every ruble spent on purchases of weapons and military hardware. That is why the conversion program is now being clarified, and I hope that it will be more civilized than the wholesale program we have today.

Of course, a particular role in conversion has been given to the aerospace complex. In the very near future the elaboration of national policy in the conversion sphere should be completed. This will define Russian industry's place and role in world cooperation. Assessing our achievements in various spheres of science and technology, we are striving to construct our national policy in such a way as to occupy a fitting place in the world market. Developing all high-tech avenues of industry, we must promote the development of the domestic economy.

In 1991, 300,000 people were laid off from the defense complex. In 1992 this figure will probably reach 1.5 million. The amount of military output produced in 1992 fell approximately fourfold compared with 1988.

Around 1,300 defense complex enterprise are participating in conversion programs. The depth of conversion at these enterprises is not identical, though. For instance, in missile construction it varies between 26 and 84 percent, and in research and development organizations in this area the range is 15-75 percent.

The main principle governing the work of enterprises undergoing conversion is to use the defense-complex high technology to produce output capable of competing successfully on foreign markets. Six priority avenues for the development of civilian output and consumer goods have been identified. These take account of the resolution of the most important socioeconomic tasks of developing the country's economy—namely, transport and communications, agriculture and the consumer sector, the fuel and energy complex and energy conservation, the chemical and timber complex, and medicine and ecology.

As I have said, we are giving a particular place to the conversion of the aerospace industry, which has always enjoyed the government's attention. Huge funds and intellectual potential have been invested in it, and therefore our task is to make use of all these achievements for peaceful purposes. And not just in our own country, but in the interests of all mankind.

Conversion in the aviation industry is aimed above all at the creation and production of modern passenger and transport aircraft, amphibious aircraft, wing-in-ground-effect craft, light aircraft, and machines with no counterparts worldwide. The aviation industry is capable of expanding Russia's export potential through the series production of the Il-96-300, the Il-114, the Tu-204, the Tu-334, the An-74, the An-38, the Yak-42M, and Mi-38 helicopters. Our aviation design bureaus and enterprises are cooperating with many foreign aviation firms to share production of aviation equipment.

General-purpose capacity that is undergoing conversion at missile and space firms is mainly being reoriented to the production of consumer goods, medical equipment, communications apparatus, and equipment for processing agricultural produce.

At the same time, it is this sector which has a unique scientific and technical potential based on large creative collectives with the most modern research and experimental base and powerful specialized production. Russia has a wide range of launchers capable of placing payloads of up to 100 tonnes in orbit. There is experience in developing long-term space stations and in carrying out long manned missions. All this could be aimed at the study and exploration of space in the interests of the world community.

Russian scientists are proposing that further work be done on the ICBM's due to be destroyed under the Russo-U.S. START Treaty, and that they be used for commercial spacecraft launches. This would make it possible to develop satellite-based communications and television systems, to obtain particularly pure materials in space, and to resolve other tasks using space technology.

Unfortunately, it is currently impossible for foreign firms to commission these missiles for use in commercial space launches owing to the restrictions brought in at the height of the Cold War under the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] lists on shipments of advanced Western technology to Russia. But our Western partners should realize that any further attempts to limit the penetration of missile and space technology into the international market will not bring them prosperity and will merely impede the development of conversion in Russia.

The development of a worldwide space system for surveying the earth's surface for national economic purposes is highly promising. The first radical step on the road to real conversion will be the adoption of parity measures which ensure the gradual removal of national

barriers in the way of access to information from space-based military equipment. Back in August 1992 the Russian Government adopted a resolution allowing it to use for civilian purposes images obtained from military satellites with a line resolution of up to two meters.

One of the most important and humane spheres of the conversion of the aerospace complex is activity aimed at preserving the environment and conditions for human life.

There are now thousands of artificial satellites in orbit around the world. There is an urgent need to examine the question of combating space pollution.

As is well known, cooperation between Russia and European states in the sphere of space research and exploration is expanding. This year there has been a joint Russo-French manned flight on the "Mir" station. Talks on cooperation are being conducted with many countries, and a number of agreements have been signed. Together with the United States we are thinking about joint space programs—specifically, the use of our launch vehicles for international launches.

At a session of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in New York in 1990 our delegation proposed setting up an international space-based environmental monitoring laboratory based on the "Almaz" station. The UN Committee instructed states to study the question of participating in this program. Meanwhile the second "Almaz" station was already at the final stage of its manufacture, and the program could no longer be reorganized to take account of other states' interests. The station has been working successfully in orbit since March 1991, transmitting information for geologists, oceanologists, geophysicists, cartographers, ecologists, and agricultural and forestry specialists.

The UN recommendations could be implemented on the basis of a third "Almaz" station, by equipping it with apparatus to obtain information in the interest of studying the ecological situation and exploring mineral, raw material, oil, and gas regions, supporting agriculture and the enhancement of soil fertility, providing warnings about accidents and natural disasters, and researching different countries' raw material potential.

The building of the station has already begun. Up to four tonnes of different equipment will be carried on board in a sealed capsule with its own specific microclimate. The station could be launched in 1994-1995. The third "Almaz" will cost around R1 billion to manufacture. The Russian side is interested in international investment in this project and others.

An important problem for us is to develop systems for the permanent automated exchange of information with foreign partners interested in organizing cooperation with Russia in aerospace technology. We have created the basis for the development of such a system. Efforts are now being made to unite a number of Russian data

bases into a unified structure that will be compatible through satellite communications with international information channels.

The successful implementation of this project would make it possible to organize an exchange of information on dual-use aerospace technologies and to ensure—under UN control—access to them by third countries which lack these technologies. On the one hand, this would strengthen the United Nations' peacekeeping mission while, on the other, making it harder for military space missile technology to spread uncontrolled among developing countries in the guise of civilian projects.

Russia supports the proposal from the UN Secretariat's Department of Economic and Social Development to set up an international aerospace complex conversion center which would pool the efforts of countries interested in the peaceful use of space within the framework of specific conversion programs. Given the development level of aerospace technologies and the depth of the conversion processes that have been begun in the Russian defense complex, we are proposing that Moscow be chosen as the site for the headquarters of this international center.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Yeltsin Address at MFA Collegium Viewed

934C0210A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Oct 92 p 7

[Article by Sergey Tikhomirov, assistant editor of the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA international department: "Judgment Day in the House on Smolensk Square"]

[Text] Publicly, in the presence of the collegium of the Russian MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], its curator G. Burbulis and a dozen journalists, Boris Yeltsin held a thrashing of the MFA. The president needed about an hour to give a sound scolding of our diplomacy and the methods of its action, or more precisely its inaction, dragging along at the tail end of events and not having a clear-cut program of action for the future.

In the words of the president, the conception of Russian foreign policy is "just barely" being formulated. As a result, for the "reporting period," we have brilliantly "let the countries of Eastern Europe slip away," and in regard to the United States, "the favorites... of Andrey Vladimirovich Kozyrev," we are merely espousing gratitude and cannot "express our disappointment" when it is necessary to do so. Things are also not going too well with France, in the relations with which there has been a decline after the high-level visit.

It turns out that the information which Yeltsin received from the Foreign Intelligence Service on one country or another differs considerably from the information coming from the Russian embassies, since the latter, he

said, are reminiscent of the compositions of "seventh-graders." An exception to this, in the words of the president, is the embassy in England, which received an evaluation of "good" in this connection, as well as the embassy in America, whose mark was "very good." Yet the fact that our ambassador in Albania receives \$2,000, while his colleague in Bulgaria is toiling for only 600 "greens," Boris Yeltsin absolutely refuses to understand.

The president also expressed his dissatisfaction regarding the inability of the MFA to establish real contacts with the Ministry of Defense, which today is already "not militaristic," "not Yazov-directed," and is ready for fruitful cooperation. Furthermore, it became clear that our diplomats have neither a clear-cut program for protection of Russians abroad, nor a "well-thought-out predictive policy with the CIS countries," etc. And in general, he reasonably asked the question which relates directly to the members of the MFA collegium: "What has happened to the thinkers, the analysts?"

Russia was and is a great power, grieved the guest in the multi-story building on Smolensk Square, yet at the same time "it quietly tolerates injuries and even insults." While in the Baltic countries they are infringing upon the rights of our fellow countrymen, the president continued, the MFA is stamping out "weak official statements" addressed to the oppressors.

In his speech, the president touched upon the domestic political situation in the country, stating specifically that the refusal of the Russian Supreme Soviet to move the date of the Congress of People's Deputies is a "conflicting decision," but that the most difficult time for Russians is over, and that in 1993 we "will nevertheless go upward."

In short, the discussion, or more precisely the monolog of Boris Yeltsin, turned out to be unprejudiced for the diplomats. The chief of the MFA tried from time to time to quietly raise some objections to the high-standing guest, but had no success in this.

I do not know what the president said to the representatives of our diplomatic elite and to the minister himself after the journalists were asked to leave the hall. However, personally I got the impression that Andrey Vladimirovich was probably not successful in defending his foreign policy.

IMF, World Bank Consider Rescheduling Russian Debts

934A0151A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Sep 92
Morning Edition p 4

[Article by Aleksandr Shalnev: "IMF and the World Bank Are Discussing Postponement of Former Union Debt Payments"]

[Text] Washington—Russia will apparently receive the next bunch of loans from the IMF, but the problem of

long-term, 15-20 year deferment of the former Union loan payments is still far from being resolved. This is my impression from various conversations around the annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank boards of directors. The meeting will officially open on Tuesday, but all delegations have already arrived in Washington and they are conducting intensive unofficial debates on the issues listed in the agenda for the Fund and Bank directors.

It must be said that the problems of our debts and new loans to us are not the main ones; they are given low priority and the issue most emphasized is the efficient removal of all effects of the most serious crisis in the European monetary system. Both we and our difficulties seem somewhat extraneous in this situation.

The very first behind-the-scenes discussions proved that nobody is especially prepared to accommodate us and defer our debt payments. The stumbling block is the positions of Germany and Italy, our most serious creditors, since for them any delay can only mean one thing—a postponement in getting the money that they need so badly. According to Theo Waigel, German minister of finance, "the debt issue definitely should be resolved as soon as possible. But first we have to make sure that the German federal budget can cope with this."

Another aspect of the problem is the fact that we still cannot coordinate with the IMF our financial expectations, which primarily concern any estimate of the future payments balance in Russia. The Russian delegation admits that there is a considerable difference between the proposed estimates and those that were prepared by the Fund experts. Until we find a common denominator, the IMF will not be prepared to give its blessings to the Paris Club which is to pass final judgment.

However, our delegation is feeling rather optimistic. As Aleksandr Shokhin, deputy prime minister, put it, "an agreement on deferred payments is possible within the next two weeks." Two weeks later is when the meeting of the Paris Club should take place.

According to information from some knowledgeable sources, a certain clarification of what is in store for Russia will come on Monday when our delegation is scheduled to meet with the French representative who has been requested by the "Seven" to personify the Paris Club in a way.

Now, about the 3 billion [currency not specified] in loans. We expect this money from the Fund which in turn is making it quite clear that the loan will be extended only after Moscow fulfills the obligations it took upon itself in July—after we reduce our budget deficit to 5 percent of the GNP, and after we decrease inflation rates to 9 percent. THE NEW YORK TIMES writes that the Fund "feels extremely nervous" about the current direction of Russian economy. The same newspaper even printed some information which alleged that "Yegor Gaydar has already admitted publicly to what has been common knowledge: The Russian Government will not be able to honor its financial obligations."

This information was disavowed by the Russian delegation: Gaydar never said anything of the kind, I was told. In his brief interview by REUTERS Aleksandr Shokhin declared: "We have to honor and we will honor our obligations." The delegation is convinced that receiving the \$3 billion will present no problems.

Meanwhile, the World Bank has prepared a series of reports estimating the situation in various spheres of the former Union economy; they also contain recommendations on a further course of action for the CIS states. In my view, the report on the situation of agriculture and of food supply is the most significant. According to estimates made by Bank experts, in 1992-1993 the former Union, with the probable sole exception of Kazakhstan, will have to import 33 million tonnes of grain, which is about 5 million tonnes less than the figure for 1991-1992.

The opinion of the Bank is that this year production in the animal husbandry sector will drop by 10 to 20 percent compared with 1991. But the report authors do not feel alarmed by this fact. On the contrary, they support a 15 to 20 percent decrease in the cattle population of the former Union. "Together with reorientation of our imports from the coarse grain used as cattle feed towards protein additives, together with expanded purchases of veterinary pharmacology items," states the report, "this will allow reduction of the demand for feed grain, improvement in the medical characteristics of the animals, and achievement of a sharp increase in productivity."

Concerning our agriculture in general and outlining a mid-term strategy for the development of this area of economy for the former Union, the Bank mentions the pressing necessity of conducting a radical land reform where "establishing full rights of ownership on land without any restrictions, including restrictions on plot sizes and on the use of hired labor," will be given top priority. It is significant that the bank is advocating active foreign investments in the agriculture of the CIS states, while it singles out processing, storage, and transportation of produce as "the most promising areas" for the influx of foreign capital.

One cannot but feel surprised, however, by the newly surfaced fact that Russia has not yet withdrawn the \$600 million that the bank agreed to release to us a month and a half ago. This sum includes money "for the support of agriculture" and all we needed to do to receive it is to sign a corresponding document. As of late Sunday Russia has not signed it. As I learned from some reliable sources, the Bank managers are openly bewildered by this fact. According to Western sources, we are dragging our feet in this matter because we decided, after some pondering, that the terms of the loan were not quite acceptable and now we are trying to change them somewhat.

The Russian delegation has confirmed that the problem with the loan terms really exists and it was the subject of

discussion at the Sunday meeting between our financial experts and Bank President Lewis Preston. According to our source of information about the results of the meeting, the problem would be resolved within the next 10 to 14 days.

Jurist Evaluates New Customs Code Draft

934A0145A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
23 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by doctor of legal sciences, Professor Boris Gabrichidze: "Customs Is Not a Barrier"]

[Text] Doctor of legal sciences, Professor Boris Gabrichidze ponders what the new Customs Code should be.

These days, millions of people and hundreds of freight routes cross the Russian border in both directions. The intensity of traffic on "Customs Street" is growing. And figuratively speaking, all of this growing two-way traffic is still poorly controlled, unfortunately: Bottlenecks appear here and there, upsetting the rhythm, and violations of various caliber continue to occur—besides legal import and export of goods, rivulets of contraband goods seep through the customs net, eroding away the most currency-intensive products out of the national wealth.

Small wonder. We still do not have a strong and dependable legal customs mechanism guaranteeing rhythmical development of the entire complex of customs relations. There is no shortage of legal acts. Numerous presidential and government documents pertaining to this sphere appeared in the last year. But many of them are provisional, and others are inconsistent and contradictory. And when they are looked at in their entirety, they are not always interrelated, and they do not represent a unified, harmonious system. The Customs Code is to become such a document. Recently the government approved a draft of a law addressing it.

What are the main ideas behind the principles at its foundation? Difficult as it may be to believe, the problem of customs regulation is far from adequately regulated in the existing constitution. It does not make even the status or the content of customs affairs clear. The code should obviously first provide a clear definition of customs affairs in today's terms, and indicate the circle of subjects who are to regulate these affairs.

Are the republics of the Russian Federation to participate in their administration? Neither the constitution nor the Federation Treaty offers an answer to this question. We will obviously find it within the text of the code, which will confirm this important right of the republics. In what form? Perhaps in the form of joint jurisdiction by federal and republic government organs. This of course has nothing to do with the general principles, which remain within the exclusive competency of the Federation. The interests of the republics, autonomous formations, krais and oblasts could have been accounted for by including their right to establish

free economic zones and free customs depots on their territory, with the consent of the Federation. Of course, we cannot ask a balanced legal document to regulate everything—all of the subtleties and details of the specific aspects of customs affairs. It defines only the basic institutions of customs affairs.

Consistency with the principles of market relations is a fundamental feature of the code. It is oriented on radical economic transformations, and it is based on the principle of unity of the customs territory of the Russian Federation—on land, on water and in the airspace.

The draft embodies a very important idea: unity of the system of customs organs. There should not be any confusion or anarchy here. "Autonomy" of regional and local customs services may be extremely limited. Otherwise it would be impossible to seriously talk about an effective customs policy. This does not mean that, for example, the location of customs houses can be determined without coordinating with the governments of the republics, autonomous republics, krais and oblasts. It is they that are primarily interested in ensuring the epidemiological and ecological safety of their territories. The work experience of customs houses on the western state border of Russia confirms this. Let me note that the role of local soviets and the local administration must be determined more specifically in the code.

One of the fundamental principles of the document is unity of customs legislation. It is interpreted broadly: It includes not only laws per se, but also other legal acts. Who has the decisive word in their development? There can be no diversity of opinions here: It is the prerogative of federal organs of government and administration. But of course, the opinions and recommendations of the republics are accounted for when drawing up these legal acts.

Inseparable from this principle is the requirement that lawfulness be observed in customs affairs and customs policy. This area does involve law enforcement functions, after all. However, violations of the law are rampant in the practice of customs affairs. These violations are especially troubling to foreign and domestic partners of foreign economic ties. I am referring in particular to the actions of executive organs which violate legal principles under the excuse that they are implementing so-called operational measures of economic policy.

The draft contains a section on glasnost in customs documentation of the import and export of goods and property through a customs border, and in initiating and examining cases of violations of established rules. However, it seems to me that the wording of this important principle is unjustifiably narrow. Also, glasnost in this area, openness of customs legal regulation, and availability of current information to the public and to interested organizations make the work of businessmen much easier, and help them avoid mistakes. It might perhaps be useful to include a separate clause on this problem.

References to strict observance of international legislation also suffer from excessive brevity. This principle, which is universally recognized by the world community, needs to be presented more clearly and more broadly. The same can also be said for the most favored nation principle. It would be useful not only to simply mention it but to also document the terms under which this status is granted.

The draft contains many new provisions. Sections have appeared that were not in the Customs Code of the Union: on customs fees, customs privileges, information and consultation, and others. Legal rules concerning those regulations of customs affairs which had formerly not been under legal regulation were introduced for the first time. Prescriptions that were found to be ineffective, fuzzy or contradictory were rewritten.

Matters associated with the problem of human rights are regulated in sufficient detail. I am referring to a section on appealing the decisions and actions of customs organs. It foresees in particular a democratic procedure for submitting complaints, making decisions on them and monitoring by law enforcement organs—the court and the procuracy. A section was introduced on the status of customs officials. Only a single article was devoted to it in the old document. The draft contains legal and social guarantees for workers—wages, material and personal support, and social protection.

Finally about the terms and concepts contained in the code. In my opinion they should be clear and understandable to our citizens and foreigners. For example terms such as "goods," "property," "customs regulations" and so on. Ambiguities and reservations that permit distortions or evasion of the law must not be allowed.

It seems to me that upon receiving a firm, permanent legal basis taking the form of a modern Customs Code, the country's customs system will become more effective and business-like, and it will work more efficiently. And this will improve the entire mechanism of foreign economic activity.

North Korean Fishing Boats Detained in Kurils Region

934C0183A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian
27 Oct 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Incident at Onkotan Island"]

[Text] On Sunday evening, the border guard vessel "Vorovskiy" located and detained the floating base "Bong-Dansan" and three North Korean fishing trollers in the area of one of the islands of the Kuril ridge—Onkotan.

The violators were located in our territorial waters at a distance of one mile from shore. The detained vessels were escorted to the port of Severo-Kurilsk, where an investigation of the circumstances surrounding the incident will be held.

Commentary on Visit by Mali Foreign Minister

934C0183C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Oct 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Russia-Mali: The Light at the End of the Tunnel"]

[Text] Leaders come and go. Debts and traditionally friendly relations remain.

At the beginning of this week, Mali's Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Alhousseini Toure came to Moscow on a working visit. He met with Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev and his deputy, B. Kolokolov, and with Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Petr Aven.

This is the first time since the disintegration of the USSR that Moscow has been visited by an official person of such high rank from the state of Tropical Africa. Shortly before our turnover, Mali had one of its own. In March of 1991 the authoritarian regime of General Moussa Traore, which had been in power for 23 years, was overthrown. Power was assumed by the Transitional Committee for Salvation of the People, headed by Lt. Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure, who had commemorated his rule with the introduction of a constitution and a multi-party system. As a result of the parliamentary and presidential elections which were held this year, the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) won the majority in parliament, and its leader, Alpha Oumar Konare, became the country's president. It is still too early to judge the degree of democracy of the new Bamako regime—there is no African leader today who, having come to power, would not introduce democratic institutions. However, for now the transitional period in Mali has not been accompanied by any significant excesses. Aside from the socio-economic problems, the situation within the country is complicated by the armed struggle of the Touregs against the central authorities. It is also expected that the situation will be heated up by the judicial proceedings over the former president and his followers.

We must assume that one of the main topics which the Mali minister discussed in Moscow was the problem of the foreign debt. Russia is Mali's largest creditor. Mali's total debt in current accounting comprises around \$50 million. The term of effectiveness of the latest, the 16th by count, postponement for repayment of this debt expired three years ago. Now Mali is asking for a new postponement until 1995. As of next year, they promise to assume payment of the local expenditures of Russian institutions in Bamako, but do not agree to sale of the debt.

What Mali will pay with—that is entirely unclear. The country's economy is in a catastrophic situation. There are practically no direct trade relations between Mali and Russia, with the exception of deliveries on commodity credits. At the beginning of the 80's, the "Kalana" gold mining enterprise was built in Mali with

the aid of the USSR. However, as yet we have not received a single gram of gold in repayment of the credits. Moreover, last year the enterprise closed down due to unprofitability. (Yet the mine belonging to the Australian company, "Broken Hill Proprietary," yields three tonnes of gold per year, and by 1994 the yield will be increased to six tonnes.) A similar fate has also befallen the cement plant built "as a turnkey" by the Soviet Union in 1969. However, Mali has the largest livestock herd size in West Africa (cattle +5 million head) and is a rather large exporter of cotton, 25 percent of which is purchased by Belgium and 16 percent—by France.

The Mali army is 80 percent equipped with Soviet weapons, although with the changeover of military cooperation to a commercial basis in January 1991, its volume has significantly declined. As yet it is unknown whether there was a discussion in Moscow about the re-armament of Mali's army, although such supply could not be called significant or even notable. At the present time, Mali's armed forces possess 21 T-34 tanks, 10 MiG-21 aircraft and three Mig-17's.

The only significant figure in Russian-Mali relations (with the exception of the sum of the debt) is the number of students from Mali studying in Russia. Today there are more than 1,000 of them.

Stepankov Views Contacts With Cypriot Law Enforcement Officials

934C0185A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Oct 92 p 2

[Interview with Russian Procurator General Valentin Stepankov, conducted by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent Oleg Rubnikovich: "The Cypriots Are Afraid of the Russian Mafia; Russian Procurator General Visits Positions of Peacekeeping Forces on the Island With Long-Range Goal"]

[Text] Russian Procurator General Valentin Stepankov made a brief visit to Cyprus. In his discussion with our NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent, he tells about the goals of his trip to this Mediterranean country.

[Correspondent] Many highly-placed Russian officials have visited Cyprus recently, including the minister of internal affairs. What has evoked such great interest in this small state, and what was the goal of your visit? To my knowledge, you met with all the leaders of the law enforcement agencies, and even with the president of Cyprus.

[Stepankov] I was invited by the Cyprus government and by the procurator general of this state. As for interest, it was expressed primarily by the Cyprus side itself. Despite the fact that Cyprus does not border Russia, this country, as well as other countries of Europe, I might add, has begun to feel the need to develop joint measures for preventing possible criminal manifestations on its

territory which for now, I might add, is quite successful in the sphere of crime prevention.

At the same time, the Cypriots are witnessing the active interest exhibited by Russian citizens toward this republic. Every month, tens of Russian-international companies register here. Moreover, being located on the maritime and aviation route between Asia, Europe and Africa, Cyprus is an attractive stopover base for many criminal groups, including also for dealers in the drug business. And this is one of the major problems facing the police. If we take this aspect of activity of the law enforcement agencies alone, then Cyprus views Russia today as a country which is itself producing narcotics, and as a transit route through which drugs get to Europe.

[Correspondent] Is there some information regarding ties between Russian and Cypriot dealers in the drug business?

[Stepankov] The Cypriot law enforcement agencies have a rather extensive data bank. And although our citizens have not yet manifested themselves sufficiently, nevertheless the Cypriots do not want the emergence of such ties to catch them unaware. Moreover, the local police are aware of the Russian crime rate in Germany, Austria, and Poland... This is why they are ready and willing to take measures ahead of time to protect against the manifestation of our criminal structures in Cyprus.

[Correspondent] But the Cypriots are probably already familiar with the concept of the "Russian mafia?"

[Stepankov] They do have a concept of our mafia, and they are afraid of it. When the local population gets information to the effect that criminal groups in Moscow are drawing up accounts in broad daylight, this is perceived with great caution. But, unlike other European countries, in Cyprus the Russian mafia does not yet operate openly.

We must pay the Cypriot side its due. It is not waiting for the emergence of criminal situations, but is preparing for them. At the present time there are around 600 joint companies operating in Cyprus with the participation of Russian businessmen. Moreover, in reality around 150 of these are actually operational, for the most part performing middleman deals. The Cyprus authorities have heard many stories about how money is laundered or about how weapons are sold with the aid of our firms. They are very much concerned that the companies existing on the island do not become middlemen in criminal deals.

[Correspondent] What questions were raised at the meeting with the procurator general and other leaders of the law enforcement agencies of Cyprus? And were there some points of contact outlined between your departments?

[Stepankov] There was an agreement on provision of legal aid between the USSR and Cyprus. Today it is

being reworked with consideration of the fact that Russia's international-legal status has changed.

In all my trips abroad, I try to evaluate from a purely practical standpoint the course of our judicial-legal reform, since it contains efforts to transfer to Russian reality the existing experience and practice of the work of foreign law enforcement agencies. When in our country—and I attribute this primarily to certain members of parliament and the government—they call for the transfer of Western models to our reality and speak about this with an ease which I cannot understand, I assure them the situation is far from being that simple. In many countries I have been told not to idealize their system, including also in the sphere of law enforcement.

In our discussion with the procurator general of Cyprus and the country's minister of justice, we concentrated specifically on the following aspect: What does the Cyprus Ministry of Justice do? The Russian Ministry of Justice has several times announced its readiness practically to stand at the head of the procurator's office and to operate as if by the American model. In Cyprus the model is English, and the Ministry of Justice is far removed from judicial activity. Although it is true, it does deal with jails and penal colonies. The Cypriot side sees many positive aspects in our system of the procurator's office, especially in its powers and authorities on supervision of the militia and investigations. We have come to an agreement with the procurator general of Cyprus to continue contacts on all levels, and to make them permanent.

[Correspondent] While in Cyprus, you visited the camp of the UN peacekeeping forces and met with the commander of the UN armed forces and the personal representative of the UN Secretary General in Cyprus, thus, I believe, becoming the first official Russian representative in the zone of separation of the sides. Were these meetings a diversion from the regimen of your trip, or were they planned?

[Stepankov] My desire to visit specifically Cyprus, and I have received many invitations to other countries as well, was evoked also by the fact that a unique and tragic situation for the Cypriots has been formed in this country. For almost 20 years, the two opposing sides—the communities of the Turks and Greek Cypriots—have been separated by UN forces. There is in fact a front line, on which, fortunately, thanks to the peacekeeping forces, the shooting is very rare.

[Correspondent] Yet why did this problem interest the Russian procurator general so much?

[Stepankov] The fact is that Russian troops, not being specially prepared and trained, are today forced to fulfill a very similar mission in the region of combat operations in South Osetia, Abkhazia, Tajikistan, and the Dniester region. I became convinced that we approach this problem too lightly, believing that it is enough to deploy a battalion of paratroopers to the conflict zone, and order will be restored. As it turns out, this is far from

being the case. For this we need to instill the appropriate thinking in the military servicemen, to specially train and prepare them for this far from simple mission.

I was primarily interested in the organization of performing service by the UN forces and in the legal base of operation of these forces as applied to Russian activity.

After the talks, and accompanied by an Austrian officer who had been assigned to us, we, at his suggestion having first removed our jackets and ties so as not to attract undue attention, took a passenger car directly to the combat positions and saw how these troops were deployed and to what extent the questions of interaction had been resolved, and learned what means and methods were used to resolve the conflicts. I might add that last year alone, around 600 incidents between the opposing sides were averted.

I was interested in this problem also because in Russia and the CIS countries we use Russian military servicemen for these purposes, and the procurator general and his subordinate military procurators bear the responsibility for organization of procurator's supervision. It was important to learn whether the UN soldiers fall under the jurisdiction of the Cypriot or Turkish sides, how questions of investigating criminal cases were resolved, how inspections of sites of occurrences were conducted, etc. We even got down to such details.

Today these questions loom before us in full view. Not too long ago, some of our soldiers died in Armenia. An investigation is underway. Recently I sent a letter to my colleague in Armenia with a request to expedite the investigation and to take immediate measures to identify the persons involved in this incident. However, as yet it is unclear how the question will be resolved further.

One thing is clear: Many of our political leaders need to study the experience of this very same Cyprus. Perhaps then we will be able to avoid the mistakes for which we are paying with the blood of our soldiers.

Mongolian Foreign Minister Interviewed

934C0209A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Oct 92 p 4

[Interview with Mongolian Foreign Minister Tserenpiliyn Gombosuren conducted by Vladimir Abarinov; place and date not given: "We Are Seeking Our Place in the Region and in the World": This Is How Tserenpiliyn Gombosuren, Minister for Foreign Relations of Mongolia, in Russia on an Official Visit, Defines the Country's Foreign Policy Priorities"]

[Text]

[Abarinov] Permit me, Mr. Minister, to begin with a question of the domestic policy situation in Mongolia, even though it is not directly within your jurisdiction. The situation is paradoxical to some extent: the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] won the June

democratic multiparty elections, obtained a parliamentary majority, and formed a government. The new parties have remained in the opposition. What, in your view, contributed to the MPRP's success?

[Gombosuren] We have virtually a one-party parliament and, correspondingly, a one-party government—a government of ex-communists. This is a unique, purely Mongolian situation. Why did the people vote for the MPRP? This was mainly connected with mundane reconstitution. Under the MPRP the people had lived pretty well, in the main. But in the past two years the living standard had declined considerably. This, I believe, was the main reason. So ideology is ideology, but living conditions and the living standard are determining. Of course, we are not in the least guided by communist principles. And we have no right-wing, communist opposition, incidentally.

[Abarinov] What are the foreign policy priorities of the new, democratic Mongolia?

[Gombosuren] We are seeking our place in the region and in the world and establishing political and other cooperation with new partners both in Asia and in the world. Relations with our two neighbors—Russia and the PRC—are the most important direction for us. We advocate a strengthening of the atmosphere of trust and cooperation. Russian-Japanese relations, for example, are not a matter of indifference for us. Their normalization would correspond to our interests. We have an interest also in a political settlement on the Korean peninsula. We would very much like to see the establishment of normal relations between North Korea and Japan and North Korea and the United States. On all these matters we are exchanging opinions and ideas with our regional neighbors. But we are giving economic relations priority, for all that.

[Abarinov] We could not in former times speak of Mongolia's independent foreign policy—Ulaanbaatar was under the strongest influence of Moscow. Are you not afraid now also of becoming dependent on donor countries?

[Gombosuren] We are all dependent on someone or other. The whole world is interrelated and interdependent. Mongolia is no exception. It is important to secure relative independence and the priority of national interests. After all, in the past we put the interests of the socialist camp above national interests. We do not aspire to be within anyone's embrace but nor are we afraid of new dependence in the sense of the development of prudent relations. We are for equal, civilized interstate relations.

[Abarinov] Is Mongolia not worried by the nuclear policy of your powerful southern neighbor—China?

[Gombosuren] We understand China's position. China is also in principle for nuclear disarmament, but believes that it is still too soon for it to be thinking about a reduction in its nuclear arsenals. The other nuclear

powers should first reduce their arms to the Chinese level. This position is well known, and I cannot say that it is devoid of common sense.

[Abarinov] Pretty good relations have taken shape between Mongolia and the United States. What circumstances have contributed to this?

[Gombosuren] The Americans support our reforms and believe that they are no camouflage. This is the main reason. We are pursuing an honest policy, democratizing the political system in earnest, and undertaking economic reform—they see this. In turn, we value American support—both political and economic—highly.

[Abarinov] A circumstance complicating the continued development of bilateral Russian-Mongolian relations is the problem of Mongolia's debt. How is it contemplated removing this problem?

[Gombosuren] It is contemplated solving this question by way of negotiation. Even the amount of the debt has not, strictly speaking, been agreed as yet. We clearly owe, but how much? You yourself know how our reciprocal payments were muddled. So it is still too early to speak about specific solutions. A group of Russian experts will leave for Mongolia on 26 October to study the problem. In any event, the problem will be resolved with regard for the interests and possibilities of the parties. I do not believe, for that matter, that this question will prevent the development of Mongolian-Russian relations.

[Abarinov] Is the Russian Government making concessions or adopting a tough position?

[Gombosuren] "Concessions" is an imprecise term. Russia is displaying a flexible approach.

[Abarinov] But do you get the feeling that Russia wants to preserve and develop relations with Mongolia?

[Gombosuren] Yes, I have felt this in the course of this visit. As Minister Kozyrev told me, Russia has two reasons for maintaining ties to Mongolia: This is a democratic and a neighboring country. Mongolia has the same reasons, the same criteria. We have a common border of approximately 4,000 km. This determines the community of political interests. In addition, there are no serious political problems between our countries.

[Abarinov] I agree that the debt problem should not impede further Russian-Mongolian cooperation. It is well known, for example, that Russia has allocated substantial funds for the completion of construction left incomplete per the contracts of past years. Is it contemplated altering the structure of this cooperation, and in what sectors, in your opinion, will it develop best?

[Gombosuren] The most promising form of cooperation is investments, primarily, I believe, in our mining industry.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Moscow Aide on Housing Administration's Switch to Market Conditions

934C0177A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Oct 92
Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with L. Kuznetsova by Viktor Belikov: "An Increase in Rent? That is for the Moscow Soviet to Solve..."; date and place not given]

[Text] Beginning next year apartment rent in Moscow may increase by a factor of 3.5 to 6.0 depending upon the quality of housing. This is envisaged by a program for transition to the market system of financing the operation and servicing of the city's available housing, drawn up by the Moscow Institute on the Economy in cooperation with the US Agency for International Development.

[Correspondent] Privatization of apartments, which has become widespread in Moscow, is only one part of the housing reform which also envisages changing the amount of rent for all categories of Muscovites, and offering many of them so-called housing grants. L. Kuznetsova, deputy chief of the Facilities Engineering Department, describes the peculiar features of the new concept.

[Kuznetsova] First of all I would like to point out that for now we are talking only about a concept—about working out a different approach to payment of rent and not about a specific directive or document. We still have to examine the entire complex of questions at a session of the city government, which will then present proposals to the Moscow Soviet. Following this, the budget will have the last word as the principal "master."

[Correspondent] What made it necessary to change the present level of apartment rent?

[Kuznetsova] The funding situation for operation of residential housing and municipal services is catastrophic. Not many people realize that to this day we are paying the 1928 rate for living space in our apartments and rooms—16.5 kopeks per square meter.

For decades, the difference between the apartment rent collected from the populace and the actual cost of housing has been covered by multi-million-ruble subsidies from the city and republic budgets. Now this centralized "binge" is coming to a halt—there simply is no money for it. Muscovites themselves now cover only 3.5 percent of the necessary expenditure for maintaining the housing which they occupy; meanwhile, nearly R200 billion has to be spent for these purposes in 1993.

[Correspondent] Can such an astronomical sum be realized by means of increasing the rates for housing and municipal services? Just how many times will they increase?

[Kuznetsova] Calculations indicate (and dozens of variants and methods were proposed), that we must adopt a process of gradually increasing rents to the market level,

over a period several years. And the rents must be collected on the basis of all factors—not just the amount of living space. Approximate rates per square meter beginning 1 January next year will range from 0.6 to 1.0 rubles, depending on the category of housing and conveniences; beginning 1 July, from 1.5 to 3 rubles; and beginning 1 October, they will already be 3 to 5 rubles per square meter.

For owners of privatized apartments, expenses for maintenance and building repairs will remain at the same level as the rental rate for apartments in available municipal housing. By virtue of a gradual increase in the cost of public utilities beginning the middle of next Spring, by the Fall state subsidies will be dropped from payments for hot water service.

[Correspondent] Families with average and low wages will hardly be able to endure such a radical price increase.

[Kuznetsova] The program envisages social defense measures for the overwhelming majority of Moscow families, depending on their level of income. To be specific, it establishes that for the first three months, beginning with 1 April next year, housing expenses may not exceed 5.0 percent of all wages in a family; after that, the "threshold" will be raised to 7.0, and then to 10 percent of total family income. The family will receive housing-support compensation for the difference between it and the amount of rent for the maximum allowable square meters (the so-called "social norm").

Each and every Muscovite living in municipal buildings, privatized apartments and cooperative houses will receive it, without exception. The following figures can serve as an example of the proposed social norms for housing: for a single person, a one-room apartment with total space of not more than 35 square meters; for a family of three, an apartment with total area of up to 45 square meters. Any space above this is considered excess.

The specific program for changing the rent for housing and introduction of housing subsidies will be presented to the Moscow Soviet for its adoption before the end of this year.

Council of Heads of Republics Attacked, Defended

934C0141A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Oct 92 p 1

[Statements by Supreme Soviet member V. Tikhonov, People's Deputy M. Chelnokov for and against the creation of new government organ in the Russian Federation: 'Who Needs the Council of Heads of Republics']

[Text] As we have already reported, on 15 October of this year, a new government organ of the Russian Federation was created—the Council of Heads of the Republics, headed by the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin. This decision has called forth an ambiguous reaction. Some

believe that in the present conditions such a coordination organ is necessary, others have doubts about the constitutionality of its creation.

Vladimir Tikhonov, member of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation:

I believe, the newly-created Council of Heads of Republics under the chairmanship of the President of Russia may become one of the organs capable of the consolidation of the Russian Federation, the development of common approaches and mutually-acceptable solutions.

As far as the various apprehensions on this account are concerned, I think, they are exaggerated. As far as I understand, the Council of Heads of Republics does not in any way encroach on the prerogatives of the Supreme Soviet and all the more so the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia.

It is not envisaged by the existing Constitution? But, you know, Russian statehood in essence is only taking shape. The search is going on.

They say, that here, they say, the Council of Heads of Republics, having just been born, already exerts pressure on the Supreme Soviet, proposing to postpone the next congress until spring. But, first of all, it is up to the Supreme Soviet to accept or to reject this proposal. And secondly, perhaps, this is reasonable. What do we intend to discuss in December if the draft Constitution will still not be ready? Again the situation in the country? But, you know, it is so apparent that our affairs could not be worse.

Mikhail Chelnokov, people's deputy of Russia:

Part V of the Constitution of Russia, which carries the heading "The Supreme Organs of State Power and Administration of the Russian Federation," stipulates the following supreme organs: The Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet (Chapter 13), president (Chapter 13), and the Council of Ministers (Chapter 14). Hence it follows that the Council of Heads of Republics is not envisaged by the Constitution of Russia or by any law, and therefore its creation is an anti-constitutional action. The very existence of this organ is illegal and extremely similar to the creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR. It is interesting that both of these organs were created by people already in power.

Already this alone is more than sufficient for the immediate disbandment of the Council of Heads of Republics and for an examination of the responsibility of the President of Russia and the presidents of the republics for the creation of an illegal organ of power and administration.

Nevertheless, the Council of Heads of Republics immediately began to act—it adopted an appeal to the Supreme Soviet of Russia with the request to examine

the question of moving the Congress of People's Deputies from 1 December 1992 to March-April 1993, in order perhaps to have it adopt the new Constitution. And in this lies the main reason—the unconstitutional organ of power was created especially in order to exert collective influence on the Supreme Soviet of Russia and to postpone the holding of the Congress.

In connection with this, the following should be noted. The 6th Congress of People's Deputies of Russia decided to hold the 7th congress at the end of 1992. To change this decision by law no one has the right, except the congress itself. Further: On 1 December the term of the additional powers of the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, expires. If the congress does not assemble at this time, the situation becomes extremely strange and undetermined—do the additional powers continue or not? There arises the possibility of enormous arbitrariness of the organs of executive power in the conditions of such legal uncertainty.

It is worthwhile to note further that the President of Russia has already repeatedly violated the existing Constitution, which has been recorded by the Constitutional Court. For example, in terms of the ukase of the President concerning the creation of the monster, combining the Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the country. At the present time, a number of appeals apropos of the unconstitutionality of a number of ukases of the president are lying in the Constitutional Court, but the Constitutional Court does not examine these appeals.

Thus, the conclusion is unambiguous—the new organ of power has been created in contradiction of the Constitution, but for this reason, first of all, there must be disbandment immediately, and, secondly, it is necessary to examine the question of the violation of the Constitution by the highest officials of Russia.

Separatism in North Caucasus Reviewed

934C0093A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
11-18 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Yemelyanenko: "Don't Divide and Rule"]

[Text] **Russia will have to adopt this political doctrine for the Northern Caucasus.**

A year ago, Moscow launched an attack against Chechen separatism, endangering, as a result, burgeoning democracy at home. The Russian White House has reaped the harvest it has sown: Chechnya's example was followed by Ingushetia, Abkhazia (which is formally beyond the Russian Federation border), Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachai-Cherchessia, which includes the whole of Northern Caucasus.

Despite its Tskhinval experience, Georgia did in Abkhazia something which Russia abstained from in regard

to Chechnya. The pretext was the protection of territorial integrity. Eduard Shevardnadze managed to convince his influential supporters in Russia and in the West that the pretext was quite relevant. However, the result was very much like the Russian affront in Chechnya, only with a bloodshed. Georgia is facing the threat of fracturing into smaller parts. Regrettably, this example didn't teach Russia anything.

The Russian parliament agreed to the dismembering of Checheno-Ingushetia, and created an ephemeral Ingush Republic lacking its own territory, capital, and bodies of power, not to mention its own economy. Remaining unresolved is the dispute between North Ossetia and Ingushetia over the Prigorodny Region of Vladikavkaz, from which the Ingushes had been deported in 1944.

Concurrently, Moscow imposed a financial and transportation blockade on Grozny. Thanks to the efforts of the Russian parliament's Speaker, Chechens were declared undesirable persons in Moscow and southern Russia, which was detrimental primarily to the Chechen economy. Grozny's response was to restore the command and administrative system, with an extensive "security agency" sponsoring Chechen banditry.

The Center's aim seemed close to being achieved. However, its reliance on muscle caused an imposing wave of solidarity, and the anti-imperial and nationalist direction of this wave was determined by the Confederation of the Caucasian Mountain Peoples (CCMP). Its volunteers and mercenaries fighting in Abkhazia sobered up the Georgian State Council and gave a chance for the September 3 Moscow agreement—that is, maintained a balance of forces. This triggered Moscow's disagreement, and it reacted by bringing a legal action against the CCMP leader, Yuri Shanibov.

An important detail: The Confederation men also fought in South Ossetia against Gamsakhurdia's regime. They all volunteered to fight, and no one accused the Assembly of being an anticonstitutional organization. Given that the Russian Federation parliament and the Justice Ministry were silent about the Cossack's involvement in the Trans-Dniestrian conflict, their indignation at the presence of the Cossacks and the CCMP men in Abkhazia looks like ill-considered protection of the old imperial ideology. Commitment to that ideology led Russia into a trap; even the quiet Kabardino-Balkaria, which used to be Russia's staunch ally, exploded in protest. The result was the threat of a break-up of the territory into separate Karachai-Balkarian and Kabardino-Cherchessian regions.

Russia has prepared for that in a very special way; since the start of the Abkhazian events, an additional 10 Internal Force battalions have been deployed in the Northern Caucasus, and a Special Force regiment has been deployed on the Chechen border. The Prigorodny Region has been invaded by a Cossack regiment, units from the Internal Force Dzerzhinsky Division, and cadets from three military academies.

"He will not fire the gun if he is sane. He can't aim properly if he is insane." (Chechen adage)

Legend has it that this was exactly what an indigenous Caucasian thought the first time he saw a Russian. The Russian, however, fired the gun. The outcome of this policy is that all the Caucasian nations have followed Chechnya's suit in their demands. Both the Left Wing and the Right Wing, as well as nationalists, are united in one thing; that it is time for the status of relations between the Centre and the Northern Caucasus to be changed.

Quotation:

"The Caucasian peoples approached the idea of a confederation via a Union of the Mountain Peoples (1917—Ed.) and declared an independent North Caucasian Republic on May 11, 1918...

"In the current times of troubles, when conditions of life are changing throughout Russia, each Caucasian nation must see that its rights and interests aren't infringed or damaged or ignored during the changes in Russia."

From the "Declaration of the Congress of Abkhazians," November 1918.

Russia gave a perfectly hostile reception to the idea of one republic for all the nations of the Caucasus. That reaction placed Russia in a vulnerable position. Abkhazia has taught Russia that to war against the people of the mountains means to share Georgia's fate. However, Russia isn't quick enough to build new relations ahead of the separatists. While the Russian-Chechen talks were dragging on in Sochi, Chechnya did everything to run a diplomatic blockade, and got recognition from Lithuania, Estonia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran. Dzhokhar Dudayev is so confident in his power that he ventured to leave developments at a CCMP Congress without his supervision, and left for a tour of Turkey, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, and the United States, with an aim to convince the world of the viability of a Republic of the Caucasian Mountain Peoples. The CCMP Congress was forging ahead with the idea of such a republic, making Russia face another stage of separatism that it itself provoked. Russia's slide into the use of force, following the example of Georgia (in Abkhazia) and Azerbaijan (in Nagorny Karabakh), could push Russia back into the 19th century, towards a prolonged Caucasian war.

Only due regard for grassroot initiatives, like the initiative of a Republic of the Caucasian Mountain Peoples, can provide a chance to stall the disintegration. For Russia, this will mean a chance to preserve its democratic statehood. The wilfulness of the upper echelons, and their unilateral stake in rigid unitarianism, are conducive to the rise of fascist regimes or the proliferation of local mafias, which is attested to by the tragic experience of Georgia.

Tensions, Volatility in North Caucasus Analyzed

934C0165A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Oct 92 pp 1,2

[Article by Vladimir Zelentsov: "Soldiers in the Center Group: The Northern Caucasus Today Is a Zone of Increased Danger"]

[Text] An echo in the mountains is long-lived. Perhaps the roar of the first Caucasian War is still rumbling about somewhere in the rocks to this day. Or is it the second war, today's war?

In any event, the Northern Caucasus today is a zone of increased danger, despite the traditional hospitality of the descendants of the Alans and Adyge. The situation is complex and contradictory. Otherwise, how does one explain the sending of 10 battalions to that region from Russia's central regions? The well-known events in Kabardino-Balkaria showed that the soldiers and officers of the MVD's troops did not arrive with their mattresses in those parts in order to bring in the harvest. On the other hand, another harvest is abundant.

The "Quiet City" of Nalchik

A kilometer and a half from the House of Soviets, where the rally was going on, in the squat and relatively nondescript building of the Kabardino-Balkaria MVD's medical unit, the soldiers, who had taken a good beating from the angry mob at the republic television center and on the square outside the House of Soviets, were hidden. At first the boys were put in the republic hospital, but the rally participants came to its steps. And then it was decided to move the soldiers farther from harm. Well, we are all good at hindsight.

At the time, there were at first only 24 people at the television center. If help had been just slightly delayed, the boys, even in their bulletproof vests with their "democratizers" and assault rifles would have simply been torn to pieces. Pvt Denis Shch., who had left a mother with two eight-year-old twin brothers at home, was dragged out of his ranks by four strapping fellows who tried to take away his rifle and club. Denis recalled that at that moment he was not thinking about himself; the main thing was to keep his service weapon from being taken away. His shield was torn out of his hands; his helmet was knocked off, and he was bashed in the teeth, but he gave up nothing to his attackers. "Strange people," he said to me in the medical unit. "They themselves elected a president, and now they are dissatisfied with him."

Strange people. One can understand Denis. He was carrying out orders. On the day following his clash at the television center, he was again standing in a cordon in front of the House of Soviets, and the "strange people" were once again attacking him. They screamed in the soldiers' faces: "Yuriy! Yuriy!" And the soldiers could not even understand who it was that the attacking crowd was so upset about. Incidentally, here is another enigma.

Why not cry, "Musa!"? After all, Shanibov, who became head of the Assembly of the Caucasus Mountain Peoples in the spring of 1990, adopted the Muslim name. Evidently, the rally participants were not interested in these subtleties.

The first two cordons consisting of the militia and people in civilian clothes disappeared almost immediately. The soldiers of the Kursk, Ulyanovsk and Nalchik battalions of the internal troops were left one-on-one with the rally participants. And it began.

Pvt Sergey Cherednichenko recalls:

"We stood in a sparse chain, about three meters apart. It was no great difficulty to beat us up and crush us."

In answer to the first stones and fence posts, a tear-gas bomb was thrown from the cordon into the crowd. Moments later it came back to the soldiers, many of whom had not had time to put on their gas masks and were immediately blinded by the gas. Pressed back to the entryway to the House of Soviets, barely swinging their clubs and covering themselves with their shields, they started to filter into the building. But when there were about 15 soldiers left on the steps, the door of the House of Soviets was closed tightly behind their backs. The last thing that the fellows heard from behind the door was "You'd better get going." The ring of attackers closed in, and a real beating began. At that time shots were fired into the air from the windows of the building. The crowd rushed back.

Pvt Igor Dronov from the Kursk Battalion was taken away to Moscow with two knife wounds (his bulletproof vest did not save him). The 37 other men were hospitalized, mainly with skull and brain injuries. In the hospital there temperature was taken, and they were called by their first names and "boys." But the boys kept asking themselves the question: just who closed the door of the House of Soviets? Indeed, who.

The building that the crowd at the rally attacked on 27 September sticks in one's memory with its rolled-up carpet runners and stairwells blocked with safes, cupboards and desks from the offices. We were searched and given one-time passes. There was wariness and worry in people's faces. But then the face of Militia Capt Batiy Balkizov lit up with surprise and anger: "Closed the door? Let people stop imagining things!" And then, evidently to prove he was right, he presented his credentials as a member of the USSR Writers' Union. It looked very persuasive.

Is it possible that it also seemed that way to Pvt Arsen T., a Kabardinian? "No," Arsen shakes his head. "I knew the person who hit me. A fellow countryman. We live on neighboring streets."

Of course, those who attacked the soldiers also caught it. How well the cordon accomplished its mission is for specialists to judge. Nonetheless, even from the description of events one can draw the conclusion that the

soldiers were unprepared for such fury from the crowd. After all, just recently we were singing about the indestructible friendship of peoples. And were smiling at one another and shaking hands. Granted, there were no clubs in those hands, and cordons of guards were for the most part formed only at large concerts and stadiums. It has now become fashionable to institute a state of emergency and curfew. The gentle and hospitable people of Nalchik do not acknowledge such a fashion. The mountain people are a proud and passionate people. Showing them a fist is like waving a red cape at a bull. But it also makes no sense to blame the soldiers, or the officers. After all, they were not the ones who got the idea of coming to the Northern Caucasus to impose order.

Everything Is Calm in Nazran

A new republic, the Ingush Republic, has recently emerged in Russia. It does not yet have any clear borders, capital, bodies of authority or other attributes of statehood. On the other hand, there is an unresolved dispute between Ingushetia and North Osetia over the Prigorodnyy Rayon in Vladikavkaz, from which Ingush were exiled in 1944. Authorized representatives of the Supreme Soviet and a temporary representative of the Russian president have been appointed to solve all these problems; they set up in Nazran under guard by a special-purpose internal troops.

The platoon of stern fellows in camouflage berets headed by Maj Oleg Kublin was greeted by the local population in the person of a little boy who threw an anti-tank grenade into an armored personnel carrier. Fortunately, this "toy" did not go off, and Pvt Pavel Z. did not pull the trigger on his large-caliber machine gun. As they say, everyone got off with a mild scare and started to make friends. Kublin was helped to organize mess for the soldiers and was invited to a wedding. He even got an offer to become chief of the local special-purpose militia. "Stay, and we'll give you a house." But the major, who, by his calculation, had been in 22 hot spots, smiled in reply and tactfully expressed thanks for the confidence that had been shown in him. Everything was nice, quiet and peaceful.

Why, you ask, did the representatives need a platoon of men in camouflage berets? People's Deputy Ibragim Kostoyev, the deputy authorized representative of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, replied: "That's what was agreed on." Agreed on or not, when he phoned home that same Pavel Z. told his mother, just in case, that he was harvesting potatoes near Kaluga. His sensitive son's heart felt that his parents would not be very happy over such a situation. Granted, it is not the custom to be sentimental in the Knight [Vityaz] special-purpose unit. They, if anyone, would not have lost their heads outside the House of Soviets in Nalchik. But "crowd control" is not their specialty. Their equipment is another matter. It would have come in very handy for

the soldiers in the noisy days in the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria. There would most likely have been fewer smashed heads. But it would have been better if there had been none at all.

The small garrison guarding the authorized representatives in Nazran is quiet. But around it events are going on that can only be called anarchy. In one village a small war is being waged between two families. Each side has up to a thousand guns. In another rayon an armed group broke into the rayon soviet and overthrew the government, staging a local revolution. Right in Nazran, in the market, one can freely (if one has the money) buy a pistol, hand grenades, or assault rifle and cartridges. Among the sellers of these murderous goods are many small boys.

Of course, one can get indignant and exclaim: "But where are the special forces looking?!" Calmly. Maj Kublin's unit has a different mission. So Viktor Yermakov, the special representative of the Russian Supreme Soviet in Ingushetia, has something to rack his brains over. I racked mine, too, in walking along the stalls of the arms merchants. "How about buying a 'lemon' as a souvenir of Nazran?" After all, the mountain people say that in the Caucasus only a lazy man doesn't have a weapon.

The Border City of Vladikavkaz

Viktor Gafarov, deputy commander of the internal forces said outright that additional forces has been brought into North Osetia at the request of the republic's government in order to stabilize the situation in the region, preserve citizens' life and health, and block the way to the movement of armed groups and close off channels for the delivery of arms to the Northern Caucasus.

The situation is also being made more complicated by the fact that Vladikavkaz has, for all practical purposes, become a border city. It is no more than an hour's ride to the Daryalskoye Canyon. There, beyond a tunnel dug through the rock, lies the border with Georgia. Everything appears the way it used to be. The Terek's waters are flowing, and the mountains are standing. On the substation building there are large letters that read: "The Friendship of the USSR's Peoples Is Indestructible." Vitaliy Belyayev, director of the Northern Caucasus Veterinary Border Station, says, shifting his Kalashnikov on his shoulder: "And who does it hurt, the slogan? Let it adorn the building."

There are no longer any border guards here. Instead there is a customs post. At the Chmi border station, alongside the highway patrol service booth, old acquaintances stand behind reinforced concrete blocks: an internal troops' post, reinforced with an armored personnel carrier. A soldier wearing a helmet sits in a trench and looks wearily toward the border with Ingushetia. Anticipating a question, Sr Lt Oleg Panin, the post commander, answers: "Sometimes they shoot." And he nods in the direction the soldier is looking.

For now, the post is not answering the shots. The bullets fly at Chmi without being aimed. Maybe someone is joking on the other side or wants to frighten people. And the bang of the shot strikes the rock after the bullet, which knocks a chip of granite out of the rock and falls with a rumble into the canyon. A mountain echo lasts a long time.

Amur Oblast Admin Head on Oblast's Problems, Development

934C0153A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Oct 92 p 2

[Interview of Albert Arkadyevich Krivchenko, Amur Oblast Chief of Administration, by Nikolay Bely (Blagoveshchensk): "A Year of the Amur's Governor"]

[Text] Our correspondent talks with Chief of Administration of Amur Oblast Albert Krivchenko.

[Bely] I remind you, Albert Arkadyevich, of your arrival from Moscow after your appointment. The sunny airfield, the Kazakhs in parade formation, the democratic community, the press.... As they say, caps were thrown into the air. But the euphoria died down quickly. The empty store shelves, the drop in production, a mass of other problems, and [illegible word] greeted the chief of the vast region, and they did not allow the new authority to take it easy in victory tents. There have been critics to spare during the past year. But you yourself, how do you evaluate the results of the year in the post of the Amur's governor?

[Krivchenko] The beginning actually was complicated. Winter was approaching, there was no heat in Blagoveshchensk, there was nothing at all in the stores, and everything was on coupons, which everyone had forgotten about then and which once were used for products not in stock. Everything was done in fragments. Production was falling uncontrollably. Especially at the start of the current year, after price liberalization and the enterprises' reluctance to conclude contracts for the ruble, only for barter.

Not right away, but enterprise managers began to become conscious of and to turn to the market economy. By September production output reached 86.8 percent of the 1991 level. And in September it was 101.1 percent versus September of the preceding year. Incidentally, as Gaydar reported at the opening of the current session of the Supreme, for Russia as a whole this same indicator was 83.3 percent.

And there is still another comparison. Under the market economy relationships between enterprises and regions are founded, as is well known, on a contract basis. Whereas in the first half of last year the oblast fulfilled its contract commitments for delivery of the most important types of output to other USSR regions by only 66 percent, in the first half of this year such contracts with regions of Russia and CIS countries were fulfilled 90.8 percent.

Agrarian reform. Despite predictions that the peasants would not take land, by the start of sowing 2,000 livestock farms were organized, and right now there are more than 2,500. Moreover, more than 70 percent of the oblast's population is provided with land under potatoes, oats, berries, and private farms, that is, everyone who desired land received it. There were cases of obstacles in allotting land or shares to the peasants by leaders of various ranks and other violations of land legislation, but we fought decisively with such phenomena with the help of economic sanctions. The Committee on Land Reform and Land Resources has imposed on the guilty parties more than 2 million rubles [R] in penalties.

[Bely] But nevertheless an extraordinary situation was introduced at harvest time.

[Krivchenko] The administration itself took remedial action on the extraordinary situation. Powerful Pacific Ocean typhoons battered the Far East in September. About 200,000 hectares of plantings were completely flooded, and the remaining areas were greatly waterlogged. Nevertheless, grain harvesting was almost completed, and the yield, despite understandable losses, equaled last year's, and so much vegetables and potatoes were collected that a market for them could not be found. We were forced to ask the government for help in finding a place in some area for 20,000 tonnes of potatoes and 10,000 tonnes of cabbage. Of excellent quality at prices below the market. We completely covered deliveries of agricultural output to the Far North.

[Bely] And what about shipments within the oblast? The administration was constantly criticized at those same oblast soviet sessions for not being engaged in social protection of the populace, its actions suffered from populism, incompetence, and so on. Accusations primarily against the chief of the Amur government are being heard.

[Krivchenko] The deputies, yes, are criticizing. But I shall cite the facts. A month and a half before the corresponding RF [Russian Federation] Supreme Soviet decree and the President's ukase we created an oblast state social fund for social protection and charity, as well as funds in all the Amur's cities and rayons. Almost everywhere we opened specialized stores or sections for the indigent, in many places we held monthly free distribution of products to cardholders, and free food in dining rooms has been organized. We were accused of populism when we introduced rationing cards in January. But first, this was done temporarily, when a severe shortage of commodities was being felt, and second, it was mainly for products whose prices have remained fixed. Third, otherwise we would not have been able to distribute fairly inexpensive foodstuffs that were acquired by barter in China.

We have developed a program for increasing the production and processing of the Amur's main single crop—juice, which never existed before. The Russian Ministry of Agriculture approved this program, and Rutskoy and

Shumeyko supported it. On the basis of our program, our specialists participating, competent bodies were charged with developing a juice program for the whole Russian Federation. The administration also prepared a program for attracting to the oblast joint-stock and private Russian and foreign capital. For the first time in seven Soviet decades, Blagoveshchensk held an international trade fair, at which more contracts were concluded than had been concluded in recent years. We adopted a program for supporting the construction of private residences in addition to the regular plans for housing construction. Are these not really new solutions, approaches, and designs? I am not speaking about the program for creating jointly with the Chinese a region of intensive foreign economic collaboration, which the oblast never has had.

[Belyy] And still: you are planning, you are making decisions, and you are being pushed off in elementary fashion. More than ten of the chief's decrees and orders have been repealed by the oblast soviet and its Minor Soviet, and the administration has been accused of confrontation.

[Krivchenko] From the first days of operation of the administration, I have spoken out for consolidation. I met several times with oblast soviet Chairman Belonogov in order to come to an agreement about collaboration. He apparently concurred. But he has routinely raised alarms to Moscow, and our "comrades," led by the chairman of the soviet, once again dashed into battle. Belonogov provoked and directed the doctors' strike against the administration and the government. He openly called for a strike by peasants, and he explained how to strike correctly, to avoid prosecution by law-enforcement bodies. He calls the President's and the governments's reform policy criminal, genocidal, a slip knot around the people's necks, and so on. And when, at the oblast soviet session, he was asked: "That means that our President who was elected by the whole people is a criminal?", Belonogov answered: "He will be thrown out in about two months, then you will find out."

I am in agreement that the war must be ended, but how, if the proponents of a socialist election everywhere take the bit in their teeth and make desperate efforts to prevent very necessary radical reforms?

The Soviet can rescind only those decrees and orders that contradict the laws and the President's ukases. And what do we have? I will cite only a few examples.

Our newspaper twice wrote that a year and a half ago the former Amur Oblast Ispolkom chairman and, simultaneously, chairman of the Soviet falsified a decision of an oblast soviet session, on the basis of which North Korean loggers are now eliminating clear cutting at our felling sites. I established a commission and they checked the documents. Everything was confirmed. Actually, the session decided not to extend the agreement with the

Koreans, but Belonogov reported to Pavlov, who was then the Premier, and to the Tyndales Association that the session had consented to an extension of the agreement. For that reason I adopted a resolution that brought this situation to the attention of the government and the oblast soviet, and I also charged the Committee for Economics to develop steps for making effective use of the forest. What law or regulation does this violate? The oblast soviet, however, adopted the absurd decision to rescind the decree, protecting the notorious "honor of the uniform." Just who wins from this?

Another example. For several years Blagoveshchensk's contract for startup of a second water line has fallen through, because of which the city is on a scanty water ration. Starting it up this year was threatened. By their decree I assigned responsibility for carrying out this important social work to the city's mayor personally and set a deadline for him to report on its fulfillment. The council repealed the decree, but the mayor still carried it out to the day. Often it is precisely for populist purposes that our decisions are rescinded, negating all the efforts we had spent. They act on the principle that no allowances must be made.

Alas, according to the law, the administration does not have the right to a court appeal on the rescission of their decrees. This favors the soviet. We strongly recommended a representative authority based on principle; once, in our opinion, the administration also adopts illegal decrees, then you study them and express your views in writing. Is it logical? No, they do not go for this. They answer: The juridical services of the soviet and of the administration have different functions. You, they say, adopt your decree and we will rescind them.

Land reform has in essence stopped in the Amur region through the fault of the oblast soviet. In defiance of legislation, the soviet has deprived the administration of the right to have land at its disposal, it has taken for this right for its own and demanded that all the administration's decrees that allocated sections for road construction, for excavating for construction materials, for collective vegetable gardening, and so on, be repealed. The oblast court has satisfied our lawsuit only partially, but right now the suit is being examined by the Supreme Court, while the work is at a standstill.

But enough of this! The oblast is poorly prepared for privatizing and is conducting it poorly—probably nowhere in Russia is the situation worse. Right now we are throwing all our efforts into this part of the work, for progress in all the economic reforms depends upon it. We have adopted the programs about which I spoke, but they still must be executed. The main thing is the desire and the support of the city and rayon administration chiefs.

A year of work on the President's team has flown by imperceptibly. Each day has been Judgment Day. But time will make the final evaluation of our work and the people will give it.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Kravchuk Warns Tatars Against Using Force

93UN0196B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Pilat: "We Will Respond With Force," Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk in an interview for Crimean Television"]

[Text] Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk spoke on Crimean television on 20 October. "This is what I think: A legal, juridical assessment must be given to the events in Crimea," he said. "Particularly to what happened in Krasnyy Ray and next to the Supreme Soviet. The guilty parties on both sides must be punished—publicly, openly. Nobody can act as though the law does not apply to him. Ukraine has helped and will help Crimea organizationally and materially in defense of the interests of all nationalities. We must not allow these problems to be resolved out on the streets."

Kravchuk stated that he intends to meet with representatives of the Crimean people in order to "reason together, without losses to the people or to anyone else, and, the main thing, to resolve this most important issue." The Crimean Tatars, he thinks, have the right to return to their homeland. But living there today are different people who cannot be simply shipped out the way the Crimean Tatars were resettled at one time. There will be a possibility—and I invite the leaders of the Crimean Tatars to come and see me, but not as members of the majlis, but as representatives of the people. [Sentence as published] To do anything else would mean to recognize a diarchy in Ukraine: If the majlis were a sociopolitical organization of the Crimean Tatar people, I would vote for it. But it is assuming state functions, and "there cannot be two states within a state." Today it is possible to resolve the major issue—on plots of land and material aid for the Tatars—with the interaction of Crimean Tatars, other peoples, and organs of power. Therefore, Kravchuk "does not support those powers in the localities who are dragging out the settlement."

The president of Ukraine noted that if the Crimean Tatars were to act with force, they would merely complicate the situation for themselves: "To place hope in force is absolutely a losing proposition. Ukraine is an immense state with immense power, and we will respond to force with force. We have no alternative. We will not allow blood to be spilled in the Crimea. Regardless of whose it is."

Split in Government Party Analyzed

93UN0196A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Skachko: "Plan of Concrete Actions Regarding CIS Demanded of Kravchuk. Closed Session of Ukraine Parliament To Be Held Today"]

[Text] A certain role in recent political events in the republic is now being played not by the split in the National-Democratic camp, but by the confrontation within the so-called party in power, which is conventionally divided into two camps: the "political theoreticians," headed by Leonid Kravchuk, and the "economic pragmatists," headed by Ivan Plyushch. Judging from everything, this split will be the subject of discussion at the parliamentary session.

Neither camp has anything against building an independent state in Ukraine, but they differ in their views as to how this should be done. The former devote more attention than the latter to, as it were, the political side of the matter: the adoption of the state symbols and attributes of the state, the recognition of Ukraine in the world, the creation of its own armed forces, an independent foreign political course, etc. Hence their rejection of the CIS and support from a certain element of the National Democrats. The basis of this camp, both in parliament and in the society, in addition to the aforementioned national radicals, is composed of nationally oriented representatives of the creative intelligentsia, businessmen whose enterprises can function within the republic, and representatives of the new presidential administration who have received real power from the hands of Leonid Kravchuk.

Among their opponents one can include representatives of business circles whose enterprises were integrated into the economy of the former USSR and cannot exist without close economic ties, leaders of local soviets whom Leonid Kravchuk deprived of real power after appointing his representatives, and representatives of the liberal democratic opposition and the emerging class of property owners. Objectively close to them are also representatives of those National Democrats who are irreconcilably opposed to Leonid Kravchuk, who wish political failure for him personally.

The fact that the former allies, Leonid Kravchuk and Ivan Plyushch, have ended up on different sides of the political fence can be explained. For Kravchuk, who has taken a course toward a strong presidential republic, to take power away from parliament and assign it a secondary role of supplying laws to an obedient president and government is quite logical. It is possible, however, that he has made two large political mistakes: First, he has lost the support of representatives of the local soviets. Second, by supporting Vitold Fokin and intending to reform the inactive government, which has demonstrated its inability to propose an independent reform program, Leonid Kravchuk is left without the support of businessmen, above all agrarian kolkhoz workers. As a result, for the first time in his presidency he has been unable to control the parliamentary majority, which ended up under the influence of the speaker, Ivan Plyushch, who, having over time become an independent political figure, made good on the promise he made at a news conference immediately after his election: In the event that Ukraine entered on an "incorrect" course, he would move to opposition to the

president. Plyushch experienced his influence for the first time when he sharply criticized the presidential structures for their desire to assume all the power, and the government—for inactivity once it received the support of parliament. The Supreme Soviet, in spite of the admonition from Leonid Kravchuk, not only voted for the retirement of Vitold Fokin and his government, but also elected as the new prime minister a representative of the other camp: Leonid Kuchma. The latter, although he was nominated by Kravchuk, might well oppose the president if he continues his course toward further separation from the CIS, which, in the opinion of the new prime minister, will lead to a deepening of the crisis in the Ukrainian economy. It is the economy that will determine the republic's entire policy in the future.

Since after the collapse of the USSR the economy of Ukraine still remained attached to its national economic complex by a multitude of bonds, representatives of the camp of pragmatists at the closed session will quite probably demand that Leonid Kravchuk explain what his policy will be with respect to the CIS. The first to do this were the agrarian deputies, who during the fall became aware of their dependency on Russian energy sources, mainly petroleum products. The agrarians demanded that the president immediately engage in negotiations with Boris Yeltsin. The directors of large plants will tell Kravchuk at the session what Russia's raising prices of energy sources to the world level next year will do to the Ukrainian economy. It is quite possible that at this same session they will draw up the main principles of the concept of relations between Ukraine and countries of the Commonwealth and take the first steps to implement them. One can hardly expect changes in Ukraine's course toward independence in politics and the economy, but they will put an end to the useless discussions of this: They will demand concrete actions from the president. The pragmatists see Ukraine's withdrawal from the CIS not as a one-time act, but as a fairly lengthy process involving the arrangement of new and the restoration of old economic ties. A similar view of this problem was announced on 19 October at a joint news conference in Kiev by representatives of the All-Ukrainian Association of Solidarity of Workers (VOST) and the Union of Ukrainian Students (SUS), who, as we know, are protesting and demanding Ukraine's withdrawal from the Commonwealth. SUS leader Vladimir Chemeris told the journalists: "What we need from Leonid Kravchuk is not a one-time act, but a step-by-step plan for Ukraine's withdrawal from the CIS." The fate of the students' protest and the general political strike of the VOST and SUS are linked to the decisions of the closed session of parliament.

The second major issue at the session will be the formation of a new government. It can be any kind—consisting only of representatives of the party in power or a coalition; but one thing is for sure: The ministers must state their positions regarding the main issue for Ukraine—how to halt the crisis in the economy and avoid a social explosion. And Leonid Kuchma, as we

know, is in favor of preserving the old ties and says it is impossible to withdraw from the CIS immediately.

Nor can one rule out the possibility that the session could easily end with a reconciliation between the political opponents and their leaders—Leonid Kravchuk and Ivan Plyushch. But if the main issue is not resolved, in the opinion of many observers and politicians, the development of Ukraine could proceed according to the Georgian or Azerbaijani scenario, where violence on the part of an insignificant opposition group was enough for a wave of public anger to overthrow the first post-communist regimes in these republics. There are already groups like these in Ukraine—more than 30 students are staging a hunger strike in the center of Kiev. As their leaders announced at a news conference on 19 October, one of the strikers had already been placed in an intensive-care unit, and another had declared a "no water" hunger strike.

But if Leonid Kravchuk agrees to the demands of the new opposition and the new government is able to keep the economy and policies of Ukraine from a catastrophe, this will reconcile all parties. Kravchuk will be able to assume his favorite position again, above the fray, and Ivan Plyushch will elevate the role of the parliament as the savior of our nation and, possibly, will prolong its existence, while the government will ultimately be able to begin market transformations and employ the people in something other than building barricades and overthrowing the legally elected powers.

State Of Democratic Revival Party Viewed

92UN2169A Kiev UKRAYINA MOLODA in Ukrainian
11 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Volodymyr Katsman: "From the Lives of the Party Members. 'The Workers' Party' Has Ruined Everything. Maybe in 'The Party of the Docents' It Will Turn Out Better"]

[Text] The PDVU (Partiya Demokratychnoho Vidrodzhenia Ukrayiny, Ukrainian Democratic Revival Party) does not aspire to become a mass movement, as once did the CPSU. However, it can boast about its authority. Mainly because it is supported by intellectuals: the majority of the party are representatives of the technical and artistic professions.

The PDVU is a party of the parliamentary type. Consequently it works through "its own" up above—in the Supreme Council (where together with the party "New Ukraine" it can gain, if not a commanding majority, then quite a loyal vote on some points), in the Cabinet of Ministers, in the National Parliament, in the diplomatic corps, etc., and at times in the immediate surroundings of President Leonid Kravchuk. The intellectual "upper crust" of the PDVU calls for opposition concerning these same power structures, and is even ready to withdraw at any time the support of "its own" in order "to topple," for example, the Cabinet of Ministers.

On the whole, analyzing the dispositions of today's political arena, the majority of the PDVU in its general congress reached the conclusion that a split had occurred in the democratic movement, which permitted the formation of a wing in the party with social-liberal leanings and a wing of national democrats. However this situation should not be overly dramatized, because all this are but the signs of a normal democratic process, through which stage passed, without exceptions, all the nations of Europe. Here is how one of the founders of the People's Movement of Ukraine and the PDVU, a well known intellectual, doctor of philosophical studies, Myroslav Volodymyrovych Popovych, expressed himself in a conversation with me:

"One would not want to examine the present political status on the territory of Ukraine from the viewpoint of dissent. We all have considerably more in common: for instance, we are against this command-administrative government, we are for a broad legal democracy, and lastly, we all are for national renewal. This is quite normal, that there exists a national-democratic orientation—it performs its duties; social-liberals or liberal-democrats—they perform theirs. I lean to the view that this situation is a planet wide catastrophe (not in the sense of catastrophe as something necessarily tragic, but rather in a philosophical sense). The Soviet Union split along its seams, we wound up among the remnants of the empire, and world history teaches that in such remnants were born progressive creatures as well as monsters-usurpers. So, it is necessary to do everything to ensure that we rid ourselves of the complex of provincialism."

We must forthwith accept the laws concerning political parties and organizations, and the demonopolization of mass communication. The goal is to have multi-party elections in the fall or by spring, to take part in them once again with our "younger sister"—"New Ukraine," and also to be open to cooperation with any other democratic forces. To return land to the peasants, to as quickly as possible effect "an untying of the hands" for any kind of business or enterprise—large or small, to begin purification, to lay the groundwork for positive social guarantees. The PDVU reaffirmed its support for the idea of "a federal-agricultural system for Ukraine, but believes that the appropriate legal, political and social-economic conditions necessary for its practical realization have not yet been created." As for the participation of Ukraine in the CIS: this, in the view of the "democratic revivalists," is one of the forms of international cooperation, but only to the extent that it serves the interests of Ukraine and does not prevent our country from cooperating with other countries of the world.

Unfortunately, the PDVU, in this respect, as do many other political groupings in Ukraine, suffers today from a lack of understanding by the so called "middle class"—entrepreneurs, businessmen, workers. It is true, on the other hand, that this middle class has so far stood aside from the political battle, carefully observing, not rushing into politics, but yearning to secure the immediate future

more quickly, and frankly speaking, to fill its purses. In this respect "New Ukraine" has gone considerably farther than its "godmother."

But the PDVU has experience in the electoral fight (let me remind you that it put forth Ihor Yukhnovskyy and in part Volodymyr Hryniv as candidates for president last fall). It is free of nationalistic complications, superstitions, because it speaks for the interests of the citizens of Ukraine, no matter what their nationality.

Who knows, perhaps this will have a deciding influence in the upcoming multi-party elections? In any case the number of sympathizers of the PDVU is growing, and the party itself at its last forum in Luhanske took a serious step forward, not even considering the fact that the disease of party splitting has touched even the "democratic revivalists"—a group of deputies from Donetsk, Simferopol, Mykolayev and a few other regions have demanded their own faction, and their own, separate outlook on selected problems in present day Ukraine. Well, that's what pluralism is for, even if the supporters of a one party system would not yearn for solidarity the epoch for which, it seems, is behind Ukraine. In this the danger of Bolshevik tendencies in views for such a pluralism still exists, but from another flank.

Green Party Makes Organizational Changes

93P50014A Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
21 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by HOLOS UKRAYINY special correspondent Oleksiy Breus: "The 'Greens' Are Betting On Elections"]

[Text] The Third Congress of the Ukrainian Green Party took place on 9-10 October in Kiev. Questions of PZU [Ukrainian Green Party] tactics, as well as changes and additions to the party program and rules, were discussed.

No significant changes were made to the program. Only in the new version were the distinctive features of the period of state building in Ukraine were taken into account.

The significant changes that were made in the party rules concerned its organizational structure. From now on one chairman will head the party instead of 10 cochairmen "scattered" in various regions. It is an understatement to say that earlier the positions of the cochairmen did not always agree. Sometimes, having determined a program, the cochairmen differed on ways to implement it. A radical faction headed by I. Pushkar, a former cochairman of the party has even formed in the PZU. V. Kononov, another former cochairman, was elected chairman of the Ukrainian Green Party.

In 11 regions deputy chairmen will now coordinate the work of the primary clubs. Another five cochairmen were elected to guide the basic direction of PZU activity.

At the press conference which took place the day after the end of the congress, it was stated that the PZU is a political party and will not be limited to the solution of purely ecological problems. Of the nine resolutions adopted by the congress, at least five were political. In them the PZU, stating that the present composition of the Supreme Council is incapable of leading society out of the crisis, proposes its own draft of the Ukrainian constitution. It also views the resignation of the government as a victory for democratic force, although a conservative coup is also seen as possible.

Regarding the radical faction, S. Kurykin, the speaker of the political council of the Ukrainian Green Party, is certain that its existence is completely normal and is only an impetus toward work. "We are for leaving the CIS," he said. However, distancing himself from the categorical position of the faction, he added that in the PZU they understand that this is a gradual process the same as the rejection of nuclear power.

Vitaliy Kononov, the chairman of the Green Party, believes that under the conditions of support by the adherents of the party, who principally consist of women because the PZU cares about the defense of children as well, the party will soon make its presence felt. By bringing new problems into the light, we will have an exceptional chance at success during parliamentary elections on a multiparty basis.

Democrat-Labor Alliance Advocated

93UN0170A Kiev *VECHERNIY KIYEV* in Russian
15 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Yu. Litvinenko, post graduate student, V. Koretskiy Institute of State and Law: "The Hour of Anger"]

[Text] The people are dissatisfied with the powers that be. The powers are dissatisfied with the people. The situation is a common one and as old as the world. It will be resolved in a common way as well. Either the powers feed the people without taking away their freedom in return, or it will be a dictatorship, from a nationalist to a monarchist one. Let us look closely at what is taking place.

The present Ukrainian parliament formed during the overwhelming dominance of communist administrative structures. As a consequence, despite what, for those times, was a sufficiently progressive election law, most of the deputies were actually appointed by the communist party. In their person we in essence had representatives of monopolistic administrative-bureaucratic structures. Disintegration of the union, proclamation of Ukraine as an independent state and outlawing of the Communist Party of Ukraine could have had and actually did have only one consequence—a change in the form in which the former essence of the powers that be manifested itself since these changes had little or no effect on the sources

of its domination—monopolies on land and the management of most of the enterprises in the national economic complex.

Although the powers are refusing to have anything to do with communism, that was not what formed their essence then (and now). Marxism and Leninism, like fascism, are merely a method for establishing monopolies permitting exploitation of the entire society. After the monopolies are created, however, it basically does not matter at all to their owner under what flags, colors, or ideology such domination is presented to the world. This explains why the communists-managers of yesterday, branding Marxism as a disgrace and a shame, so readily abandoned it, but have no intentions whatsoever of abandoning their high positions. Their motto was and remains: create the appearance of progress where there is none.

The communists of yesterday, however were unable to retain a monopoly on truth. Thus there exists the threat of popular anger that was spawned by freedom of speech, which compels the powers to make concessions, freeing market relations. The market, which is a synonym for freedom, is gradually expanding. But how? The monopoly of the bureaucrat is being replaced by a monopoly of very large companies and corporations, naturally, by means of an ever increasing impoverishment of the lower strata. The variant of privatization adopted by the parliament, in accordance with which state property is divided up by the same practically uncontrolled official with impunity, allowing him to make the rich richer and the poor poorer, is called upon to play a substantial role in that process. It is not by accident that the people call it "grabatization."

In one way or another a switch in ideological labels permitted the monopolists to placate the deceived people for a while. But this could not continue indefinitely, and now we have:

- 1) A campaign calling for dissolution of the Supreme Council (the "A New Parliament for an Independent Ukraine" Coalition);
- 2) A campaign for the formation of "a social force which will be able to bring order." This movement denies the ability of democrats to resolve important problems with the aid of the parliament—see the declaration of the Ukrainian National Assembly, and believes that there is no need for new elections. In other words its supporters strive to establish an authoritative regime;
- 3) The campaign for preservation of the current parliament (this movement is first of all represented by the Socialist Party).

This gives rise to a number of questions. First of all, can the current Supreme Council, if it essentially represents the interests of the monopolists, repeal the privatization concept it adopted along with a series of enforceable enactments which implement it, and adopt a concept of privatization which allows each citizen to receive an

equal share of state property, including the land on which that property is located? Secondly, can the current parliament conduct a reform similar to the one carried out by Stolypin, i.e. allow each kolkhoz member to withdraw from the kolkhoz if he wishes with the share of land that belongs to him. I feel certain that it cannot because that frees the market and undermines the boundless dominance of bureaucratic and private monopolists.

Is the current parliament capable of risking its benefits, privileges, and salaries, "attaching" their amount to the amount of revenues and expenditures of the state budget on a per capita basis? Likewise, no, since in that case, in order to increase their incomes the deputies will be forced to raise the incomes of all the citizens. At the same time this is possible only with a significant freeing of market relations, which would inevitably ruin the monopolistic structures, depriving their owners of monopolistic profits.

The final question: will the current parliament establish a subsistence allowance equal to the minimum wage of a deputy, which could be received by anyone wishing to do so if the value of his property is below the minimum established by law? At the present time such an allowance could save tens, if not hundreds of thousands of deprived people from horrifying poverty. The answer here is also—probably not. What has prevented it from doing so until now?

What can our deputies do? Adopt laws, decrees, and other enforceable enactments which, at best, do not hurt the current situation. They can even fully replace the Cabinet of Ministers. But a newly appointed government will remain the same since its composition will remain the same just as the essence of the Supreme Council which was formed on the basis of the interests of bureaucratic and private monopolists who flourished then and at present. Therefore to wait for the expiration of the term of its powers established by law means allowing those on top to ruin the lower strata with impunity leading the country toward further impoverishment. This, in turn, threatens to bring about either a mutiny, a dictatorship, or both.

Former irreconcilable enemies—communists and nationalists, have now become allies on the question concerning dissolution of the Supreme Council. The former do not favor such a dissolution since the coming of democrats to power might undermine their monopoly, while the latter do not want it because such an advent, if it takes place, may feed the hungry without depriving them of their freedom thereby substantially shrinking the social base of the nationalists who are offering the deprived some food instead of freedom.

In such a situation will the democrats be able to achieve the dissolution of the parliament and win in the next elections? I assume that this is possible if the democratic leaders, who for the most part have withdrawn from the

national movement, unify their efforts with representatives of the labor-socialist elements which today in many ways expresses the interests of the lower strata (excluding the Socialist Party as a party of the nomenklatura). Such an alliance is needed at present particularly since the party of ruling monopolists and the party prepared to take their place tomorrow and establish dictatorship, are already unanimous in their efforts to preserve the current Supreme Council.

Editor's Apartment Damaged In Arson Attempt

93P50013A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 23 Oct 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "In Kiev They Set the Editor's Apartment On Fire"]

[Text] Unknown persons set fire to the apartment door of Vladimir Kuleba, editor-in-chief of the Kiev newspaper NEZAVISIMOST.

Kuleba himself commented on the incident in the following manner:

"Of course the matter is not simply revenge for one single publication. Lately in Ukraine very dangerous tendencies for the reanimation of Communist structures under nationalist slogans have become noticeable. Precisely the democratic press and journalists were chosen as one of the first victims. The "strange" death of telepublicist and people's deputy Vadim Boyko, supposedly as the result of the explosion of a television set, the criminal prosecution for publications in NEZAVISIMOST and VECHERNIY KIYEV, pogroms and arson in the editorial offices of Zhytomyr and Kharkiv independent newspapers, the beating of a CNN correspondent by the militia, and finally this nighttime arson - even if these facts are not linked into one chain - it is impossible not to draw the conclusion that in Ukraine there are forces which are doing everything to silence the opposition."

At a press conference organized by the Alternative Association of the Democratic Press of Ukraine, a detailed statement was adopted demanding that the president, the Council of Ministers, and the parliament of the republic take decisive measures against the all-out campaign to discredit the independent press and certain journalists.

Editor Charged With Improprieties Resigns

92UN2002A Lvov ZA VILNU' UKRAYINU
in Ukrainian 18 Aug 92 p 1

[Appeal by Yuriy Shukhevych, et al: "An Appeal To the Readers of the National Newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAYINU and To the Editorial Collective"]

[Text] Having read and discussed at a joint meeting the demands of the individual national deputies and leaders of political parties and organizations for the launching of

a "campaign against the newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAYINU [ZVU] and its chief editor, and also the information 'What the Collective Decided,' signed by several members of the collective (ZVU dated August 6, 1992)," we the representatives of political parties and organizations are indignant at the political insinuation, the gross misrepresentation of the facts. In particular:

1. We regard the statement, published in the newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAYINU under the signatures of the national deputies Dmytro Pavlychko, Ivan Gelya, Oles Shevchenko, Vasyl Chervoniy, Levko Horokhivskyy and others as a disgraceful act. The above named deputies, and also the leaders of the separate political parties, defended the chief editor of the newspaper, Mr. Vasyl Baziv, who not only lead the paper to an economic crises, but also compromised its integrity.

We have become aware that names of some people highly respected in Ukraine have appeared in this statement as a result of being misinformed by Mr. Baziv, who is trying to take all the credit for the creation of the national newspaper ZVU, an act in which not only the editorial staff, but a broad cross-section of the people of our nation took part. Otherwise it cannot be appreciated that, the fight for a strong moral climate in the collective, the proper status of the newspaper, attempts to terminate staff abuses and outright theft of publication property, is described in the statement as "unsupported accusations, political denunciations, public slander," while the striving of the progressive social forces, which have a background of years of struggle in the fight for national freedom, the yoke of repression, the weight of continual humiliation of the nation's self-respect by the Bolshevik system is evaluated "as a backsliding into Stalinism, which must be resolutely rooted out."

2. We regard as defamation the assertion in the referenced remarks, that "meetings were carried out under the pressure of foreign forces which frightened the editorial workers with threats of physical punishment." The description of the conduct of the meeting, and the decisions made, is also not entirely true. At the meeting were present, as observers, three of our representatives. They did not interfere in the conduct of the meeting. The vote of no confidence in Mr. Baziv was made by the workers of the newspaper, freely, by secret ballot, by a majority vote, without any kind of pressure.

3. We condemn the politics of those deputies of the District Council who adopted an uncritical attitude to the election of Mr. Vasyl Baziv as the chief editor of the newspaper and Mr. Oleksander Maslotsiynk as his assistant, the former administrator of the city department of the party. And now some of the national delegates in their estimation of Mr. Baziv's "service" are adopting positions as biased observers, and even worse—as protectors.

Our dear countrymen, readers of the national newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAYINU, workers of the editorial staff:

Let us remember, in what suffering two years ago was born this national paper. Hundreds upon hundreds of people responded in support of this paper, and made their contributions. This was done even by people of modest means, living both within Ukraine and outside its territory, they regarded it as a matter of honor to support this paper, and all this was grossly ignored. It became evident that public funds were being stolen. This became possible after Mr. Baziv abused his position of public office. The fact that a criminal case was opened because of this occurrence, speaks for itself.

We will no longer tolerate such shame. The nation needs a newspaper which is published by people beyond reproach. This paper needs our defense and protection. Let us be resolute and of one mind in this matter.

We plead with the district council of national deputies—co-founders of ZVU, to the representatives of the President in the district, Mr. Stepan Davymuk with a request to take decisive steps, to wit, to remove the chief editor Mr. V. Baziv, who from his position is shaming the national interest, and who has also received a vote of no confidence from the majority of his staff.

We demand the publication of our appeal on the pages of ZVU.

[Signed] UNA—Yuriy Shukhevych; UKRP—Volodymyr Fartukh; DCU—Ivan Kandyba; president of the union of branch presidents of Rukh in Lviv—Ihor Baranovskyy; UPA—Serhiy Pushchuk; the brotherhood "Sich"—Yoroslav Lykhach; the union of the repressed—Petro Franko; committee for the protection of the rights of citizens (by strike)—Yakiv Ukhach; UVO in the name of Yevhen Konovalts—Yaroslav Kitura.

From the editors. Finally taking into account the situation which has developed around him as a result of the serious violations in managing the publication of the newspaper ZVU, and the opening of a criminal lawsuit in connection with this, on August 13 1992, Mr. Baziv announced that he would no longer carry out the responsibilities as chief editor of the newspaper ZVU.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Symonenko Press Conference On Economic Reform

UN2039B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 2 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Vitaliy Portnikov: "Counting On The Government Sector. Press Conference of the First Deputy Prime Minister"]

[Text] Ukraine

"The difference between Ukraine's and Russia's direction is that we cannot immediately come to a market economy, this is a gradual process," declared at a press conference in Kiev, the first deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, Valentyn Symonenko, responsible for carrying

out economic reforms in the Cabinet of Ministers. Of course, bearing in mind the work of his predecessor, Vladimir Lanovoy, whose dismissal many observers considered to be the departure of the leadership from the market course, Symonenko said that "it is necessary to change from romantic twaddle to pragmatic action." In connection with this action, the deputy Prime Minister considers his general strategy to be a "socially oriented market" and in the economic reforms he is planning to count on the "government sector, which needs to be privatized." Valentyn Symonenko shows particular concern over investments which he considers to be "the key method for healing the Ukrainian economy" and he therefore turned the journalists' attention to the projects for creating free economic zones in the republic.

Symonenko called the recently created coordination council for economic reform, whose members are mainly big business executives and ministers, "the headquarters which develops a coordinated policy but does not supervise anything." The deputy Prime Minister tried not to answer any concrete economic questions. He did not give the inflation rate from the beginning of the year and was not able to pass on the names of the scholars who are developing government plans of reform, noting that they belong to the Cabinet of Ministers. As to the plans for introducing Ukrainian national currency, Valentyn Symonenko referred to the recent press conference of the President of Ukraine during which Leonid Kravchuk spoke about the strategy for introducing the hryvnya (NG No 159). In general, the architect of Ukrainian reform appeared to have complete confidence in himself, which it is true, cannot be said about the economy of his country. A sufficiently accurate indicator of its present condition are the numerous sellers of coupons, rubles, dollars and marks which flood the train stations, markets, and entrances to the department stores of Kiev. Valentyn Symonenko responded to this activity very negatively.

Deputy Minister for Social Security on Economic Measures To Protect Needy

92UN2040A Kiev *VECHERNIY KIYEV* in Russian
27 Aug 92 p 2

[Interview with B.G. Aleynik, Deputy Minister for Social Security in Ukraine, by Anatoliy Skichko; time and place not given: "Before It Will Be Done, One Can Starve"]

[Text] Ever since the steady spiraling of prices began and along with it came the "limping" of wages and pensions, there has been an incessant stream of letters to the editor in which the pain and despair of the representatives of the most vulnerable sections of society is heard—the pensioners, invalids, single mothers. Our correspondent, Anatoliy Skichko, met with the deputy minister for social security in Ukraine, B.G. Aleynik, in order to get concrete answers to the questions of our readers.

[Skichko] Boris Grigoryevich, let's begin with the most important. What is the cause of such long delays, sometimes by several months, in paying out pensions.

[Aleynik] In view of the appearance of ever newer legislative acts in the branches of social security, a very difficult situation has come up in carrying out the pension law. The pension reform began here in May 1990, at the same moment that a new pension law was accepted in the USSR.

[Skichko] Pardon me, Boris Grigoryevich. Let's begin from the point when the prices started rising and in view of this they began to examine wages and pensions.

[Aleynik] I only want to say that from the moment that the new legislative acts were adopted, more than ten times, we were forced to make a fresh account of the whole load of pension cases, and right now we have 13.5 million of them. As we know, as of January 1, 1992, the social security law of Ukraine took effect. As soon as we began to work with it, there followed a whole series of standardized formal documents in view of the change in the economic life and the sharp decline in the position of the most vulnerable sections. But I want to say: everything will be returned to those pensioners, to whom, for whatever reason, a pension was not recomputed on time. Without fail.

[Skichko] But we have here one nuance—inflation. If a person does not receive his money for two or three months, it must in all fairness be indexed. What are you presently undertaking? What realistic steps do you envision to simplify and accelerate the service?

[Aleynik] Recently there was a meeting between our minister and Prime Minister Fokin, at which the question of material support for our workers was examined, considering this situation of such an unbelievable volume of recomputations. They came to a mutual understanding and we were allocated 100 million rubles. Our staff members work, how can I say, by hand with every case, and we do not have an IBM. And they have to be specialists, because put simply, you cannot place an economist, even a good one, on this job. We need here, as we say, a pension expert. So, there will be some kind of additional payment to this money and additional workers will be attracted. This is during the time of pension reform.

[Skichko] You can state exactly that there will be additional workers and that in the final count they will somehow ease the lot of the pensioners?

[Aleynik] Yes, of course. Many in places are already solving this problem. We allocate money and it is there that they decide how to use it more efficiently.

[Skichko] Boris Grigoryevich, let's try to specifically explain something to the readers. I have this question: what supplementary payments are allotted to single pensioners?

[Aleynik] Here I have a document. Single pensioners are allotted supplementary payments for their care according to the size of the social pension.

[Skichko] What does social pension mean?

[Aleynik] This term was introduced just recently. A social pension is allotted to unemployed citizens who do not have the right to a work pension. This is either a man, who for some valid reason did not earn a pension, or someone, let's speak frankly, played the fool all his life.

[Skichko] What reasons are considered valid?

[Aleynik] For instance, wives of servicemen for whom work could not be found upon the husband's placement in service.

[Skichko] Understood. What are the rates and who is it allocated to?

[Aleynik] Thirty percent of the minimum pension according to age; at present, this is R800, is given to those who have not gained the right to a work pension without valid reasons. It means, men and women receive R240 after reaching the ages of 60 and 55 respectively.

Fifty percent of a minimum pension is paid to those who have not gained the right to a work pension with valid reasons, and also to the disabled of group III, that is, if the husband has not earned more. To disabled children up to age 16 and also to the disabled of group II we pay 100 percent, that is, R800. The disabled of group I and mothers who have earned the title "Mother-heroine" receive 200 percent; at present that is R1600.

[Skichko] We understand the social pension. Now what of the disabled veterans?

[Aleynik] A disabled veteran receives two pensions as it were: an old age pension plus and a disability pension, which is determined according to the pension security law for servicemen.

[Skichko] More precisely?

[Aleynik] For group I and II, it is three minimum old age pensions, that is, R2400. For group III, it is one and a half—R1200. This is in addition to the work pension.

[Skichko] And to those who are not disabled? To those who took part in the war?

[Aleynik] To war participants, to the parents and to the widow, if she has not remarried, 50 percent of the minimum pension is paid. Pensions for those disabled since childhood are in the same amount, that is, R400, if the wounds or contusions were sustained during the Great Patriotic War.

[Skichko] What type of compensations do those subject to repression get?

[Aleynik] Citizens who were groundlessly subjected to repression, the pension is increased by 50 percent, and

members of a family who were relocated, that is, to some degree also repressed, receive 25 percent of the minimum pension.

[Skichko] Next question: what payments are provided for children?

[Aleynik] Presently families with children are allotted and paid ten types of aid.

[Skichko] For instance, what do single mothers receive?

[Aleynik] Aid is paid to single mothers of children below the age of 16 (of students to the age of 18 who do not receive stipends) and is determined at a rate of 50 percent of the minimum wage, that is, R450 a month. Single mothers who are inmates of a Children's Home receive 100 percent (R900). A one time allowance for the birth of a child is allotted at a rate of three times the minimum wage, that is, R2700. Besides this, yearly compensation payments are made for children. Yearly payments, made quarterly and adjusted for inflation of children's goods, depend on the age of the child: up to 6 years of age—R900, from 6 to 13 years—R1080, from 13 to 18—R1260. Yearly special payments are made for the purchase of children's clothing: for children of preschool age and school children up to 13 years of age—R900. For students who will have completed their thirteenth year in the current year, older students, and those studying at the PTU who are not supplied with uniforms—R1125. Specific compensation payments are paid in full if the average monthly combined income of every member of the family for the previous quarter does not exceed twice the minimum wage in effect for that month, and the payments are cut in half if that income does not exceed three times the minimum wage.

[Skichko] What are the payments to family members of a deceased person as compensation for funeral expenses.

[Aleynik] In accordance with the July 11, 1992, decree No 390 of the Cabinet of Ministers, members of the family of deceased citizens, or persons who arrange the funerals, are compensated for expenses relating to the funerals in the form of a two-month pension of the deceased, but not less than five times the minimum wage.

[Skichko] And what are the deadlines?

[Aleynik] As soon as a person brings in a death certificate to the regional social security office, we immediately pay out the money.

[Skichko] Yes, but you send the money through the mail. This means that the money may get to the addressee in a month or two.

[Aleynik] Unfortunately, we do not have cash at our disposal. I must explain that we are speaking only of those complications which are connected with our department. Because, for instance as far as communication costs are concerned, someone else is responsible for that.

[Skichko] Yes, I understand that. And, I think, the reader also will take that into consideration. Boris Grigoryevich, pardon me, but your computer center on Komar Street is not spoken well of by many.

[Aleynik] It is called the payment center. Yes, you are right.

[Skichko] It is said that when it was not there, there were fewer problems. A person could resolve a problem right on the spot at his regional social security office much faster than now. It seems it was established to facilitate matters, but it is just the opposite.

[Aleynik] The fact is that in its time it was justified. The circumstances were different, there was a stable pension law.

[Skichko] Was the center established long ago?

[Aleynik] Yes, 10 years ago. Then centralization was expedient. Now when we have such a flow of work, of conversions, the payment center can no longer cope. And the main problem, our common problem, stems from this. It is that we have removed the pensioner from the regional social security offices and he cannot explain anything on the spot. He comes to the regional office, which communicates by phone with the payment center and explains why there is a delay or a mistake, let's say.

[Skichko] Or they don't communicate. That is more frequent. Or they simply send the pensioner there. But it is difficult to see one's way clear even there; to get through on the phone to the post office is impossible.

[Aleynik] To get through on the phone is difficult, yes. But I want to say something else. We have been allotted more than two billion rubles to set up a mechanized system for the social security office. We won't have those centers, but there will be in principle a new automated system. We have already closed a deal with the V. Glushkov Cybernetics Institute and obtained computer technology for all the regional social security offices.

[Skichko] Yes, but that probably will not be accomplished in a month or two; you need a year, or at least, half a year. And up till then the pensioners will undergo trying experiences.

[Aleynik] The adoption of the new system will proceed in stages. The full execution of this program will be concluded in 1995. But the first stage we plan to finish this year already. Right now the installation of new technology and personal computers is being carried out; the training of people has started.

[Skichko] When will Kievans actually experience the changes for the better?

[Aleynik] I think this year already. To reach this goal we are hiring 60 additional people in the payment center.

[Skichko] In fact, our meeting was brought about because people are not sufficiently informed. "Vecherka" is doing something in this direction; the

August 5 issue, for instance, published the new ratios for the recomputation of pensions granted up to January 1, 1992. In this same issue, we are partially told about the forms of material aid to single mothers.

[Aleynik] I will explain this more accurately. The question concerns Decree No 395 of July 20 of this year by the Cabinet of Ministers, "Of the Supplementary Adjustment of Government Pension Levels." In view of this we have now actively begun to work on this and we will begin to pay out pensions from the first of October with these ratios taken into account. To the point, as regards being informed of matters, this year we have started a bulletin called "Sotsialnyy Zakhyst." Questions about pensions will be highlighted in it, questions about social security; we will give explanations, answer letters. And I would like to ask you to inform the readers of this through the newspaper. The new trial issue has already come out; we will try to make it inexpensive, available to all.

[Skichko] When can we expect it to go on sale?

[Aleynik] The bulletin "Sotsialnyy Zakhyst" will start to appear regularly from the fourth quarter. After selling at retail it will be available by subscription.

[Skichko] And the last question, Boris Grigoryevich. Do you have relatives who are pensioners?

[Aleynik] Yes. A mother and a sister. My sister, it is true, still works.

[Skichko] Don't they have problems?

[Aleynik] Yes. My mother writes of those same delays. "What should I do?" I answer "Nothing. Wait."

[Skichko] Thank you.

Largest Metallurgical Concerns Leave 'Ukrmetall' Company

92UN2039A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Nikolay Mironov: "Metal and Power. Ukraine: An Economic Barometer"]

[Text] Perhaps, nowhere will you so prominently see the fluctuations in the barometer of economic reforms as in the center of Dnepropetrovsk in the Minchermet building of Ukraine.

Industry sometimes gives up conquered positions with catastrophic speed. The smelting of cast iron and steel has shrunk almost by half. Blast furnaces are being shut down, open-hearth furnaces are going up. The situation is not better in the mining industry and the coal-tar chemical industry: the technology has long since become obsolete and there are no resources for reconstruction. Last year all industrial ministries were abolished in a freely proclaimed independence. Enterprises immediately gave a sigh of relief. We know how to make steel without any support, declared the directors. And we will know how to make contact with the suppliers and consumers ourselves.

And thus in February of this year, around 150 managers of metallurgical and associated enterprises met in Dnepropetrovsk in order to unite themselves into a non-government structure, the first in the industry, the "Ukrmetall" Company. I was at that meeting, saw the enthusiasm and the beaming eyes of those who spoke.

"We need to form our own bank, our own stock exchange, our own house of trade," said A. Poshivanov, the representative of the state committee of the metallurgical industry.

"Only unification will protect us against the government," echoed V. Martynenko, director of HOK in Poltava. "The law for creating a currency reserve has made work unprofitable for export."

"We cannot carry out a technical rearmament on our own, and the industrial institutions find themselves without orders, and we will lose financing for the sciences," complained V. Sergeyev, director of the pipe institute.

"Thirty percent of efficiency was lost because of the absence of pipe procurement," stated A. Kutsenko, director of the Nikopolsk pipe. "I am for the company."

Only one person in the filled hall withheld his vote—V. Slodnev, director of the Donetsk metallurgical plant, deputy of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, member of the president's economic council. Close to the "top," he felt more than the others the hidden springs of the structures of authority. Speaking at the meeting he recommended to his associates that they wait a little with the organization of the company.

"Very soon documents on privatization will be issued," persuaded Slednov. "Then I think that there should be three or four associations in Ukraine, so that there won't be a monopoly."

But we see that even Vladimir Petrovich did not foresee everything. No more than a month went by since that meeting when industrial ministries began to appear again. The nearly finished document on privatization seemed to be put on ice. And in spite of the sharp criticism, once again V. Fokin's Cabinet of Ministers held its ground.

I make a call to "Krivorozhstal."

"Well how is it going at 'Ukrmetall,' I ask the head engineer, S. Serha.

"We already left it," announced Stepan Sergeyevich.

"You counted on the distribution of raw materials and credits from state resources?"

"We counted on them. But neither they nor others helped. Seven billion on the card file. The nonpayment exhausted us."

"And how is the privatization going? It seems you were among the first on the list."

"We were. But the ministry and privatization are incompatible. The battle continues. The largest enterprises left the Company: 'Petrovka,' Dnieprodzerzhinsk, the Ilyich Azovstal."

The next call is to "Zaporozhstal." V. Satskiy answers the phone.

"No we do not want to return under the wing of the ministry even though Minister V. Hladush proposed this to us." "Why do you need a company," he said? "You have a debt of thirteen billion." "But I think that in the company we can handle those mutual nonpayments more quickly." "Fine, we will see," said Hladush in parting.

We won't try to guess if there is more of a threat or warning in that "we will see." But there is no doubt in the fact that the interests of the newly formed company, laying claim to independence, and the intentions of the ministry to incorporate one and all, have crossed each other.

Viktor Dmitriyevich Hladush, new minister of industry of Ukraine, declares in all his public appearances that the ministry now does not have the right to interfere in the economic operations of enterprises and cannot directly manage them. But the fact is, something totally different is happening—every kopek is being squeezed into the budget and in order to do that there are endless operations, inflations, searching for reasons to cut plans, etc. In a word, all the former attributes of the administration.

One of the aides to the President's representative in Dnepropetrovsk, upon meeting me, casually mentioned. "If independent companies emerge, there will be no need for ministries. If there are no ministries, it appears that the Cabinet of Ministers is open to question. How and whom will those in Kiev govern?"

The question is not as naive as it may seem at first. Well then, the first steps of the company "Ukrmetall," whose mode of operation—cost accounting, contract relations, the safeguarding of common interests, the full absence of authoritative functions—have shown that it can survive independently. Namely, this circumstance has frightened the powers that be more than anything else. And thus they already "have left" the government built on the original reforms of deputy Prime Minister V. Lanovoy. The style of operations of the President's representatives in the cities has started to noticeably change, whose chief argument again is the peremptory cry, and if not, then "write declarations and we will part." And perhaps, as V. Lanovoy remarked in one of his recent interviews, the new economic policy did not come at all? Is it possible, there were just talks of it?

Number of Homeowners Increases in First Half of 1992

92UN2039C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Aug 92 p 4

[Article by Nega: "The Number of Homeowners Increases in Ukraine"]

[Text] In the first half of 1992, the Ministry of Statistics of Ukraine reported that more than 181,000 apartments and houses with a total area of more than 9.3 million square meters were sold through government and public funds to the population for personal ownership. This is 37 percent more than the total for all of 1991. The average price of the apartments was 7.5 thousand rubles, and the total value of the residences sold was 1.4 billion rubles.

Crimea Rescinds Instruction To Close Ruble for Coupon Exchange Posts

92UN2039F Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Aug 92 p 4

["Crimea Continues To Exchange Coupons For Rubles"]

[Text] The Crimean Council of Ministers has issued an order about the change of Clause Three of its order of August 10, "About the use of ruble bank notes on the territory of Crimea" in regard to the closing of exchange posts of coupons for rubles. In the new order the posts are instructed "to continue the job of exchanging coupons for rubles as well as rubles for coupons." A five-percent commission fee is charged only in the exchange of coupons for rubles. It is not charged in the exchange of rubles for coupons.

Ministry for Resources Attempts To Make Paper, Pulp Industry Self-Sufficient

92UN2039G Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Aug 92 p 4

["Paper Plans of Ukraine"]

[Text] In the Ministry for State Resources in Ukraine a program for the development of the pulp-paper industry is being researched. Right now the work of this industry depends wholly on the shipment of lumber from Russia, and this is why the aim of this program is to establish a raw materials facility. From 1993 to 1996 a pulp-paper combine will be constructed with an output of 160 thousand tonnes of pulp, and 200 thousand tonnes of letter and newsprint paper per year. Furthermore, the construction of plants producing cartons, paper bags and boxes is planned.

Industrial Production for 1992 Viewed

92UN2115A Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 21 Aug 92 p 2

[Text] January was the most difficult month this year, the correspondent of URYADOVYY KURYER, L. Samsonenko, was told by the chief of the statistics administration in Ukraine, V.V. Kompalov. As you can see from the table, we find here the lowest monthly production volumes. A similar status is held in February. In March, industry reached the highest production volumes so far this year.

Analysis shows that the situation in industry is stabilizing. What were the negative factors? There were serious political conflicts between Ukraine and Russia which had a serious affect on the break in economic ties, there were changes in the system of mutual settlements among the enterprises of

the countries of the former Soviet Union. In addition, as we know, in January prices rose sharply higher. As a result the production of many enterprises remained unsold, the producers could not find consumers for it. After a certain period of price stabilization, the enterprises began to repair the economic ties broken by the establishment of price setting reforms. Today all branches of industry have stabilized their work. Unfortunately, the situation remains complicated in the food, color metallurgy, and microbiological industries, etc. But let us say that from January to July, the polygraphic and porcelain industries have exceeded the production volumes of last year.

If analyzed as a whole, then out of 148 of the most important types of production, 125 have lower production volumes today than last year. But what is consoling is that for practically none of them has the lag increased, and for some a growth trend has been noticed. And if we maintain production volumes for July, then for August and September, industry can considerably improve the rates from the beginning of the year. If we are not able to increase them by the end of the year, then it is necessary to at least maintain them at the present level. Besides that, if during this time there are no social political shake-ups which reflect negatively on the work of the national economic complex, we believe that Ukraine can get over the peak of its economic crisis.

Industry: recession has ended? Dynamics of Industrial Production for 1992

	Rate of growth, percent.	
	Up to the corresponding period of last year	Up to the corresponding month of last year
January	-19.7	-19.7
January-February	-17.2	
February		-14
January-March	-15.3	
March		-9.2
January-April	-14.1	
April		-9.9
January-May	-13.2	
May		-9.4
January-June	-12.3	
June		-7.2
January-July	-10.8	
July		+0.7

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Envoy to Austria Views Role, Ties With Russia

AU0311135592 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
27 Oct 92 p 11

[Interview with Yuriy Kostenko, Ukrainian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in Austria, by Artem

Prokhorenko, Kiev; date not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction published in a box: "It Is Now Time for Lawyers To Have Their Say"]

[Text] Yuriy Kostenko, Ukraine's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in the Republic of Austria, has been back in Kiev on official business. On this occasion, our correspondent asked him a number of questions.

[Prokhorenko] Mr. Ambassador, it is more than four months since the Ukrainian ambassador's credentials were submitted to the president of the Republic of Austria. What were these days filled with?

[Kostenko] It has been a time that I may briefly describe as my discovery of a different Austria. Let me explain. For a certain period of time before, as well as at present, I have been Ukraine's permanent representative in international organizations in Vienna and head of Ukraine's delegation at the Vienna talks on security and cooperation in Europe. However, the duties of a bilateral ambassador in a country differ appreciably from multilateral diplomacy. I have read a great deal about this, but this is the first time I have had personal experience of it. The embassy work involves everyday work aimed at studying all aspects of political, economic, and cultural life in the country of residence and requires close and diverse ties with a wide circle of partners. My first months of work as head of Ukraine's diplomatic mission in Austria were, in fact, devoted to this.

[Prokhorenko] What events during this period do you particularly remember?

[Kostenko] Perhaps, two, not to mention the ceremony of submitting my credentials. The first was the state reception on the occasion of the first anniversary of our state's independence. It so happened that, on that very day, a large group of Ukrainian parliamentarians arrived in Vienna from Kiev. It was a pleasure to see the genuine interest with which the guests talked to them.

The consecration of the building of the Consular Department of Ukraine's Embassy in Austria was, in my opinion, another outstanding event. With the help of our state's Austrian friends, we have rented an apartment in the very center of Vienna. It consists of three quite large rooms that are now occupied by the offices of the Consular Department and of the delegation at the Vienna talks on the questions of security and cooperation in Europe.

Well, after the premises were repaired and properly equipped, our good friend O. Ostheim-Dzerovych [second part of name as transliterated], metropolitan [mitrat] of the Vienna Greek-Catholic Church, consecrated these premises. Since then, they have been serving the interests of independent Ukraine.

[Prokhorenko] What does the consular activity of Ukraine's embassy in Vienna consist of?

[Kostenko] First of all, issuing visas for visiting Ukraine. Over four months we have issued about seven hundred. People come to the Consular Department with all sort of problems—some need certificates confirming that they once worked in Ukraine, others want to invite relatives to Austria, and still others have lost their documents. The embassy is becoming increasingly involved in finding the places of burial of those Soviet Army servicemen of Ukrainian origin who perished on the territory of Austria. There is much work ahead on preparing the Austrian pages of the "Memorial Book." It is also worth mentioning that quite a number of members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists perished in concentration camps, in Mauthausen in particular. Many young girls who had been taken from Ukraine for forced labor found their eternal rest in Austrian land.

In the interview with me that your paper published on 11 June 1992 (under the title "We Will Start With a Consular Department") I put emphasis precisely upon the pressing nature of consular problems. I am glad that, over this period, something could be done. The mechanism has begun to function and it now needs to be improved and reinforced with new cadres.

[Prokhorenko] How are things in Vienna regarding the division of the former USSR's property? In August 1992, in Yalta, ministers of foreign affairs of Ukraine and Russia signed a corresponding agreement.

[Kostenko] After the Yalta accords, a joint commission made up of representatives of the foreign affairs ministries of the two countries visited Vienna. The negotiations were protracted and strained, but specific proposals could be coordinated. If Moscow opts to approve them in the near future, Ukraine will receive a nice building for its embassy in Vienna and accommodation for the embassy workers.

So far, the Russian representatives in Vienna do not want to do a thing to somehow improve our embassy's situation. This is despite the fact that they have every opportunity to do so. They are waiting for Moscow's decision.

[Prokhorenko] What are your tasks in Austria for the next few months?

[Kostenko] First of all, we must continue the important work with our Austrian colleagues on forming a serious legal foundation for bilateral relations. The agreement on cooperation between the ministries of internal affairs on combating illegal drug trafficking and organized crime has become the first sign in this connection. Next, we will sign an interstate agreement on cooperation in trade and the economy.

In the very near future, it would be a good thing if the process of providing Austrian credit guarantees for Ukraine is completed. This might make it possible to implement a whole series of interesting projects for bilateral and mutually advantageous cooperation.

[Prokhorenko] We wish you success and thank you for the interview.

BELARUS

Belarusian Referendum on Dissolving Parliament

93UN0206A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Oct 92 pp 1,3

[Article by I. Sinyakevich: "Will the Parliament Permit a Referendum on Its Dissolution?"]

[Text] Belarus

The ninth point in the draft agenda of the regular 12th Session of the Supreme Council of Belarus, which begins today, pertains to the question about a referendum. Let us recall that in the spring of this year 440,000 citizens of Belarus signed a petition calling for a referendum on the question: "Do you consider it necessary to hold elections to the highest legislative organ of the Republic of Belarus in the autumn of 1992 and vote on the law on elections of people's deputies of the Republic of Belarus, the draft of which was prepared by the Belarusian People's Front opposition in the Supreme Council, and in this connection have an early dissolution of the Supreme Council?" Almost 100,000 more signatures were collected than the minimum required by law and the Central Election Commission, which checked their authenticity, requested the Supreme Council to set a date for the plebiscite. At a session of the Presidium in May a decision was adopted, in accordance with the law, to study the question concerning a referendum at a regular session of the Parliament. The Presidium of the Supreme Council, however, the majority of whose members oppose a referendum, decided to call for a session only in the middle of October, even though the last session of the Supreme Council was held at the end of April. During such a long vacation many unresolved questions have accumulated and it is not surprising that the agenda of the forthcoming session turned out to be truly extensive: more than 80 points, including such important ones as consideration of the draft constitution.

The prolonged break in the work of the Supreme Council undermined the international prestige of Belarus: the republic was unable to ratify the agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe in a timely manner. Receiving a postponement of three months in early June at the Helsinki meeting, Belarus was incapable of meeting even that deadline for ratification of the CFE agreement which was already in effect.

Thus the parliamentary struggle for and against the referendum starts on 20 October. I already had occasion to write (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 5 June 1991) that this campaign was initiated by BNF (Belarusian People's Front) national radicals and does not enjoy widespread support among the population. This, however, does not mean that people support the current pro-Communist composition of the Supreme Council and the government. A political vacuum exists in society along with general apathy and mistrust of all the forces. According to public opinion polls conducted by various sociological

services, the Belarusian People's Front is the most popular organization having received the votes of 11-13 percent of the voters. The rating of neo-Communists is second and fluctuates between 3 and 4.5 percent. The position of the Unified Democratic Party and the Belarusian Social-Democratic Hromada are each supported by approximately 1.5 percent of those polled. The rest of the parties and movements did not garner even one percent of the votes. Around 70 percent of those polled cannot or do not want to name a worthy political organization. Such a distribution has existed in Belarus for more than a year, and not one of the parties that appear, with the most attractive names and programs, managed to alter the picture.

On the other hand the current composition of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers, which were formed under the communist regime, also do not have broad support among the people. The absence of a worthy alternative and lack of faith that as a result of elections more competent leaders will come to power, provides passive support for the opponents of the referendum. According to data produced by the polling of public opinion approximately 40 percent of the respondents express themselves as being in favor of a referendum and early elections, with as many opposed, while 20 percent are undecided. Such a shaky balance makes any outcome of the voting quite possible. Perhaps it is for this reason that the pro-Communist majority in the Council of Ministers did not risk taking the wisest step for it—schedule a plebiscite in the summer, when the people are interested in politics least of all and the referendum could simply not have taken place because of a low turnout. The ex-Communists preferred a more reliable path gradually usurping all of the power in the republic.

After collapse of the Communist Party of Belarus in August 1991, the cabinet of Vyacheslav Kebich was transformed from a tool for the conduct of communist party policy into a base of the ex-Communists. The Council of Ministers was reorganized with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus as the model, and administrations, sectors, and departments were created within its structure which control groups of ministries and state committees. The "Belarus" faction was created in the Supreme Council which included a relative majority of those legislators who were former communists, and which was headed by Gennadiy Kozlov, a member of the Administration for the Rights of Citizens, Public Security, and Defense Operations of the Council of Ministers. A merger is taking place between executive and legislative powers. Kebich invited many of the legislators to work within structures under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers. At present around 60 of the deputies from Parliament work there. Republic press is almost entirely monopolized by the government: the Council of Ministers is the founder or cofounder of four of the five daily republic sociopolitical newspapers. Utilizing the difficult economic situation at former party and komsomol publications, the

government simply purchased the "big" press at the expense of budgetary funds and is now dictating conditions to it: whoever pays, orders the music.

The greatest concern for the fate of democracy in Belarus, however, is caused by the extremely active efforts of Kebich's "team" to establish control over the army and intelligence services. At the present time the Ministry of Defense is subordinated to the Council of Ministers. The military agency is headed by a protegee of the Council of Ministers, Colonel General Pavel Kozlovskiy. All officers, right up to division and brigade commanders, are appointed by him upon coordination with the Council of Ministers. This procedure is implemented by a worker in the above-mentioned Administration for the Rights of Citizens, Public Security, and Defense Operations, Colonel Valeriy Pavlov, who, in interviewing officers, more than once complained about the democrats who destroyed the union and about the violence of nationalism in Belarus. It is curious that Pavlov appeared in the press expressing regrets that there is no corruption in the defense forces. This at a time when the board of the Ministry of Defense was raising the question concerning dismissal of high officials, right up to the deputy minister, from the army for that reason. This provided Stanislav Shushkevich with grounds to express bewilderment at one of the last press conferences. He said: "The Ministry of Defense considers that corrupt generals have no place in the army, while the Council of Ministers believes that they do!"

The appointment of General Uskhopchik, who commanded the Vilnius garrison during the bloody events of January 1991, as commander of a tank corps, for instance, was a result of the personnel policy of the Council of Ministers. In the army itself officers who speak Belarusian and officers who are offering to institute an oath for command personnel are being subjected to persecution on direct instructions of the leadership in the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Defense board, by the way, adopted a decision as late as August to institute a national oath for the armed forces on 31 December 1992. Such a late date is officially explained by the need for the Supreme Council to adopt the new text. All this leads one to think that before New Year's the army will have to play a "coercive" role under the leadership of certain kinds of politicians. It is characteristic that Kebich's cabinet recently adopted a decision concerning the joint patrolling of cities by detachments of militia and soldiers for the purpose of which special subunits are being created at the garrisons. As with a similar instruction issued by Gorbachev, this measure is explained by the increase in crime.

The rise in crime also became a reason for attacks by the government on Vladimir Yegorov, the minister of internal affairs. Attentive observers, however, noted that the blizzard of criticism was directed at the minister after the newspaper KOMMERSANT published information indicating the involvement of Nikolay Kostikov, the deputy premier, in a shady barter transaction with vodka from the state fund for stabilization of the market.

The information was based on a memorandum from V. Yegorov to the premier, which existed in three copies. The pro-government press accused the minister of internal affairs of deliberately leaking information. According to some data the question concerning removal of V. Yegorov from his post will be raised at the next session with his post to be offered to Mechislav Grib, chairman of the Supreme Council Commission on Questions of National Security, Defense, and Struggle Against Crime—a member of Kebich's team.

The Committee for State Security, however, is causing "headaches" for Council of Ministers strategists. No one regarded it as being of any particular importance when in November 1991 the republic KGB was transferred under the jurisdiction of the Presidium of the Supreme Council. All attention was focused on the fact that this agency was being withdrawn from central administration and placed under the jurisdiction of the republic. At the present time they are "biting their nails" in the government and preparing a draft decree on resubordination of the KGB under the Council of Ministers. In those organs themselves, however, they are viewing this innovation without any enthusiasm. General Eduard Shirkovskiy, chairman of the KGB, placed his bet on Stanislav Shushkevich probably not so much because of the similarity of their political views, as because of the possibility of greater freedom: the Supreme Council chairman has fewer levers directly controlling the security service. When in July Shushkevich was told that in the absence of himself and the KGB chairman, the government link would be transferred under jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers, he replied: "It cannot happen that both I and Shirkovskiy would be absent from Minsk at the same time."

All of this evidences the fact that the nomenklatura summit is prepared to engage in unlawful retention of power. The concrete mechanism for that is already known. In an interview on the "Radiofakt" program on 16 October Gennadiy Kozlov, coordinator of the ex-Communist "Belarus" faction in the Supreme Council, declared that at a closed session of this parliamentary group certain members of the faction proposed raising the question concerning self-dissolution of the Parliament without a preliminary adoption of the constitution and the law on elections or setting a date for new elections so as to create a legal vacuum. According to Kozlov, however, a majority rejected this proposal inasmuch as "the Belarusian people would not forgive us the creation of a State Committee as in Georgia." The revelation of such an intriguing detail on the closed meeting may be regarded either as a warning and a threat directed at supporters of the referendum, or as "reconnaissance in force" testing public opinion, or both. This variant in the retention of power appears more attractive to the government than, let us say, a large-scale provocation with subsequent introduction of a state of emergency: that relieves the republic leadership of responsibility.

This, however, is merely one of the variants prepared by the ex-Communists in case of an extreme emergency. So

far everything is developing within a legal framework. Even though Dmitriy Bulakhov, chairman of the Commission on Legislation, submitted a draft decree at the meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, which took place last week, in which the question concerning a referendum is withdrawn from the agenda of the forthcoming session of the Supreme Council, while the gathered signatures are declared invalid, other members of the Presidium failed to support that decision. The permanent organ of Parliament made a Solomonic decision proposed by Shushkevich: to study the question concerning a referendum in Parliament but regard its approval in the version proposed by the Belarusian People's Front as unfeasible. With consideration of the fact that the composition of forces in the Presidium of the Supreme Council is the same as in Parliament, it is possible to assume that one of the intermediary variants will be adopted: either the formularization of the question being submitted for plebiscite will be altered, or the character of the referendum will be changed from binding to advisory. It is possible that the Parliament itself will announce early elections. It is not precluded that primary significance will be acquired by the question on the presidential form of rule, as it is incorporated in the draft constitution which will be brought up for a second reading.

Decree on Measures Taken to Fight Governmental Corruption

Text of Decree

935D0052A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 29 Sep 92 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed Foreword: "Second 'Salvo' Fired at Corruption From Two Guns in One Day" and text of Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus No. 588 of 24 September 1992, Minsk, "On Serious Deficiencies in the Functioning of State and Economic Organs and Officials in Safeguarding the Economic Interests of the Republic"]

[Text] Foreword. SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA readers will recall our article "Vyacheslav Kebich: 'One's Hair Stands on End!'" which appeared on 12 September. People were upset by the article about cases involving unseemly actions by representatives of power and administrative offices. Angry letters to the editor followed and almost each one of them contained the question: When will the government finally bring to an end these outrages and will the officials causing losses for the state who were named in the article be punished?

Today we are furnishing detailed information for the readers about measures undertaken by the Council of Ministers and presenting the government decree for their attention.

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus No. 588 of 24 September 1992, Minsk, "On Serious Deficiencies in the Functioning of State and Economic Organs and Officials in Safeguarding the Economic Interests of the Republic"

After studying the memorandum from the Administration of Public Security and Defense, Administration of Industry, Interstate Ties and Material Resources, the Administration of Foreign Political and Foreign Economic Activity, the Department of Organizational-Soviet Work and Local Self-Government, the Administration of Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, the Committee on State Security, the Procurator's Office, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs "On serious deficiencies in the functioning of state and economic organs and officials in safeguarding the economic interests of the republic" the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, decrees as follows:

1. Surmach, V. V., chairman of the State Committee for Petroleum Product Supply merits removal from his post for deficient management of the activity of the State Committee for Petroleum Product Supply, lack of control over fulfillment of government decisions with regard to export of petroleum products outside the republic, and violation of the order established for expenditure of foreign currency resources. This, however, to be accomplished along with formation of the Committee for Petroleum and Chemistry under the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus with subordination to it of associations, enterprises, and organizations of the former State Committee for Petroleum Product Supply with no disciplinary measures to be taken against it. Further utilization of the services of Surmach, V. V. in managerial positions in republic administrative organs to be considered no longer feasible.

2. Radkevich, V. V., chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Ties to be given a warning for failure to exercise appropriate control over the licensing of product exports and not performing analysis of the effectiveness of their sale.

Take note that Makayed, N. A., first deputy chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic ties, is herewith removed from his post.

3. Shkurdya, G. M., chairman of the State Customs Committee to be issued a warning for inadequate control over the activity of customs services under his jurisdiction and inefficiency of their work in the struggle against smuggling and other customs violations.

4. The question concerning responsibility of Deputy Minister of Resources Tsygankov, A. G. for failure to initiate appropriate measures to control cross hauling of goods and other material assets in the republic on the basis of coordinated licenses issued in the established order by the Ministry of Resources and also for coordination and issuance of licenses which involved violation of the established order that led to the squandering of

material-technical resources of the republic, to be studied following his recovery.

5. Focus the attention of Kurenkov, V. I., chairman of the State Committee on Industry and Interbranch Production, on the inadequacy of control exercised over activity of subordinate associations, enterprises, and organizations in safeguarding the interests of the republic. Direct Kurenkov, V. I. to conduct an appropriate investigation with respect to each point indicated in the memorandum "On serious deficiencies in the functioning of state and economic organs and officials in safeguarding the economic interests of the republic," and initiate disciplinary action against those found guilty right up to removal from office.

6. Mirochitskiy, F. V. to be given a reprimand for inadequate supervision of personnel, lack of appropriate control over observance of legislation by enterprises and organizations of the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs which led to a rise in prices for individual types of production and an unsubstantiated diversion of significant funds from the republic budget.

7. The question concerning liability of Shepel, V. M., minister of resources, Zarenko, V. P., deputy chairman of the State Committee for Petroleum Product Supply, and Deduk, Yu. M., deputy minister of agriculture to be studied after their return from vacation.

8. Inadequate control over compliance with existing tax legislation to be pointed out to Yanchuk, S. P., minister of finance.

9. Feasibility of retaining Maysyuk, V. T., deputy chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and Foodstuffs of the oblast executive committee at his present post to be considered by the Vitebsk Oblast Executive Committee in the light of violations of state discipline and abuse of office by him.

Mogilev Oblast Executive Committee to study and furnish a principled evaluation of the activities by heads of soviet organs of the city of Mogilev on the basis of evidence indicating allocation of summer home plots for them as well as that of activities by other officials engaging in unlawful transactions in the sale of products outside the republic.

Chairmen of oblast executive committees in the oblasts of Brest—Burskiy, V. I., Vitebsk—Kulakov, V. P., Gomel—Voytenkov, N.G., Grodnensk—Artsimen, D. K., Minsk—Tishkevich, A. I., Mogilev—Grinev, N. F., and Gerasimenko, A. M. chairman of the Minsk City Executive Committee to study the cases involving participation of officials of executive committees and heads of state enterprises and organizations in entrepreneurial structures and carry out appropriate measures.

The Baranovichskiy City Executive Committee and the Lyakhovich Rayon Executive committee to file charges in the established order against Golos, V. V., director

general of the "Belmestbytkhim" Production Association, Kukharchuk, V. V., deputy director general of the cotton association, Yakimchik, E. S., director of machine tool accessory plant, and Tretyak, G. M., chairman of the Lomonosov Kolkhoz for the squandering of commodity stocks and supplies and unlawful inducement of workers to participate in the "Agora" limited partnership association.

10. Deem as unfeasible the participation of heads of state associations, enterprises, and organizations in entrepreneurial activity.

The Ministry of Justice with participation of the State Committee for Economic Planning, the State Committee for Labor and Social Protection of the Population, and other interested ministries and agencies to prepare within a ten-day period and submit to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus an appropriate draft law for consideration by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus.

11. Direct the Administration of Industry, Interstate Relations and Material Resources (Mordashov, A. A.), the Department of Organizational-Soviet Operations and Local Self-Government (Shcherbakov, A. A.), the Administration of Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, together with other competent organs, to conduct an investigation of facts indicating shipment of oil from Novopolotsk to the Baltic republics and on the basis of such investigation prepare appropriate recommendations for the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus.

12. The Administration of Public Security and Defense (Danilov, G. I.), the Administration of Foreign Political and Foreign Economic Activity (Kareysha, K. Ya.), the Department of Organizational-Soviet Operations and Local Self-Government (Shcherbakov, A. A.), the Administration of Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, together with other competent organs to conduct a through study of facts involving abuse of office by officials of the Main Administration of Border Troops, the State Customs Committee, and the Administration of Belarus Railroad and make appropriate recommendations to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus

13. Prior to 10 October 1992 the Administration on Agricultural Affairs and Foodstuffs of the Administration of Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus (Avdeychik, I. A.), the State Committee for Economic Planning (Shalabadinskiy, A. F.), and the Department of Economic Control of the State Committee for Economic Planning (Poznyak, N. A.) to study questions concerning conduct of barter transactions in the purchasing of grain, sugar, vegetable oil, and other foodstuffs and make appropriate recommendations for the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus.

14. Heads of ministries and agencies, and chairmen of oblast executive committees and the Minsk City Executive Committee to eliminate instances involving violations of licensing procedures in the export of goods and authorize exchange operations only with the availability of economic estimates confirming their feasibility. Responsibility and control in the issuance of licenses for export of goods and other material assets outside the boundaries of the republic to be delegated personally to ministers, chairmen of state committees, key senior officials in other regulatory organs, and chairmen of oblast executive committees, and of the Minsk City Executive Committee.

Overall control over the export and import of products is carried out by the Department of Economic Control of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus.

15. The Ministry of Finance, the Department of Economic Control of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, the Department of Prices of the State Committee for Economic Planning, together with internal affairs organs to conduct regular checks of ministries and agencies, enterprises and organizations, and oblast executive committees subordinated to them as well as the Minsk City Executive Committee which participate in foreign economic activity and with revelation of cases involving legislative violations make recommendations regarding disciplinary, administrative, or criminal liability of those deemed to be guilty.

16. Establish a state monopoly on the sale of wine, vodka, and cognac as well as other alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and beer produced in the republic and countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States with their sale to the public only through a network of state trade enterprises and consumer cooperatives.

Executive committees of city and rayon soviets of people's deputies to immediately repeal previously issued authorizations for the sale of indicated products by private individuals, cooperatives and other commercial structures.

Stocks of wine, vodka, and cognac as well as stocks of other alcoholic beverages and tobacco products and beer remaining at entrepreneurial establishments are to be sold prior to 1 October 1992.

17. Ascertain that sales of consumer goods, obtained through commodity exchanges and reserved for personal needs, are carried out with observance of trading regulations that are in force.

18. Prohibit the sale of resources, distributed in a centralized manner, on exchanges by ministries, agencies, enterprises, associations, and organizations.

19. Establish a state monopoly on the sale of ferrous and nonferrous metals outside of the republic as of 1 October 1992.

Direct the Administration of Industry, Interstate Ties and Material Resources of the Administration of Affairs

of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus (Mordashov, A. A.) jointly with the State Committee for Economic Planning, the Ministry of Finance, the State Committee for Industry and Interbranch Production, and the Ministry of Resources to determine within a ten-day period the order in which ferrous and nonferrous metals are to be sold in the republic and prepare recommendations for establishment of export tariffs compensating losses resulting from the difference in prices at which raw material is actually exported and world prices for it, submitting them to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus.

20. The Ministry of Internal Affairs together with interested organs to intensify the struggle against organized crime and corruption while interdicting the squandering of material and monetary assets in a more efficient manner and submit recommendations to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus concerning those questions that require governmental decisions.

21. Within the period of one month the State Committee for Industry and Interbranch Production, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to prepare recommendations concerning determination of responsibility of subjects of management for violation of conditions and rules in carrying out transactions stipulated by licenses.

22. Personnel of services engaged in combatting economic and organized crime and of criminal investigation departments of organs of internal affairs to conduct on-the-spot searches and other measures within the customs control zone aimed at prevention, interdiction and exposure of law violations.

23. Request the Supreme Court to keep the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus informed on investigations conducted by criminal courts in cases involving damage to the economy of the republic and abuse of power by officials.

24. The Department of Trade and Public Services of the Administration of Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus (Vashkevich, I. F.) jointly with the Ministry of Trade, Belkoopsoyuz, Ministry of Public Health, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Inspectorate for Trade and Protection of Consumers of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, the Society of Consumers, and the Union of Entrepreneurs to work out rules for conduct of trade and trade-production activity on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the order in which such activity is to be registered and submit a draft of the document to the government of the republic prior to 10 October 1992.

25. Direct the Administration of Foreign Political and Foreign Economic Activity of the Administration of Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Finance to prepare recommendations for the Council of Ministers within a ten-day period on regulation of

official travel on temporary assignments abroad. For the purpose of strengthening the responsibility of heads of state structures for foreign currency that is disbursed ascertain that as of 1 October 1992 those individuals managing state property in cases involving disbursing of foreign currency for other than official purposes, including payment of expenditures in foreign currency for individuals sent on assignment abroad who are not members of the staff and also incurring expenditures in excess of authorized norms will reimburse the republic budget at ten times the value of such foreign currency as determined in accordance with the market exchange rate in effect at the time the violation was committed.

The levying of indicated funds shall be by appropriate financial organs in the established order.

26. Prior to 1 January 1993 the Department of Economic Control of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Justice, jointly with other interested ministries and agencies, to prepare a draft law of the republic of Belarus "On state control in the Republic of Belarus."

27. Prior to 1 November 1992 the Ministry of Finance and the State Committee for Economic Planning to prepare a draft statute on an auditing service with determination of the status of the auditor submitting it to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus.

28. Request that within the period of one month the National Bank together with the Ministry of Finance conduct a check of the operations of commercial banks of the republic in the distribution of profits and issuance and utilization of credit resources and submit recommendations on interdiction of economic abuses.

29. On 1 October 1992 the State Committee on Statistics to introduce state statistical reporting on the export and import of products and raw and other materials carried out on the basis of barter operations and issuance of licenses.

30. Heads of ministries and agencies, chairmen of oblast executive committees and the Minsk City Executive Committee to report to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus within two weeks on measures undertaken in fulfillment of this decree.

31. Monitoring of the fulfillment of this decree to be delegated to the Administration of Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus.

[Signed] V. Kebich, chairman Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus

N. Kavko, administrator of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus

Newspaper Correspondent's Commentary

93SD0052B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 29 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by L. Maslyukova, SOVETSKAYA BELORUS-SIYA observer: "Epilogue"]

[Text] The decree hardly calls for extensive commentary. There is one detail however to which it is necessary to return. In the SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA issue of 12 September mention was made of Aleksandr Gerasimenko, chairman of the Minsk City Executive Committee. The following day the newspaper issued an apology to Aleksandr Mikhaylovich inasmuch as it turned out that his name appeared in error in an accusative piece. At the session of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of 22 September Premier Vyacheslav Kebich expressed personal apologies to Aleksandr Gerasimenko for the misunderstanding that occurred.

It is true that this detail gives rise to the thought not only about the possibility that such inaccuracies may occur but also about legal interpretations of various disclosures since they occur within the government and not in the investigating organs or in court. The procurator's office and the police, naturally, took part in the preparation of information for the Council of Ministers, but the final evaluation of facts is still within the competence of the court—economic or general. By the way, it is specifically on this that Eduard Shirkovskiy, chairman of KGB, focused his attention before reporting on new facts of corruption and economic crimes in Belarus at that session of the presidium.

Thus a highly important topic was developed: the first "salvo" fired by the government at corruption on 8 September was followed by a second one on 22 September and from both "guns" simultaneously. A decree was adopted on the basis of previously heard facts and a list of new cases exposed by the Committee on State Security was published.

According to KGB estimates corruption has affected primarily the sphere of management, planning, supply and foreign economic ties. Officials issue licenses, credits, and loans for a bribe. Commercial organizations are avoiding taxation on a large scale. Noncash assets are being turned into ready cash, part of which is stolen. The export of raw resources, products, and consumer goods outside the republic is growing.

Using a fictitious license a Latvian firm attempted to export 60 tonnes of sheet steel for roofing from the Volkovysk Plant. Dealers intended to illegally "transfer" fuel oil and gasoline worth around a billion rubles to Lithuania from the Smorgon Petroleum Product Storage and Distribution Center. KGB agents interdicted both this and the other deal. A Mogilev commercial enterprise managed to obtain a license for export of 250 tonnes of powdered milk to Poland. With authorization of the

Mogilev Oblast Executive Committee some Riga entrepreneurs attempted to ship 50 tonnes of sheet copper to themselves which our republic is exporting, despite a direct prohibition of re-export, including that of nonferrous metals, by the Council of Ministers.

It goes on and on—a complete list of unfortunate facts will hardly supplement or increase the meaning of the document submitted to the Council of Ministers. Investigation of revealed facts continues and, we hope, each of them will receive appropriate legal, and what is even better, a court evaluation.

According to certain information similar revelations are being expected with regard to two more "branches," beside power and managerial structures—with regard to the army and trade.

In conclusion it is probably necessary to stress that at present we are observing how the highest organ of executive power, utilizing its mandates, is attempting to counteract the rapid development of the mafia, to a certain degree at its own risk, primarily using the method of administrative action against violators which is available to it. On the whole, however, the protection of economic interests of the republic in criminal cases may be effective only if the legislators adopt a package of effective laws against corruption and the mafia and law enforcement organs launch a professional and systematic struggle against these evils on the basis of the new legal norms.

Decree, Statute on Pensions, Wages

93SD0046A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 10 Oct 92 p 1

[Decree No 606 of Republic of Belarus Council of Ministers, signed by council Chairman V. Kebich and Administrator of Affairs N. Kavko in Minsk on 7 October 1992, and statute]

[Text]

Decree on Procedure for Recalculating Pensions and Adjusting Wage Base for Pensions

For the purpose of implementing the Decree of the Republic of Belarus Supreme Soviet of 17 April 1992 "On the Procedure for Enacting the Law of the Republic of Belarus 'On Pension Security,'" the Republic of Belarus Council of Ministers hereby decrees that:

1. The attached statute on the procedure for recalculating pensions and adjusting the wage base for pensions will be ratified.
2. The disability pensions of inducted servicemen and the pensions paid to families after the loss of a breadwinner will be calculated according to the procedure in the statute ratified by this decree.
3. The State Committee for Statistics will submit the following to the Ministry of Social Security:

—by 20 November 1992—annual indicators of the average monthly wages of workers and employees in the republic from 1950 through 1990 and monthly and quarterly indicators for the period from 1 January 1991 to 1 October 1992;

—by 22 January 1993—indicators of the average monthly wages of workers and employees in the fourth quarter of 1992.

4. Pensions granted prior to 1 January 1950 will be recalculated on the basis of the pension wage-base augmented by the growth index of the average monthly wage in the republic during the period since 1950.

5. Before 1 December 1992 the State Committee for Statistics and the Ministry of Social Security will publish growth indices in the republic press for the average monthly wages of workers and employees from 1950 through 1990 in relation to the average monthly wages of workers and employees in the third quarter of 1992.

6. In January 1993 the State Committee for Statistics will begin publishing monthly reports on the average wages of workers and employees during the previous month in the republic press by the 22d of the month.

7. Before 20 October 1992 the Ministry of Social Security will approve the format of reports on the pension wage-base.

[Signed] V. Kebich, chairman of the Republic of Belarus Council of Ministers

N. Kavko, administrator of affairs of the Republic of Belarus Council of Ministers
7 October 1992, Minsk

Statute on Procedure for Recalculating Pensions and Adjusting Wage Base for Pensions

1. Procedure for Recalculating Pensions Granted Prior to Enactment of Law of Republic of Belarus "On Pension Security" in Accordance with Section 96 of This Law

1. Pensions granted prior to 1 January 1991 will be recalculated on the basis of the monthly wage serving as the pension wage-base, increased by the growth index of monthly wages in the republic during the period since the time the pensions were granted.

The growth index of monthly wages will be calculated by dividing the average monthly wages of workers and employees in the third quarter of 1992 by the average monthly wages of workers and employees during the year the pensions were granted.

2. Because of the repeated increases in salary and wage rates in 1991 and 1992, pensions granted between 1 January 1991 and 31 December 1992 will be recalculated by using the individual pensioner's earnings coefficient to adjust the wage base.

The individual pensioner's earnings coefficient will be calculated by correlating the pensioner's actual average

monthly earnings during a certain period with the average monthly wages of workers and employees for the same period.

The pensioner's actual average monthly earnings will be adjusted by multiplying the average monthly wages of workers and employees in the republic in the third quarter of 1992 by the individual coefficient.

3. In the event that a retirement or disability pension was recalculated on the basis of a higher wage after it was granted, the growth index of the average monthly wages of workers and employees and the individual pensioner's earnings coefficient may be calculated from the date the pension was first granted.

In the event of a transfer from one type of pension to another, with the pension on new grounds calculated with the wage base of the earlier pension, the growth index of average monthly wages and the individual pensioner's earnings coefficient may be calculated from the date the original pension was granted.

4. The amount of the pension to be paid on a wage-base increased in accordance with subsections 1 and 2 of this statute will be calculated according to Section 56 of the Law of the Republic of Belarus "On Pension Security." Pensions will be recalculated on the basis of wage documents available to the pension office at the time of the recalculation.

II. Procedure for Recalculating Pensions in Accordance With Section 70 of Law of Republic of Belarus "On Pension Security"

5. In connection with the rising average wage in the republic, after 1 January 1993 the pension wage-base will be adjusted quarterly and pensions will be recalculated accordingly.

The following procedure will be used in the adjustment of the wage-base:

- for pensions granted prior to 1 January 1991—the individual pensioner's earnings coefficient, which will be calculated by correlating the pensioner's actual average monthly earnings, serving as the basis for the pension, with the average monthly wages of workers and employees in the year the pension was granted;
- for pensions granted after 1 January 1991—an individual coefficient calculated according to the procedure specified in the second paragraph of Subsection 2 of this statute.

6. The average monthly wages of workers and employees in a particular quarter will be multiplied by the individual pensioner's earnings coefficient for the recalculation of pensions. The resulting wage-base will be used to calculate the pension in accordance with Section 56 of the Law of the Republic of Belarus "On Pension Security."

The average monthly wages of workers and employees in the fourth quarter of the previous year will be used for

the recalculation of pensions after 1 April, wages in the first quarter of the current year will be used after 1 July, wages in the second quarter of the current year will be used after 1 October, and wages in the third quarter of the previous year will be used after 1 January.

III. Procedure for Adjusting Average Monthly Wage Serving as Wage-Base for Pensions in Connection with Increases in Salary and Wage Rates

7. When pensions are granted after 1 January 1993, the pensioner's actual average monthly earnings during a particular period (according to the wage document submitted at the time the person applies for a pension) will be adjusted in connection with increases in salary and wage rates and the rising average wages of workers and employees.

The average monthly wages of workers and employees in the third quarter of the previous year will be used to adjust the wage-base in the first quarter, wages in the fourth quarter of the previous year will be used in the second quarter, wages in the first quarter of the current year will be used in the third quarter, and wages in the second quarter of the current year will be used in the fourth quarter.

The following procedure will be used in the adjustment of the wage-base: The average monthly wages of workers and employees in a particular quarter will be multiplied by the individual coefficient calculated in accordance with the second paragraph of Subsection 2 of this statute. This adjusted wage-base will then be used to calculate the pension in accordance with Section 56 of the Law of the Republic of Belarus "On Pension Security."

Note: The growth index of the average monthly wages of workers and employees and the individual pensioner's earnings coefficient will be figures with five numerals to the right of the decimal point.

A detailed analysis of the procedure for implementing this decree will be published in a coming issue of SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA.

MOLDOVA

Moldova's Status in Commonwealth Analyzed

93UN0199A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Arkadiy Pasechnik, PRAVDA correspondent, Chisinau: "Mircea Snegur Does Not Excite the Geese"]

[Text] The session of the Moldovan parliament opens next Tuesday.

Subjects of particular importance are highlighted on the agenda, which the presidium of the parliament intends to

submit Tuesday for approval. This is, for example, a determination of the political status of the Dniester region and Gagauzia and the draft of the new Constitution. Finally, a discussion of the program of privatization, a whole raft of accompanying economic laws, and the budget for the next year. But even on this list, the problem of the Dniester region stands out by itself. A lot, if not everything, now depends on its resolution.

The blazing fire of war left not only hundreds of graves and destroyed houses and enterprises on both banks of the Dniester, but also still-smoldering embers of confrontation and distrust, and incessant informational crossfires. The peacekeeping battalions of Russia, Moldova, and the Dniester region are performing their third month of service in the zone of conflict. As early as the end of September, the joint control commission, perceiving its mission to be completed in principle, addressed a special statement to all political figures of the sides with an appeal "to initiate negotiations on the development and implementation of measures for the final normalization of the situation in the Dniester region." Judging by last month, this appeal was not heard. At the same time, the protracted interval between the cessation of combat actions and the political eradication of their causes becomes more and more dangerous. There is a threat of a new explosion in the Dniester region at any time.

However, in politics, there is no such thing as a vacuum. It is urgently filled from all sides. The left bank is hurriedly completing the formation of structures for statehood of its own republic, and on the right bank, they are speeding up the establishment and increase in the combat capability of their own army. Given even the greatest optimism, it is difficult to expect that these actions will lead to a rapprochement in the positions of the opponents, who are stubbornly holding their ground. Chisinau, as President Mircea Snegur declared once again the other day, is ready only for maximum local self-government of the Dniester region. But Tiraspol is insisting on a federative arrangement for Moldova.

But in this case, what can be expected from the session? I posed this question to two parliamentarians—a resident of Chisinau and a resident of Tiraspol. Their opinions coincided: It is hardly realistic to expect a quick and effective solution. The pertinent drafts that exist in Chisinau are not reinforced by preliminary expert consulting work and by an effective negotiating process. Without such a basis, any answer of parliament is a house built on sand. It is most likely that the national-democrats, whose positions are especially strong in the presidium of parliament, will not miss the opportunity to bring pressure on the Tiraspol "separatists." Is this not the reason why, as was reported recently, winter quarters are already being prepared for the "blue helmets?" But just as there is no perpetual motion machine, there is also no eternal buffer....

Evidently, the next theme in importance at the session concerns the attitude of Moldova toward the CIS. As is

known, Moldova took part in the Bishkek summit as a full-fledged member only with the kind concurrence of the rest of the partners. Further, as they say in Moldova, "either-or"—either ratification by parliament of the Alma-Ata documents, or withdrawal from the Commonwealth. The latter, assert sensible economists, would denote a complete catastrophe for the republic. The ship of its economy—which this year sustained two gaping holes, in the form of 30 billion rubles [R] from the military conflict and another approximately R40 billion from a drought that is unprecedented in the postwar years—given such a distribution, will really not remain afloat.

So, in this critical situation, the question on the status of Moldova in the CIS is still not even mentioned in the draft agenda of the session (at least, two days before its beginning). Two variants are seen here. Either the president, in order not to excite the geese too soon, will propose this point already during the session, or he will wait until the question comes up when it is presented by some deputy faction. In order to understand this tactic, it is necessary to take two facts into account: the essence of the matter and Snegur's position.

The idea of the membership of Moldova in the CIS has been attacked long and fiercely by the opposition, which is headed by the Christian-Democratic People's Front (KhDNF). The leaders of the KhDNF are not too burdened with serious economic knowledge, especially the not-unknown ex-premier Mircea Druc, and they see a way out of the crisis only in an immediate union with Romania, assuming that the sovereignty of Moldova is a farfetched and illusory notion. Therefore, they cannot endure even the very mention of the CIS. Just as also the leaders of another one and a half dozen social, cultural, and professional formations of the republic that recently organized the "Christian Alliance for Joining Romania."

It would be a mistake to think that similar dispositions occur only outside the power structure. At a recent celebration of Moldova's Independence Day, none other than Aleksandr Mosanu, the head of parliament, expressed himself in the spirit that unification with Romania is inevitable. Deputy Viktor Morev remarked sarcastically in this regard: "Of course, if anybody visualizes Moldova as a godforsaken Romanian province, he, understandably, will not begin to think about any kind of interstate treaties and agreements with Europe and the CIS. As for the people of Moldova, then, it appears that somebody can barely wait for the time when, in an economically chaotic situation, their standard of living drops lower than the critical point and the people's dissatisfaction turns against the present government of the republic and its president, who is holding to a policy of real independence for Moldova."

Now, let us imagine Snegur's position, who, on the one hand, understands very well that without the Commonwealth, and without a quick restoration of disrupted economic relations with the former republics, a total crash awaits Moldova, and, on the other hand, distinctly

realizing that, after taking a course on joining the CIS, it is possible to run into jagged political reefs. Only skillful maneuvering, in which the president is sometimes successful, can help out. Thus, having neutralized the radical opposition in his time through intensified pressure on the Dniester region, Snegur then successfully distanced himself from it, after finding that the matter had gone too far. Later, there was one more maneuver—the president enlisted the support of the powerful bloc of agrarians, agreeing to their candidacy of a new prime minister in the person of Andrei Sangheli.

It can be expected that such maneuvers will also be continued at the session that is opening. It cannot be ruled out that they will be accompanied by intense passions even right in front of the parliament building and farther toward the Dniester. A typical prediction was made by RESPUBLIKA, the newspaper of the social democrats of Moldova, concerning the possibility of actions by the leaders of the opposition: "Knowing the hot temperament of these people, it can be expected that they will not begin to pay a lot of attention to laws, and they will try to resort to the 'direct democracy' of the street, which is shifting imperceptibly to a coup d'etat of the Caucasian-Asiatic type." The prediction is somewhat gloomy, but groundless. In any case, for a week already the center of Chisinau has been seething with student demonstrations. One of the most deprived elements of society is justly demanding an increase in stipends and other social support measures. But students can be controlled not only in an auditorium. Commenting on student speeches, the KhDNF newspaper TsARA concludes: "In fact, the only political demand on whose resolution all other questions depend is an immediate withdrawal from the CIS."

November promises to be hot in Moldova.

Energy Situation Termed 'Critical'

934A0136A Moscow GUDOK in Russian 14 Oct 92 p 1

[Report: "Moldova on the Brink of an Energy Crisis"]

[Text] On the threshold of the autumn-winter period a critical situation has evolved with regard to providing Moldova with supplies of fuel and electric-power resources. At a session of the Parliamentary Commission on the Economy and Budget deputies noted that never before has the electric-power system entered upon the winter season with zero reserves of mazut, i.e., residual fuel oil, and miserly amounts of procured and prepared coal, while—at the same time—being utterly incapable financially of correcting the situation to even the slightest extent. Never before has there been a situation whereby deliveries of liquid fuel from Russia and coal from Ukraine have been continuously broken off for many long months.

Nikolay Chernyy, the general director of this republic's Gostopliv [State Fuel Administration] declared that if Moldova remains outside the CIS, there will be nothing more for it in the East. In his words, if energy resources are allocated and released to Kazakhstan, Belarus, and other CIS member-countries at Russian prices, for Moldova they will be multiplied by a coefficient ranging from 2.5 to 3. If Moldova's parliament continues to postpone ratifying the treaty on its inclusion within the CIS, then the same coefficient will be applied to it as is now being applied to the Baltic countries—namely, 5. Nobody could stand the economic consequences of such a "settlement."

In the considered opinion of the people in the Department of Electric Power Engineering and Integration within Gostoplivo, Moldova has no alternative to obtaining the necessary fuel and electric-power resources in the West. Even Romania at this level cannot aid Moldova in any way, inasmuch as Romania itself is compelled to acquire energy sources in the world market. Furthermore, Moldova—despite all its own difficulties—for the time being is still continuing to export a small amount of electric power to Romania, based on barter exchange for goods produced in Romania.

TAJIKISTAN

Options for Ethnic Russians Considered

93US00824 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 42, Oct 92 p 4

[Interview with deputy chairman of Russian Community V. Dubovitskiy, by D. Makarov; place and date not given: "I Am Going Nowhere"]

[Text] The fate of people living in Tajikistan is tragic. The republic is being sucked deeper and deeper into the maelstrom of civil war. The nonindigenous population faces a cruel dilemma: to leave or not to leave. But representatives of "Russian Community" have decided unambiguously that they will not leave.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent D. Makarov talks to the deputy chairman of Russian Community, the historian V. Dubovitskiy.

[Makarov] Viktor Vasilyevich, do you believe that the Russians will be able to survive in Tajikistan in these difficult times and to preserve themselves as an ethnic group?

[Dubovitskiy] Only with help from Moscow. Of course, without it the Russian community may preserve itself even under the conditions of an Islamic fundamentalist state, in the form of some kind of sect, but is there any sense in that? If Russia has no interests in the Central Asian region, then our presence has no point.

[Makarov] How so? Surely you do not simply live here, but are the channels of a certain influence?

[Dubovitskiy] A people that has been dispersed throughout the world and does not have its own national center is one thing. But if a powerful national center like Russia does exist, and we feel that we are linked to it ethnically and culturally, then we shall not decide to cut ourselves off completely from our own motherland. It is most likely that some Russians will remain here even if there is a properly organized departure from here, those who really do not care a fig where they live. Russian Community does not belong to that category. We believe that Tajikistan and Russia must preserve the links formed within the Russian state that have mutually enriched our peoples in the spiritual and material senses. Therefore, Russia should not discard Central Asia politically. Although of course, their relationship must change.

[Makarov] Now, when Russians are returning to their Christian values while the peoples of Central Asia are returning to Islamic values, why do you think that these peoples will be able to live with each other?

[Dubovitskiy] For many centuries, ever since the time when Velikaya Bulgariya embraced Islam, the Russians have been in constant contact with the Muslim world. And with the capture of Kazan and Astrakhan by the troops of Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century, the

Russian and Muslim peoples have exerted a great deal of influence one on the other. No European people has this kind of experience in dealing with Muslim peoples.

The culture based on Orthodoxy gave birth to an unusually easy disposition, and hence the settled nature of Russian colonialism. The intermingling of the population on the territory of the former Union was a guarantee of stability.

[Makarov] Why?

[Dubovitskiy] Because wars have always started with the reciprocal deportation or internment of representatives of the hostile nation. Let me remind you that this was exactly how the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia started—with the reciprocal exile of tens of thousands of people. And the governments still feel no sense of responsibility for the fate of those of their own faith and their own blood living outside their borders.

So if the processes now taking place in Tajikistan result in a full-scale deportation of Russians, this will lead to harder relations between Russia and Tajikistan. Events cannot be allowed to unfold in this way, because it may cause a chain reaction in other republics of Central Asia.

[Makarov] And to what will that lead?

[Dubovitskiy] First and foremost to a total destabilization of the economies of both sides. In all fields of industry, the Russian-speaking population plays a key role, thanks to its skills. The flood of refugees into Russia is causing such a sharp deterioration in social relations that it may lead to civil war.

[Makarov] What is your prediction for the further development of events in Tajikistan?

[Dubovitskiy] The present situation in the republic is one of total anarchy. It really began in May. While President Nabyev was in power, the structures of power devolved about him. But since his departure, industry, trade, the militia, and so forth have been working only through inertia. Tajikistan may disintegrate into separate principalities and bring civil war to a qualitatively new level that covers all fields if Russia and the other CIS countries do not intervene.

[Makarov] What kind of help do you expect from the Russian Government?

[Dubovitskiy] A powerful impetus toward stabilization and toward reinforcing the Russian-speaking population in Tajikistan would be provided by introducing the institution of dual citizenship for people from Russia. And not only Russians, but also, for example, Tatars and Bashkirs, of whom there are quite a lot here. If this is impossible, then make us unambiguously Russian citizens. Although we do understand that this is not an easy thing, because no law on citizenship has been passed in Tajikistan.

Second, we need economic help. Give orders for Tajikistan industry in which Russians are employed, and this will stabilize not only our position, but also the position of the Tajik Government and the entire republic. Little money will be needed for this.

Finally, let a statement be issued at the government level to the effect that the Russian Government is concerned about our fate. This would be quite adequate. The close interaction between our states is the basis of their stability. It would be easier for either of us to pack his cases and leave, but we do not want to do that.

[Makarov] How, in your opinion, do they now regard Russia in Central Asia?

[Dubovitskiy] Here, perhaps earlier than elsewhere, they recognized that Russia was losing its authority, and how banefully this has been reflected throughout the region. Presidents I. Karimov and N. Nazarbayev have already been at pains to talk about this. They are trying to create their own alliance for stabilization in the region, and so they have a clear understanding of the enormous danger of their republics sliding into civil war.

[Makarov] Is it difficult to live among the Tajiks?

[Dubovitskiy] No. They are a very easy-going, tactful people. There is much in the way in which they deal with people that offers an opportunity to live along with people of a different culture.

[Makarov] Under what circumstances would you personally leave?

[Dubovitskiy] I shall remain here until there is a threat to my family.

TURKMENISTAN

Niyazov on Political, Economic Situation

93US0075B Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Oct 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov by TRUD correspondent Mikhail Pereplesnin and TRUD special correspondent Yuriy Ursov, on the eve of Independence Day; place not given: "You Cannot Drive Round the Sand Hills in a Mercedes"]

[Text] Yesterday Turkmenistan marked the first anniversary of its independence. Today we offer readers an interview with President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Atayevich Niyazov, given to TRUD correspondents on the eve of Independence Day.

[TRUD] Mr. President, I do not want to use journalistic clichés, but today, when Turkmenistan is celebrating the first anniversary of its independence, let us start with the traditional questions: What real changes have occurred this past year?

[Niyazov] It is thankless and indeed probably unnecessary to set a complex and multistage historical process

within specific time periods. Turkmenistan's movement toward sovereignty and a worthy place in the international community started long before 27 October last year and is continuing now, and it promises to be a long and difficult road ahead. Previously they used to love exact planning prospects that brooked no objection, for example, build communism in 20 years. Today we have learned to understand that the special features in the historical development of any given people cannot be squeezed into some kind of "ideologically verified" socioeconomic models. But we have finally sensed that we are dissimilar to others and we have seen that our path is a complicated one. And I think that the very fact of that recognition has been the main achievement of the first year of our state's existence under the conditions of independence.

This year Turkmenistan became a member of the United Nations and we have been recognized by the world community, and the country has taken its first steps in the field of shaping an independent foreign, domestic, and economic policy. Despite the gloomy predictions of some "analysts" in the Commonwealth and the West, things are going well in Turkmenistan and the prospects for the future are bright.

[TRUD] If we talk about dissimilarity, life today in Turkmenistan really stands out in events in most states of the former USSR. Turkmenistan has happily succeeded in avoiding interethnic conflicts and interethnic dissensions in politics, and in its economy it has a budget that is not in deficit. Can you tell us the secret of how this is done?

[Niyazov] There are no secrets. But there is a loyalty to the traditional way of life, unhurriedness, and thoroughness—the national traits of the Turkmen, a mentality if you will. These qualities of the Turkmen people have often been misunderstood by some people, and at times there have been animosity and intolerance. The epithets that we have been awarded by the CIS press! They say that in Turkmenistan they are conservatives and party autocrats and that in general it is a preserve of the period of stagnation...

Meanwhile there are the results of sociological polls, in which people have answered that the best time for them were the years of stagnation. Why such a phenomenon? I think that it is not out of nostalgia for the diktat of officials but because life then, even if it was not a frolic with variegated packages from abroad in commercial stores, it was stable and tranquil and predictable. But I think that our critics have other ideas. In truth, they are indelible habits ingrained in several generations of people to measure everyone and everything by standard yardsticks and to fit anyone dissimilar into a stereotype. But, please, not everything that suits Moscow, for example, is always to the liking of its immediate neighbors.

I speak in a roundabout way in order to emphasize once again how important it is to take into consideration the unique nature of the traditions and national characteristics of the former citizens of the USSR. Unhurriedness and thoroughness have helped us not to rush headlong after illusory immediate success in carrying out the reforms. Moreover, in many regions of the former USSR they have buried the existing power structures in a euphoria of indiscriminate democratic license. And the result? A paralyzed management mechanism, chaos in the economy, total lack of control in domestic life. The next stage is the people's dissatisfaction and the growth of mutual enmity and suspicion.

We have chosen a different path: to reform the existing economic and political structures gradually. And in this connection for us what is more important is not the label of conservatives that they are trying to pin on us but stability and calm in the life of society. I emphasize particularly that this scenario for reform is not the fruits of some invention of an apparatus of power but a course approved by the people of Turkmenistan.

The answer to the second part of your question about stability in the economy is not so simple. Since they are bound in a tight knot with the economic structures of the former USSR, our enterprises cannot but experience the same upheavals that have fallen to the lot of the national economy generally. Nevertheless, we are oriented not on abstract models for a transition to the market but on maintaining an acceptable living standard for people. Compare prices for basic foodstuffs here and in any other CIS country. In Turkmenistan bread costs from 1-3 rubles [R] per kilogram, butter and meat R6-10, and sugar R16. A liter of gasoline is R5. And so on... Because we are allocating a considerable proportion of earnings from the sale of raw material resources to maintain the low prices for basic products and goods, we are to some degree losing the tempo in the economic transformations. But surely the impoverishment of the people cannot be an acceptable price, nor the only price, to pay for speed in the advance to the market, can it?

No one knows Turkmenistan's misfortunes and problems better than we do. And this means that no attractive-looking formulas or recipes devised in a prosperous country in the West should determine the forms and methods for our transition to the market. We proceed on the basis of our own conditions and the features of our historical development.

You do not drive around the sand hills of the Karakum in a Mercedes, do you? It is fine for a fast highway. So, to put it graphically, we are trying first to build the highways across the desert. It may be slower, but it is more reliable. Otherwise we may be bogged down in the sand.

This also applies to sweeping privatization. This scenario is not for us. Time is needed to shape our own national class of entrepreneurs. Until then the state should keep the economic levers in its own hands and use them in the interests of all of society.

[TRUD] But many people claim that without privatization it is impossible to develop democracy. Is this not the reason for the reproaches about the lack of democracy in Turkmenistan and the hidden desire to revive Islamic fundamentalism?

[Niyazov] I hope that the present fashion of reproach and suspicion is a temporary thing. Let us leave the reproaches to the consciences of those who show basic ignorance of the true state of affairs.

Yes, today we are still a long way from democratic ideals in the classical sense. Our democracy is a child born out of a totalitarian state. Every child must have time to grow. It must learn, and only then move on to an independent life. But if it is put out on a street where anyone who passes by may shape it to his own way, then nothing grows except neglect.

The development of democracy cannot be reduced to the breakdown of existing state structures alone, which is often done. As a rule the initiators and executors of that breakdown pursue primarily personal goals—power, career, money. Even though many of them talk about the well-being of the people while they do it. We are moving toward the creation of a democratic, secular state in which all human rights and freedoms secured today in our constitution will be guaranteed. But taking into account today's specific conditions, the state has been forced to regulate the effect of legal standards in the interests of all of society with the single goal of preventing a worsening of people's lives and confrontation between different social forces and the emergence of nationalism.

Nor should it be said that Islam determines social life in Turkmenistan. Yes, the overwhelming majority of the population are Muslims. But Islam is not being elevated to the level of state policy. There is separation of church and state, and the Islamic clergy have the same rights as the representatives of other confessions. The Constitution of Turkmenistan prohibits the creation of any political or public organizations along national or religious lines, and so the danger is excluded that any kind of destructive political force will emerge on the basis of religious persuasion.

The state, however, does not raise obstacles of any kind against the spread of common human values—charity, nobility of intention, love of family... If this is regarded as consolidation of Islamic fundamentalism then it must be considered that the present upsurge of Orthodoxy in Russia will lead to the persecution of atheists and persons of other faiths, while the development of Catholicism in western regions of the former Union will lead to courts of the Inquisition...

[TRUD] Should it be suggested that it is the unique nature of the path chosen that may also explain Turkmenistan's special position in devising a policy within the CIS framework?

[Niyazov] We are not striving for a "special" viewpoint as an end in and of itself. But we are against an averaged approach to the fate of each of the CIS states. There is no collective, single position on everything without exception, nor can there be. And it is not fortuitous that none of the collective meetings of the leaders of the CIS countries have produced any specific result that could be acceptable for all. At the same time we cannot deny the success of bilateral meetings and negotiations between the leaders of the CIS states. I think that only by establishing firm bilateral relations among all the CIS states shall we be able to embark on the path of a true collective commonwealth. And it is a waste of time to try now to revive something like the former vertical structures. For us this is also unacceptable because for Turkmenistan this scenario would mean a return to its earlier role as a raw materials appendage to a general economic structure.

[TRUD] The overwhelming majority of Turkmenistan's population expressed unconditional trust in you at the presidential elections. In this connection do not the expressions of national love with which the press of Turkmenistan bristles today seem somewhat excessive?

[Niyazov] There are two sides to that coin. The flatterer trying with honeyed tongue to ensure his own place in the sun meets with a decisive rebuff. And I have many times had to put such people in their place. On the other hand, however, just read the presidential mail. Most letters are from simple people. It is difficult to suspect them of some desire to make a career as a flatterer or obtain some kind of privileges. I understand and I share the sense of pride of most citizens for the fate of a state that is seeking true independence. And here we should be talking not so much about the personal authority of the president but rather about the authority of the power personified through him. A power that broad strata of society support. Among every people, including those in countries with a developed democracy, there are state leaders whom a majority of the people support. The forms whereby this devotion is expressed can differ. But its essential nature is the same: pride in belonging to their state and faith in its strength and its ability to defend itself. Incidentally, our country has fully demonstrated this capability. The recent steps taken to provide social protection for the population—free supplies of gas, electricity, and water for the citizens of Turkmenistan—graphically illustrate this. It is not every state in the world, let alone the CIS states, that can take such a step. And despite the complexities of the transitional period we have been able to take such major steps to protect the social interests of citizens. And I believe that it is quite natural that people express their gratitude to the country's leadership.

[TRUD] Today it has already been remarked that lack of understanding about Turkmenistan's position is based on ignorance of the true state of affairs in the republic. We hope that this interview will to some extent dispel this lack of understanding. In this connection, however, our readers' interest in the personality of the head of state is

natural. Can you please tell us about yourself and your family, and the home in which you live? What kind of literature do you like to read? Do you often have dealings with simple folk? Which of the CIS leaders is closest to you in terms of views and sympathies?

[Niyazov] I am married and have a grown son and daughter and a six-year-old granddaughter. Strictly speaking I do not have a house, it is an apartment; the dachas provided for me as president are, of course, the state's. Although I intend to set up a house. Plots of land are available for private building in the suburbs of Ashgabat and I have acquired one of them. But I do not know when I will have my own house; absolutely no time frame has been set for the construction.

I love to read. Despite my duties I try to set aside time for this. I read mainly books about the history of Turkmenistan and the countries of the East, and I like the poetry of Makhtumkuli. I am doing a great deal of work now on archive documents from the period of the Stalinist repressions in Turkmenistan. God forbid any state should have to experience such a thing. In general it is difficult to believe that such a thing was possible but, as they say, facts are stubborn things. I would like to give a series of lectures at the Turkmen State University on the period of the repressions in Turkmenistan. I think that it will be useful for the rising generation to learn about the nature and essence of tyranny. Perhaps on the moral and spiritual planes it will give those who are just embarking on life an immunity against dictatorship of any ilk.

I very often have direct dealings with simple folk as I travel about the country, and through their letters. Despite the enormous presidential mail, I read most of the letters myself and I believe that a head of state is simply obliged to read the letters of simple folk, and all references to being enormously busy are simply unsupportable. It helps to be constantly in the midst of human problems and it provides a more complete picture of the situation in the country. For whereas an official somewhere may be inclined to embellish a situation, a simple person is objective in this regard. Indeed, in the purely moral sense, constant live contact with the people is simply essential.

I have friendly, businesslike relations with all the Commonwealth heads of states. In my opinion they are all worthy representatives of their countries, and in the interests of our peoples we are simply fated to friendship.

Republic Signs Ruble Zone Agreement

93US0075A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Oct 92 p 3

[NEGA report: "Turkmenistan"]

[Text] Turkmenistan has signed an agreement on the unified monetary system and agreed money-and-credit and currency policy for CIS countries that are members of the ruble zone.

The deputy chairman of the Turkmenistan Cabinet of Ministers, Nazar Suyunov, signed the document in Minsk on behalf of the republic government.

According to associates of the Turkmen president's press service, the absence of the signature of a representative of Turkmenistan beneath the text of the Bishkek agreement had to do not with any considerations of principle but with reasons of a purely technical nature. According to the Turkmen president's press service, the republic does not intend to withdraw from the ruble zone.

The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Turkey to Turkmenistan, Selcuk Incesu, has stated that "the visit by President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov to Turkey, planned for 28 through 31 October, should activate bilateral business and political contacts."

Speaking to journalists, the ambassador reported that the program for S. Niyazov's visit proposes not only his participation in ceremonies marking the 69th anniversary of Turkey's independence but also work in the Istanbul conference of the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the states of Central Asia.

In addition, a package of Turkmen-Turkish economic agreements will be signed.

During the course of the visit the Turkmen Embassy in Turkey will be officially opened.

Water Resources Minister on Current Tasks

93US0074B Ashgabat TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 14 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by A. Ilamanov, Turkmenistan's minister of land reclamation and water resources: "Water by Contractual Agreement and for Fees"]

[Text] In 1993 a system of paying fees for water utilization will be introduced in Turkmenistan. The state-budgetary, operational, water-management organizations are now making the transition to full cost accountability.

This republic has a large water-management system and a ramified network of specialized organizations. Our Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources includes 44 etrap- and 5 velayat-level irrigation-system administrations, the Garagum [Karakum] Canal Administration, and a hydrogeological-land-reclamation station. They are engaged in carrying out the whole complex of operations involved in supplying water to kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other water consumers, as well as with regulating, accounting, and exercising monitoring controls over the utilization of water resources, the technical operation of the water-management systems and facilities, overseeing the reclamation status of the lands being irrigated, and monitoring the quality control of irrigational and drainage waters; they also render organizational and technical assistance for operating irrigation and collector-drainage networks.

Their administration includes the Garagum Canal, more than 6,000 kilometers of irrigation canals, approximately 9,000 kilometers of collectors, inter-etrap, inter-velayat, inter-state, and 258 stationary pumping stations, 2,000 drilled wells, operating for purposes of irrigation and drainage, 15 reservoirs, 3,000 kilometers of anti-flood and flood-protection dikes, 4,600 various types of hydraulic-engineering structures, and many other production-type facilities.

Discussion of the system of paying fees for water has taken place in various publications, including the pages of TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA. And now, upon the recommendation of the president of Turkmenistan and in agreement with the Ministry of Agricultural Products, this extremely important economic measure will become a reality. Strictly regulated relations must be established between the water-management organizations and the water-users.

What brought about the need to introduce a system of paying fees for using water? I would single out the following two causes. As you know, Turkmenistan's entire economy is keyed on making the transition to market-type relations. And the water-management sector is no exception to this. Another—no less important—cause is that the present-day level of efficiency in utilizing water and, hence, land resources also is extremely low here in our country. In order to raise this level, we need radical organizational and technical measures.

The planned economy and super-centralized administration have very obviously proved their own inability to ensure the optimal utilization of those abundant resources which nature has endowed us with. This can be demonstrated with particular clarity based on the example of agricultural production. The extensive approach to conducting irrigational agriculture and the residual principle used in financing land-reclamation and water-management construction led to a situation whereby serious problems arose in the further development of this republic's agriculture. It is no secret that 90 percent of the irrigation canals in our country have been constructed in earthbeds. Some 588,500 hectares of irrigated lands lack collector-drainage networks. Colossal filtration losses, a rise in the level of ground waters, and the well-known excesses of agro-engineering have sharply reduced the fertility and hence the productivity of the irrigated sector of our agriculture.

Construction has been proceeding too slowly on reservoirs for storing and making good use of floodwaters from the Murgan, Tedzhen, and Ertek rivers. The problem of the well-organized collection and discharge of drainage waters beyond the boundaries of the irrigation zone without damaging the environment is becoming acute. Well, what can we say? Even the throughput capacity of our principal manmade waterway—the Garagum Canal—has not been brought up to

its planned parameters. Eliminating all these shortcomings and deficiencies is the care and concern of Turkmenistan's government and its Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources. Now we must find our own forces and funds.

The low efficiency in utilizing our water and land resources has also been caused by the lack of genuinely economic incentives and levers. State financing of the activities conducted by the operational water-management organizations has engendered an indifferent attitude among the water-consumers toward the water resources which are free of charge for them. In my opinion, this is the only possible explanation for the numerous violations of the water-use regulations on farms. Violations of the irrigation system and its schedule are to be seen everywhere: over-watering to the point of flooding, discharge of fresh water into collectors and onto roads, the lack of keeping tabs on water and over-irrigated areas, the arbitrary setting of pumps and above-plan water collectors, maintaining intra-farm canals and collector-drainage networks in a neglected condition....

If we add to all this the fact that Turkmenistan's water resources are extremely limited and amount to only about 25 billion cubic meters for an average water year from sources, and—moreover—that this amount of water is fully used right away, then it becomes clear that further development of irrigational agriculture—including the adoption of the state program entitled "Zerno" [Grain]—is impossible without radically improving water utilization. But this can be accomplished—and extremely effectively—by introducing the system of paying fees for the services of the state operational water-management organizations operating on the principle of economic accountability.

The attentive reader who has comprehended the last proposal may rightfully ask the following question: But just what will we have to pay for—the water or the "services"? Right here is where we must stipulate the following fundamental factor. Water itself—as a natural resource—is certainly not subject to payment of fees. And what would be paid for is only the expenses incurred by the operators in bringing the water to the consumers in the necessary amounts and taking into account the normative profits of the water-management organizations.

Payment for water utilization will be carried out by means of a single-rate tariff, when the reciprocal accounting will be computed on the basis of the amount of water received, as well as by a double-rate tariff, when one part is paid for the water delivered (at a rate per cubic meter), and the other part—for the area irrigated (to be paid at the per hectare rate). The tariffs will be determined by a special methodology. Taking into consideration the fact that the operational expenses for delivering a water supply vary within a wide range (depending upon the methods and the location of the lands to be irrigated relative to the water sources), it is

deemed feasible to set or establish a standardized tariff at the etrap level. A standardized, single-rate tariff is also being provided for collecting water from the Garagum Canal along its entire length. Water delivery will be carried out by the administrations of the irrigation systems and by the Garagum Canal Administration on the basis of a contractual agreement to be concluded between them for a calendar year. This contractual agreement and its appendixes will indicate the volume and the calendar schedule for delivering the water, the total of the payment, the reciprocal accounting procedure, the obligations of the parties involved, and other conditions.

Of course, water deliveries exceeding the plan are permitted, provided that the irrigation sources have water surpluses. But water collection exceeding the plan shall be paid for in a three-rate scheme. In case of an arbitrary water collection, penalty fines shall be applied with the payment for the amount of water obtained in such a fashion equal to 10 times the amount of the single-rate tariff.

Our ministry is stepping up its pace in preparing to make the transition to operating under the new conditions. I assume that the water-consumers will find it worthwhile to follow our example. There is not much time left for all of us. Therefore, prior to the end of this year, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other water-consumers must make sure that they work out the appropriate plans in conjunction with the local water-management organs; whereas those who do not have irrigational lands must determine and specify their basic normative (planned) need for water and must conclude well ahead of time contractual agreements with the operational water-management organizations.

Conference on Alphabet Reform Previewed

93US0074A Ashgabat *TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA*
in Russian 3 Oct 92 p 2

[Report: "What Will the New Alphabet Be Like?"]

[Text] When and how will the Latinized Turkmen alphabet be introduced, and what will it be like? These questions will be answered at a scientific-working conference which will take place in November. Linguists, representatives of the creative intelligentsia, VUZ [higher educational institutions] faculty members, schoolteachers, and representatives of Turkmenistan's public have begun to prepare for this conference.

"Working groups have already been formed and are preparing the necessary materials for this conference." So stated Academician P.A. Azimov of the Turkmenistan Academy of Sciences, in a conversation with a correspondent of Turkmen Press. "These will be specific proposals by scholars and model variants of a new Turkmen writing system. Judging by the discussion which has been unleashed in the pages of the newspapers, the public is greatly interested in making the transition to a Latin graphic system. However, we must

not be in too much of a hurry with regard to this matter. In my opinion, the variant of the new Turkmen alphabet which was published recently and which purported to be the final version was erroneous and patently premature. To my way of thinking, before we adopt a new alphabet, we should submit it to a broad discussion by the public. A group of scholars from the Turkmenistan Academy of Sciences is also preparing its own variant. In drawing it up, we have proceeded on the basis of certain principles. In the first place, we must take the new alphabets of the Turkic-speaking countries into account. In the second place, the graphic system to be adopted must reflect the specific phonetic features of the Turkmen language. And, in the third place, the new alphabet should be easy to read and not too complicated to write."

UZBEKISTAN

Text of Uzbek Draft Constitution

935D0049A Tashkent VECHEPNIY TASHKENT
in Russian 28 Sep 92 pp 2-3

["Draft Constitution" of the Republic of Uzbekistan]

[Text]

PREAMBLE

The people of the Republic of Uzbekistan,

solemnly proclaiming their commitment to human rights and the principles of national sovereignty,

recognizing their high responsibility to present and future generations,

relying on the historical experience of the development of Uzbek statehood,

affirming their fidelity to the ideals of democracy and social justice,

recognizing the generally accepted rules of international law,

endeavoring to ensure for citizens of the republic a decent life,

defining as their mission the creation of a humane democratic state based on the rule of law,

for the purpose of the assurance of civil peace and national accord

adopt in the person of their empowered representatives this Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

SECTION ONE

BASIC PRINCIPLES

Chapter I. State Sovereignty

Article 1. Uzbekistan is a sovereign democratic republic. The names of the state "Republic of Uzbekistan" and "Uzbekistan" are of equal value.

Article 2. The state expresses the will of the people and serves their interests. State authorities and officials are responsible to society and the citizens.

Article 3. The Republic of Uzbekistan determines the national-state and administrative-territorial arrangement and system of state administration and pursues its own domestic and foreign policy.

The state border and territory of Uzbekistan are inviolable and indivisible.

Article 4. The official language of the Republic of Uzbekistan is Uzbek.

The Republic of Uzbekistan ensures a respectful attitude toward the languages, customs, and traditions of the peoples which live on its territory and the creation of the conditions for their development.

Article 5. The Republic of Uzbekistan has its own official symbols—flag, coat of arms, and anthem—approved by law.

Article 6. The capital of the Republic of Uzbekistan is the city of Tashkent.

Chapter II. Power of the People

Article 7. The people are the sole source of state power.

State power in the Republic of Uzbekistan is exercised in the interests of the people and exclusively by the authorities so empowered by the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan and legislation enacted on the basis thereof. The usurpation of the authority of state power, the suspension or termination of the activity of organs of power in a procedure not specified by the Constitution, and the creation of new and parallel structures of power is unconstitutional and entails responsibility in accordance with the law.

Article 8. The people of Uzbekistan are composed of citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan, regardless of their nationality.

Article 9. The most important questions of state and public life are submitted for discussion by the people and put to a general ballot (referendum). The procedure of the organization of a referendum is determined by law.

Article 10. Only the popularly elected Supreme Council and the president of the republic may speak on behalf of the people of Uzbekistan.

No part of society, political party, public association, movement, or individual may speak on behalf of the people of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Article 11. The system of state power of the Republic of Uzbekistan is based on the principle of the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial.

Article 12. In the Republic of Uzbekistan social life develops on the basis of a diversity of political institutions, ideologies, and opinions.

No ideology or religion may be installed as the official state ideology or religion.

Article 13. Democracy in the Republic of Uzbekistan is based on principles common to all mankind, according to which the highest value is man and his life, liberty, honor, and dignity, and other inalienable rights.

Democratic rights and liberties are protected by the Constitution and the laws.

Article 14. The state organizes its activity on the principles of social justice in the interests of the well-being of man and society.

Chapter III. Supremacy of the Constitution and the Law

Article 15. The unconditional supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan is recognized in the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The state, its bodies, officials, and the citizens act in accordance with the Constitution and the laws.

The Republic of Uzbekistan recognizes the priority of the generally accepted rules of international law.

Article 16. None of the provisions of this Constitution may be interpreted to the detriment of the rights of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

No law or other enforceable-legal enactment may conflict with the provisions and principles of the Constitution.

Chapter IV. Foreign Policy

Article 17. The Republic of Uzbekistan is an equal subject of international relations. Its foreign policy proceeds from the principles of states' sovereign equality, the nonuse or threat of force, the inviolability of borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes, noninterference in internal affairs, and other generally recognized principles and rules of international law.

The republic may conclude alliances and join commonwealths and other interstate formations and also withdraw from alliances, commonwealths, and other interstate formations on the basis of assurance of the highest interests of the state and its people and their well-being and security.

SECTION TWO

BASIC RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND OBLIGATIONS OF MAN AND CITIZEN

Chapter V. General Provisions

Article 18. All citizens have identical rights and liberties and are equal before the law without distinction as to sex, race, language, religion, social origin, beliefs, and personal and social position.

Benefits and privileges may be established only by law and must correspond to the principles of social justice.

Article 19. The citizen of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the state are bound by mutual rights and mutual responsibility. The rights and liberties of the citizens enshrined in the Constitution and the laws are permanent, and no one has the right to take them away or qualify them outside of a court of law.

Article 20. The citizen's exercise of rights and liberties must not violate the legitimate interests and rights and liberties of other persons, the state and society.

Chapter VI. Citizenship

Article 21. Citizenship common to the entire territory of the republic is established in the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Citizenship of the Republic of Uzbekistan is equal for all, regardless of the grounds on which it is acquired.

A citizen of the Republic of Karakalpakstan is simultaneously a citizen of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The grounds and procedure of the acquisition, preservation, and loss of citizenship are established by law.

Article 22. The Republic of Uzbekistan guarantees its citizens legal defense and protection both on the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan and outside.

Article 23. Foreign citizens and stateless persons on the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan are assured rights and liberties in accordance with the rules of international law.

They bear the obligations established by the Constitution, laws, and international treaties of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Chapter VII. Personal Rights and Liberties

Article 24. The right to life is the inalienable right of each individual. An offense against it is a heinous crime.

No one may be arrested or held in custody other than on the basis of the law.

Article 25. Everyone accused of having committed a crime has the right to be considered innocent until his guilt is established in accordance with the law, by way of public trial, whereupon he is assured every opportunity for defense.

No one may be subjected to torture, violence, and other cruel or degrading treatment.

No one may be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without his consent.

Article 26. Everyone has the right to protection against encroachments on his honor and dignity, interference in his private life, and inviolability of abode.

No one has the right to enter a dwelling place, carry out a search or inspection, or violate the secrecy of correspondence and telephone conversations other than in the instances and procedure specified by law.

Article 27. A citizen of the Republic of Uzbekistan has the right to unrestricted movement on the territory of the republic and to enter and leave the Republic of Uzbekistan except as restricted by law.

Article 28. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, speech, and beliefs. Everyone has the right to seek, obtain, and disseminate any information except that directed against the Constitutional system.

Freedom of opinions and their expression may be qualified by law on grounds of personal and commercial and also official secrecy.

Article 29. All state authorities, public associations, and officials of the Republic of Uzbekistan are required to secure for the citizens the opportunity for familiarization with documents, decisions, and other material affecting their rights and interests.

Article 30. Freedom of religion is guaranteed for all. Everyone has the right to freedom of worship and the right to confess any religion or not to do so. No religious organization should obtain from the state any privileges and may not enjoy political power.

Chapter VIII. Political Rights

Article 31. Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan have the right to participate in the administration of the affairs of society and the state both directly and via their representatives. Such participation is exercised by means of self-government, the organization of referenda, and the democratic formation of state authorities.

Article 32. Citizens have the right to exercise their public activity in the form of mass meetings, gatherings, and demonstrations in accordance with legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The authorities have the right to suspend or prohibit these activities only out of justified security considerations. Such a prohibition may be protested in legal form.

Secret societies and associations are banned.

Article 33. Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan have the right to associate in trade unions, political parties, and other public associations and to participate in mass movements.

No one may infringe on the rights, liberties, and dignity of persons constituting an opposition minority in political parties, public associations, and mass movements and also in representative authorities.

Article 34. Everyone has the right both individually and together with other persons to address requests and complaints in writing to the competent authorities and institutions or to a people's representative.

Statements, proposals, or complaints must be examined in the procedure and within the timeframe established by law.

Chapter IX. Economic and Social Rights

Article 35. Everyone has the right to property.

The secrecy of bank deposits and the right of inheritance are guaranteed by law.

Article 36. Everyone has the right to labor, to free choice of work, to fair conditions of labor, and to protection against unemployment in the procedure established by law.

Forced labor other than by way of punishment in accordance with a verdict of a court of law or in other instances specified by law (at the time of military service, in a state of emergency and so forth) is prohibited.

Article 37. Persons working for wages have the right to paid leave. The length of the work day and paid earned leave is determined by law.

Article 38. Everyone has the right to social security in old age and in the event of disability and also loss of the breadwinner and in other instances specified by law.

Pensions, allowances, and other forms of social assistance may not be less than the officially established subsistence minimum.

Article 39. Everyone has the right to qualified medical assistance.

Article 40. Everyone has the right to education.

The state guarantees general education free of charge. Schooling is under the supervision of the state.

Chapter X. Guarantees of Human Rights and Liberties

Article 41. The state ensures the rights and liberties of the citizens enshrined by the Constitution and the laws.

Article 42. Everyone is guaranteed legal defense of his rights and liberties and the right to appeal the unlawful actions of state authorities, officials, and public associations in a court of law.

Article 43. The rights of minors, the handicapped, and elderly persons on their own are under the protection of the state.

Chapter XI. Obligations of the Citizens

Article 44. All citizens enjoy the rights and bear the obligations secured for them in the Constitution.

Article 45. Citizens are required to comply with the Constitution and the laws and respect the rights, liberties, honor, and dignity of other people.

Article 46. Citizens are required to preserve the historical, spiritual, and cultural heritage of the peoples of Uzbekistan.

Article 47. Citizens are required to adopt a solicitous attitude toward the environment.

Article 48. Citizens are required to pay the taxes and local dues established by law.

Article 49. Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan is the duty of each citizen of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Citizens are required to perform military or alternative service in the procedure established by law.

SECTION THREE

SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Chapter XII. Economic Foundations of Society

Article 50. The basis of the economic system of Uzbekistan is the social market economy, in which freedom of economic activity, enterprise, and labor with regard for the priority of the rights of the consumer is guaranteed. The diversity and equality of forms of ownership and their equal legal protection, fair competition, and social benefit are assured.

Property is inviolable, and an owner may be deprived thereof only in the instances and the procedure specified by law.

Article 51. An owner possesses, enjoys, and disposes at his discretion of assets belonging to him. The use of assets must not harm the environment or violate the rights and interests, protected by law, of the citizens, legal persons, and the state.

Article 52. The land and its interior, waters, the plant and animal world, and other natural resources represent national wealth, are to be used rationally, and are protected by the state.

Chapter XIII. Public Associations

Article 53. Trade unions, political parties, societies of scholars, youth organizations, mass movements, and other associations of citizens registered in the procedure established by law are deemed public associations in the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Article 54. The creation and the activity of political parties, as, equally, of other public associations, whose purpose is a forcible change in the constitutional system, which are opposed to the sovereignty, integrity, and security of the republic and the constitutional rights and

liberties of its citizens, which propagandize war and social, national, racial, and religious enmity, and which trespass against the health and morals of the people and also of militarized formations and political parties on a national and religious basis are prohibited.

Article 55. The state ensures observance of the rights and legitimate interests of public associations and creates for them equal legal opportunities for participation in public life.

The interference of the state authorities and officials in the activity of public associations, as, equally, the interference of public associations in the activity of the state authorities and officials, is prohibited.

Article 56. Trade unions express the socioeconomic rights and interests of employees. Membership of professional organizations is voluntary.

Article 57. Political parties express the political will of different social strata and groups and participate via their democratically elected representatives in the formation of the state authorities. Political parties are required to present in the established procedure to the Supreme Council or a body which it authorizes public accounts of the sources of the funding of their activity.

Article 58. Religion and religious associations are separate from the state and are equal before the law. The state does not interfere in the activity of religious associations.

Article 59. The disbandment and prohibition or limitation of the activity of public associations may occur only on the grounds of a judgment of a court of law.

Chapter XIV. The Family

Article 60. The family is the basic cell of society.

Marriage is based on the free consent and equality of the parties.

Article 61. Parents are required to support and raise children until they reach the age of majority.

The state and society provide for the support, schooling, and education of orphans and children deprived of parental tutelage and encourage charitable activity in relation to them.

Article 62. Children are equal before the law, regardless of the origins and civil status of their parents.

Article 63. Adult able-bodied children are required to care for their parents.

Chapter XV. The Mass Media

Article 64. The mass media are free and operate in accordance with the law. They bear responsibility in the established procedure for the authenticity of information.

Censorship is prohibited.

SECTION FOUR**STATE AND ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL
ARRANGEMENT****Chapter XVI. The Republic of Karakalpakstan**

Article 65. The sovereign Republic of Karakalpakstan is a part of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The sovereignty of the Republic of Karakalpakstan is protected by the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Article 66. The Republic of Karakalpakstan has its own Constitution.

The Constitution of the Republic of Karakalpakstan may not contradict the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Article 67. The laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan are binding on the territory of the Republic of Karakalpakstan also.

Article 68. The territory and borders of the Republic of Karakalpakstan may not be changed without its consent. The Republic of Karakalpakstan decides questions of its administrative-territorial arrangement independently.

Article 69. The Republic of Karakalpakstan has the right to secede from the Republic of Uzbekistan on the basis of a general referendum of the people of Karakalpakstan.

Article 70. The mutual relations of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Karakalpakstan are regulated by treaties and agreements concluded by the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Karakalpakstan.

Disputes between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Karakalpakstan are resolved by way of conciliation procedures.

**Chapter XVII. Administrative-Territorial Arrangement
of the Republic of Uzbekistan**

Article 71. The Republic of Uzbekistan is composed of oblasts, rayons, cities, communities, and villages, and the Republic of Karakalpakstan.

Article 72. A change in the borders of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, the oblasts, and the city of Tashkent, and also the formation and abolition of oblasts and rayons, requires the consent of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

SECTION FIVE**ORGANIZATION OF STATE POWER****Chapter XVIII. The Supreme Council of the Republic of
Uzbekistan**

Article 73. The highest state representative body is the unicameral Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan exercising legislative authority.

Article 74. The Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan consists of 150 deputies elected by territorial constituency on a multiparty basis for a five-year term.

Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan who have attained to the age of 25 by election day are eligible for election to the Supreme Council.

The demands made on the candidates for deputy are determined by law.

Article 75. Pertaining to the exclusive authority of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan are:

1) the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan and revisions and addenda to it;

2) the enactment of laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan and revisions and addenda to them;

3) determination of the system and authority of the organs of legislative, executive, and judicial power of the Republic of Uzbekistan;

4) the admittance to the Republic of Uzbekistan of new state formations and approval of the decisions on their secession from the Republic of Uzbekistan;

5) the legislative regulation of customs, currency, and credit matters and control of the state banks;

6) the legislative regulation of questions of the administrative-territorial arrangement; a change in the borders of the Republic of Uzbekistan;

7) determination of the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the adoption of strategic state programs;

8) the adoption of the budget of the Republic of Uzbekistan and supervision of its results and the establishment of taxes and other compulsory payments;

9) the scheduling of elections to the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan and local representative bodies; formation of the Central Electoral Commission;

10) the scheduling of the date of the election of the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan upon the expiration of his constitutional term;

11) election of the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan and his deputies;

12) election of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan;

13) election of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan;

14) election of the Supreme Industrial Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan;

15) election of the chairman of the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Environmental Protection;

16) approval of the edicts of the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the appointment and dismissal of the prime minister, his first deputy, deputy prime minister, and members of the Cabinet of ministers;

17) approval of edicts of the president of the republic on the appointment and dismissal of the prosecutor general of the Republic of Uzbekistan and his deputies;

18) approval of the nomination of the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan for chairman of the board of the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan and his dismissal;

19) approval of the edicts of the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the formation and abolition of ministries, state committees, and other organs of state administration;

20) approval of the edicts of the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the announcement of general or partial mobilization and the introduction, extension, and termination of a state of emergency;

21) ratification and denunciation of international treaties;

22) the institution of state awards and titles;

23) the formation, abolition, and renaming of rayons, cities, and oblasts and a change of their boundaries;

24) the exercise of other authority specified by this Constitution.

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan has the right to transfer its exclusive authority to bodies and other state authorities of the republic which it forms and to officials.

Article 76. A session of the Supreme Council is competent if no fewer than two-thirds of all deputies participate.

Article 77. The president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the prime minister and members of his cabinet, the chairmen of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Industrial Court, the republic prosecutor general, and the chairman of the board of the Central Bank may participate in a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan and its bodies.

Article 78. Upon the expiration of its term the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan continues its activity right up to the commencement of the new Supreme Council.

The first session of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan after the elections is convened by the Central Electoral Commission no later than two months following the elections.

Article 79. The president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Republic of Karakalpakstan in the shape of its highest organ of state power, deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan's ministerial cabinet, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Industrial Court, and the prosecutor general of the Republic of Uzbekistan have the right of legislative initiative in the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Article 80. The Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan adopts laws, decrees, and other instruments. A majority vote of all the deputies of the Supreme Council is needed for the enactment of a law.

Constitutional statutes are adopted by no less than a two-thirds vote of all the elected deputies.

The publication of laws and other enforceable enactments is an obligatory condition of their application.

Article 81. The Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan elects the chairman of the Supreme Council and his three deputies, from the Republic of Karakalpakstan included.

The chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan is accountable to the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Article 82. The chairman of the Supreme Council and his deputies are elected by ballot from the ranks of deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

A representative of Karakalpakstan who is a deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan is a deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Uzbekistan *ex officio*.

The term of the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan and his deputies is five years.

One and the same person may not be elected chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan for more than two terms in succession.

He may be subjected to early recall in accordance with a decision of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan adopted by a more than two-thirds vote of the deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan expressed by ballot.

Article 83. The chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan:

exercises overall leadership of the preparation of the questions presented for debate to the Supreme Council;

convenes sessions of the Supreme Council and formulates in conjunction with the chairmen of the committees and commissions proposals pertaining to its agenda;

presides at sessions of the Supreme Council;

coordinates the activity of the committees and commissions of the Supreme Council;

organizes supervision of the execution of laws and decrees of the Supreme Council;

directs the work on the realization of interparliamentary ties and the activity of groups connected with the work of international interparliamentary organizations;

presents to the Supreme Council candidates for election as deputy chairman of the Supreme Council and the chairman of committees and commissions of the Supreme Council;

in accordance with a proposal of the committee and commission chairmen, makes changes to the committees and commissions with their subsequent presentation to the Supreme Council for approval;

exercises day-to-day leadership of the activity of the press organs of the Supreme Council;

approves the bylaws and editorial teams of the press organs of the Supreme Council and their estimated support costs;

appoints and dismisses editors of the press organs of the Supreme Council;

approves the estimated expenditure on the support of the deputies and the administrative system of the Supreme Council;

signs decrees of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan issues directives.

Article 84. The Supreme Council elects from the ranks of the deputies committees and commissions for legislative work and the preliminary examination and preparation of questions to be put to the Supreme Council for consideration, exercise of the above-mentioned authority of the Supreme Council, and supervision of compliance with the laws and other decisions of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The Supreme Council creates, if necessary, deputy, auditing, and other commissions on a permanent or temporary basis.

Article 85. The appointment, election, and confirmation by the Supreme Council of officials and the approval of the budget and long-term investment programs is studied [as published] following preliminary examination and with the findings of the corresponding committees and commissions of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Article 86. The deputies elected to the Supreme Council receive the specified compensation and reimbursement of expenditure. Deputies working in the Supreme

Council of the republic on a permanent basis may not during their term hold any other paid office or engage in entrepreneurial activity.

Article 87. A member of the Supreme Council enjoys immunity. He may not be indicted on a criminal charge, arrested, or subjected to measures of administrative punishment imposed in legal form without the consent of the Supreme Council.

Chapter XIX. The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Article 88. The president of the Republic of Uzbekistan is the head of state and of the executive in the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Article 89. A citizen of the Republic of Uzbekistan not less than 35 years of age, fluent in the official language, and a permanent resident of the territory of Uzbekistan for no fewer than 10 years directly preceding the elections may be elected president of the Republic of Uzbekistan. One and the same person may not be president of the Republic of Uzbekistan for more than two terms in succession.

The president of the Republic of Uzbekistan is elected by citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the basis of general, equal, and direct suffrage by ballot for a five-year term. The procedure of presidential elections is determined by Republic of Uzbekistan law.

Article 90. For his term of office the president suspends his membership of a political party and may not occupy any other paid office, be a deputy of a representative body, or engage in entrepreneurial activity.

The person of the president is inviolable and is protected by law.

Article 91. The president is deemed to have assumed office the moment he takes the oath at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan as follows:

"I solemnly swear to loyally serve the people of Uzbekistan, strictly abide by the Constitution and the laws of the republic, guarantee the rights and liberties of the citizens, and conscientiously perform the duties entrusted to the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan."

Article 92. The president of the Republic of Uzbekistan:

1) is the guarantor of observance of the rights and liberties of the citizens and the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan;

2) adopts the measures necessary to guard the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan and realize decisions pertaining to questions of the national-state arrangement;

3) represents the Republic of Uzbekistan within the country and in international relations;

4) negotiates and signs treaties of the Republic of Uzbekistan; ensures compliance with the treaties concluded by the republic and commitments it has assumed;

5) receives the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic and other representatives accredited to him;

6) appoints and dismisses diplomatic and other representatives of the Republic of Uzbekistan in foreign states;

7) delivers to the Supreme Council of the republic annual reports on the domestic and international situation;

8) shapes the machinery of the executive and directs it; provides for the interaction of the highest organs of power and administration of the republic; forms and abolishes ministries of the Republic of Uzbekistan, state committees, and other organs of state administration with the subsequent presentation of the edicts on these matters for approval by the Supreme Council;

9) appoints and dismisses the prime minister and the first deputy and deputy prime ministers, members of the Cabinet of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and the prosecutor general of the Republic of Uzbekistan and his deputies with their subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Council;

10) presents to the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan the candidates for the positions of the chairman and members of the Constitutional Court, the chairman and members of the Supreme Court, the chairman and members of the Supreme Industrial Court, the chairman of the board of the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and the chairman of the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Environmental Protection;

11) appoints and dismisses the judges of oblast, rayon, city, and industrial courts;

12) appoints and dismisses from office the hakim of oblasts and the city of Tashkent with their subsequent confirmation by the pertinent soviet of people's deputies; the president has the right by his decision to dismiss the hakim of rayons and cities in the event of their having violated the Constitution or the laws or of having perpetrated actions bringing the honor and dignity of the hakim into disrepute;

13) rescinds enactments of ministries and departments of the republic and also of the hakim;

14) signs laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan; has the right to send back a law with his objections to the Supreme Council for further discussion and a vote. If by a two-thirds majority the Supreme Council upholds the decision it had previously adopted, the president signs the law;

15) in exceptional instances (an actual external threat, mass unrest, major catastrophes, natural disasters, epidemics, and such) he imposes in the interests of the

safety of the citizens a state of emergency throughout the territory or in particular localities of the Republic of Uzbekistan with the immediate submittal, within a maximum of three days, of the adopted decision for approval by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The terms and procedure of the imposition of a state of emergency are regulated by law;

16) is the supreme commander in chief of the armed forces of the republic and appoints and dismisses the top command of the armed forces; confers the top military ranks;

17) declares a state of war in the event of an attack on the Republic of Uzbekistan or in the event of it being necessary to fulfill treaty commitments in respect to mutual defense against aggression with the approval, within the next three days, of these decisions by the Supreme Council;

18) awards decorations, medals, and testimonials of the Republic of Uzbekistan and confers qualifications and honorifics of the Republic of Uzbekistan;

19) decides questions of citizenship of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the granting of political asylum;

20) adopts acts of amnesty and pardons citizens convicted by courts of the Republic of Uzbekistan;

21) decides other questions referred to his jurisdiction by laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The president does not have the right to transfer exercise of his authority to state bodies or officials.

Article 93. On the basis and in execution of the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan issues edicts, decrees, and directives binding throughout the territory of the republic.

Article 94. Upon insurmountable disagreements threatening the Supreme Council's normal functioning or its repeated adoption of decisions conflicting with the Constitution arising within the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan, it may be dissolved by a decision of the president adopted in concordance with the Constitutional Court. In the event of the dissolution of the Supreme Council, new elections are held within three months. The Supreme Council may not be dissolved in the period of a state of emergency.

Article 95. If the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan by reason of his state of health confirmed by the findings of a state medical commission formed by the Supreme Council is unable to perform his duties, an acting president of the Republic of Uzbekistan is within 10 days temporarily elected at a special meeting of the Supreme Council from the ranks of the deputies for a term of up to three months. In this case general elections for president of the Republic of Uzbekistan must be held within the three months.

Article 96. A president who has retired upon the expiration of his Constitutional term is confirmed a life member of the Constitutional Court.

Chapter XX. The Cabinet Under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Article 97. The ministerial cabinet is formed by the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan and approved by the republic Supreme Council.

The cabinet includes ex officio the head of the Government of the Republic of Karakalpakstan.

The cabinet ensures leadership of the efficient functioning of the economy and the social and spiritual spheres and the execution of the laws and other decisions of the Supreme Council and edicts, decrees, and directives of the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

In accordance with current legislation, the cabinet issues decrees and directives binding throughout the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan on all bodies, organizations, officials, and citizens.

The cabinet tenders its resignation to a newly elected Supreme Council.

The procedure of the organization of the activity and the jurisdiction of the cabinet are determined by law.

Chapter XXI. Fundamentals of State Power Locally

Article 98. The representative authorities in the oblasts, rayons, and cities (other than cities of rayon jurisdiction and also rayons which are part of a city) are soviets of people's deputies headed by hakim, who, proceeding from the interests of the state and the citizens, decide questions of territorial significance.

Article 99. Pertaining to the jurisdiction of the local authorities are:

assurance of legality, law and order, and the safety of the citizens;

questions of the economic, social, and cultural development of the territories, the formation and utilization of the local budget and local taxes and dues, and the formation of outside-of-budget funds; management of public utilities;

environmental protection;

registration of public records;

the adoption of enforceable enactments and other powers not conflicting with the Constitution and legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Article 100. The local authorities implement the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan, edicts of the president, and decisions of the superior state authorities, direct the activity of the lower soviets of people's deputies, and participate in the discussion of questions of republic and local significance.

Decisions of superior authorities adopted within the competence accorded them are binding on the lower authorities.

The term of office of the soviets of people's deputies and the hakim is five years.

Article 101. Representative and executive authority on the corresponding territory is headed by the hakim of the oblast, rayon, and city.

The hakim of the oblast and city of Tashkent is appointed and dismissed by the president and confirmed by the corresponding soviet of people's deputies.

The hakim of rayons and cities are appointed and dismissed by the hakim of the corresponding oblast and confirmed by the corresponding soviet of people's deputies.

The hakim of rayons within cities are appointed by the hakim of the corresponding city and confirmed by the city soviet of people's deputies.

Article 102. The hakim of the oblast, rayon, and city exercises his authority on the principles of individual command and is personally responsible for the decisions and actions of the bodies which he directs.

The organization of the activity, the extent of the authority, and the procedure of the election of local soviets of people's deputies and hakim of all levels are regulated by law.

Article 103. Within the authority accorded him the hakim issues decrees and directives which are binding on all enterprises, establishments, organizations, associations, and societies, and also officials and the citizens on the corresponding territory.

Article 104. The organs of self-government in the villages and districts are gatherings of the citizens electing for two years six months the chairman of the soviet (elder, chairman) and his advisers.

The procedure of the elections, the organization of the activity, and the extent of the authority of the organs of self-government are regulated by law.

Chapter XXII. Electoral System

Article 105. All citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan are enfranchised and eligible for election to the representative authorities. Each voter has one vote. Suffrage, equality, and freedom of expression are guaranteed by law.

The president and the representative authorities in the Republic of Uzbekistan are elected on the basis of general, equal, and direct suffrage by ballot. Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan who have attained to 18 years of age are enfranchised.

Citizens deemed incompetent by a court of law and also persons held in places of confinement are not eligible for

election and may not participate in elections. In all other cases the direct or indirect qualification of the electoral rights of the citizens is prohibited.

A citizen of the Republic of Uzbekistan may not simultaneously be a deputy of more than two representative authorities.

Article 106. The procedure of the conduct of elections is determined by law.

Chapter XXIII. The Judiciary

Article 107. The judiciary in the Republic of Uzbekistan operates independently of the legislature and the executive, political parties, and other public associations.

Article 108. The judiciary of the Republic of Uzbekistan consists of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Supreme Industrial Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Karakalpakstan elected for a 10-year term, and oblast, Tashkent city, rayon, city, and industrial courts appointed for a five-year term.

The organization and procedure of the activity of the courts are determined by law.

The creation of special courts is prohibited.

Article 109. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan examines cases concerning the constitutionality of acts of the legislature and the executive.

The Constitutional Court is elected from the ranks of specialists in the field of law in the composition of a chairman, deputy chairman, and judges of the Constitutional Court, including a representative from the Republic of Karakalpakstan.

Performance of the duties of chairman and member of the Constitutional Court is incompatible with the mandate of deputy.

Judges of the Constitutional Court enjoy immunity.

Members of the Constitutional Court may not simultaneously be members of other state bodies.

In their activity judges of the Constitutional Court are independent and subordinate only to the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Article 110. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan:

a) determines the conformity to the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan of laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan and other instruments adopted by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan, edicts of the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, decrees of the government, decisions of the local organs of state power, interstate treaties, and other obligations of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

b) renders a finding on the conformity of the Constitution of the Republic of Karakalpakstan to the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and of the laws of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, to the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan;

c) examines other matters referred to its jurisdiction by the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Judgments of the Constitutional Court take effect as of the moment of publication. They are final and not subject to appeal.

The organization and procedure of the activity of the Constitutional Court are determined by law.

Article 111. Judges are independent and are subordinate only to the law. All interference in the activity of judges in respect to the administration of justice is impermissible and is punishable by law.

Judges' immunity is guaranteed by law.

The chairman and members of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Industrial Court may not be members of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Judges, rayon included, may not be members of political parties and movements or occupy any other paid position.

Prior to the expiration of his term a judge may be dismissed only on the grounds specified in law.

Article 112. Trials in all courts are public. The hearing of cases in closed session is permitted only in the instances established by law.

Article 113. Acts of the judiciary are binding on all state authorities, public associations, enterprises, establishments, and organizations, officials, and the citizens.

Article 114. Judicial proceedings in the Republic of Uzbekistan are conducted in Uzbek and Karakalpak or in the language of the majority of the population of a given locality. Persons involved in proceedings who do not know the language in which the judicial proceedings are being conducted are assured the right of full familiarization with the material of the case, participation in the judicial actions via an interpreter, and the right to speak in court in their native language.

Article 115. A defendant is assured the right to a defense.

The right to professional legal assistance is guaranteed at any stage of judicial proceedings. A bar association operates to render citizens, organizations, and establishments legal aid. The organization and procedure of the activity of the bar association are determined by law.

Chapter XXIV. The Public Prosecutor's Office

Article 116. The highest supervision of the accurate and uniform execution of the laws on the territory of the

Republic of Uzbekistan is exercised by the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Article 117. The single centralized system of arms of the procuracy is headed by the prosecutor general of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The prosecutor of the Republic of Karakalpakstan is appointed by the highest representative body of the Republic of Karakalpakstan upon concordance with the prosecutor general of the republic.

Prosecutors of oblasts and rayon and city prosecutors are appointed by the prosecutor general of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The term of office of the prosecutor general of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the prosecutor of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, and the prosecutors of oblasts, rayons, and cities is five years.

Article 118. Arms of the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Uzbekistan exercise their authority independently of any state bodies, public associations, and officials, being subordinate only to the law.

For their term of office prosecutors suspend their membership of political parties and other public associations pursuing political goals.

The organization, authority, and procedure of the activity of arms of the procuracy are determined by law.

Article 119. The creation and functioning of private and cooperative organizations and public associations and their subdivisions independently engaged in operational-search, investigatory, and other special functions pertaining to the fight against crime is prohibited on the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

In the defense of legality and law and order and rights and liberties of the citizens the law enforcement authorities may be assisted by public associations and the citizens.

Chapter XXV. Finances and the Budget

Article 120. The Republic of Uzbekistan has its own financial and monetary and credit system.

The state budget of Uzbekistan incorporates the republic budget, the budget of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, and local budgets.

Article 121. A single tax system operates on the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan has the right to establish taxes.

Article 122. The banking system of the Republic of Uzbekistan is headed by the republic's Central Bank.

Chapter XXVI. Defense and Security

Article 123. Armed forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan are created for defense of the interests of the republic,

the peaceful life of the populace, and the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The structure and organization of the armed forces is determined by law.

Article 124. The Republic of Uzbekistan ensures security at the level of the necessary sufficiency for defense against armed aggression.

SECTION SIX

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PROCEDURE OF REVISIONS THERETO

Chapter XXVII. Procedure of a Revision of the Constitution

Article 125. Revisions to the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan are made by laws enacted by a majority, not less than two-thirds of the total number, of members of the republic Supreme Council.

Article 126. The Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan may enact a law on revisions and amendments to the Constitution within six months following submittal of the corresponding motion with regard for its extensive discussion. If the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan denies a motion for a revision of the Constitution, it may be taken up again only after one year has elapsed.

Chapter XXVIII. Implementation of the Constitution

Article 127. The procedure of implementation of the Constitution is determined by the corresponding decree of the Supreme Council.

The draft Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan was prepared by the Constitutional Commission in accordance with the assignment of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Comments, suggestions, and wishes pertaining to the draft Constitution are to be sent to the following address:

Constitutional Commission, Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Government House, Tashkent 700008.

Telephone: 398-160, 398-536, 398-665, 398-786.

Health Minister on State of Medical Profession, Republic Health Problems

93US0076A Tashkent MOLODEZH UZBEKISTANA
in Russian 17 Oct 92 p 3

[Interview with Shavkat Ibragimovich Karimov, Uzbekistan minister of health, by Svetlana Stakhovskaya; place and date not given: "Nonprofessionalism—That's the Burden We Must Get Rid of: And Then We Can Leap Forward"]

[Text] The editors are beginning herewith to acquaint their readers with persons who have the administration of the most important aspects of public life concentrated in their hands—persons on whose activities our well-being and yours depend.

Today we present an interview with Shavkat Ibragimovich Karimov, this republic's minister of health. The professional qualities of a surgeon have helped this minister to decisively avoid the "beaten path" and to change the basic principles of administering health care. But the process—as the minister himself admits—is going too slowly: "One can buy medications and equipment, and even build hospitals, but a responsible attitude toward one's work cannot be bought so quickly."

Shavkat Ibragimovich Karimov is the Republic of Uzbekistan's minister of health. In 1966 he graduated from the Treatment Faculty of the TashGosMi [Tashkent State Medical Institute]. He began to work as a surgeon at the Yangiersk City Hospital. He successfully defended his doctoral dissertation and became a professor. He taught for a long time at the TashGosMi and at the Institute of Cardiology. Karimov is the chairman of the Department of Hospital Surgery at the TashGosMi and still performs operations. He is married and has two children. Karimov is fond of books and paintings.

"A bad physician? That's nonsense. You're either a physician or a charlatan."

[Stakhovskaya] Shavkat Ibragimovich, for many years our numerous medical schools have been graduating students with "Threes" on their diplomas. Of course, we have also had quite a few talented kids. But the prestige of the profession—no matter how paradoxical it may sound—has also become the cause of the appearance of incompetent medical personnel....

[Karimov] It is precisely for that reason that we have abolished all the privileges of the notorious oblast recruitment, whereby an average student from a remote area could be admitted to a prestigious institute, whereas an outstanding student who had the "bad luck" of being registered as a resident of the capital could "fail to be admitted." This used to be done because of the acute shortage of physicians in the rural areas. Now times have changed. The only criterion for admission is knowledge. The instructional program will also be revised in the very near future. It must be brought into line with the world educational level. **Incompetent students will simply be dropped from our medical schools.**

But this will be a good time for our talented students. It will be more interesting to study and learn. The system of instruction has already been completely "deideologized." Previously the kids spent 40 percent of their study time on subjects having nothing to do with medicine. This had an adverse effect on their level of training.

[Stakhovskaya] But is it realistic to have a world standard in our education?

[Karimov] A great deal of work is being done. We have begun to conclude contractual agreements with the largest medical educational centers in foreign countries which are close to us, as well as those in more distant European and Asian countries. They are prepared to teach our kids not only on a compensatory basis, but also for free. Only our most talented kids will study there. No kind of "acquaintanceship" will help a careless or lazy student to get through the testing process. Passing the exams will be the sole condition for acceptance. And, of course, one must know languages. Knowing many languages is a passport to knowledge, a career, and professionalism. Our young fellows and girls must open up the world for themselves. And that is already possible these days.

[Stakhovskaya] We have many fine, young physicians in the remote areas. You yourself told me about a young specialist who was able to create a burn center at a high professional level in an oblast-level hospital [in Khorezm].

[Karimov] It is precisely for that reason that we are now working on a new system called "A Fair Start." A talented pupil from a rural area can enroll at an oblast-level medical school. But this will not become a "ceiling" for him. If he can achieve a high score in the testing process, he will be able to continue his studies—as early as the third year—at a larger scientific center. He could go farther and higher. Either to a nearby foreign country, or to one farther away. No kind of "protection" will have any power here—only knowledge and talent.

[Stakhovskaya] If I have understood you correctly, a tight course correction has been made here from quantity to quality. Am I right?

[Karimov] That's it exactly. Nowadays Uzbekistan has more physicians than any other country in the world. But that, as you can see, has had little effect on the quality of our health care. We have 71,000 physicians in this country, and another 20,000 will soon enter practice. For the sake of comparison—Korea—with a total population of 42 million—has 12,000 physicians.

Cutting down on our acceptance rate to medical schools will allow our teaching faculty to accord more attention to their students. In groups at the first-year level there will be 15 persons each (previously there were about 30 each); in the senior courses the person in charge will direct a group of 4 students. This will enable us to instruct specialists more carefully, to lead the students into scientific work, and to systematize their knowledge.

[Stakhovskaya] You have visited many countries in the world and can compare—better than anyone here—the level of our medical services with those provided in foreign countries.

[Karimov] So far, the comparison is not to our advantage. Although with regard to certain scientific developments our medicine is equal to that of many foreign

medical centers, and in some areas we are even ahead. But our average level of "ordinary" health care still lags behind the norms.

The "Third World" countries have made a leap in their economy, and this has had an immediate effect on their medicine. The health care of any country, even one with a completely "market-type" economy, depends upon its budget. And we are no exception. And until we have completed the complicated period of transition to the new economics and have stabilized our economy, it is difficult to expect progress in the social sphere. Let's be realistic in this matter.

[Stakhovskaya] I'd like to touch upon the problem of financial relations between the ministry and the government.

[Karimov] Even during such complex and difficult times as the present the government has made it possible to accord significant subsidies for the purpose of developing health care. The whole question is how to spend these funds as rationally and sensibly as possible. We are all studying this anew. My colleagues come to conferences armed with calculators. Every investment of funds must bring a maximum of benefits to people.

In our country, for example, people are very fond of purchasing a rare apparatus, even though there is no particular need for it. They wipe the dust off of it and express pride in it: "Here's something we can show off! What a level of equipment we have reached!" But perhaps it would have been more important to purchase some medications, an apparatus for more ordinary use, to make repairs in a hospital, rather than to go chasing after prestigious equipment. We need to learn how to count our money, especially now.

"Put the monster on starvation rations."

[Stakhovskaya] We have many hospitals whose conditions are simply depressing....

[Karimov] Yes, we have many hospitals! That is a very painful matter; it touches upon the basic principles upon which our health care was structured for a long time. In all the world's countries the main load is borne by polyclinics. Not a single country, not even the economically powerful ones, can permit itself to have as many "beds" as we do here in our country. Now do we really have to answer the question as to why our "beds" are of such poor "quality"? The system of in-patient hospitals is a monster which must be put on starvation rations when redistributing funds and priorities. We must develop a network of polyclinics; there should be fewer hospitals; and they ought to become better. It is precisely in the polyclinic that we need to conduct our basic treatment and research study. A hospital is already an extreme case, and in our times an expensive "luxury."

Some people say that the total number of places would not change with such a shift. But I dispute the mathematics here; for if we redistribute the priorities, we would obtain a different result.

We do have reserves. We must take advantage of them and put them to good use.

[Stakhovskaya] At one of the conferences of the city's medical personnel I learned to my surprise that plans are afoot in the capital to cut back on the number of medical-hygiene units at enterprises. Just prior to this, I had had occasion to visit one of the most successful production facilities—one which, at its own expense, had built for its own employees an entire polyclinic, purchased medications, and equipment, and is building an in-patient infirmary.

[Karimov] There can be no trend toward cutting back on medical-hygiene units. Health care is a common cause, a public matter. And if enterprises and commercial structures help out, that can only be welcomed, especially now, when we are experiencing such difficulties due to the disruption of the usual ties. There are difficulties with medications. Here too we must give this republic's government its due. Despite the fact that prices have jumped threefold, fivefold, or even tenfold, funds have been found to purchase medicines in almost the same quantities as before.

This situation came out because we do not have our own pharmaceutical companies. We import virtually all our medications into this republic from abroad. Galloping inflation is hitting our pocketbook. We need our own production facilities. A program has been worked out. Of course, we will not be able to provide ourselves with all the medicines that we need. Even such a highly developed country as the United States produces only 40 percent of the medicines it needs and purchases the rest abroad. And, in the future, we also intend to purchase such items abroad or to exchange them for our own medicines. We have prepared contracts for signing with many foreign countries; a network of functioning joint ventures are already in place; and licenses have been bought for producing medications. But that is a matter for the future. For the time being, we will continue to buy medications and other preparations, no matter what they cost. Because, after all, for many patients (such as diabetics and cancer patients), this is a matter of life or death.

[Stakhovskaya] A worsening of the ecological situation directly affects the level of diseases. What can be done about that nowadays?

[Karimov] We are reaping the fruits of the barbaric attitude toward nature which was so characteristic for our economy during recent decades. The state program entitled "EKOSAN" has been adopted. We are exercising rigorous quality controls on drinking water. And already this year there have been no epidemiological outbreaks. The rising generation is being affected by worsening nutrition. These are alarming symptoms. In

order to construct an economically powerful state, we need a healthy generation of young people. Here too, in my opinion, the words of our ministry must carry substantial weight.

"Let's dot the 'i's'."

[Karimov] We have many women who are suffering from anemia. By an edict of the president, special measures have been undertaken to maintain their health. These include supplementary nutrition, medications, and investigation. Because, after all, **only a healthy woman can have healthy children.** And the fact that in our country every day pediatrician-resuscitators save hundreds of infants attests not only to their heroic work, but also to how many children we have with birth defects. Sometimes people scold us, alleging that we are attempting to limit the birth rate. Nothing of the kind! As physicians, we are for limiting the birth of defective, ill children. Medicine is capable of making the necessary recommendations and taking a stance on the birth of healthy children.

An ill child is a tragedy not only to its family, but is also a misfortune for the state. **Healthy children comprise our strength for tomorrow's progress.** And so a healthy woman can have more children, raise them better, provide for them, and look after them. And a young couple entering into marriage should be concerned for each other's health, as well as for the birth of a healthy baby. We are convinced that young marrieds should take a minimum, two-week course of instruction in how to have a healthy family life.

[Stakhovskaya] Now it is customary for us to ask you to compare how things were previously and how they are nowadays....

[Karimov] Our ministry has already defined and specified a new concept of health care. But we do not intend to thoughtlessly destroy everything of value that was worked out before. In the field of health care there was much that was good in our "yesterday." First and foremost, there was access to treatment for everybody and experienced medical personnel. Our goal is to take what is best with us into "tomorrow," and leave behind the burden of incompetence and bungling.

[Stakhovskaya] Under the new conditions of the market, commercialization of services, including medical services as well, the entire burden with regard to social protection will be assumed by insured medicine.

[Karimov] On both the economic and the social level our republic must make a leap forward so as to be among the world's developed countries. This likewise pertains to our health care.

From the editors

Issues regarding medical insurance are of interest nowadays not only to you and us, but also to medical personnel themselves. This problem is so new and encompasses so many aspects that we have considered it possible to devote some special material to it. Shavkat Ibragimovich Karimov has promised to provide exhaustive answers to all interesting questions (you can write them in letters)

ARMENIA

Health Minister and Deputy Minister on Salmonella Outbreak

93US0049A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA
in Russian 9 Sep 92 pp 1-2

[Interview, published under the heading "Reporting the Details," with Minister of Health Ara Babloyan and Tereza Khachatryan, Chief Physician for Sanitation of the Republic of Armenia and Deputy Minister of Health for Sanitation and Epidemiologic Service, by RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA correspondent Eleonora Vartanyan; place and date not given: "Value of Life: 12 Newborn Infants Die From Salmonella Infection"]

[Text] The most recent issue of RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA contained a brief article reporting a tragedy at a maternity facility. Our correspondent asked Minister of Health Ara Babloyan to provide more details on the causes of this tragedy. Here is what he told us.

[Babloyan] Twenty-one infants were infected with Salmonella. Twelve of them in fact died. What was the cause? Pregnant women and mothers of newborn infants come to the Republic Maternity Facility from throughout the republic. This is the only hospital to which female patients with septicopyemic complications come. Within the course of a single month 27 newborn infants were transferred from this facility to various other hospitals. In the majority of cases they subsequently showed symptoms of dyspepsia. They had been transferred to the other hospitals, however, by reason of various pathologies. The infection was discovered after the infants had been transferred from the maternity facility to the other hospitals, and at different times. For some it was the ninth day after arrival, the sixth day for others, and in some cases the day of arrival. What does this indicate? Salmonella infection cannot bring death so swiftly. The infants' death was accelerated by attendant affections and defects, which created a favorable environment for the illness to progress. This was initially determined by a ministry board of experts and subsequently was confirmed by a government review. We have expended a great deal of effort in analyzing the cause of this tragedy. Appropriate administrative punishment has been carried out against those who should have prevented the Salmonella poisoning. To be honest, this was not the sole purpose of our efforts. First and foremost we analyzed organizational oversights and reached rather severe conclusions as regards our practices. The fact is that we are still being guided today by obsolete standards, regulations and procedures, which are designed for peacetime and for more favorable socioeconomic conditions. One could accuse us of making mistakes in the area of diagnosis and treatment, but for some reason we forget how the socioeconomic changes which have occurred in recent years are reflected in these errors. Can you call it a normal situation when a maternity facility periodically has the water and electricity shut off, etc.? And what about the situation

regarding medical supplies? And how about the health of the new mothers? We get new mothers with lowered levels of immunity. Living standards are dropping catastrophically, and this is reflected first and foremost on the quality of diet received by expectant mothers and, consequently, infants as well. Nor should we ignore the stress factor.

[Vartanyan] Was this an outbreak of infection?

[Babloyan] Of course we discovered violations of epidemiologic procedures, and serious ones at that. The maternity facility's epidemiologist received a severe reprimand for these violations. The person in charge of the neonatal care unit was fired, and the maternity facility's chief physician was given a severe reprimand. We are thinking about conducting certification in order to help prevent such things from occurring in the future. But fact remains fact: Salmonella poisoning did occur. Bacteriological testing was performed in a timely manner at some hospitals, but not so promptly at others. You can understand that if five days have already passed since an infant with a discovered pathology had transferred from a maternity facility to another hospital, it is difficult to establish whether infection stems from the maternity facility or from the hospital.

[Vartanyan] What are you saying?!

[Babloyan] Don't be so surprised. According to all present instructions and prescribed methodological procedures, bacteriological testing is not conducted at maternity facilities, particularly at the present time, since we have been forced to shorten the stay of newborn infants at maternity facilities. A minimum of three days is required to perform bacteriological testing, with three more days required to obtain test results, while mother and child are checked out on the fourth or fifth day. What this means is that there is no sense in conducting bacterial analysis. Of course this practice should be revised.

[Author's note] The Sanitation and Epidemiologic Service is charged with overseeing observance of sanitation and epidemiologic requirements at medical care facilities. The republic's chief physician for sanitation, Deputy Minister of Health for Sanitation and Epidemiologic Service Tereza Khachatryan, also commented on this tragedy at the request of our correspondent.

[Khachatryan] Inasmuch as this maternity facility was already in violation of certain regulations when it entered service, lacking a centralized sterilization unit, lacking a disinfection chamber, and lacking its own laundering facility, it became the object of heightened attention on the part of the Mashtotskiy Rayon Sanitation and Epidemiologic Station [SES] as well as of the Republic Sanitation and Epidemiologic Service. Last year the rayon SES conducted a bacteriological inspection on eight occasions, while one was conducted by the republic service. This year the rayon station conducted inspections in February and April. The latter inspection revealed procedural violations and a high degree of

bacterial contamination. We interpreted these facts as harbingers of epidemiologic problems in the neonatal care unit. The rayon SES carried out a number of preventive measures, after which the maternity facility commenced full-scale operations. It is my firm conviction that the cause of the outbreak of infection was the fact that both the maternity facility itself and the medical care facilities to which the infants were transferred failed to notify the sanitation and epidemiologic station in a prompt manner. But in the larger picture we in fact have no guarantee against the occurrence of intrauterine infections. In order to prevent such infections it is of course essential first and foremost to improve the plant and equipment of maternity facilities, so that they have their own centralized sterilization unit, regular disinfection chambers, laundry facilities, and bacteriological testing laboratory. The fact is that these facilities are lacking, but it is precisely for this reason that we need to have on the part of all maternity facility personnel absolute and unwavering observance of the requirements of current orders and instructions pertaining to prevention of in-hospital infections.

After my interview with Minister Ara Babloyan and Deputy Minister Tereza Khachatryan, I clearly grasped the fact that there are indeed no guarantees that the same tragedy will not be repeated tomorrow. And our calamitous socioeconomic conditions are not the only factor, although the minister is absolutely correct in his statement that our women are not getting a proper diet. He is also possibly correct in stating that prescribed standards, procedures, and laws have become obsolete. They are indeed designed for peacetime, but at the moment no new laws have been introduced.

Neither the esteemed minister nor the chief physician of the maternity facility have come right out and confirmed that an outbreak of infection did take place. In human terms I can understand them. It is one thing when there exist mitigating circumstances, such as a congenital pathologic condition in an infant, while an outbreak of infection which is somewhat of a mass nature is another thing altogether, is it not? I am no medical expert, but it seems to me that if the same pathogen is discovered in as few as three or four children, we are dealing here with an outbreak of infection. Is it really necessary for 100 or more infants to become infected before we call a spade a spade?

I was assured that they had also been let down by the epidemiologist. Such a responsible person and such a good worker, and then suddenly this occurred. There had to be punishment. She certainly may be a conscientious individual and a highly-skilled specialist. But as a rule epidemiologist personnel are staff employees of the facility and are appointed by the chief physician. I wanted very much to meet and talk with the epidemiologist, but I refrained from doing so. I was not entirely sure that she would speak frankly, if only because she

would never say anything against her boss. Those who possess the required courage and integrity come few and far between.

On 5 September a discussion of the causes of this tragedy took place in the office of Minister of State Grigor Areshyan. I am ignorant of the particulars of this discussion and do not know what results it will produce. One thing I do know, however: the time is past for organizational conclusions, administrative punishments, and the search for scapegoats. That does nothing to solve the problem. What we need are serious measures, perhaps radical structural changes, changes to ensure that the life and health of our children do not depend on the sense of responsibility and professional duty of any individual. It is essential to do everything possible to find means of improving maternity facilities. We are dealing here with a very high price: the value of life. The cost is 12 children to date, but what about tomorrow?

Additional Social Protection for Servicemen

93US0049B Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA
in Russian 9 Sep 92 p 2

[Text of enactment: "Enactment of the Government of the Republic of Armenia on Supplementary Measures for the Social Protection of Military Personnel and Fighting Men Who Have Taken Part in Combat Operations in Defense of the Republic and Who as a Consequence of This Have Become Disabled, as well as the Families of Personnel Who Have Lost Their Lives"]

[Text] In execution of the Edict of the President of the Republic of Armenia dated 25 June 1992 entitled Enactment of the Government of the Republic of Armenia on Supplemental Measures for the Social Protection of Military Personnel and Fighting Men Who Have Taken Part in Combat Operations in Defense of the Republic and Who as a Consequence of This Have Become Disabled, as well as the Families of Personnel Who Have Lost Their Lives, the Government of the Republic of Armenia has directed that the families of military personnel and self-defense forces fighting men who have lost their lives shall be granted 100,000 rubles per family, while military personnel and fighting men who have become disabled shall receive benefits as follows: 50,000 rubles for Group 1 disability, 40,000 rubles for Group 2 disability, and 30,000 rubles for Group 3 disability.

This enactment also prescribes a number of additional benefits, including the following:

1. Disabled military personnel and fighting men as well as the families of military personnel and fighting men who have lost their lives shall receive:

—prosthetic and orthopedic devices free of charge and, once each year, travel to and stay at a sanatorium free of charge;

—a 50-percent discount on rent and utilities;

- gratis privatization of apartments;
 - installation of a telephone free of charge and without the normal wait, as well as a 50-percent discount on phone subscriber charge;
 - for the children of persons in the above-specified categories—a 50-percent discount in fees at school and preschool facilities;
 - assistance in obtaining fuel for tenants of buildings without central heating, in the form of a 50-percent rebate on expenditures.
2. Military personnel and fighting men who have taken part in combat operations and become disabled as a consequence shall be entitled to the following:
- free use of all modes of transportation on the territory of the republic, with the exception of taxicabs;
 - free medicine on the basis of a doctor's prescription, and free, priority services at state medical facilities.
3. Military personnel and fighting men who have taken part in combat operations shall be entitled to the following:
- free use of urban transit services and public motor transport on the territory of the administrative rayon of residence in a rural locality, with the exception of taxicabs.

Press service of the Government of the Republic of Armenia

AZERBAIJAN

Western Oil Investment To Be Encouraged

93US0077A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Aydyn Mekhtiyev: "Baku Is Counting on Western Investment in Oil Extraction"]

[Text] Azerbaijan

The national monetary unit is the manat, introduced into circulation by presidential edict starting 1 August; and, by all appearances, it is competitive: Today, as was true two months ago, ten rubles are paid for one manat. The cabinet of ministers recently announced that privatization of state enterprises and plots of land will be carried out exclusively with manats. Following the latest rise for prices of energy resources in Russia, the government of Azerbaijan is adopting measures to prevent illegal shipments of oil products beyond the boundaries of the republic. From now on, gasoline is to be sold, as a rule, for manats.

Badir Garayev was recently dismissed from his post as minister of finance by decree of President Elchibey, and doctor of economic sciences Salekh Mamedov, who was

appointed to this position, proclaimed his radical program for strengthening the manat. In an interview with the national agency "Azerinform," Mamedov stated: "The manat should become the single monetary unit in the republic, and parallel circulation of the ruble along with it will be excluded." In his opinion, it would be expedient for Azerbaijan to conclude bilateral agreements in the next two years with the countries of the CIS on the establishment of economic ties on the basis of the ruble, for which a ruble reserve must be created in the republic.

Thus they are confident in government circles in Azerbaijan about the success of the financial reform. The republic still has substantial reserves of oil, which is almost fully equivalent to a gold reserve in securing a national hard currency. (The republic's stock of gold is extremely meager.) Western oil magnates have entered into a fierce competitive struggle for the right to control the oil fields in Azerbaijan.

The American corporation Amoco won the victory in the tender. However, neither America's "Unocal" nor England's "British Petroleum" renounced their plans for active participation in oil extraction. "British Petroleum" beat out "Unocal," signing a suitable agreement with the Azerbaijani concern "Azerneft." The head of "British Petroleum's" delegation in the negotiations with the Azerbaijani government, Peter Wells, stated that, as an initial payment, "BP" [British Petroleum] had granted Azerbaijan 30 million dollars. At subsequent stages in the implementation of the agreement, the sums invested in the development of Azerbaijan's oil fields, according to Wells, will amount to billions of dollars. Vice president of the American corporation "Unocal," John Aimee, in a meeting with the first vice premier of Azerbaijan, stated that the "haste" with which the Azerbaijani side had signed the contract with "BP" had come as a complete surprise, but nevertheless his company intends to extend significant assistance in the reorganization of Azerbaijan's industry.

But this still does not signify a painless exit for the republic from a most severe financial-economic crisis. Opponents of the current government direct attention to the fact that, in contrast to Russia, in Azerbaijan state regulation of the economy in the next several years will predominate, land reform has been postponed until better times, and privatization in industry will take place extremely slowly. Thus a sharp drop in the exchange rate of the national currency—the manat—against a background of a further deepening of the crisis in Azerbaijan is not ruled out.

GEORGIA

State Program on Privatizing Enterprises

State Council Chairman's Decree

93SD0041A Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA
in Russian 25 Aug 92 p 2

["Decree of the Republic of Georgia State Council 'On State Program of Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises of the Republic of Georgia'"]

[Text] The Republic of Georgia State Council decrees:

1. Approval of Decree No. 829 of 11 August 1992 in the form in which it was presented: "State Program of Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises of the Republic of Georgia," adopted by the Government of the Republic of Georgia.

[Signed] E. Shevardnadze, chairman of the Republic of Georgia State Council

V. Gogvadze, secretary of the Republic of Georgia State Council

Tbilisi

18 August 1992

Prime Minister's Decree

935D0041B Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA
in Russian 25 Aug 92 p 2

["Decree of the Government of the Republic of Georgia 'On State Program of Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises of the Republic of Georgia'"]

[Text] In accordance with the Law of the Republic of Georgia "On Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises in the Republic of Georgia," the Government of the Republic of Georgia decrees that it will for realization of the purposes and tasks of the privatization of state-owned enterprises of the republic:

1. Approve and present for confirmation to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Council the State Program of Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises of the Republic of Georgia as enclosed.

2. Entrust supervision of fulfillment of the decree to the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia.

[Signed] T. Sigua, acting chairman of the government-prime minister of the Republic of Georgia

[Signed] K. Gelashvili, acting first deputy administrator of the State Chancellery of the Government of the Republic of Georgia

Text of State Program

935D0041C Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA
in Russian 25 Aug 92 p 2

[Text of "State Program of Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises of the Republic of Georgia"]

[Text]

I. Introduction

The fundamentals of the state program (hereinafter the program) of privatization of state-owned enterprises of the Republic of Georgia were compiled in accordance with the requirements of the law of the Republic of Georgia of 9 August 1991 "Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises of the Republic of Georgia" with regard for

international experience and they determine the purposes and tasks of privatization and also the privileges and restrictions and sectoral and territorial priorities in this sphere.

The order and procedure of the conversion of state-owned property are determined by the Regulations Governing the Sale of State-Owned Property at Public Auction and its Competitive Sale and Conversion into Joint-Stock Property. The program contains common approaches to the forms of the valuation and privatization of properties.

The main purposes of the privatization of state-owned enterprises are:

1. Conversion of state-owned property into other forms of property, citizens' acquisition of the assets of state-owned enterprises (securities), and a change in the economic system of the country as a whole;

2. Stabilization of the political situation in the country;

3. Elimination of the state monopoly in all the main sectors of the economy, establishment of a multitude of forms of ownership, including predominantly private ownership, the creation of a competitive environment, the formation of a stratum of private entrepreneurs, and the actual transition to a market economy;

4. The development of small business and the revitalization of the economy as a whole and its extrication from the protracted crisis, an enhancement of the quality of finished goods and services, and an improvement in the consumer market;

5. An improvement in the country's financial position;

6. Release of the state budget from subsidies to unprofitable enterprises by way of the privatization of a large part of them;

7. The formation by way of the establishment of a diversity of property of real proprietors and the creation of a motivation to highly productive labor in the sphere of material production and services;

8. Release of organs of state power from a function which is not within their jurisdiction—management;

9. The attraction of foreign investments.

State-owned property which is functioning inefficiently is by way of privatization to be converted into efficiently operating private property, mainly by way of sale. The consequence of this is to be the replacement of the state sector in the sphere of production and circulation by private enterprise to the extent to which this latter really proves its advantages compared with the state sector. At the same time the state sector itself is to be transferred to a commercial basis.

The legal and illegal capital which exists currently will in the process of privatization be incorporated in economic

activity mainly competitively and by way of the sale of state-owned enterprises and properties at public auction.

The social base of privatization will be expanded by the transfer free of charge to the populace of a considerable part of the value of state assets in the form of privatization cards, which will at the same time be a means of social protection of the neediest strata of the populace and their inclusion to a certain extent in business by way of the acquisition of shares of stock for the privatization cards.

The formation of stock companies from enterprises and the sale of shares of stock on the open market will contribute to the formation of a securities market.

Privatization will be undertaken in stages.

So-called small-scale privatization will be undertaken, in the main, at the first stage of privatization (latter half of 1992-first half of 1993): privatization of small enterprises and also unprofitable and loss-making enterprises of trade, public catering and municipal services, industry, construction, agriculture, and other sectors of the economy, which should strongly boost small business and revitalize the economy. Large enterprises will at this same stage be converted in parallel with small-scale privatization into public-type stock companies. Real prerequisites and organizational structures for full-scale privatization will by means of all this have been created in the subsequent period.

The state program of privatization will determine the role and interaction of the organs of state government in this period. Proceeding from this, the demands specified by the program are binding on ministries, departments, and committees of the Republic of Georgia, the Councils of ministers of the Abkhaz and Adzhar Autonomous Republics, other organs of local and state government and state-owned enterprises, organizations, and establishments of all types and also on the persons who represent the interests of the Republic of Georgia in business organizations involving the participation of state assets.

The single policy of privatization in the country will be directed by the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia, which will tackle the tasks entrusted to it by means of the corresponding organs of administration of state assets of the Abkhaz and Adzhar Autonomous Republics and territorial administrations and branches. It will prepare the state program of privatization of state assets in close interaction with ministries, committees, departments, organs of state government of the autonomous republics, and organs of local self-government.

The State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia will, as necessary, present the Government of the Republic of Georgia with the revisions and addenda to be made to the state privatization program.

In accordance with the program, the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia will periodically present the Government of the Republic of Georgia with a list of properties to be privatized. This program will not regulate privatization of the land and housing.

II. State-Owned Enterprises and Facilities Whose Privatization Is Not Contemplated at the Present Time

At this stage of privatization there is no provision for the privatization of the following facilities and enterprises:

- minerals, water resources, the forests, air space, territorial waters, and marine economic and border zones of the Republic of Georgia;
- objects of historical-cultural and artistic worth (including historical and cultural state archives and their branches on the territory of the republic and the state collection of official motion-picture, photographic, and audio records), and state museums;
- the state treasury of the Republic of Georgia, funds of the budget of the republic, currency reserves, social security and medical insurance funds, state-owned outside-of-budget monies, the national bank, and gold reserves;
- geological, cartographic-geodesic, hydrometeorological, and environmental-protection enterprises and establishments and services monitoring the state of the environment;
- enterprises and establishments of health care, sanitary-epidemiological and veterinary and plant protection, and forestry services;
- enterprises of patent services, standardization, metrology and certification services, machinery-experimental stations, and testing centers;
- large-scale electric power enterprises and facilities (with a capacity of more than 10 megawatts);
- enterprises of pipeline transportation and its organizations and establishments, urban mass transit, the Metro and the Georgian Railroad, and their maintenance enterprises;
- research, planning and survey, and educational and research institutions of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, the Georgian Academy of Agricultural Sciences, the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of Georgia, the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Georgia, the Ministry of Health and Social Security of the Republic of Georgia, and other sectoral ministries, and also archives and collections of research establishments;
- facilities of trade servicing publicly funded organizations (hospitals, kindergarten-creches) and school dining establishments;

- enterprises and facilities of strategically important communications and television and radio-broadcasting centers;
- general motor highways;
- jewelry enterprises and enterprises producing and fashioning precious metals and precious and semi-precious stones and manufacturing narcotics and toxic substances and also sowing, cultivating, and processing crops containing narcotic and toxic substances;
- the fleets of training and rescue services and the Marine Inspectorate;
- mobilization stocks;
- facilities of the engineering infrastructure (power, heating, and gas supply, water supply and sewerage, street lighting, and the upkeep and civic improvement of the cities) and also enterprises undertaking the operation, maintenance, care, and renovation of the above-listed facilities;
- pantheons, cemeteries;
- enterprises manufacturing radioactive material and that of a military purpose and their experimental-design and research establishments;
- regular and reserve property of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Georgia and the Information-Intelligence Bureau of the Republic of Georgia and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Georgia;
- thoroughbred, seed-growing, nursery, quarantine, and strain-testing farms (plots);
- gas supply, gasification and gas facility enterprises and organizations, which form the single system of gas supply of the Republic of Georgia;
- specialized elevators, refrigerators, and warehouses catering for state reserves and mobilization stocks;
- facilities for the social protection of the populace.

III. Properties and Enterprises To Be Privatized in 1992-1993, Rules of Their Privatization and Privileges

The enterprises and properties which exert the most influence on the formation and functioning of the market structures of the economy and also the enterprises and properties whose inefficient operation is preventing the extrication of the economy from crisis and formation of the market will necessarily be privatized in 1992-1993.

Such properties and enterprises include:

- enterprises and properties of wholesale and retail trade, public catering and consumer service, construction and building materials industry, and agricultural

production, those processing agricultural raw material, and food and light industry enterprises.

The majority of loss-making enterprises in all the main sectors of the economy, temporarily closed and incomplete construction projects, the standard times for whose completion have expired, and others are subject to compulsory privatization.

Application of the following forms of the privatization of the assets of state-owned enterprises is contemplated in 1992-1993:

- the sale of enterprises at public auction;
- the competitive sale of enterprises;
- the sale of shares of stock of a public stock company;
- redemption of leased assets.

The initiators of the privatization of the assets of individual enterprises may be:

- the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia and its territorial body;
- ministries, departments, and the work force of enterprises of the Republic of Georgia; individuals and nonstate legal persons of the Republic of Georgia engaged in private enterprise;
- foreign investors.

Small enterprises may, as a rule, be sold at public auctions.

Large enterprises are, as a rule, to be privatized by way of their conversion into public-type stock companies. The remaining categories of enterprises may be privatized in any form.

The form of privatization is determined by the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia and its territorial body with regard for the findings of the enterprise privatization commission, the Law "On Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises in the Republic of Georgia," this program, other enforceable enactments, and the opinion of the employees of the enterprise to be privatized.

Shares of stock are state property and will be sold on the open market.

The participation of foreign investors in the acquisition of shares of stock will be regulated on the basis of special regulations.

In the process of conversion of state-owned enterprises into public-type stock companies the privileges specified by Article 17 of the Law on Privatization of an Enterprise will be realized in accordance with the following rule:

1. Registered preferred (nonvoting) stock in the amount of up to 20 percent of the capital fund, but totaling not more than 10 times the minimum wage in the Republic of Georgia per employee, will be transferred free of charge simultaneously to all employees of the enterprise to be privatized.

2. Common stock in the amount of up to 10 percent of the capital fund, but not more than five times the minimum wage in the Republic of Georgia per employee, will be on sale by subscription to enterprise employees at a 20 percent discount of the nominal value and with a two-year grace period, at the same time the first stock-purchase payment must not be less than 20 percent of the stock's nominal value.

3. To acquire preferred stock the employees of an enterprise to be privatized may use the resources remaining in the enterprise economic stimulation fund.

4. If by means of competitive bid or public auction a state-owned enterprise has been acquired by a partnership formed by its employees, the privileges specified by Article 18 of the Law on Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises in the Republic of Georgia are extended to it.

5. The procedure of the distribution of preferred stock is determined by a general meeting of enterprise employees (conference).

6. The preferential sale of shares of stock to enterprise employees which is defined by this program is undertaken in accordance with regulations approved by the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia.

If the total subscription is in excess of the amount mentioned above, the enterprise privatization commission reduces the share of all employees in an equal proportion in order that the said limitations be observed.

7. The said privileges extend to the employees for whom the enterprise is the principal place of employment, the persons who in accordance with legislation of the Republic of Georgia have the right to return to this enterprise, pensioners who have retired from the enterprise, and the persons who since 1 January 1992 have been terminated and registered as unemployed.

Enterprises are sold to competitive bid in accordance with the restricted-auction principle in cases where compliance with certain conditions (preservation of the profile of the property, jobs, and the volume of commodities and services, investments, and such) are required of those acquiring the enterprises to be privatized.

In commercial competition the purchaser who pays the maximum price becomes the owner of the enterprise.

For the purpose of protection of the interests of the employees of an enterprise to be privatized following submittal of the application for privatization of the enterprise (irrespective of the initiator of the application) and prior to the purchaser's acquisition of title

(before the first meeting of shareholders) it is prohibited without concordance with the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia:

—reorganizing the enterprise and eliminating and replacing its structures;

—revising and terminating contract agreements concluded by the privatized enterprise previously on the use of the buildings, structures, and premises which it occupies.

In this same period it is prohibited to revise the list of personnel of the enterprise and reduce the numbers of employees without a decision of a general meeting of employees of the enterprise (subdivision) or a body which it has authorized.

IV. Use of Privatization Cards in 1992-1993

1. For the purpose of protection of the interests of the public each citizen of Georgia will have an opportunity to obtain free of charge a share of state property, for which as of 1 January 1993 privatization cards (deposits) will be introduced. A month prior to distribution of the privatization cards the Government of Georgia will determine the total amount for which privatization cards will be issued and the amount to be issued per citizen.

2. For the purpose of service of the circulation of the privatization cards the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia will create and contribute to the formation of special financial institutions (investment companies, funds, and such) and provide for the extensive participation of entrepreneurial structures in them.

3. For the purpose of the citizens' acquisition with privatization cards of assets to be privatized the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia will prior to 1 December 1992 provide for the conversion of large enterprises (with a book value of R20 million on 1 January 1992) into public-type stock companies. The managers of such enterprises are instructed to draw up the draft constituting documents of the stock companies and the plans of their privatization in accordance with the requirements of the Law "On Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises in the Republic of Georgia," this program, and regulations approved by the Government of the Republic of Georgia. The managers must present the said plan, agreed with the employees of the enterprise, to the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets no later than 1 November 1992.

V. Relations of the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia and Its Bodies and the Organs of State Government and Others in the Process of Realization of Privatization

The State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia or its territorial body are the seller of state-owned properties.

Enterprises of state trade (other than interregional facilities), public catering and consumer services, and the sectors of housing and public utilities located on territory within the jurisdiction of enterprises, organizations, and establishments whose purpose is satisfaction of the production needs and social requirements of the local population and industrial, agricultural, repair and construction, sports, and tourist enterprises whose book value is not in excess of R1 million (in 1992 prices) or with up to 100 employees, regardless of jurisdiction, will be privatized, as a rule, by territorial bodies of the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia.

Ministries and departments of the Republic of Georgia will draw up sectoral recommendatory programs of the privatization of republic property, which, following consultation with the Ministry of Economy and the organs of local self-government of the Republic of Georgia, will be presented to the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia.

Territorial bodies of the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia will on the basis of consultations with ministries and departments draw up territorial programs of the privatization of assets, which they will present to the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia.

The State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia will draw up the State Program of Privatization of State (Municipal) Assets in the Republic of Georgia, which will be amplified annually by the Government of the Republic of Georgia and approved by the Republic of Georgia State Council.

The local program of privatization will be drawn up by the local body of the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia based on consultations with ministries and departments of the republic. Following concordance with the committee, the program will be approved by the organ of local government, after which it will become an integral part of the State Privatization Program.

The territorial program of privatization is to be drawn up and approved no later than one month following approval of this program.

The local privatization program is to be published in the local press.

The local privatization program:

- must not conflict with the basic provisions of this program;
- must contain a list of the actual properties specified by the State Privatization Program.

Local programs will be drawn up for one year.

The forms and timeframe of the presentation of the report on the accomplishment of the tasks outlined in the program will be determined by the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia.

Responsibility for fulfillment of the local program of privatization is entrusted to the appropriate territorial body of the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia.

Overall supervision of the fulfillment of the local privatization programs is entrusted to the State Committee for the Administration of State Assets of the Republic of Georgia.

ESTONIA

Laar Sets Out Foreign, Economic Policies

93UN0181A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT
in Finnish 19 Oct 92 p 6

[Article by Vesa Santavuori: "Estonia Aiming For Rapid Reforms"]

[Excerpts] *Mart Laar, candidate for prime minister, promises to rid [the country] of "Soviet-style thinking," sell off the big state enterprises immediately, and provide guarantees of equal treatment to the Russian population.*

Candidate for prime minister of Estonia's new nonsocialist government coalition Mart Laar, 32, plans to rapidly set in motion the privatization of industry and modern industrial operation.

He wants to purge Estonia "of the Soviet way of thinking." Of wanting "to work in the old way," that is, not work at all, Laar said on Sunday [18 October] in Helsinki. He was on a private visit to Finland on the weekend.

"We're not going to have a radical purge, but we want to have a generation that's prepared to move matters forward—and more rapidly because, unfortunately, speed is very important for us now."

Laar also assured Estonia's non-Estonian population that there will be no discrimination. No one will be forced to go "back to Siberia" out of revenge, he said.

Moscow's Responsibility

However, Mart Laar's attitude toward official Russia is a firm one. He is demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Estonia and clear recognition from Moscow that Estonia was an occupied country for decades.

It was apparent from Laar's statements that such recognition would also mean that Moscow assumes responsibility for the problems created by the occupation.

One of these problems is the Russian population's status in Estonia. The Laar government plans to begin to settle the problem by immediately granting civil rights to all of the approximately 40,000 Russians who have already applied for citizenship and who "helped us to achieve independence."

About 600,000 of Estonia's population of 1.6 million are non-Estonians. Mart Laar also promises to see to it that "the difference between citizens and noncitizens is as small as possible."

Mart Laar said that, as for those Russians who are voluntarily moving away from Estonia, they have already been guaranteed, among other things, the right to sell their homes and take the proceeds with them, which is a unique occurrence in the former Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

Laar said that the foreign policy would scarcely change. The present foreign minister, Jaan Manitski—who has a solid Swedish background—will remain in the government as his adviser. Their eyes are on Europe and the goal is membership in the Council of Europe by as early as next year. The development of economic relations with Russia and free trade with it are also to be hoped for.

Membership in the European Community can only be applied for when Estonia is economically and industrially ready for it. In Laar's opinion, membership in NATO is not excluded either, but the time is not yet ripe for that.

Mart Laar had nothing to say about Estonia's new defense minister. It is a well-known fact that many people criticize Ulo Uluots, the defense minister of the former government, for being a man of the old power faction.

Bankruptcies in Sight

Mart Laar said that the new government plans to put 30 big enterprises up for sale in Estonia immediately. In principle, they have been trying to do this for a year and a half now, but actually the reform has been opposed in many ways, Laar said.

He thinks that there will certainly be bankruptcies since many of the privatized factories are not capable of surviving. On the other hand, businessmen from Sweden, for example, have now begun to energetically come to Estonia where labor is cheap and relatively "very good," he put in a plug for it.

It is at present difficult to estimate the government's need for money because they do not know exactly how many bankruptcies there will be. He said that a need for loans will certainly arise and they have already discussed this with several Western countries.

Laar Pledges To Bring Discipline to Forces

93UN0181C Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT
in Finnish 21 Oct 92 p B 7

[Article by Jukka Rislakki: "Hard Times Indicated for Estonia; Prime Minister Says: 'Tood, Vaeva, ja Pisaraid—Blood, Sweat, and Tears'"]

[Excerpts] Tallinn (HS)—Estonia's new prime minister, Mart Laar, 32, promises the people blood, sweat, and tears—tood, vaeva, ja pisaraid. The goal is to create a "favorable business climate," but a rapid improvement in conditions is not indicated. [passage omitted]

According to Laar, his government is "the first in decades in Estonia to clearly assume responsibility for its actions to Parliament and the people."

The Riigikogu [Parliament] passed a law on the republic's government—a noticeably controversial one—at the

last minute on Tuesday [20 October]. Thirty-four members of Parliament did not participate in the vote.

Long Life Predicted

A long life is predicted for the government. The government coalition has a sufficient majority of over 50 seats. "We figure that the royalists and part of the Conservative Party will generally support us in voting," one politician said.

Laar is planning a cabinet in which there are 14 members in addition to the prime minister. According to law, there are only 10 ministers.

Government Employees Purged

Laar is combining ministries and intends to sweep at least a third of the bureaucrats out of the government agencies. His Fatherland Party's election slogan, "*Plats puhtaks!*" [*sweep the place clean*], has become a common and slightly bitter joke in the mouths of Estonians.

Laar is still keeping some of his ministers' names secret. It is generally already known that the ultraright independence party, ERSP [expansion unknown], will get the defense and interior minister portfolios.

Laar is giving the important portfolio of minister of economy to a quite unknown man, the Fatherland Party's Ain Saarmann. "He's a forest engineer and used to head a company that produced a good return. The company used to ship 90 percent of its exports to the East and in the space of one year it turned 90 percent of its exports to the West," Laar said to HELSINGIN SANOMAT. "Wouldn't a man like that understand something of Estonia's economy as well?"

Armed Forces To Be Disciplined

One of Laar's goals is to bring discipline to the armed forces. The civil guard units will continue to exist and they will be given official status alongside the army as forces under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. The armed forces proper will get a chief, probably before the end of October. The Interior Ministry will get the police, the border patrol, and the special units.

Rights for Non-Estonians

Laar has also promised to guarantee non-Estonians equal rights. "Furthermore, we are prepared to automatically grant citizenship, without any language requirements to those Russians who applied for it by 1990."

The government intends to consider Ingrians and other kindred peoples equal to Estonians when deciding on citizenship and to shorten the processing of applications of young foreigners who come of age by one year.

"According to law, non-Estonians may now vote in next year's local elections. Estonia is the first nation in Europe to try this," Laar said.

The creation of a "stable and loyal" civic society is mentioned in the government's platform. Russians who want to leave will be helped to emigrate from Estonia.

"I believe that Russia wants to reach agreement on this in a civilized manner. Compare Estonian Russians' situation with what is happening to Russians in Georgia, Tajikistan, and elsewhere. In view of this, the accusations made against us are very interesting."

Rapid Privatization of the Economy

The government has promised to privatize the economy and property as quickly as possible. There will be a special reform minister in the cabinet.

He intends to curb inflation and he does not yet promise wage raises and a rise in the standard of living. "This is an unpleasant truth, but, in our opinion, the truth is better than a lie."

Laar spoke of economic policy almost as though it had come from the mouth of a Finnish politician, assuring us that "we don't have any other alternative."

The conservative majority government, which is taking the medicine prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), may quickly be forced into a confrontation with the opposition and the labor unions.

The labor union delegation for the big Russian plants in Narva negotiated in Tallinn on Tuesday. It asked the labor union federation for help because of unemployment and the threat of the plants' going bankrupt.

Of the 8,675 officially unemployed workers in Estonia, 1,657 are registered in Narva. The government intends to let the unprofitable plants go bankrupt and considers the rise in unemployment to be natural.

The Narva workers did not now directly threaten to go on strike, but they did say that they are readying themselves for a confrontation. Labor union leaders decided to try for talks with the government as soon as it came into office. Laar plans to again set up a commission to resolve the problems of northeastern Estonia.

Deputy Defense Minister on Russian Pullout

93UN0181D Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT
in Finnish 21 Oct 92 p B7

[Article by Jukka Rislakki: "No Signs in Estonia of Pause Yet in Withdrawal of Troops"]

[Text] Tallinn (HS)—There are no signs in Estonia yet of a pause in the withdrawal of troops. On Tuesday [20 October] a column of soldiers with their vehicles and artillery withdrew from Estonia and crossed the Russian border.

The Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry have not yet received an official Russian announcement of a suspension of the withdrawal by this evening. At both

ministries they think that what is involved is a domestic policy ploy aimed at "the home public."

According to officials, the Russian troops are in a hurry to leave Estonia because it is the only Baltic country to have effected a currency reform. "Now they have to pay for their bread with hard currency."

We hear that officers have not been paid their wages for a couple of months now.

Officers' Wives Unemployed

According to Estonian newspapers, "rebellious" officers' wives have recently visited Russia to see under what conditions families have to live there. They discovered that there may be only one water faucet for an entire barrack.

"It's true that the wives are unemployed," Estonian Foreign Ministry press secretary Urmas Reitelmann said. "This is why we don't press the Russians too hard to leave. As far as we're concerned, the wives could just as well stay here until conditions are improved in Russia."

Reitelmann thinks that there are political reasons behind Russia's announcement on Tuesday: a power struggle and an attempt to reassure the Russian public.

Estonia is still demanding that combat troops leave and that Tallinn be emptied of all soldiers by the end of 1992.

"Maybe the slowdown or suspension is attributable to technical, not political reasons—the fact that winter is approaching," Deputy Defense Minister Hannes Valter surmised. "One doesn't leave under difficult conditions unless one has to."

According to Valter, to what extent the troops that are in the Baltic countries are any longer controlled by Russia's politicians is also uncertain.

It is estimated that there are still about 10,000 Russian soldiers in Estonia. This figure increases many times over if we include in it members of officers' families.

High-ranking officers who are in Estonia have just these past few days assured us that the withdrawal will continue and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachov said on Monday that the Baltic countries will be emptied of soldiers by the end of next year.

Paramilitary Firms Seen Active In Metal Trade

93UN0035A Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 26 Sep 92 p 12

[Article by Bjorn Hygstedt: "Scrap Metal Gathering Feeds Both Poor And Rich"]

[Text] Tallinn—Carl, from Helsinki, makes himself comfortable in his Cadillac Brougham d'Elegance, parked outside the fashionable Hotel Palace in Tallinn.

Heavy gold chains around his wrists jingle as he turns the ignition key. He is making fantastic sums of money exporting scrap metal all over the world and his life is filled with champagne, caviar, and women.

Alexander, from Tallinn, is trying to get his rusting Lada to start. He has just sold a carful of scrap metal he has found to the state-run company Eesti Metalliekspor and received a little money to spend on food for his family. Alexander is unemployed and the only way for him to take care of his children is to collect scrap metal.

These are two pictures from the Estonian capital, which should now be renamed Metallinn. Since last spring it has become a melting pot for the export of strategic metals and all types of scrap metal to buyers in the West. Every day hundreds of tons of scrap metal, mostly from Russia but also from Estonia, end up at scrap yards in the Tallinn harbor area.

Turned Over List

To date, a special licensing commission at the Estonian Customs Office has issued export permits for 55 different companies. After two days of negotiations, SVENSKA DAGBLADET managed to obtain the list, but the authorities refused to turn over any addresses or telephone numbers.

"We do not reveal addresses or other information on what metals the permits include," the sullen official said.

"Why? Because the companies do not want us to, of course."

The question is whether the authorities want to do so. Many of the approved companies have been involved in shady business deals and in some cases it is suspected that Estonian remnants of the KGB are behind them. A coded telegram with the identification number 174033, dated 5 January 1991, from what was then the KGB leadership stated that "commercial structures" must be established. Such paramilitary businesses are now able to bring in enormous sums of money by exporting scrap military materiel.

Plundering

What we are seeing is a massive plundering of the metal resources of Russia and Estonia. SVENSKA DAGBLADET revealed in yesterday's paper that large quantities of metal are being smuggled over the Russian-Estonian border for further transport to other countries, including Sweden.

Carl, from Helsinki, and hundreds of other metal kings, large and small, are buying everything they can get their hands on. The idea is to strike while the iron is hot. When the sleepy authorities finally wake up and take action against the corruption and the flow of metal, then the carefree days of the scrap rush will be over.

"The other day we bought 680 tons of metal from a Russian base up on the Arctic Ocean. They are selling everything from tracked vehicles to submarines," Carl said.

He proudly drove us around in his Cadillac to show off his empire. The metal depot is down by the harbor. Nickel, copper, cobalt, and bronze from trucks with Russian registry are sorted in different containers, most with U.S. codes.

"We are serious," Carl said. "When customs officials want bribes we refuse to pay. And all the metal is checked for radiation before we ship it, especially nickel from missile bases."

A dosimeter and a mobile telephone—these are the primary working tools of the metal king. Carl's telephone rings constantly.

"Okay, Tim. You will have your cobalt in Helsinki tomorrow. No problem. That's right, cash."

"Okay, Steve. Next week. Two hundred tons of nickel. Dollars? Of course."

Inside the parade ground for Russian tracked vehicles, a secure, rented industrial area near Tallinn, the contrasts are striking. Carl's telephone continues to ring. His customers want information and deals are made to the amount and the minute of delivery. Dingy curtains hang in the factory windows. The plaster is falling off the front of the building and the weeds are growing wild.

"This kolkhoz went bankrupt," Carl said. "Too bad for them, but good for us. Now we have a place to put our tracked vehicles."

"Envious"

He would not reveal the purchase price for the 11 nearly new vehicles, but the selling price is \$10,000. Three have already been sold to lumber companies in Finland.

"Now we are going to contact Elisabeth Rehn, Finland's defense minister. She may want to buy some real cheap."

Carl's laughter reverberates between the walls of the building like cannon fire. His eyes glisten and the accusations of crimes committed in Stockholm and Helsinki have vanished completely. Life is a game.

"That is all nonsense. People who are envious of me talk a lot of trash," Carl said.

Then he climbed into his Cadillac and drove to the Palace. New deals were in the making and thick stacks of dollars are waiting to be made in this scrap-iron Klondyke.

People Standing In Line

Alexander received 67 kronor for the scrap metal he brought to the receiving room at Metallieksport. That is good money—almost a fourth of a month's wages. It is

no wonder people stand in line to sell, especially since the state-run company does not even blink at buying street signs that the state already owns.

Business ventures such as this hardly help the already strained state finances.

In Estonia, with its high unemployment rate, searching for scrap metal has become the only means of support for many people. The good news about this is that rusty engine blocks and empty food cans are being removed from the environment. But the bad news is that electric cables are being dug up, bronze statues are being stolen, and at many private homes the copper downspouts end 4 meters above the ground.

This is not even a good deal, since the income from the downspouts is not enough to cover the cost of cleaning up a moisture-damaged basement.

Bergmann Aims Goals for Privatization Agency

93UN0181B Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT
in Finnish 19 Oct 92 p B 16

[Article by Anna Paljakka: "They Are Starting To Privatize Estonia; Everything Is for Sale, So Far Only Small Businesses Sold"]

[Text] Tallinn (HS)—Estonia's Business Privatization Agency is located in the offices of the former Gosplan [Central Planning Commission, USSR] on Suur-Ameerika Street in Tallinn. "Estonia's Treuhand," as its director, Andres Bergmann, refers to the agency, is still in part operating without funds.

Bergmann was appointed to his post last spring by the previous government, which passed the decree establishing the Privatization Agency as its last act in September. Bergmann serves in the Estonian Ministry of Economy with the title of deputy minister and is waiting along with his staff for the newly appointed government's policy lines this week.

"I don't know yet what the new Parliament's intentions are. In the previous administration's opinion, it's urgent that the state enterprises be privatized," Bergmann said.

It is to be anticipated that the new Parliament and the government will listen to the voice of the growing business sector in Estonia even more closely than did their predecessors. The goal is rapid privatization and the promotion of foreign investments by eliminating the differences in operating opportunities between foreign-owned and local businesses. The settlement of land ownership and a land law are their most urgent wishes.

"Everything is for sale and money has no name, not even the Estonian kroon," Bergmann characterized the agency's policy.

Businessman From Germany

Bergmann, 33, is one of those foreign officials who have now been promoted to top posts because leaders are wanted in Estonia who are free of the encumbrances of the old power faction.

Bergmann has spent half of his life in Germany and worked there as a small businessman. He also operated a business in the recording industry in Finland for a couple of years. He said that he accepted his present post once he received a promise of cooperation from the German Treuhand.

"Our projects are similar and the problems are the same. It's just that the Germans' problems are on a much larger scale and they have a couple of years lead on us," Bergmann said. He is expecting a consultant in his agency sent by the Berlin Treuhand soon.

The enterprises to be privatized will be offered for sale in the same way the German enterprises have been. During the initial phase contacts will be made through chambers of commerce and trade secretaries in foreign countries.

A listing of the enterprises to be sold is being drawn up. It is estimated that they will add up to a couple of thousand.

Bergmann is authorized to turn enterprises into money whose value is no more than 600,000 Estonian kroons (about 240,000 markkas). "Furthermore, this year we can sell about 30 big ones, in other words, enterprises whose value exceeds that ceiling. They generally employ about a thousand workers," Bergmann said. Negotiations may be initiated for others too.

They are just beginning to consider the strategy for privatizing the biggest enterprises of all. "In the food industry, for example, there are monopolies with which we won't interfere at this point. Similarly, many energy projects will have to wait."

The so-called all-Soviet plants, that is, those owned by Moscow, are now being nationalized in accordance with the fastest possible plan. "With our current problems, it's difficult to go ahead and privatize them right away," Bergmann said.

To date the Estonian Treuhand has entered the sales of only about 800 small enterprises on the credit side of the ledger. They were mostly commercial and service enterprises and they went to domestic investors cheap.

Bergmann conceded that there are many uncertainty factors, for example, the lack of an official supervision system and a way of compiling comparable statistics. He judges Estonian workers to be fairly well-educated and trained, and nowadays motivated as well. "Management, on the other hand, is lamentable here."

Based on his own experiences, he is convinced that the buyer of an Estonian firm will not get a mafia into the

bargain. "Petty crime does appear, but getting the country's borders under its own surveillance helps to avoid it."

Competitiveness Is a Problem

Bergmann is familiar with the Western estimate that only 15 percent of the companies operating in the Baltic countries are competitive on world markets. Probably only 15 Estonian companies are among the top 100 competitive Baltic companies, and they are at the bottom of the list.

"Of course, if exactly the same theoretical standards are applied to the companies, that's the result you may come up with," he conceded. "However, all of them are for sale to foreign and domestic investors, if only the price can be agreed on!"

There are special provisions in the Estonian foreign investment law that has been in effect for a year now for tariff relief, import and export activities, the repatriation of profits, and pricing, as well as the realization of production. Enacted at the same time, the business tax law provides for tax relief for foreign-owned companies graduated according to the extent of ownership participation.

Bergmann also plugged the lengthy—10 years, for example—payment terms for enterprise purchases.

Up to now, Sweden holds the lead in investments, but Finns have founded the largest number of companies.

Bergmann expects the best customers to come from the Nordic countries, Germany, and even Russia. "Small investments also work well on the scale of things in Estonia and at the level of costs here," he believes.

Deputy Minister on Ikea's Pullout Decision

92UN2186B Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET
in Swedish 1 Sep 92 p 9

[Article by Carl-Gustav Linden: "Ikea Finished in Estonia"]

[Text] Tallinn—The Swedish furniture giant Ikea has suddenly pulled out of all activity in Estonia in protest against the treatment of foreign investors.

The local office, which was founded in January, and the plans for expansion have been scrapped.

"We will focus our activity at Lithuania and Latvia instead," says the head of Ikea's Baltic activities, Bernhard Furrer.

The background is an agreement which Ikea wrote with the Soviet Ministry of Forestry for delivery of machines for 100 million Swedish kronor to approximately 10 Estonian furniture factories.

Ikea, which has a long experience of coproduction in Hungary and Poland, planned to invest another 100 million kronor in Estonia.

According to the agreement, Ikea gets paid in semifinished or finished products. But the largest of the companies which received the machinery, the state-owned Standard factory in Tallinn, refuses to adhere to the contract with the motivation that the party to the agreement is located in Moscow and that for this reason it is invalid. Standard's company executives are backed up by the heads of the Estonian Ministry of Industry and Energy. The former minister was of the opinion that the agreement should be respected and promised that all the machinery would be paid for, but in January the new politicians turned thumbs-down: The agreement is invalid.

"The other factories behave in a civilized manner. This concerns one case: Standard," Furrer says. His opinion is that the state in practice confiscated the machines. Ikea risks losing 40 million kronor.

"We refuse to continue to provide credits; the Estonian Government has no longer been reliable since January 1992."

Deputy Minister Koit Karisto of the Ministry of Industry and Energy says that "international legal organizations" support the Estonians.

"They have stated that we do not have to pay Ikea directly."

But according to Karisto the ministry will submit a new proposal for solving the legal conflict with the Swedish company.

Furrer, who has asked both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Embassy in Tallinn for help, is not impressed, however.

"We will not continue in Estonia until they come to their senses and we also will not advise others to do business there."

Furrer is extremely disappointed over the way the Estonians acted in view of the fact that Ikea in January, during the most difficult phase of the oil crisis, donated half a million Swedish kronor so that the Estonian furniture factories would be able to buy fuel and keep the production going.

It is not only Ikea which is disappointed with the economic policies of the newborn Baltic states. Neste feels badly treated by the Lithuanian Government and is protesting by shelving its plans for a chain of gas stations in the country. Neste, which operates gas stations in Estonia and Lithuania, has opened one station, but that is the end of the plans for now.

Problems of Starting, Operating Business Aired

93UN0021A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
29 Sep 92 p 33

[Article by AFTENPOSTEN correspondent Elizabeth Holte: "Estonia's Private Capitalists Put Trust in a Market Economy"]

[Text] "There are no loans to get, and we are not getting to buy property or land. This is a big problem!"

To put it mildly, he is not exaggerating, the 39-year-old entrepreneur and building engineer Gunnar Dudkin in Tallinn. With his own company, Inrestaator, and a Finnish-Estonian joint venture (cooperative company), Markrup, he is among the enterprising young businessmen in the new Estonia who are trying to run a market economy in practice. To conduct business in the midst of the vicious circle of a legal vacuum and a goods shortage, and to build up their own businesses in an extremely complex society.

He has his headquarters in two renovated, fine, medieval buildings on the outskirts of the old city, on the slopes of the Toompea hills. He has invested 40,000 dollars himself there. But he does not own the houses.

As long as the ownership question remains a political issue and has not been clarified, nobody gets to buy anything and, for the time being, he has only a five-year lease with a first-refusal clause if the house is sold—without a hint of price. The ownership question is not the least among the reasons that foreign investors also are banging their heads against a wall at the present time.

German Marks

So, against what, for an outsider, seems like all odds, Dudkin is restoring the decayed medieval buildings in Tallinn's old city and is building thousands of apartments over in Russian territory, as well as villas for Estonians who have made big money dealing in metal. He buys most of the materials in Estonia, while interior appointments generally come from Sweden or Finland.

Besides this, Dudkin also built the Danish Embassy in Tallinn, and thinks this was important because, as a result, foreigners get to see that he can build good quality and deliver on time.

All contracts in Estonia are concluded in German marks—even if settlement takes place in Estonia's new kroons, which are tied 8-1 to the mark. And because the new and hesitant private banks seldom give long-term loans for more than two or three months, both Dudkin and other Estonian entrepreneurs must, as a rule, have all the money on the table before they set to work.

Soldier Housing

He is now one of the four Estonian entrepreneurs who, on a private basis, will build housing inside Russian territory—on the Russian account, with a contract in

German marks—for the old Soviet military that is being withdrawn from the Baltics. Dudkin himself will build 10,000 apartments in Pihkva, in the vicinity of the Estonian border and in Novgorod.

He understands the situation inside Russia from before. He was in charge of the building of 15,000 apartments in the Russian area. Some 380 kilometers south of Moscow they built 10,500 square meters of temporary housing in three months, out in the middle of a field.

Dudkin's business world is a dizzying whirl of Turkish and Polish workers, Finnish, Polish, Turkish, and German cooperative partners, German mark guarantors, and payments in dollars here and in rubles there. Here one needs a broad view—and ice in his veins.

Enough "For the Time Being"

When we asked what new development plans he has, he replied that he has enough to do for many years ahead, given his own present financial situation. Because the supermarket will demand large investments in the future.

But, he says, because raw materials have now become so much more expensive, the Estonians must rely on fine technology and "the brain business" and begin producing the top technology they "almost had before" but did not have the money to put into production.

The investment law, however, is still a problem. Foreigners receive up to three years freedom from taxes if they own 30 percent of a corporation and have invested more than 50,000 dollars, and after this only half taxes for two to three years. The Estonians, on the other hand, get only to invest 25 percent of what they earn. Thereafter, they must pay 33 percent of taxes. An absolutely incomprehensible policy in a time when Estonia needs all the investments the country can get, thinks Dudkin.

Un until three years ago Dudkin worked as second-in-command at the large Standard furniture factory, which has collaborated with Ikea and Finnish suppliers since 1970 and had 100 workers divided up among five factories. Dudkin started there in 1981 and it is there he got his experience in cooperation with Western business circles. In his time, 25-30 percent of the production went to Western markets.

To begin with, joint ventures were the only possible ones and, toward the end of 1990, Standard entered into a cooperative venture with Finnish interests, with Dudkin as the brains behind this and Inrestaator as the Estonian part. Standard subsequently sold its part to Dudkin. Thus, today there are about 60 persons working in Inrestaator—which was a state-owned enterprise, but now is leased via a corporation; 40-45 workers and 15 in administration, of whom five or six are project engineers.

What advice does he want to give to Norwegian investors in Estonia?

"They must be prepared to work hard. A good possibility is to find a new Estonian firm to collaborate with. There are many well-educated young Estonians to rely upon. But, by all means, get yourselves a market in the West for the goods you will produce, because in Estonia there are few or no possibilities to sell anything at the present time," he says.

LATVIA

Non-Militarized Shore Guard Proposed

93UN0042A Riga DIENA in Latvian 26 Sep 92 p 7

[Article by Eriks Kulis "Elimination of the Naval Forces of the Republic of Latvia Means the Plundering of Latvia"]

[Text] Liepaja, Sept. 25. "National Defense Commission representatives to the Supreme Council, Indulis Emsis and Guntis Drunka, are the authors of a plan to replace the Latvian naval forces with a non-militarized shore guard, because doing so will save Defense Ministry resources," according to Ilmars Lesinskis, commander of the Liepaja division of the naval forces, as told to DIENA. "I would like to know how much money from the budgetary funds will be needed to disband our organization, and how much will be needed to pay the salaries of the men in the non-militarized unit, in order for them to agree to stay on guard day and night to prevent Latvia from being plundered. The folks in our service only receive 30% of the minimum subsistence wage. Furthermore, the non-militarized shore guard service will need the same ships, the same expensive fuel oil. It will take a certain amount of time before the required staff is recruited and trained."

I. Lesinskis explained: If the naval forces of the Republic of Latvia are eliminated, Latvia will be the only nation in the world without such a military division, and it is possible that this may inspire the representatives of the Russian naval fleet to assume the role of "guardian" for this shore of the Baltic sea. Another fact worth considering is that today, Lithuania is moving out two anti-submarine vessels from Liepaja harbor, just purchased from the Russian naval fleet, which are equipped with rockets for repelling attacks from the air. Therefore, Lithuania has serious concerns about defending its border along the seacoast.

"We need naval forces, not only to defend Latvian economic and ecological interests," said I. Lesinskis, "but also because, right now, our main goal is to control what the Russian military is bringing out, since they are trying to remove non-military type valuables from Liepaja. On August 7, Russia's large naval landing vessel No. 018 attempted to ship 22 screw propellers to Poland. Tugboat No. 921 attempted to tow away no more and no less than a floating pier. Our patrol boat forced them to

return. We sent the army division a fine in the amount of 25,000 rubles. The tugboat 'Janis Berzins' attempted to ship out arms belonging to the Strelnieks. There was an attempt to sell scrap from warships to foreign firms. I could mention more and more of these examples. I would only like to add that there is no Republic of Latvia naval force division in the harbors of Riga and Ventspils. Could someone actually be benefitting from the fact that there is no division in Liepaja harbor to 'spoil the atmosphere'?"

Unfortunately, the plan to eliminate the naval force division in Liepaja has already been adopted by the Supreme Council at the first reading.

LITHUANIA

Democratic Labor Party Success Reviewed

93UN0207A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 42, Oct 92 p 5

[Report by I. Vasilyeva of SANKT-PETERBURG-SKIYE VEDOMOSTI specially for ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, published under the heading "A. Brazauskas' Party Obtained 44.7 Percent of the Vote": "Sensation in Lithuania: Sajudis Loses"]

[Text]

Situation

On election day Vilnius was dusted with snow, and homes had been made cold by the energy crisis: 13 degrees was the maximum heat which could be given off by the central heating, on account of which hot water was an item of luxury also.

Despite the cold, prices are becoming increasingly hot—you cannot pick them up with your bare hands. Inflation, with which neither pensions nor salaries can keep pace, is growing. The official subsistence minimum today amounts to 1,600 coupons (the money of the transitional period), and the average wage, 3,500 coupons. In the opinion of experts, no fewer than 30,000 a month are needed for clambering up over the poverty line.

People

Of those with whom I managed to have a word on the streets of Vilnius, no one voted for the victorious Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (DPTL). But the majority of inhabitants of Lithuania are of a similar opinion.

A couple of elderly people, indigenous Lithuanians:

"We live badly, like everyone else. We are retirees and feel that we are below the poverty line, there is no comparison with past years. We have no hope of living to see better times."

Juozas Shimulenis, retiree:

"I voted for the Christian Democratic Party since it defends the former victims of the punitive measures. I am one of them and spent three years in Magadan. My pension is enough for bread and milk, the orchard and truck garden help out with the rest. I expect nothing from these elections. In the previous parliament the deputies were involved merely in political fighting, they split into left and right.... Only one-third-one-fourth got down to business."

Tadas and Vitaliy, police officers:

"We voted for the social democrats. This party understands the needs of ordinary people. Our wages are enough only for sustenance, although they are higher than those of workers. We are at the end of the century, and we have had no hot water for a week now! But we expect changes."

Before the Election...

During the election campaign none of the other 16 parties and movements of Lithuania experienced such strong pressure on the part of the official authorities as the DPTL and its leader Algirdas Brazauskas, formerly first secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee.

"The economy is being destroyed not by the reforms but by procommunist forces, which still have real power, supporting arbitrary action, unrest, and corruption and encouraging noncompliance with the new laws," G. Vagnorius, ex-premier of Lithuania, said on the eve of the elections. But the DPTL won....

...And After

"The formation of our party was difficult," G. Kirkilas, deputy chairman of the DPTL, said. "Former premier Vagnorius financed only the parties of the right, which did not, come to that, help him create more powerful professional structures in the government."

"What impelled you to switch to the opposition?"

"We disagreed with the strategy of economic reforms, believing that a 'great leap forward' concept—in which direction is immaterial—is not justified in Lithuania. The abrupt decline in the subsistence level shows that our forecasts were correct, unfortunately. The ruling majority degenerated very quickly. Latter-day democrats set about 'turning the screws.' This affected both the press and the intelligentsia. On the eve of the elections the national radicals tried intimidation: Beware, the 'left' or 'centrists' will come to power, and you will see no help from the West. But the West has rendered practically no assistance as it is. We have been very critical of the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund, obedience to which has led to a considerable decline in the living standard in many postcommunist countries."

"You criticize the reforms. But what do you propose in their place?"

"We see two main paths. The first: We open up to the West and become a tourist country. But, first, we could hardly offer Western tourists the necessary standard of service and, second, we would run the risk of burying our national culture. The influence of alien traditions, American particularly, could prove very strong, and preserving our character would be far more difficult than in the so-called occupation years.

"The second path is attempting to reconstruct and modernize current industry and the erstwhile strong agriculture and to expand them, maintaining ties to the eastern market, primarily to Russia. The choice is up to the citizens of Lithuania, and it is in such cases that a referendum is appropriate. But it should be remembered that it is impossible to pursue any policy when you spit on the East and stand with hand outstretched toward the West."

Paulauskas on Problems Facing General Procuracy

93UN0145B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
29 Sep 92 p 3

[Interview with Lithuanian Procurator General A. Paulauskas by L. Baltkalis; place and date not given: "Our Interview: The Law Is Always the Law"]

[Text] Procurator General A. Paulauskas acquaints EKHO LITVY readers with the work of the Procuracy of the Lithuanian Republic.

The phrase in the headline defines fully enough the principle within whose boundaries the life of a rule-of-law democratic state flows. His majesty the law has command or, rather, should have command over everything in all cases. It is possible to disagree with it, to criticize its imperfection, but it should be obeyed under any circumstances as long as it is in force and is not changed. This is a mandatory condition, tested over the millennia, for the normal functioning of authority and the well-being of the society and each of its citizens. It is the Procuracy's duty to maintain law and order in our republic and to put a stop to violations of it, which in the final analysis contributes to more fruitful activity of the entire state mechanism, and therefore it contributes to the well-being of each of us. This was the topic of our correspondent's discussion with the republic's General Procurator A. Paulauskas.

[Baltkalis] Obviously, to you, a person standing guard over the law, my first question might seem very, say, awkward: Do you think at the present time in Lithuania there is enough respect for the laws?

[Paulauskas] No, I do not think so. Respect for the law must be instilled and developed. If it does not exist in the highest power structures, and everywhere you look you see that it is not, what can one say about the rank-and-file citizens, who encounter all kinds of violations every day? Moreover, the laws change so frequently that people sometimes do not have time to get used to them. Of course, the very poor recognition of the laws as

something of public and social value is also in evidence. Many people treat them as if they were nothing more than pieces of paper, and they judge them not so much in terms of their content, their essence, as in terms of their author (whether he deserves respect or not), automatically transferring their attitude toward him to the document itself.

Why are the laws so frequently broken? Previously everything was based on fear: If you do not obey them, one punishment after another will rain down upon you. Now we are proceeding toward a democratic state, where there is no jailer with noose in hand standing behind everyone's back, and a person must be motivated to obey the laws not by fear alone but also by higher feelings, which are certainly not developed all at once. It will probably take a whole new generation. But all the same, the significance of respect for the law is exceptionally great and indisputable.

[Baltkalis] Let us now turn to, as it were, specifics: What are the consequences of a disrespectful attitude toward the laws and how is the republic's Procuracy fighting against this?

[Paulauskas] The first consequence, which is on the surface, is the growth of crime, and the rapid reduction of the standard of living exerts a considerable influence on this. Thus during the first half of this year in the republic 18.7 more crimes were reported than in the corresponding period of last year. The problem of promptly solving crimes is becoming more and more crucial. This year 77.3 percent of the thefts and 82 percent of the premeditated murders are not solved. The main reasons for the low level of effectiveness of the work of law enforcement organs, in my view, lie in the inadequate cooperation between operational investigatory and police services, the poor organization of investigations, the inadequate use of the possibilities of surveillance and criminological technology, and the tardy initiation of criminal cases.

Workers of the republic Procuracy, when supervising interrogation and preparatory investigation and also checking on the legality of the actions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and services under its jurisdiction, have discovered many violations, especially with the reporting and clarification of reports and statements about crimes committed and during the course of interrogations. Thus a worker of the police commissariat of Shakyayskiy Rayon refused to initiate a criminal case because the theft of three calves from the farm of the Sudargas agricultural enterprise, in his view, was not important enough. Similar cases have been established in Trakayskiy, Ionishkiy, and other rayons. During the first six months of 1992 procuracy workers overturned 655 unsubstantiated decisions made by police officials.

Unfortunately, when criminal charges are filed there are frequent violations of the legally established deadlines (for example, eight cases in the police commissariat of Varenai Rayon), and incorrect preventive punishment is

taken against individuals committing serious crimes (for example, chief of the investigation division of the second police commissariat in Vilnius released a person guilty of committing four thefts, which made it possible for the latter to commit more crimes).

The Procuracy responded to all these violations during the first half of this year by filing 140 demands for compliance with the law, disciplinary charges were brought against 103 officials under procurators' decrees, and the negligence of the chief of the police commissariat of Vilnyuskiy Rayon resulted in the filing of criminal charges.

[Baltkalnis] It is well known that it is not enough to adopt one law or another. It is important for it to work, for it to be complied with and obeyed. What has been the Procuracy's contribution to this?

[Paulauskas] A large amount of work is being done to oversee the execution of laws at enterprises, institutions, and organizations. Primary attention is being devoted to protection of state and public property and also proper execution of laws on labor, housing, and environmental protection. Procuracy officials check to make sure that legal acts applied by organs of government and self-government do not contradict the law and they consider reports from citizens. During the first half of this year procurators, overseeing the execution of laws concerning various questions, conducted 1,702 inspections (in the first half of 1991—1,297), including regarding questions of protection of state property: in agriculture—244, in industry—82, and in trade—35. They discovered 923 illegal juridical acts, registered 524 protests (520 of these were satisfied), and 596 demands concerning violation of laws (581 of these were satisfied), and they initiated 55 criminal cases (29 involving theft of state and public property in agriculture). At the request of procurators 230 officials were given disciplinary punishment and 140—administrative.

An especially large amount of attention has been devoted to overseeing the execution of laws related to the economic reform and privatization of state property. And many violations were discovered. Thus at the Kaunas state poultry farm they illegally sold citizens four motor vehicles, and at the Manzheyk housing and operations enterprise they sold a truck with a trailer for a negligible sum. The procurators are filing suit in the courts to declare purchase-sales contracts illegal and to return property that was sold illegally. There were 14 demands submitted for elimination of violations of privatization laws and six civil suits were brought for declaring contracts for the purchase of facilities invalid.

[Baltkalnis] Letters to the editors indicate that labor legislation is being violated in a number of places, and this leads to encroachment on the rights of citizens. What measures does the Procuracy take in cases like this?

[Paulauskas] During six months of this year 246 inspections were conducted, during the course of which 170

illegal acts were revealed, 127 of which were protested. For example, the Sauliai city procurator protested an order from the director of a fuel delivery base, on the basis of which the worker I. Fokinaite was discharged because of her deteriorating health. As a result, she returned to her job. They protected the rights of 46 workers of the Lelija Lithuanian-Norwegian joint venture who had illegal deductions from their wages.

Monitoring the observance of housing legislation takes a good deal of effort. Recently many violations have been discovered in the distribution of housing and the privatization of apartments. The Procuracy conducted 204 inspections for this and 65 illegal acts were protested, on the basis of which apartments were assigned to people in evasion of the law. Also, 96 demands were submitted for elimination of legal violations.

[Baltkalnis] Recently the broadest rights have been granted to organs of government and self-government. Are the acts they publish always in keeping with the laws?

[Paulauskas] As a result of 162 inspections conducted in the first half year, 140 illegal acts were revealed, 100 of which were protested by procurators. Additionally, more than 50 demands were submitted for elimination of legal violations. Thus the chief procurator of Vilnius Rayon protested five illegal decisions of the Buivydai apilinka council. Many decisions of local self-government organs were protested, under which (going against the law) citizens and legal entities were leased nonresidential premises (through a noncompetitive procedure and without permission from the Central Commission for Privatization).

[Baltkalnis] The readers of EKHO LITVY are well aware of the large amount of work being done by the Procuracy for rehabilitation of the victims of the Stalinist repressions and execution of the Law on Responsibility for Genocide of the Residents of Lithuania. Tell us, please, what has been done and what is still to come.

[Paulauskas] During the first half year victims of illegal repressions and their loved ones have been issued 15 certificates of restoration of rights (38 were refused these because they participated in the genocide or destruction of unarmed civilian population), and on the whole since the time of the adoption of the law (2 May 1990) the general procuracy has issued certificates of rehabilitation to 15,037 individuals and refused them to 114. At the present time we have about 2,000 applications from citizens on which it is practically impossible to make a decision because there is no information about court proceedings or findings concerning the individuals mentioned in them. We think the procedure for restoring the rights of people of this category should be regulated by law.

The Procuracy has also begun to oversee the execution of the law on genocide of the population of Lithuania: Three criminal cases have been brought and 12 applications are being checked for individual facts. It should be

noted that the investigation of these applications is complicated by the fact that these events occurred so long ago and there are no witnesses or other evidence. The general procuracy has signed agreements for cooperation in the prosecution of war criminals with legal institutions of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Scotland. Negotiations are in progress for signing similar agreements with the United States and Great Britain.

[Baltkalis] In conclusion I would like to ask whether you have been exasperated by the fact that you are always having to play the role of "dirt diggers" and deal with citizens who are, frankly, far from the best kind.

[Paulauskas] There is nothing we can do about that—it is our profession. But we derive satisfaction—and, believe me, it is of the highest kind—from knowing that we are participating in the creation of a rule-of-law democratic state. The path to it is difficult, but it must be traveled. And we will travel it!

[Baltkalis] Thank you for the conversation.

Lithuanian Election Procedures Detailed

93UN0198B Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER
in English 15-21 Oct 92 p 9

[Article by John Dale]

[Text] The final draft of the Lithuanian Constitution (which involved the nine-month collaboration of both left wing and right wing parliamentary factions) will be presented for discussion this week at a special session of the Lithuanian Supreme Council (SC—the present parliament) and could be adopted in a referendum on October 25—the day of the elections to the Seimas (the soon to be parliament). According to SC chairman Vytautas Landsbergis, final details of the new Constitution could be worked out by the Seimas.

The draft Constitution provides that the president of Lithuania will be elected in general elections for a period of 5 years. The newly-elected Seimas would also be able to announce extraordinary elections of the president, if 60 per cent of the deputies agree to this.

The Seimas also appoints the prime minister, whose candidacy is presented by the president. Government ministers are selected by the prime minister and their appointments are confirmed by the president. After presenting its program, the cabinet of ministers must be accepted by the Seimas.

This process is based on the law *On the Seimas Elections*, adopted on July 9, 1992. According to this law, Lithuanian citizens 18 years of age and older have the right to vote. A parliamentary deputy, however, must be a Lithuanian citizen of at least 21 years of age, and have permanently resided in Lithuania for the last three years.

Military servicemen, police and security force members, convicts and mentally-incapacitated persons cannot become members of parliament. Lithuania differs from

Latvia with the election rights granted to its prisoners. In Lithuania they will be allowed to vote in their places of confinement.

The Lithuanian parliament will be elected for four years. The elections will be organized in 71 single-mandate voting regions (in each of these regions one deputy, i.e., mandate will be nominated) and one polymandate voting region, which will elect a total of 70 deputies. In all, a total of 141 Seimas members will be elected.

Political parties and socio-political movements that have collected the signatures of at least 1,000 voters have the right to nominate their candidates to all voting regions. Individuals can nominate themselves as candidates in single mandate voting regions, if they are supported by at least 1,000 voters.

Each voter will receive two ballots—one in his/her single mandate region, and the other for the polymandate voting region. The voter must place a checkmark by the name of his/her candidate on the first ballot, and mark the name of the political party or movement which he/she prefers on the second ballot.

The results of elections in the single mandate voting regions are valid if more than 40 percent of the voters in that region take part. The candidate who gains more than half of the votes is elected. If there are more than two regional candidates and no one receives the majority vote, a second election between the top two candidates must be organized within two weeks. The candidate who then receives the most votes is elected.

The results of elections in the polymandate voting region are valid if more than 25 percent of all voters have participated in the voting process. Candidates from party lists that gain at least 4 percent of the total number of votes will receive seats in parliament. Candidates from one list gain their mandates in the order in which their names are listed.

According to the law, each candidate to the Seimas must inform the public on election posters if he or she has collaborated with the KGB or other foreign security services. If undeclared collaboration is proven after the election, he/she loses his/her mandate.

In Lithuania it is forbidden to publish the results of political polls during the election campaign, which begins at latest one month before the elections. Seventeen political parties and movements have nominated a total of 1,210 candidates to the Seimas.

'Positive Steps' for Ethnic Minorities

93UN0198A Vilnius LITHUANIAN WEEKLY
in English 9-15 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Janetta Aristovich: "National Minorities: A Perspective"]

[Text] "We open our land and entire kingdom for every man of good-will..." (from *Lithuanian Grand Duke Gediminas' letter to inhabitants of various cities, January 25, 1323*)

Even though some skeptics in Lithuania and abroad claim that the rights of ethnic minorities are being violated in this country, recent events in Lithuania would suggest that positive steps favorable to minorities are now underway. Before discussing these events it is imperative that we will briefly review the history of ethnic minorities in Lithuania.

From the very beginning Lithuania was formed as a multinational state. Starting from the times of Gediminas (14th century) peaceful and friendly relationship existed among different national and religious communities. This country also developed specific traditions, its own tolerant way of accepting anyone willing to come here, settle down and live. Indeed, at the end of the 17th century, Polish and Jewish communities of Lithuania were considered to be the largest in Europe. In the 18th century, Vilnius, which had become the most important Jewish cultural and spiritual center in Europe, was known as "Northern Jerusalem." As far as the Russian population is concerned, in the second half of the 17th century a great number of them settled down in north-eastern Lithuania.

Unfortunately, in various historical periods Lithuania suffered because of germanization, polonization and russification. However, it still managed to preserve its originality, national traditions and customs. In the late 1980s, when the independence movement started here, both Lithuanians and ethnic minorities began to revive their cultural identities.

On November 23, 1989, the Lithuanian Law on Ethnic Minorities was adopted. A section of this Law reads that "the Lithuanian Republic grants equal political, economic and social rights, as well as liberties, to all Lithuanian citizens of any nationality, accepts national identity, cultural preservation and stimulates national consciousness and its self-expression. The year 1990 marked the establishment of the Department of Nationalities.

A noteworthy and symbolic point is that the day after the Lithuanian Republic was declared to be reestablished (March 11, 1990), the Parliament addressed ethnic minorities of Lithuania, stating that "Lithuania is our common Motherland. All Lithuanian state, political, and economic decisions will be carried out taking into consideration the interests of all national communities living in Lithuania and without violating their national dignity and rights."

At the present moment there are many national cultural, public and religious organizations in Lithuania.

The number of Polish organizations, which are considered to be widespread and numerous, totals nearly 20. Eventually all of them are functioning around the Polish

Union which was established in 1988. The Polish community publishes 8 newspapers and has access to the Lithuanian Radio. Every evening one can hear a half-hour Polish program beginning and ending with a mазurka. Poles can also watch the Warsaw TV channel, some Polish programs on the Lithuanian TV-1 or Eastern TV channels. The recent news in the "Polish world" is that on July 1 of this summer the first private Polish radio station—"Znad Wilii"—was opened in Lithuania.

There are approximately 15 Jewish organizations. The Jewish Council, the highest official and consultative body, is supposed to represent Jewish interests in Lithuania. The only Jewish newspaper THE LITHUANIAN JERUSALEM is printed in Hebrew, Lithuanian, English and Russian.

In terms of Russian organizations, there are about 15 of them. The Russian community prints many newspapers and magazines; their range of TV and radio programs is very wide. The biggest problem, as Mr. Vaitiekus, adviser to the Department of Nationalities views it, is that Russians are divided among themselves. They express no will to unite and lack organizational initiative. At times some of them explain this behavior by saying it was enough to have been forcefully united in the Soviet system for 50 years.

The number of educational institutions is also growing. Apart from numerous Russian and Polish schools, there are two brand new schools for children: the first Byelorussian and the first German school in many decades.

But what do foreigners coming to visit Lithuania think about the present position of ethnic minorities in this country?

This autumn, on October 9, an official delegation representing the Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN), visited Lithuania. The organization, formed in 1949, has a consultative status to the Council of Europe. Presently it has 60 members in 19 European countries. The aim of FUEN lies in supporting the concerns of European ethnic groups and minorities and representing their interests internationally. Following these principles, the FUEN Meeting of Delegates (summoned on May 28, 1992) unanimously adopted the Convention on the Basic Rights of European Ethnic Groups and Minorities.

It is of interest to note that members of the delegation who visited Vilnius were representatives of ethnic minorities themselves. Dr. Karl Mitterdorfer, President of FUEN, is a German living in Italy. Dr. Reginald Vospernik, Vice-president, is a Slovenian who resides in Austria and, finally, Armin Nickelsen, Secretary-General, a German lives in Denmark.

The guests met with representatives of Russian, Polish, Jewish and other communities in Lithuania, as well as

with representatives of local authorities, members of the Parliament and the Lithuanian Prime Minister.

Their unanimous impression of the particular situation concerning ethnic groups and minorities was that goodwill is predominant here. They were convinced that the old traditions of having relatively good relationship between different nationalities is still being followed. As it was further discussed, they naturally heard criticism, but no ethnic group seemed to be oppressed or persecuted, in their judgment.

The FUEN representatives also found most Lithuanian laws favorable to ethnic minorities, progressive and corresponding to European standards. Dr. Mitterdorfer noticed even very high achievements in some cases, including the opportunity for Russians and Poles to take their entrance exams to higher institutions of education in their native language.

All three guests agreed on the point that the difficult economic situation in Lithuania serves as a great obstacle in solving various issues, especially those concerning ethnic minorities. Their forecast, however, was optimistic: only positive changes are expected to take place.

Energy Crisis in Lithuania

93UN0201A Vilnius LITHUANIAN WEEKLY
in English 9-15 Oct 92 p 2

[Text]

Lithuanian and Latvian Greens Speak Out for Governmental Cooperation

The Lithuanian and Latvian Green movements staged a conference "Environmental Protection of the Baltic Sea" in Vilnius on October 10-11. One of the main aims of the conference was to prove that the disputed oil terminal should not be constructed on the Lithuanian seaside; instead, the Latvian port of Ventspils, if reconstructed, could be used for serving oil import and export needs of both countries. It was suggested to resolve all transportation problems by building a pipeline which would link the Mazeikiai oil refinery with Ventspils.

Participants of the conference accused the Lithuanian and Latvian authorities of not negotiating the issue on a governmental level.

First Drops of Oil

The Baltic News Service reports that on Tuesday, October 13, the Mazeikiai oil refinery received the first shipment of crude oil from Novopolotsk. The oil has been bought for hard currency by the German-French firm "Marimpex" and to be processed in Mazeikiai. Eight per cent of the total amount of 300 thousand tonnes, expected to flow in by the end of October, will be left in Lithuania as payment for processing. Another 50 thousand tonnes will be supplied by the Latvian private joint-stock company "Inkomi."

However, according to the management of the refinery, the oil shipments are too small to eliminate the existing shortage of power resources in Lithuania.

Moscow has promised to sell 1.5 million tonnes of crude oil to Lithuania for rubles at world-prices and 2.2 million tonnes for hard currency already this year. This means that the cost of one tonne of crude oil is going to quadruple.

Nearing a Standstill

The TV tube-manufacturing plant "Ekranas" in Panevezys, mid-Lithuania, is on the verge of a stand-still after it was cut off from 50 percent of its natural gas supplies for not making the required payments. The factory's melting baths are kept merely smouldering so that the molten glass does not harden. In spite of the fact that 200 workers have already been laid off, further job-reductions are expected.

Meanwhile, Russian factories, which receive the plant's production, have not yet paid "Ekranas" a debt of 800 million rubles.

Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant: Essential Factor in Power Engineering

With repair works under way in its first block, the Ignalina nuclear power plant was operating in a half-capacity (1,300 Mw) regime. The first block is expected to start working on December 1. Meanwhile, on October 15, the second reactor was also stopped because of a radioactive leakage in one of the non-production premises. Experts maintain that the leakage is of a local character and poses no threat to the environment.

The importance of the Ignalina plant may be illustrated by the following figures: out of 1,600 megawatts of electric power consumed in Lithuania on October 7, 1,300 were produced by the Ignalina nuclear power plant, 160 by the Kaisiadorys pumped water storage plant, 120 by the thermal electric power station in Elektrenai, and 20 by the Kaunas hydro-electric power station.

The World Bank Will Help Overcome Energy Crisis

On October 12, officials from the Lithuanian Ministry of Power Engineering met with the delegation of the World Bank Energy Section to discuss possible assistance in overcoming the energy crisis. During their two-week stay in Lithuania, members of the delegation are going to visit all major power generating facilities. The guests are especially interested in the Ignalina nuclear power plant and the construction of the Klaipeda oil terminal.

Citizens Cope With Fuel Crunch

Gasoline Rationed

93UN0200A Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER
in English 15-21 Oct 92 pp 1, 9

[Article by Tony Hall: "Lithuania Rations Gasoline"]

[Text] Meetings between Lithuanian and Russian prime ministers in Moscow this week allowed Russian Premier Yegor Gaidar's announcement that oil and gas deliveries to Lithuania would resume, but Anatoly, a Ukrainian emigre cab driver in Vilnius, does not expect to feel the results soon. Gasoline rationing began October 10 throughout Lithuania, so ambulances, delivery trucks and other public service vehicles will continue to receive gasoline from the state. Private car owners and businessmen like Anatoly must look elsewhere.

"I just went to Belarus the other day and paid 80 talonas for a liter of gasoline," he said. "With these prices I can't keep working by myself, so soon I'll start driving for a private enterprise."

Gasoline rationing raised the price of fuel from 35 talonas (or \$0.15) a liter to 70 talonas at the privately owned stations in Vilnius. But higher costs and reduced supplies have not choked off demand yet. Near dinner time on Monday, 84 cars were waiting to charge up Kalvariju Street to the Degalines gasoline station on the corner. The length of time for this effort was about seven hours.

"If I kept driving as if the price was 35 talonas, I'd spend 70 percent of my salary on gasoline each month," said a man who had finished filling up his red Lada.

The burden of locating gasoline to fill tanks falls on Jurgis Ilkevicius, general director of Lietovos Kuras, or Lithuanian Fuel. He said the bulk of the burden arises from the border.

"Russia has a blockade on the transport of fuel by railways into the country, so now it's not possible to get gasoline," Ilkevicius said. A blockade could be explained by the 10 billion ruble debt that Lithuania owes Russia for fuel.

The Freedom Support Act, in its final state, contains three conditions bringing aid and Russian troop withdrawal together: the president must give a report to Congress on the progress of troop removal from the Baltics before aid is issued; Russia will only receive 50 percent of the aid if the president is unable to report on considerable progress or a working schedule concerning withdrawal; if Russia has not taken all its army from the Baltics or concluded negotiations to do so within a year, no further aid will be given.

Valujevs is thankful to the US for these conditions. Even though it allows a provision for the Russian army's presence in the Baltics over a year from now, he said the

document is balanced by the possibility that troops could be withdrawn by then or earlier.

Lithuania already sealed the exit of troops from its state in principle, but the practice of it is still distant, said Valdemaras Katkus, first deputy foreign minister. From this view he calls the act practical progress without punch. He stressed that it goes further than the Helsinki agreements, which said withdrawal at talks should close within two years.

"Whatever the conclusion of negotiations we have from Helsinki, a superpower like the US should point towards withdrawal first," Katkus said.

Katkus does support the financial aid package wholeheartedly. He believes Russian economic security ultimately makes the Baltics a safer place.

"If there would be a very unstable situation in Russia, they would lose control of troops in the Baltic states," he said.

One part of Russian troop control that will not be finished soon regards army movement to Kaliningrad from Russia. The other direction is not a problem, Katkus said, since it signifies withdrawal.

"But with this travel of troops from Russia to Kaliningrad, we must also consider the danger to our security," he said.

Another danger is inconsistency in the opinions of Russian leadership, Valujevs said. He did not think that statements by Russian President Boris Yeltsin last week were motivated by any financial security offered by the Freedom Support Act. Yeltsin had demanded human rights guarantees in exchange for withdrawal from Estonia and Latvia. However, Yeltsin did highlight a certain recklessness in Russian policy, he said.

Valujevs pointed to a contrasting statement by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozereyev earlier this month. He had told Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans that Latvian progress on the human rights issue would not be tied to troop removal.

"It is very difficult to qualify whose statements represent the official Russian position," he said.

Heating Season Delayed

93UN0200B Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER
in English 15-21 Oct 92 p 7

[Unattributed article: "Lithuania Shivers From Lack of Heating Fuel"]

[Text] Lithuania has postponed the heating period indefinitely until new sources of fuel can be found. The heating season usually began after September 20, when the average air temperature became lower than eight degrees Centigrade three days in a row. Lithuania has already had three such days, but is refraining from firing up its central heating plants.

Robertas Tamosiunas, the Lithuanian Deputy Minister of Energy, said the heating season will be delayed since present fuel reserves would last only three months. Lithuania did not accumulate adequate reserves of fuel during the summer, due to the lack of large capacity underground reservoirs. The possibility for obtaining fuel for the Mazeikiai oil refinery remains uncertain, since Russia has not been sending the facility any oil for several months.

Government Regulates Pornography

93UN0198C Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER
in English 15-21 Oct 92 p 9

[Text] In an effort to control the quickly growing pornography business in the republic, Lithuania has introduced regulations governing erotic films, publications and shows presented for profit.

Specific areas covered by the rules include demonstration, duplication and distribution of movies, video films and video programs, public erotic shows and distribution of publications with pornography and violence.

Public demonstration of movies and videos is now legal only by permission of the Ministry of Culture and Education, which has also specified the minimum viewing age.

Four ratings of movies, video films and programs have been defined. A movie labeled A can be watched by a person of any age. Those labeled B are recommended to be viewed by persons under 16 years of age only in the presence of their parents or guardians, while C movies are solely for audiences 16 or older. Films with a D rating are limited to the 18 or older age group.

As for television, no erotic programs may be broadcast earlier than 11 p.m.

Permission for public erotic shows can be granted by local authorities.

Erotica will be distributed only after registration at the Press Control Department and sold only at approved locations.

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